Kofi Obeng-Amponsah v. Don Miguel Apartments

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 17 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KOFI OBENG-AMPONSAH, No. 21-55851

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:16-cv-01054-PA-AFM

v. MEMORANDUM * DON MIGUEL APARTMENTS; FDC MANAGEMENT, INC.; TIM GENOVESE, as an individual; MARIA OLIVA; DOES, 1- 10,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 10, 2023**

Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Kofi Obeng-Amponsah appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing as a discovery sanction his action alleging federal and state law claims.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). discretion. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1022 (9th

Cir. 2002). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Obeng-

Amponsah’s action after Obeng-Amponsah failed to comply with the district’s

orders to produce written discovery and appear for his deposition and finding that

Obeng-Amponsah’s behavior was willful and in bad faith. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(b)(2); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217,

1233 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Rule 37 sanctions, including dismissal, may be imposed

where the violation is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the party.” (citation,

emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)); Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1022

(discussing five factors courts must weigh in determining whether to dismiss a case

for failure to comply with a court order).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Obeng-Amponsah’s

post-judgment motion because Obeng-Amponsah failed to demonstrate any basis

for relief. See Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2009)

(setting forth standard of review and discussing factors for excusable neglect under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th

Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and discussing factors for granting a

motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).

In light of our disposition affirming the dismissal of Obeng-Amponsah’s

2 21-55851 action as a sanction, we do not reach the merits of Obeng-Amponsah’s challenge to

the district court’s interlocutory orders.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

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