United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 25-1275
JOHN T. KOLACKOVSKY; ZENAS B. SEPPALA; ANNE HYDE; ROBERT SONIA; JONATHAN RING; TIM ROSE; RAY THURSBY; DEE OLIBERIO; CALANDRA SALO; LARY SALO; CASSI HOHENWARTER,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
TOWN OF ROCKPORT,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Myong J. Joun, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Montecalvo, Rikelman, and Dunlap, Circuit Judges.
Michael C. Walsh and Walsh & Walsh LLP on brief for appellants.
Deborah I. Ecker, Amy E. Kwesell and KP Law, P.C. on brief for appellee.
January 22, 2026 DUNLAP, Circuit Judge. Eleven residents of the Town of
Rockport, Massachusetts (the "Town"), brought various state
statutory and federal constitutional challenges to the creation of
a new zoning district in the Town. The district court dismissed
the residents' claims for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction -- specifically, lack of standing. Because we agree
that the residents have not alleged the necessary prerequisites to
establish standing, we affirm the district court's order.
I.
As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiffs-Appellants are
residents, registered voters, and taxpayers in the Town of
Rockport. Of these, a subset reside on property abutting the
Rockport commuter train station or reside on property within the
overlay district that is the subject of this dispute.
Defendant-Appellee Town of Rockport is an incorporated
municipality in Massachusetts.
Massachusetts law requires the Town to have a zoning
ordinance or by-law that provides for an of-right, high-density,
multi-family housing district located within a half mile of a mass
transit station. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, §§ 1A, 3A (2023).
Under Massachusetts law, when a "zoning ordinance or by-law or
amendment thereto" is being adopted at a town meeting, it usually
must be adopted by a two-thirds vote; certain amendments to a
- 2 - zoning by-law to allow multi-family housing, however, may be
adopted by a simple majority vote of a town meeting. Id. § 5.
The Town's adoption of two overlay districts pursuant to
these provisions lies at the heart of the present dispute. In May
2022, in order to comply with state law, the Town voted by a simple
majority of a town meeting to add a "Transit Oriented Village
Overlay District" (TOVOD) to its zoning by-law. At least one of
the Plaintiffs attended the May 2022 town meeting and voted against
the TOVOD. More than a third, but less than half, of the votes
cast on the motion opposed the TOVOD. Subsequently, perhaps
because the TOVOD did not sufficiently comply with the requirements
of state law, the Town's planning board proposed a second overlay
district that would encompass the TOVOD and two other districts.
This overlay district would be called the Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority (MBTA) Communities Multi-Family Overlay
District (MCMOD). It appears -- although it is not alleged in the
Complaint -- that on April 29, 2024, the Town voted by a simple
majority of a town meeting to add the MCMOD to its zoning by-law.
The day before the vote on the MCMOD, on April 28, 2024,
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in federal district court against
the Town. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the proposed MCMOD
would be subject to a two-thirds vote requirement at a town meeting
and that the MCMOD failed to meet state statutory and federal
constitutional requirements. They asserted that the proposed
- 3 - MCMOD "affect[ed] sharply" the property values of the Plaintiffs
who reside within the proposed MCMOD and "undermine[d]
dramatically the expectation of the property owners in their
parcel" by loosening zoning restrictions that required
single-family housing and more greenspace. The Town filed a
motion to dismiss, to which Plaintiffs responded. In Plaintiffs'
response, they asserted for the first time that several of the
Plaintiffs attended the April 2024 town meeting and voted against
the MCMOD. Plaintiffs also asserted that more than a third, but
less than half, of the votes cast on the motion opposed the MCMOD.
The district court granted the Town's motion to dismiss
because Plaintiffs lacked standing, and thus, the court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs
failed to provide specific information as to the harm that has
befallen each Plaintiff, and that Plaintiffs could not claim
legislative standing because they had not been singled out for
specially unfavorable treatment and because their votes had not
been completely nullified. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
II.
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court erred
in holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear their
claims. Because we agree with the district court that Plaintiffs
failed to adequately allege standing, our analysis starts and ends
- 4 - there. We need not, and do not, reach the merits of Plaintiffs'
claims.
