COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-10-00322-CV
KOJO WIH NKANSAH APPELLANT
V.
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT APPELLEES ARLINGTON, JAMES SPANIOLA, DANA DUNN, PHILIP COHEN, ROD HISSONG, AND SHERMAN WYMAN
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FROM THE 17TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1 ON REHEARING
Appellant Kojo Wih Nkansah filed a motion for rehearing of our opinion
issued August 18, 2011. We deny the motion, withdraw our opinion and
judgment dated August 18, 2011, and substitute the following.
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. Nkansah, pro se, appeals from orders granting a motion to dismiss, a plea
to the jurisdiction, and a motion for summary judgment in favor of Appellees
University of Texas at Arlington (UTA), James Spaniola, Dana Dunn, Philip
Cohen, Rod Hissong, and Sherman Wyman and from an order denying his
motion for new trial. We will affirm.
UTA dismissed Nkansah from its School of Urban and Public Affairs’s
Ph.D. Program after he failed his dissertation defense. Although UTA
subsequently invited Nkansah to apply for readmission, it declined his request
that he be unconditionally passed or that UTA refund or pay for him to obtain a
degree at another institution. Nkansah ultimately sued Appellees.2
The trial court granted (a) the first amended plea to the jurisdiction filed by
Spaniola, Dunn, Cohen, Hissong, and Wyman, dismissing Nkansah’s claims
against them in their official capacities;3 (b) Appellees’ civil practice and remedies
code section 101.106 motion to dismiss the tort claims that Nkansah asserted
against Spaniola, Dunn, Cohen, Hissong, and Wyman; and (c) Appellees’ second
plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, which dismissed each
of the claims that Nkansah alleged against UTA and any claims against the
individual employees that the motion to dismiss did not address. After the trial
2 Spaniola is UTA’s president. Dunn is UTA’s Vice President for Academic Affairs. Cohen is Dean of the Graduate School at UTA. Hissong is an associate professor at UTA who served as Nkansah’s dissertation supervisor. And Wyman is a professor in UTA’s School of Urban and Public Affairs. 3 Nkansah does not appeal this order.
2 court granted those motions, Nkansah filed an untimely response to the second
plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment and also filed a motion
to vacate the dismissal orders and reinstate the trial setting. The trial court
denied Nkansah’s motion and granted Appellees’ objection asserted thereto.
Nkansah appeals.
In what we construe to be Nkansah’s first issue, he argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by not granting his motion for continuance. A motion
for continuance shall not be granted except for sufficient cause supported by an
affidavit, consent of the parties, or by operation of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251.
If a motion for continuance is not made in writing and verified, it will be presumed
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. Villegas v.
Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986).
Appellees filed their second plea to the jurisdiction and motion for
summary judgment on May 24, 2010, and they served Nkansah with the plea and
motion by certified mail, return receipt requested, the same day. Several days
later, on May 26, 2010, Appellees gave Nkansah notice of the hearing date set
for the plea and motion—July 7, 2010. On June 17, 2010, Nkansah filed a
motion to continue the hearing set for July 7, 2010, stating therein that he had a
―family medical emergency conflicting with the hearing‖ set for July 7, 2010. But
Nkansah never set the motion for a hearing, nor did he timely appear at the
3 hearing on July 7, 2010, to present the motion to the trial court.4 Appellees’
counsel stated at the July 7, 2010 hearing that he and Nkansah had agreed to
continue the July 26, 2010 trial date, not the July 7, 2010 hearing on the plea to
the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. Nkansah’s motion is neither
verified nor supported by affidavit. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by not granting Nkansah’s motion for continuance.
