Kokol v. Hubbell Power Systems Inc

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 14, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00822
StatusUnknown

This text of Kokol v. Hubbell Power Systems Inc (Kokol v. Hubbell Power Systems Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kokol v. Hubbell Power Systems Inc, (W.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE 7 JOSEPH KOKOL, 8 Plaintiff, 9 v. C24-0822 TSZ 10 HUBBELL POWER SYSTEMS, ORDER INC., d/b/a ACLARA, a foreign for 11 profit corporation, 12 Defendant. 13 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Aclara’s1 Motion to 14 Change Venue, docket no. 15. Having reviewed all papers filed in support of, and in 15 opposition to, the motion, the Court enters the following order. 16 Background 17 This matter relates to events that occurred in Washington and Texas. In 2015, 18 Defendant Aclara bought out Plaintiff’s employer, “SGS,” and Plaintiff was transferred 19 20 1 Aclara contends that Plaintiff has incorrectly identified Hubbell Power Systems, Inc. (“Hubbell”) as the 21 defendant because Plaintiff was employed by Aclara, a separate legal entity from Hubbell. Motion at 1 n.1 (docket no. 15). Plaintiff’s paystubs attached to his declaration that list “Aclara Smart Grid 22 Solutions” as his employer appear to support Aclara’s claim. See Ex. 1 to Decl. of Joseph Kokol (docket no. 22 at 5–24). The Court makes no ruling concerning whether the proper defendant is Hubbell or 1 to Aclara as a project manager. Ex. 1 to Notice of Removal (“Complaint”) (docket 2 no. 1-1 at ⁋ 2.4). In 2018, Aclara was acquired by Hubbell. Id. at ⁋ 2.5. By July 2018,

3 Plaintiff moved to Shelton, Washington and worked as a project manager for Hubbell. 4 Decl. of Joseph Kokol at ⁋ 4–5 (docket no. 22). About six months later, Plaintiff was 5 promoted to senior operations manager and in that role, Plaintiff actively managed 6 projects across the United States. Compl. at ⁋ 2.9 (docket no. 1-1); Kokol Decl. at ⁋ 8 7 (docket no. 22). 8 Plaintiff worked on a project located in Austin, Texas (“Austin Project”) and spent

9 “a significant amount of time at the site” for much of the last year of his employment. 10 Kokol Decl. at ⁋ 11 (docket no. 22); Decl. of Allison Ryder at ⁋ 5 (docket no. 16). The 11 Austin Project was staffed by approximately 5 supervisors and 50–55 field technicians. 12 Ryder Decl. at ⁋ 6 (docket no. 16). Shawn Montgomery worked on the Austin Project as 13 a field supervisor and reported to Cameron Caruthers, a project manager. Id. at ⁋ 7;

14 Compl. at ⁋⁋ 2.10, 2.40 (docket no. 1-1). Caruthers reported to Plaintiff. Ryder Decl. at 15 ⁋ 7 (docket no. 16); Compl. at ⁋ 2.10 (docket no. 1-1). The four supervisors working 16 alongside Montgomery on the Austin Project all resided in Texas during the relevant 17 time. Ryder Decl. at ⁋ 10 (docket no. 16). Three continue to reside in Texas while the 18 fourth’s address is unknown. Id.2

19 Montgomery disclosed his personal struggles with alcoholism to Plaintiff. Compl. 20 at ⁋ 2.11 (docket no. 1-1). Montgomery informed Plaintiff and later Caruthers that some 21

22 2 The fourth supervisor, Christopher Lemming, was terminated in 2023. See Ryder Decl. at ⁋ 10 (docket 1 coworkers at the Austin Project site made comments about Montgomery that were 2 upsetting. Id. at ⁋ 2.27, ⁋ 2.40. Following these conversations, Montgomery filed a

3 claim against the other supervisors who made the comments at the Austin Project site. 4 See id. at ⁋ 2.41. 5 HR representative Lahanah Bowman-Sheltz interviewed Montgomery, Caruthers, 6 and Plaintiff as part of a compliance investigation. Id. at ⁋ 2.42. Defendant found that 7 Plaintiff’s knowledge of Montgomery’s medical condition and disability and failure to 8 share that knowledge with HR violated company policy. Id. at ⁋ 2.47. HR Manager

9 Allison Ryder sent Plaintiff a termination letter for failure to comply with the company’s 10 policies for reporting harassment. Id. at ⁋ 2.51; see Decl. of Patrick Reddy at p. 4 (docket 11 no. 21). The following day (on or about September 1, 2023), Plaintiff’s employment was 12 terminated. Compl. at ⁋ 2.52 (docket no. 1-1). Defendant also terminated two other 13 employees, Lee Jamerson and Christopher Lemmings, following its investigation into

14 Montgomery’s complaint. Ryder Decl. at ⁋ 11 (docket no. 16). 15 Plaintiff claims his termination was “a form of retaliation for being a witness to 16 disability discrimination in the workplace.” Compl. at ⁋ 2.52 (docket no. 1-1). Plaintiff 17 also claims, “Defendant retaliated against the Plaintiff for having a disability, for filing a 18 workers’ compensation claim of disability, and for requesting a reasonable

19 accommodation.” Id. at ⁋ 3.9. Plaintiff asserts two causes of action: (1) “discrimination 20 and retaliation under RCW 49.60.220,” and (2) “retaliation under RCW 49.60.030(3).”3 21

22 3 RCW 49.60.220 provides that “[i]t is an unfair practice for any person to aid, abet, encourage, or incite 1 See id. at pp. 8–9. Plaintiff filed his complaint in King County Superior Court, and 2 Defendant subsequently removed the case to this Court. See Notice of Removal (docket

3 no. 1); Compl. (docket no. 1-1). Defendant’s Motion to Change Venue, docket no. 15, 4 seeks to move this case to the Western District of Texas. The Court entered a Minute 5 Order that stayed the case pending the Court’s ruling on this motion. Minute Order 6 (docket no. 19). 7 Discussion 8 A. Standard

9 The Court has broad discretion to transfer cases in the interest of justice. 28 10 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Starbucks Corp. v. Wellshire Farms, Inc., 2013 WL 6729606, at *2 11 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 18, 2013). The Court must make two findings before granting 12 transfer: (1) the transferee court must be one where the action “might have been 13 brought”, and (2) the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice

14 favors transfer. Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 1985). 15 B. Plaintiff could have brought this action in the Western District of Texas 16 This action could have been brought in the Western District of Texas. Defendant 17 is subject to personal jurisdiction in that district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). 18 C. Convenience and Fairness

19 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the district court has “discretion to adjudicate motions 20 for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience 21

22 complying with the provisions of this chapter or any order issued thereunder.” RCW 49.60.040(3) 1 and fairness.” Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000) 2 (quoting Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)). The Jones court has

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno
454 U.S. 235 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.
487 U.S. 22 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Hatch v. Reliance Insurance
758 F.2d 409 (Ninth Circuit, 1985)
Decker Coal Company v. Commonwealth Edison Company
805 F.2d 834 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
472 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (S.D. California, 2007)
Amazon. Com v. Cendant Corp.
404 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (W.D. Washington, 2005)
Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc.
211 F.3d 495 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp.
236 F.3d 1137 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Lou v. Belzberg
834 F.2d 730 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Kokol v. Hubbell Power Systems Inc, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kokol-v-hubbell-power-systems-inc-wawd-2025.