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court order granting "a motion to
dismiss for both lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1) and failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)" de novo. Lyman v. Baker,
954 F.3d 351, 359 (1st Cir. 2020). Although the inquiries are
"conceptually distinct," the "same basic principles apply" to our
review of a dismissal under either subpart. Id. (quoting
Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 730 (1st Cir. 2016)).
First, we "isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that
simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash
cause-of-action elements." Id. at 360 (quoting Schatz v.
Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.
2012)). Next, we "take the complaint's well-pled (i.e.,
non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all
reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see if they
plausibly narrate a claim for relief." Id. (quoting Schatz, 669
F.3d at 55). Further, at the pleading stage, the plaintiffs carry
the burden of establishing sufficient facts to plausibly
demonstrate standing. See Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 731. "Neither
conclusory assertions nor unfounded speculation can supply the
necessary heft." Id. Finally, we are not bound to rely on the
- 5 - district court's reasoning but may affirm dismissal "on any basis
that is apparent from the record." Id. at 730.
B. Article III Standing
"Standing doctrine assures respect for the
Constitution's limitation of '[t]he judicial Power' to 'Cases' and
'Controversies.'" Lyman, 954 F.3d at 360 (alteration in original)
(quoting Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 731); see U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1. Accordingly, we must look to "whether the party
invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when
the suit was filed." Lyman, 954 F.3d at 360 (quoting Massachusetts
v. HHS, 923 F.3d 209, 221 (1st. Cir. 2019)). To establish the
stake necessary for constitutional standing, Plaintiffs must
demonstrate "(i) that [they] ha[ve] suffered or likely will suffer
an injury in fact, (ii) that the injury likely was caused or will
be caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury likely would
be redressed by the requested judicial relief." FDA v. All. for
Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024). Even plaintiffs
seeking only declaratory judgment must meet this standard. 28
U.S.C. § 2201; See Penobscot Nation v. Frey, 3 F.4th 484, 508 (1st
Cir. 2021).
"An injury-in-fact is the invasion of a legally
protected interest that is both 'concrete and particularized' and
'actual or imminent,' as opposed to 'conjectural or
hypothetical.'" Lyman, 954 F.3d at 360 (quoting Lujan v. Defs.
- 6 - of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). An injury is concrete
rather than abstract if it "actually exist[s]." Id. (quoting
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016)). Such injury
can include a "physical injury, a monetary injury, an injury to
one's property, or an injury to one's constitutional rights."
All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381. Threat of future
injury may suffice "if the threatened injury is 'certainly
impending,' or there is a 'substantial risk' that the harm will
occur." Roe v. Healey, 78 F.4th 11, 20 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014)). But
there is no standing where an injury is "too speculative for
Article III purposes." Reddy v. Foster, 845 F.3d 493, 500 (1st
Cir. 2017) (quoting Blum v. Holder, 744 F.3d 790, 799 (1st Cir.
2014)). "'[A]llegations of possible future injury' are not
sufficient." Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Emps., Inc. v. Yellen, 120
F.4th 904, 910 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l
USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)).
A "particularized" injury must be more than a
"generalized grievance," and must "manifestly 'affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.'" Lyman, 954 F.3d at
360–61 (first quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,
344, 348 (2006); and then quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).
"Injuries that are too 'widely shared' or are 'comparable to the
common concern for obedience to law' may fall into the category of
- 7 - generalized grievances about the conduct of government." Id. at
361 (quoting Becker v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 230 F.3d 381, 390
(1st Cir. 2000)). The court must be able to determine from the
face of the complaint "whether each particular plaintiff is
entitled to have a federal court adjudicate each particular claim
that he asserts." Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 733 (quoting Pagán v.
Calderón, 448 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2006)).
Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a "'concrete and
particularized' and 'actual or imminent'" injury. Lyman, 954 F.3d
at 360 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). The Complaint is
remarkably vague: as the district court noted, the Complaint lists
each Plaintiff's name, place of residence, voter status, and
sometimes whether a specific Plaintiff is an abutter to or resident
of the overlay district(s). But "no specific information is
provided regarding the harm, if any, that has befallen each
individual plaintiff." Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 732. Instead,
Plaintiffs include broad and vague injury allegations -- that the
then-proposed MCMOD "affect[ed] sharply" their property values and
"undermin[ed] dramatically the expectation of the property
owners."
