Kohlman v. Taylor

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 24, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-01482
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 GRACIELA KOHLMAN, Case No.: 23-cv-1482-JO-DEB

13 Plaintiff,

14 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS WITH 15 TIMOTHY TAYLOR, PREJUDICE 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 20

21 Plaintiff Graciela Kohlman (“Plaintiff”) filed a civil rights action against Judge 22 Timothy Taylor alleging that the legal rulings and statements he made from the bench 23 violated her constitutional rights. Dkt. 1, Complaint. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss 24 pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. 5. For the reasons 25 stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff alleges that Judge Taylor repeatedly violated her constitutional rights 3 while presiding over her state court case. In January 2019, Plaintiff and her daughter 4 filed a lawsuit against their former attorney, Lawrence Mudgett, in San Diego Superior 5 Court. Compl. at 4, 6. Judge Taylor was assigned to the case. Id. at 6. To begin, while 6 holding a hearing on an anti-SLAPP motion brought by Mudgett, Judge Taylor 7 “exhibited bias and prejudice” by refusing to consider Plaintiff’s untimely briefing, 8 granting the anti-SLAPP motion, and dismissing the complaint. Id. 9 After this hearing, Judge Taylor continued to preside over this case. In July 2019, 10 Judge Taylor held a case management conference even though Plaintiff and her daughter 11 were not present. Id. at 5. Later, at a hearing in November 2019, Judge Taylor denied 12 their request to continue the matter so that they could find an attorney. Id. In February 13 2020, during a hearing on Plaintiff’s and her daughter’s motion to set aside the initial 14 anti-SLAPP ruling and to amend their complaint, Judge Taylor refused to wait for their 15 counsel, who was tardy, and held a hearing in his absence. Id. at 7. At this same hearing, 16 Judge Taylor denied both motions and made rude comments from the bench. Id. 17 Additionally, in April 2023, Judge Taylor granted Mudgett’s motion to restrain Plaintiff 18 as a judgment debtor. Id. at 8. 19 Plaintiff and her daughter then filed another suit against Mudgett, this time in small 20 claims court. Id. At a subsequent hearing, Judge Taylor found that the small claims case 21 was related to the original case before him and dismissed the small claims case. Id. 22 Plaintiff alleges that, while dismissing the small claims case, Judge Taylor shouted at 23 Plaintiff and her daughter that “there were winners and losers, and you lost.” Id. 24 Based on these facts, Plaintiff brings a civil rights action against Defendant under 25 42 U.S.C § 1983. First, she alleges that Judge Taylor violated her First Amendment 26 rights by (1) denying Plaintiff a fair hearing; (2) rejecting her motion to amend her 27 complaint; (3) refusing to consider her untimely briefing on the anti-SLAPP motion; (4) 28 denying her motion to set aside the judgment; (5) failing to wait for her attorney to arrive 1 during a hearing; and (6) interrupting her during hearings. Second, she alleges that he 2 violated her Ninth Amendment rights by (1) refusing to let her amend her complaint; (2) 3 rejecting her untimely anti-SLAPP briefing; (3) denying her motion to set aside the 4 judgment; and (4) depriving her of adequate time to find an attorney. Finally, she alleges 5 that he violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by (1) denying her a fair hearing; (2) 6 denying her request to amend her complaint; (3) refusing to wait for her attorney to arrive 7 for a hearing; and (4) depriving her of adequate time to find an attorney. Id. at 5. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD 9 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims 10 asserted in the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 11 (9th Cir. 2001). A court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true 12 and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party. Cahill v. 13 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). However, a court need not 14 accept conclusory allegations as true, but “examine whether conclusory allegations follow 15 from the description of facts as alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 16 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 17 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 18 678 (2009). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint must plead “enough facts to 19 state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 20 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). 21 A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw 22 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While 23 a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts 24 that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. 25 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 26 than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 27 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility requires pleading facts, as opposed to 28 1 conclusory allegations, which rise above the mere conceivability or possibility of unlawful 2 conduct. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 3 When a court dismisses a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), it must then decide 4 whether to grant leave to amend. Federal Rule 15(a) provides that a district court should 5 “freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A district 6 court has discretion to deny leave to amend when a proposed amendment would be futile. 