GLASS, J.
The plaintiff, Chester Kolakowski, appealed to the Superior Court from the suspension of his motor vehicle operator’s license by the defendant commissioner of motor vehicles (commissioner) pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b,1 the implied consent [638]*638statute. The trial court sustained the plaintiffs appeal. On appeal to this court, the commissioner claims that the trial court improperly sustained the plaintiffs appeal because there is substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s decision to suspend the plaintiffs [639]*639operator’s license. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The record discloses the following facts relevant to this appeal. At about 12:45 a.m. on February 18, 1994, Officers Jeffrey Bender and Gary Krassner of the Anso-nia police department were stopped in the middle of Crescent Street with their vehicles facing in opposite directions. While they were stopped, a pickup truck drove up and stopped behind Krassner’s vehicle. Kras-sner drove away and the truck followed. As the truck passed his vehicle, Bender recognized the driver as the plaintiff. Bender also noticed that the plaintiff was [640]*640alone. Bender turned his vehicle around to follow the plaintiff because, as Bender testified, “I know [the plaintiff] had recently gone through another [driving while under the influence (DWI)] proceeding and I wanted to see if his license was under suspension or not. . . .” When the plaintiff reached the intersection of Crescent Street and Howard Avenue, he made a right turn onto Howard Avenue without signaling in violation of General Statutes § 14-242.2 Bender continued to follow the plaintiff and activated the overhead lights of his police vehicle. The plaintiff continued driving until he reached his home on Howard Avenue, pulled into his driveway and turned off the lights and engine. Bender and Kras-sner drove their vehicles into the driveway behind the plaintiffs truck, walked up to the driver’s side door and knocked on the window. The plaintiff opened the door and Bender asked for the plaintiffs operator’s license, registration and insurance identification card. The plaintiff replied, in a slurred, mumbled voice, “I don’t have a license.”3 Thereafter, the plaintiff exited his vehicle and, in response to Bender’s inquiry, admitted to Bender that he had been drinking. In addition, the plaintiff denied that he had been driving the vehicle, even though he was the sole occupant and Bender had observed him driving. As he spoke with the plaintiff, Bender detected that the plaintiff had a strong odor of alcohol, that he spoke with slurred speech, that he had a “droopy expression,” and that he walked with a severe stagger, running his hand along his truck to balance himself. The plaintiff refused to take any field sobriety tests and was placed under arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and making a turn at an intersection without giving an appropriate [641]*641signal in violation of §§ 14-227b and 14-242, respectively.
At the police station, the plaintiff refused to submit to a test of his blood alcohol level. On the basis of Bender’s report and the plaintiffs refusal to submit to a test, the commissioner sent a notice of the proposed suspension of the plaintiffs operator’s license pursuant to § 14-227b (c) and (d). The plaintiff requested and was subsequently given an administrative hearing on the proposed two year license suspension pursuant to § 14-227b (f).
On March 30, 1994, a hearing was held before Jeffrey Donahue, a department of motor vehicles hearing officer. Bender’s testimony, the “Officer’s DWI Arrest and Alcohol Test Refusal or Failure Report” and an attached narrative report were admitted into evidence without objection. Donahue issued his decision on March 31, 1994, finding that (1) the police officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for violating § 14-227b, (2) the plaintiff was placed under arrest, (3) the plaintiff refused to submit to a test to determine his blood alcohol level, and (4) the plaintiff was operating the motor vehicle. See General Statutes § 14-227b (f). On the basis of these findings, the commissioner suspended the plaintiffs driver’s license pursuant to § 14-227b (h) (3), which provides that an operator’s license is to be suspended for two years where such a driver has previously had his license suspended under § 14-227b on at least two other occasions.
The plaintiff appealed the suspension to the Superior Court, claiming that (1) Bender did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying a stop of the plaintiffs vehicle, and (2) Bender did not have probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. The trial court determined that, while the police officer’s investigatory stop was justified because of the plaintiffs violation of § 14-242, [642]*642the record did not provide substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding that the police had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. The court concluded, therefore, that the commissioner had acted unreasonably, arbitrarily and in abuse of his discretion. This appeal followed.