In what we construe to be Nkansah’s second issue, he argues that the trial
court erred by granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss Spaniola, Dunn, Cohen,
Hissong, and Wyman from his lawsuit.5 Civil practice and remedies code section
101.106(e) provides that ―[i]f a suit is filed under this chapter against both a
governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be
dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.‖ Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106(e) (West 2011). All tort theories of recovery alleged
against a governmental unit, whether sued alone or together with its employees,
4 The trial court later observed,
The Court will note that although Mr. Nkansah had, in fact, filed a motion for continuance, an unverified motion for continuance, that he did not request a hearing on the motion. And it could be that the Court would have considered his motion for continuance at today’s hearing, but, of course, it would be necessary for him to be here to present that motion for continuance. 5 The motion to dismiss was based on Nkansah’s second amended original petition. Therefore, we look to the claims alleged by Nkansah in his second amended original petition, rather than in his third amended original petition. See City of Arlington v. Randall, 301 S.W.3d 896, 903 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied).
4 are assumed to be ―under [the Tort Claims Act]‖ for purposes of section 101.106.
Mission Consol. ISD v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2008).
Nkansah alleged tort claims against Appellees for breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, premises liability, fraud, misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, forgery, and conversion. Because all of these tort theories
were brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) for purposes of section
101.106, the trial court did not err by granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss
Spaniola, Dunn, Cohen, Hissong, and Wyman from those claims. Likewise, to
the extent that Nkansah sought damages for alleged due process constitutional
violations, the trial court did not err by granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss the
individual employees from that claim. See Randall, 301 S.W.3d at 903
(reasoning that claim seeking damages for alleged constitutional violations is
brought under the TTCA for purposes of section 101.106(e)). We overrule
Nkansah’s second issue.
In what we construe to be Nkansah’s third issue, he argues that the trial
court erred by granting UTA’s second plea to the jurisdiction. A plea to the
jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a cause of action
without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit. Bland ISD v. Blue, 34
S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Whether the trial court has subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks &
Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Natural Res.
Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002). The
5 determination of whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction begins with
the pleadings. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. The plaintiff has the burden to
plead facts affirmatively showing that the trial court has jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of
Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). We construe the
pleadings liberally in favor of the pleader, look to the pleader’s intent, and accept
as true the factual allegations in the pleadings. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226,
228; City of Fort Worth v. Crockett, 142 S.W.3d 550, 552 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2004, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the
existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the
parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue raised. See Bland ISD,
34 S.W.3d at 555.
Sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction for
lawsuits in which the State or certain governmental units have been sued unless
the State consents to suit. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638
(Tex. 1999). State universities are agencies of the State; therefore, UTA is
protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Tex. A&M Univ. v. Bishop,
156 S.W.3d 580, 583 (Tex. 2005); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297,
298 (Tex. 1976); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.001(3) (West
2011).
Under the TTCA, a governmental unit’s immunity from suit is waived to the
extent that the TTCA creates liability. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 101.025(a) (West 2011). The TTCA expressly waives sovereign immunity in
6 only three areas: (1) use of publicly owned automobiles, (2) premises defects,
and (3) injuries arising out of conditions or use of tangible property. Id. § 101.021
(West 2011); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225.
Nkansah alleged claims against UTA in his third amended original petition
for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, misrepresentation, fraud, forgery,
conversion, negligent misrepresentation, abuse of process, and gross
negligence. Nkansah failed to plead sufficient facts to bring any of these claims
within the limited waiver of immunity under the TTCA. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225. Accordingly,
Nkansah’s claims against UTA for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence,
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, conversion, negligent misrepresentation, abuse
of process, and gross negligence are barred by sovereign immunity. See Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.057(2) (West 2011) (stating that waiver of
immunity under the TTCA does not extend to suits for intentional torts); Ethio
Express Shuttle Serv., Inc. v. City of Houston, 164 S.W.3d 751, 758 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (holding that city’s sovereign immunity was
not waived for claims of negligent misrepresentation and fraud); City of Fort
Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2001, no pet.) (holding sovereign immunity barred appellee’s claims for fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and misrepresentation); RRR Farms, Ltd. v.
Am. Horse Protection Ass’n, Inc., 957 S.W.2d 121, 133–34 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (explaining tort of abuse of process).