These allegations are so perfunctory and conclusory that
we can make nothing of them. True, monetary or property-related
injury counts as concrete injury, All. for Hippocratic Med., 602
U.S. at 381, but Plaintiffs provide no details on the changes in
- 8 - property values or other injury to each Plaintiff's property. Are
the alleged "sharp effects" decreases in value, which could show
injury, or increases in value, which would not -- or both? We are
left to guess. No further guidance is provided by the allegation
that "the expectation of the property owners in their parcel" will
be "undermine[d] dramatically." What exactly were the
expectations of each property owner? Plaintiffs' allegations have
left us with no way to ascertain each individual Plaintiff's
specific grievances.
Plaintiffs' conclusory assertions in their brief on
appeal that their property values will diminish, traffic in the
area will increase, and potential construction of tall residential
buildings will restrict their access to light and air do not remedy
the problem. Assertions of harm set forth in briefs cannot fill
the void left by the lack of adequate allegations in the complaint.
See Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 421 F.3d 1,
7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that "additional allegations" in
plaintiffs' opposition to the motions to dismiss were "not properly
before us"); see also Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, 542 F.
Supp. 3d 24, 37 (D. Me. 2021) ("[A] party cannot amend its
Complaint by assertions made in briefs."), aff'd on other grounds,
52 F.4th 40 (1st Cir. 2022).
Often, "the standing question can be answered chiefly by
comparing the allegations of the particular complaint to those
- 9 - made in prior standing cases." All. for Hippocratic Med., 602
U.S. at 384 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751–52 (1984),
abrogated in part by, Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014)). Although the Supreme
Court has addressed a "controversy" where "the precise impact of
[an] ordinance . . . on a given piece of property was not known,"
Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (discussing
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926)),
the complaint in that seminal zoning case was considerably more
specific than the present complaint. Notably, the complaint
expressly estimated approximate market values for each of the
relevant sections of the property at issue before and after zoning
restrictions were adopted. See Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384.
There are no similarly particularized allegations presented here.1
We conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately
demonstrate that they have been or likely will be injured in fact.
See Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 731–34.
1 While we have found standing where property owners alleged that a zoning decision would diminish their property's economic and aesthetic value, that case contained allegations regarding the specific effects of the zoning decision on the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their property. Indus. Commc'ns & Elecs., Inc. v. Town of Alton, 646 F.3d 76, 77, 79–81 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting allegations that the proposed tower would interrupt "the line of sight of the panoramic view . . . of Lake Winnipesaukee and the surrounding mountains" from the intervenors' property (alteration in original)).
- 10 - C. Abutter Standing
Plaintiffs' failure is not remedied by their effort to
establish standing on the basis that seven of the named Plaintiffs
are "abutters" to the railroad station or live in the overlay
district. Massachusetts law gives "abutters" standing to
challenge decisions of the zoning "board of appeals or any special
permit granting authority." Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 40A, §§ 11, 14,
17 (2024); see Stone v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Northborough, 263
N.E.3d 818, 827–28 (Mass. 2025). But this state statute does not
suffice to establish standing.
State law is generally irrelevant for purposes of
assessing standing in federal court as to federal claims.
"[S]tanding in federal court is a question of federal law, not
state law." Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 715 (2013); see
13B Wright & Miller's Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.14 (3d
ed. 2025) ("When suit is brought in a federal court to enforce a
claim of federal right, whether statutory or constitutional, the
question of standing ordinarily is treated as a federal
question."). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs rely on state
law to establish standing for purposes of their federal-law claims,
we conclude that the scope of any legislative grant of standing to
abutters by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts does not affect our
analysis.
- 11 - Nor does the state statute suffice to establish standing
for Plaintiffs' state-law claims. Some circuits have applied
state standing law when considering state-law claims pursuant to
diversity and supplemental jurisdiction. See, e.g., Atlas
Biologicals, Inc. v. Kutrubes, 50 F.4th 1307, 1325–26 (10th Cir.