“In cases involving administrative appeals it is not the function of this court, nor was it the function of the trial court, to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Rourke v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 33 Conn. App. 501, 506, 636 A.2d 409, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 909, 642 A.2d 1205 (1994). A reviewing court “shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions ... (5) clearly erroneous in view of the rehable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. ...” General Statutes § 4-183 (j). “If the [commissioner’s] determination to suspend the plaintiffs license pursuant to § 14-227b is supported by substantial evidence in the record, that determination must be sustained.” O’Rourke v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 507. It is, however, “the function of the courts to expound and apply governing principles of law. ...” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Levinson v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 211 Conn. 508, 521, 560 A.2d 403 (1989).
The commissioner asserts that the trial court improperly concluded that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing officer’s decision that the police had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff [643]*643for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See General Statutes § 14-227b (f) (1).
“In Connecticut, probable cause is required before an arrest may be made for operating under the influence of alcohol.” State v. Stevens, 26 Conn. App. 805, 810, 603 A.2d 1203, aff'd, 224 Conn.
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GLASS, J.
The plaintiff, Chester Kolakowski, appealed to the Superior Court from the suspension of his motor vehicle operator’s license by the defendant commissioner of motor vehicles (commissioner) pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b,1 the implied consent [638]*638statute. The trial court sustained the plaintiffs appeal. On appeal to this court, the commissioner claims that the trial court improperly sustained the plaintiffs appeal because there is substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s decision to suspend the plaintiffs [639]*639operator’s license. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The record discloses the following facts relevant to this appeal. At about 12:45 a.m. on February 18, 1994, Officers Jeffrey Bender and Gary Krassner of the Anso-nia police department were stopped in the middle of Crescent Street with their vehicles facing in opposite directions. While they were stopped, a pickup truck drove up and stopped behind Krassner’s vehicle. Kras-sner drove away and the truck followed. As the truck passed his vehicle, Bender recognized the driver as the plaintiff. Bender also noticed that the plaintiff was [640]*640alone. Bender turned his vehicle around to follow the plaintiff because, as Bender testified, “I know [the plaintiff] had recently gone through another [driving while under the influence (DWI)] proceeding and I wanted to see if his license was under suspension or not. . . .” When the plaintiff reached the intersection of Crescent Street and Howard Avenue, he made a right turn onto Howard Avenue without signaling in violation of General Statutes § 14-242.2 Bender continued to follow the plaintiff and activated the overhead lights of his police vehicle. The plaintiff continued driving until he reached his home on Howard Avenue, pulled into his driveway and turned off the lights and engine. Bender and Kras-sner drove their vehicles into the driveway behind the plaintiffs truck, walked up to the driver’s side door and knocked on the window. The plaintiff opened the door and Bender asked for the plaintiffs operator’s license, registration and insurance identification card. The plaintiff replied, in a slurred, mumbled voice, “I don’t have a license.”3 Thereafter, the plaintiff exited his vehicle and, in response to Bender’s inquiry, admitted to Bender that he had been drinking. In addition, the plaintiff denied that he had been driving the vehicle, even though he was the sole occupant and Bender had observed him driving. As he spoke with the plaintiff, Bender detected that the plaintiff had a strong odor of alcohol, that he spoke with slurred speech, that he had a “droopy expression,” and that he walked with a severe stagger, running his hand along his truck to balance himself. The plaintiff refused to take any field sobriety tests and was placed under arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs and making a turn at an intersection without giving an appropriate [641]*641signal in violation of §§ 14-227b and 14-242, respectively.
At the police station, the plaintiff refused to submit to a test of his blood alcohol level. On the basis of Bender’s report and the plaintiffs refusal to submit to a test, the commissioner sent a notice of the proposed suspension of the plaintiffs operator’s license pursuant to § 14-227b (c) and (d). The plaintiff requested and was subsequently given an administrative hearing on the proposed two year license suspension pursuant to § 14-227b (f).
On March 30, 1994, a hearing was held before Jeffrey Donahue, a department of motor vehicles hearing officer. Bender’s testimony, the “Officer’s DWI Arrest and Alcohol Test Refusal or Failure Report” and an attached narrative report were admitted into evidence without objection. Donahue issued his decision on March 31, 1994, finding that (1) the police officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for violating § 14-227b, (2) the plaintiff was placed under arrest, (3) the plaintiff refused to submit to a test to determine his blood alcohol level, and (4) the plaintiff was operating the motor vehicle. See General Statutes § 14-227b (f). On the basis of these findings, the commissioner suspended the plaintiffs driver’s license pursuant to § 14-227b (h) (3), which provides that an operator’s license is to be suspended for two years where such a driver has previously had his license suspended under § 14-227b on at least two other occasions.