7 Nkansah alleged a claim against UTA for premises liability, pleading that
UTA was liable to him ―because it owns and/or occupies the facilities or premise
in which all Plaintiff’s claims and/or causes of action occurred.‖ A premises
defect theory requires, among other things, that a condition of the premises
create an unreasonable risk of harm. State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v.
Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. 1992). Nkansah only pleaded that UTA’s
premises was the location where the alleged wrongful acts occurred, not that a
condition of UTA’s premises created an unreasonable risk of harm to him,
causing him personal injury or injury to his personal property. Consequently,
sovereign immunity bars Nkansah’s claim against UTA for premises liability.
Nkansah alleged a claim against UTA for violation of the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (DTPA). The legislature has mandated that a statute shall not be
construed as a waiver of immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and
unambiguous language. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034 (West Supp.
2010); Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Harris Cnty. Toll Road Auth., 282 S.W.3d 59, 68
(Tex. 2009). The DTPA does not clearly and unambiguously provide for a waiver
of immunity from suit for governmental units. Univ. of Houston Main Campus v.
Simons, No. 01-02-00368-CV, 2002 WL 31388906, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Oct. 24, 2002, no pet.). Accordingly, sovereign immunity bars
Nkansah’s claims against UTA for violation of the DTPA.
Nkansah alleged a claim against UTA for breach of contract. When a
governmental unit contracts with a private citizen, it generally retains immunity
8 from suit even though it waives immunity from liability. Fed. Sign v. Tex. S.
Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 408 (Tex. 1997). Generally, a party seeking redress for
breach of contract can establish legislative consent to sue by bringing suit under
a special statute or by obtaining a legislative resolution. Gen. Servs. Comm’n v.
Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 596–97 (Tex. 2001). Nkansah has not
alleged that he obtained legislative consent to sue UTA for his breach of contract
claim, nor has he brought that claim under a special statutory provision waiving
UTA’s immunity from suit. Accordingly, sovereign immunity bars Nkansah’s
claim against UTA for breach of contract.
Nkansah alleged a claim against UTA for promissory estoppel, asserting
that UTA ―made a promise to [him] regarding his dissertation,‖ that UTA ―could
foresee that [he] would rely on the promise,‖ and that he ―did substantially rely on
the promise to his detriment.‖ See, e.g., Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d
180, 192 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied) (stating that promissory estoppel
allows a cause of action to a promisee who has acted to his detriment in
reasonable reliance on an otherwise unenforceable promise). The general rule is
that when a unit of government is exercising its governmental powers, it is not
subject to estoppel. See City of Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex.
1970). A municipality, however, may be estopped in certain cases where justice
requires the application of estoppel and there is no interference with the exercise
of the municipality’s governmental functions. Id. at 836 (stating that the doctrine
is applied ―with caution and only in exceptional cases where the circumstances
9 clearly demand its application to prevent manifest injustice‖). UTA is not a
municipality, and we see no reason to extend this exception to UTA under the
facts of this case. See Donna ISD v. Gracia, 286 S.W.3d 392, 395–96 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.). Accordingly, sovereign immunity bars
Nkansah’s promissory estoppel claim against UTA.
Nkansah alleged that UTA acted contrary to ―Article [I] sections 3, 3a, 17,
and 19 of Texas Constitution under the Bill of Rights‖ in relation to its handling of
his dissertation defense and dismissal. Nkansah pleaded for damages in the
amount of $455,000 for UTA’s wrongful acts against him. As this court
reaffirmed, ―[u]nder the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Bouillion and its
progeny, no private cause of action exists against a governmental entity for
money damages relating to the governmental entity’s alleged violations of
constitutional rights.‖ See Randall, 301 S.W.3d at 906 (referencing City of
Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 147 (Tex. 1995)). Therefore, with the
exception of Nkansah’s claim based on article I, section 17, his claims for
monetary damages based on UTA’s alleged constitutional violations are barred
by governmental immunity. See id.; Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d at 149 (stating that the
text of section 17 waives immunity only when one seeks adequate compensation
for property lost to the State). Regarding the article I, section 17 takings claim,
there are no pleadings or evidence that Nkansah has a vested property interest
for which compensation would be allowed under article I, section 17. See
Cypress Forest Pub. Util. Dist. v. Kleinwood Mun. Util. Dist., 309 S.W.3d 667,
10 675 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (stating that plaintiff
asserting claim under article I, section 17 must show that it has a vested property
interest); City of Houston v. Northwood Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 73 S.W.3d 304,
310 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (stating that survey of
Texas cases reveals that ―property‖ has generally been found to be a ―real
property‖ interest). We overrule Nkansah’s third issue.