2022). While our circuit has not yet squarely faced this question,
we need not address it now for two reasons. First, state law
cannot overcome Plaintiffs' failure to adequately plead the
essential elements of Article III standing in this case. See id.
at 1326; Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chi. Park Dist., 971 F.3d 722,
730–32 (7th Cir. 2020); 13B Wright & Miller's Federal Practice &
Procedure § 3531.14 ("Of course state rules that recognize
standing need not be honored if Article III requirements are not
met, although Article III concepts should be sufficiently flexible
to recognize state-created rights to proceed in the public
interest."). Here, as noted, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy
the basic requirements of Article III standing. They cannot use
state law to backfill this failure. Second, even if state law
could in some way help Plaintiffs satisfy Article III standing,
the Massachusetts statute does not apply on its face. Plaintiffs
do not take issue with any decisions of a zoning board of appeals
nor the grant or denial of any special permits or variances -- the
only actions to which the state law applies. See Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 40A, §§ 11, 14, 17 (2024). Rather, Plaintiffs challenge a
- 12 - town meeting vote to establish an overlay district. A theory of
"abutter standing" under state law thus does not help Plaintiffs
even as to their state-law claims.
D. Legislator Standing
Plaintiffs forward one final theory of
standing -- legislator standing -- in an effort to save at least
their first claim, which relates to the vote threshold applied at
the town meeting.2 On its face, Plaintiffs' argument that some of
them have legislator standing to challenge the town meeting vote
threshold for the MCMOD might be plausible. If their
interpretation of the zoning by-law is correct, then their votes
may have been enough to defeat the overlay, and thus, they arguably
should be able to contest the vote threshold. Cf. Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939). Plaintiffs' effort to invoke
legislator standing is nevertheless unavailing.
As an initial matter, we note that the availability of
legislator standing in the context of this case is contested. The
Town argues that we should find that Plaintiffs lack standing in
part because Massachusetts has never granted standing based on a
legislator standing theory. While limiting standing to pursue
state-law claims via application of state standing principles
2 We do not see how legislator standing would be relevant to any of the other counts raised by Plaintiffs, none of which relate to Plaintiffs' purported actions as legislators.
- 13 - would be consistent with Atlas Biologicals (unlike using state law
to avoid Article III standing requirements based on a plaintiff's
status as an abutter), we again do not need to wade into that
particular thicket. Because Plaintiffs' legislator standing
argument is based on facts outside the pleadings and relates to a
supplemental claim that the district court had discretion to
dismiss when all Plaintiffs' federal claims had been dismissed, it
cannot save Plaintiff's vote-threshold claim.
First, Plaintiffs did not include the facts that support
their legislator standing argument in their Complaint. Plaintiffs
initially made the legislator-standing argument in their response
to the Town's motion to dismiss. And Plaintiffs supported that
argument in their memorandum with allegations of events that
happened at the town meeting on April 29, 2024 -- the day after
they filed their Complaint. Those events, however, were never
alleged in any amended or supplemental pleading.3 When reviewing
a judgment on a motion to dismiss, we "do not consider evidence
beyond" the "well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint."
Stanley v. City of Sanford, 606 U.S. 46, 49 (2025). Again, facts
3 Plaintiffs have not offered any reason why they could not have amended their Complaint as a matter of course, sought the district court's leave to amend their Complaint, or submitted a supplemental pleading to set out the facts of the April 2024 town meeting. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), (d); Douglas v. Hirshon, 63 F.4th 49, 58 (1st Cir. 2023).
- 14 - asserted only in briefing do not suffice. See Redondo-Borges, 421
F.3d at 7 n.2.
Second, even if we somehow drew an inference from the
Complaint that some of the Plaintiffs did in fact attend and vote
at the April 2024 town meeting, the district court still did not
err in dismissing the vote-threshold claim. The district court
had already dismissed all other claims for lack of standing,
leaving one supplemental, state-law claim in federal court.
Congress has given federal district courts supplemental
jurisdiction over state-law claims that are "part of the same case
or controversy" as federal questions in actions before them. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a). But "district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction" if "the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Id.
§ 1367(c)(3). Thus, "[w]hen federal claims are dismissed before
trial, state claims are normally dismissed as well."
McInnis-Misenor v. Me. Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2003);
see Rice v. President & Fellows of Harv. Coll., 663 F.2d 336, 339
(1st Cir. 1981) (stating that the district court should not have
assessed standing under state law on pendant state claim but should
have simply dismissed the state claim because "the federal claims
[were] dismissed before trial" (quoting United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966))). We are not bound to the
district court's reasoning but may affirm dismissal "on any basis
- 15 - that is apparent from the record," Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 730,
and we conclude that it would have been appropriate to dismiss
Plaintiffs' first claim on this basis as well.
III.
Accordingly, the district court's judgment is affirmed.
- 16 -