The plaintiff appealed the suspension to the Superior Court, claiming that (1) Bender did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying a stop of the plaintiffs vehicle, and (2) Bender did not have probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. The trial court determined that, while the police officer’s investigatory stop was justified because of the plaintiffs violation of § 14-242, [642]*642the record did not provide substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s finding that the police had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. The court concluded, therefore, that the commissioner had acted unreasonably, arbitrarily and in abuse of his discretion. This appeal followed.
“In cases involving administrative appeals it is not the function of this court, nor was it the function of the trial court, to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Rourke v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 33 Conn. App. 501, 506, 636 A.2d 409, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 909, 642 A.2d 1205 (1994). A reviewing court “shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions ... (5) clearly erroneous in view of the rehable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. ...” General Statutes § 4-183 (j). “If the [commissioner’s] determination to suspend the plaintiffs license pursuant to § 14-227b is supported by substantial evidence in the record, that determination must be sustained.” O’Rourke v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 507. It is, however, “the function of the courts to expound and apply governing principles of law. ...” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Levinson v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 211 Conn. 508, 521, 560 A.2d 403 (1989).
The commissioner asserts that the trial court improperly concluded that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing officer’s decision that the police had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff [643]*643for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See General Statutes § 14-227b (f) (1).
“In Connecticut, probable cause is required before an arrest may be made for operating under the influence of alcohol.” State v. Stevens, 26 Conn. App. 805, 810, 603 A.2d 1203, aff'd, 224 Conn. 730, 620 A.2d 789 (1992). Section 14-227b (c) requires a police officer to include in the incident report “the grounds for the officer’s belief that there was probable cause to arrest . . . for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . .” Probable cause exists if there are “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he has trustworthy information sufficient to justify the belief of a reasonable person that an offense has been or is being committed. State v. Kaplan, [20 Conn. App. 183, 187, 565 A.2d 11 (1989)], quoting State v. Copeland, [205 Conn. 201, 213, 530 A.2d 603 (1987)] . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevens, supra, 811.
On the basis of the objective facts and circumstances as they were available to Bender that night, the trial court improperly found that the police did not have probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed to stop after Bender had activated the overhead lights oil the police vehicle. Bender reported that the plaintiffs speech was slurred, and that he smelled of alcohol, staggered severely when he walked, and had a droopy expression. In addition, the plaintiff admitted that he had been drinking and denied driving the vehicle despite being its only occupant. These facts, in light of the plaintiffs refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, are more than sufficient to establish probable cause.
We conclude that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the commissioner’s finding that the police officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for operation of a motor vehicle while under the influ[644]*644ence of intoxicating liquor. Thus, the trial court improperly held that the commissioner acted unreasonably, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion.
The plaintiff argues, however, that even if we conclude, as we have, that the commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, we can, nevertheless, affirm the trial court’s decision on an alternate ground. See Practice Book § 4013 (a) (l).4 Although the trial court concluded that the officer’s investigative stop was justified, the plaintiff asserts that the police did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify stopping the plaintiff.
A brief investigatory detention by a police officer is proper, “ ‘even in the absence of probable cause, if the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that aperson has committed or is about to commit a crime.’ ” State v. Harrison, 30 Conn. App. 108, 111, 618 A.2d 1381 (1993), aff'd, 228 Conn. 758, 638 A.2d 601 (1994), quoting State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). An investigative stop can be appropriate even where the police have not observed a violation because “a reasonable and articulable suspicion can arise from conduct that alone is not criminal.” State v. Harrison, supra, 113.
Here, Bender observed the plaintiff make a right turn at an intersection without signaling in violation of § 14-242. This fact is sufficient, on its own, to justify an [645]*645investigative stop. Ivimey v. Watertown, 30 Conn. App. 742, 750, 622 A.2d 603, cert. denied, 226 Conn. 902, 625 A.2d 1375 (1993). We conclude that the substantial rights of the plaintiff have not been prejudiced because the police officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that justified making an investigative stop.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment for the commissioner.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.