In what we construe to be Nkansah’s fourth issue, he argues that the trial
court erred by granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. We review a
summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860,
862 (Tex. 2010). We consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable
jurors could, and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless
reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v.
Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge every reasonable
inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v.
Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). A defendant who conclusively
negates at least one essential element of a cause of action is entitled to
summary judgment on that claim. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d
494, 508 (Tex. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1017 (2011); see Tex. R. Civ. P.
166a(b), (c).
We construe the motion for summary judgment as a traditional motion for
summary judgment. Nkansah did not file a response to the motion for summary
11 judgment until after the trial court had granted the summary judgment, and the
trial court subsequently sustained Appellees’ objection to the untimely response,
which Nkansah filed without leave of the trial court. Because we overrule
Nkansah’s challenge to the trial court’s sustaining Appellees’ objection to
Nkansah’s untimely response below, we limit our review of Nkansah’s third issue
to whether the evidence that Appellees presented in support of the motion for
summary judgment was sufficient as a matter of law. See Baghaei v. Appone,
Inc., No. 02-08-00413-CV, 2009 WL 1996297, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July
9, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reviewing sufficiency of evidence to support
summary judgment when nonmovant failed to file response to traditional motion
for summary judgment) (citing Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217,
223 (Tex. 1999) and City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d
671, 678 (Tex. 1979)).
Nkansah filed a claim for due process violations against UTA, alleging that
he was denied procedural and substantive due process in UTA’s handling of his
dissertation defense and dismissal. To the extent that Nkansah relies on the due
course of law provision of the Texas constitution, it is well settled that although
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the due course of law
provision slightly differ in their language, the differences are ―without meaningful
distinction.‖ Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929
(Tex. 1995). Texas courts are not bound by federal due process jurisprudence,
12 but they have traditionally followed federal due process interpretations and
consider federal decisions on these matters as persuasive authority. Id.
The procedural component of the due process clause provides that
citizens are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner before any rights to life, liberty, or property may be
taken away by the State. Id. at 930. Cases involving dismissals for academic
reasons are reviewed under a less stringent standard than those cases involving
students dismissed for disciplinary reasons. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86, 98 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1978). In order to give due
deference to the exercise of professional judgment, and because the educational
process is not generally adversarial, students dismissed from school for
academic reasons are not entitled to a hearing. Id. at 89–90, 98 S. Ct. at 955.
Assuming that Nkansah had a property interest to assert, the summary
judgment record shows that Nkansah appealed the dissertation committee’s
decision to dismiss him for academic reasons to Richard Cole, Dean of the
School of Urban and Public Affairs. Thereafter, an ―Ad Hoc Committee on
Student Grievance‖ met to consider Nkansah’s complaint. As part of its
investigation, the committee met with Nkansah for one and a half hours and
heard his complaints. The committee concluded that ―there was no meaningful
departure from standard procedures followed in SUPA for the preparation and
defense of a doctoral dissertation‖ and that ―Nkansah was accorded adequate
procedural due process, including this opportunity for review.‖ Nkansah also
13 appealed to Cohen, who addressed Nkansah’s complaints. Under the standards
articulated above, UTA afforded Nkansah the procedural due process to which
he was entitled.
Regarding substantive due process in the academic arena, a judge may
not override a faculty’s professional judgment in academic affairs unless ―it is
such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate
that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment.‖ Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225, 106 S. Ct.