7 Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 725–26 (9th Cir. 2000). Amendment is 8 futile “if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would 9 constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Miller v. Rykoff–Sexton, Inc., 845 10 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (overruled on other grounds). 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims against him are barred for several reasons, 13 including judicial immunity, Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Rooker-Feldman 14 doctrine, and the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims. The Court will first 15 examine whether Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Taylor are barred by the doctrine of 16 judicial immunity and then determine if it needs to address Defendant’s remaining 17 arguments. 18 After reviewing the complaint, the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s claims against 19 Judge Taylor are barred in their entirety by judicial immunity. “Judges and those 20 performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts 21 performed in their official capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 22 1986) (citing Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1982)). While a judge 23 is not entitled to immunity for actions taken in their personal capacity, actions taken in 24 their official capacity and within their jurisdiction are protected from suit. Stump v. 25 Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978). In determining whether a judge’s actions are 26 subject to this immunity, courts consider factors such as whether 27 (1) the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in 28 the judge’s chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then 1 pending before the judge; and (4) the events at issue arose directly and 2 immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his or her official 3 capacity. 4 Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001). 5 Here, the entirety of Plaintiff’s allegations against Judge Taylor concern actions he 6 took while presiding over her case. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Taylor violated her 7 constitutional rights by (1) issuing substantive rulings (e.g. dismissing her case, denying 8 her motion to set aside the judgment); (2) making case management decisions (e.g. 9 denying continuances, holdings hearing without her or her attorney present); and (3) 10 making rude comments from the bench. Compl. at 5–8. These rulings and case 11 management decisions, however, are “normal judicial functions” and, therefore, protected 12 by judicial immunity. See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1133 (“Ruling on a motion is a normal 13 judicial function, as is exercising control over the courtroom while court is in session.”). 14 Similarly, a judge’s comments during court hearings also fall within the category of 15 normal judicial functions. See Pengelly v. Hawaii, Fam. Ct. of Third Cir., No. CV 17- 16 00306 SOM-KJM, 2017 WL 4683921, at *7 (D. Haw. Oct. 18, 2017) (holding that it is a 17 normal judicial function for a judge to make comments from the bench during a court 18 proceeding). Plaintiff does not dispute that Judge Taylor took these actions in his 19 courtroom and in connection with a case assigned to him and within his jurisdiction. See 20 Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57. Nor does she allege that Judge Taylor took any further 21 actions in his personal capacity or outside the context of Plaintiff’s case before him. 22 Because Plaintiff’s allegations against Judge Taylor all concern actions that he took as a 23 judicial officer on a case properly before him, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to 24 absolute judicial immunity. The Court therefore dismisses these claims in their entirety. 25 Because amendment cannot cure the fundamental deficiency of her claims, i.e., 26 that they are barred by judicial immunity, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint 27 without leave to amend. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (“If judicial . . . immunity bar[s] 28 recovery, no amendment could cure the deficiency and the action was properly 1 || terminated on a motion to dismiss.”); see Miller, 845 F.2d at 214 (finding amendment 2 || futile “if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment .. . that would constitute a 3 || valid and sufficient claim.”). 4 Because the Court dismisses these claims with prejudice on judicial immunity 5 || grounds, the Court declines to address whether Defendant is also immune under the 6 || Eleventh Amendment or whether this suit is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or 7 || the statute of limitations. 8 IV. CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to 10 |/dismiss. Dkt. 5. The Court also DENIES as MOOT Defendant’s Request for Judicial 11 || Notice [dkt. 5-2], Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice [dkt. 10-5—8], and Defendant’s 12 || Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Declarations [dkt. 12] on the grounds that the Court did not 13 on these documents in reaching its decision. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED 14 || with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. 15 16 || IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 || Dated: January 24, 2024 _ 18 C7 19 Honorable Jinsook Ohta United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28