507, 513 (1985). When a reviewing court has found evidence of ―professional
judgment,‖ such evidence is considered sufficient to justify judgment against a
student as a matter of law. Tobias v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 824 S.W.2d 201,
210 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, writ denied), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1049
(1993).
Hissong stated in his affidavit that he served as dissertation supervisor for
Nkansah’s doctoral dissertation and that ―[i]n [his] professional judgment and
experience as an academic, [Nkansah’s] research never met the academic
standards required of doctoral level scholarship.‖ Wyman stated in his affidavit
that he served as a committee member for Nkansah’s doctoral dissertation and
that ―the academic rigor of the data collection and the conceptual bases of
[Nkansah’s] dissertation were unacceptable.‖ UTA thus presented summary
judgment evidence that it exercised professional judgment in dismissing Nkansah
14 for academic reasons. We hold that the trial court did not err by granting UTA
summary judgment on Nkansah’s due process claim.
Nkansah alleged a claim against the individual employees in his second
amended original petition for breach of contract. To the extent that the individual
employees were not entitled to be dismissed from that claim pursuant to the civil
practice and remedies code section 101.106(e) motion to dismiss that the trial
court granted, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for the
individual employees on that claim because the summary judgment evidence
demonstrated that they did not have an agreement with Nkansah regarding any
matter related to his dissertation defense or his participation in UTA’s graduate
school. See City of The Colony v. N. Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 272 S.W.3d 699,
739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism’d) (stating that the existence of an
agreement is an essential element of a breach of contract claim).
Nkansah alleged a claim for injunctive relief against Appellees, though he
took no further action in pursuit thereof. Appellees argued in the trial court that
they were entitled to summary judgment on the claim for injunctive relief because
Nkansah did not have a probable right to relief. Because Nkansah’s claims
against Appellees were either barred by sovereign immunity or were properly
dismissed by summary judgment or under civil practice and remedies code
section 101.106(e), Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on Nkansah’s
claim for injunctive relief, which appears to also be moot. We overrule Nkansah’s
fourth issue.
15 In what we construe to be Nkansah’s fifth and final issue, he argues that
the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to vacate the orders
granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss, plea to the jurisdiction, and motion for
summary judgment and by sustaining Appellees’ objection to his untimely
response. We liberally construe Nkansah’s motion as a motion for new trial. We
review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion.
In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2006). To determine whether a trial court
abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without
reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, we must decide
whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609,
614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004).
The record of the hearing on Nkansah’s motion for new trial indicates that
he arrived at the trial court on July 7, 2010, at approximately 11:20 a.m., after the
trial court had already granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss, plea to the
jurisdiction, and motion for summary judgment. Nkansah explained that he was
under the impression that the trial court would be holding a hearing on his motion
for continuance that day, not on the Appellees’ plea and motion, which were
scheduled for that day. The trial court patiently explained to Nkansah that merely
filing a motion for continuance does not mean that the scheduled matter will be
continued. Rather, the party seeking the continuance needs to further obtain a
court order granting the motion for continuance or reach an agreement with the
opposing side to continue the scheduled matter. In the absence of one of those
16 things, the trial court explained, the items scheduled to be heard will remain on
the trial court’s calendar, as happened in this case.
Regarding the trial court’s sustaining Appellees’ objection to Nkansah’s
untimely response, a response to a motion for summary judgment, including
opposing summary judgment evidence, must be filed no later than the seventh
day before the date of the summary judgment hearing, except on leave of court.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). If the record does not contain an affirmative indication
that the trial court permitted the late filing, the response is a nullity. Neimes v.
Ta, 985 S.W.2d 132, 138 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet dism’d). The
record does not reflect that Nkansah sought leave to file the late response.
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Nkansah’s motion for new trial and by sustaining Appellees’ objection to
Nkansah’s untimely response. We overrule Nkansah’s fifth issue.
Having overruled all of Nkansah’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s orders
granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss, plea to the jurisdiction, and motion for
summary judgment and denying Nkansah’s motion for new trial.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MEIER, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and DIXON W. HOLMAN (Senior Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment).
DELIVERED: October 13, 2011