Kody Kothmann v. Clint Cook

Court of Appeals of Texas

Kody Kothmann v. Clint Cook

DecidedApril 11, 2007

Docket07-05-00335-CV

StatusPublished

This text of Kody Kothmann v. Clint Cook (Kody Kothmann v. Clint Cook) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Kody Kothmann v. Clint Cook, (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).

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Opinion

NO. 07-05-0335-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

APRIL 11, 2007

______________________________

Â

KODY KOTHMANN, APPELLANT

V.

CLINT COOK, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 237TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 93-543,094; HONORABLE SAM MEDINA, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before CAMPBELL, PIRTLE, and BOYD, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Appellant, Kody Kothmann, appeals an order granting a no-evidence motion for summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Clint Cook. By two issues, he contends the trial court erred (1) because the summary judgment evidence raised a genuine fact issue, and (2) by striking an affidavit that would have raised a genuine fact issue. Finding no error, we affirm.

Background

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â This controversy has been before this Court on two previous occasions; therefore, except as essential to the merits of this appeal, the details need not be restated a third time. Reference is made to our previous opinions for the background facts.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â On June 8, 1993, Kothmann filed suit against Cook and others asserting various claims, including breach of fiduciary duty. All claims against other parties have been previously disposed of and Kothmann has waived all claims and causes of action against Cook, save and except his claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â On April 7, 2005, Cook filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment alleging â[n]o evidence exists to show [Cook] either breached any duty owed to [Kothmann] or that [Cookâs] alleged breach caused harm to [Kothmann].â Kothmann failed to file a timely response, leading the trial court to grant summary judgment on May 20, 2005. The trial court subsequently granted Kothmann a new trial and leave to file a response. On June 24, 2005, Kothmann filed a response which consisted of (a) a copy of Plaintiffâs Fourth Amended Petition, (b) the Affidavit of Kody Kothmann dated June 24, 2005, and (c) the Affidavit of Steven L. Lee, dated June 23, 2005. Kothmannâs affidavit set forth pertinent facts and expressed the opinion that Cook had breached a fiduciary duty owed to Kothmann, thereby causing damages. Leeâs affidavit, which purported to be an expert affidavit, also expressed the opinion that Cook had breached a fiduciary duty owed to Kothmann.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Cook filed a motion objecting to these affidavits and on July 22, 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing on that motion. At that hearing, the trial court sustained objections to both affidavits, striking the Lee affidavit in its entirety and striking that portion of Kothmannâs affidavit which purported to give an expert opinion on the issue of breach of a fiduciary duty. The trial courtâs rulings were never reduced to a written order; however, they are contained in the reporterâs record of that hearing.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Thereafter, Kothmann filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Lee and a new affidavit of his own, both of which were acknowledged on July 29, 2005. On August 1, 2005, Cook filed his Response to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffâs Amended Summary Judgment Affidavits and on that same day, the trial court entered an order purporting to grant that motion. On August 16, 2005, the trial court granted Cookâs no-evidence motion for summary judgment without specifying the basis of its ruling.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â By his first issue, Kothmann alleges the trial court erred in granting Cookâs no-evidence motion for summary judgment. By his second issue, he alleges the trial court erred in striking his affidavit in its entirety. We disagree.

Standard of Review

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, this Court must apply well-established standards. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), after an adequate time for discovery, a party may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence to support at least one of the essential elements of the non-movantâs claim or defense. Western Investments, Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005). A no-evidence motion for summary judgment must specifically set forth the elements of the non-movantâs claim or defense for which there is no evidence. Id. When properly raised, the burden shifts and the trial court must grant summary judgment unless the adverse party produces sufficient summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003); Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 207 (Tex. 2002).

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because a no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict, we apply the same legal sufficiency standard we apply in reviewing a directed verdict. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. 2003); Roth v. FFP Operating Partners, 994 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex.App.âAmarillo 1999, pet denied.); Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex.App.âAustin 1998, no pet.) Accordingly, we must ascertain whether the non-movant has produced any evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue on a material issue and we must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the no-evidence summary judgment was rendered. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119 (1998). A no-evidence summary judgment is not proper if the non-movant has presented more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d at 70-71. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence ârises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.â Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711. Â

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â When an order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds upon which it was granted, we must affirm the trial courtâs judgment if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.

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NO. 07-05-0335-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

APRIL 11, 2007

______________________________

Â

KODY KOTHMANN, APPELLANT

V.

CLINT COOK, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 237TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 93-543,094; HONORABLE SAM MEDINA, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before CAMPBELL, PIRTLE, and BOYD, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Appellant, Kody Kothmann, appeals an order granting a no-evidence motion for summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Clint Cook. By two issues, he contends the trial court erred (1) because the summary judgment evidence raised a genuine fact issue, and (2) by striking an affidavit that would have raised a genuine fact issue. Finding no error, we affirm.

Background

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â This controversy has been before this Court on two previous occasions; therefore, except as essential to the merits of this appeal, the details need not be restated a third time. Reference is made to our previous opinions for the background facts.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â On June 8, 1993, Kothmann filed suit against Cook and others asserting various claims, including breach of fiduciary duty. All claims against other parties have been previously disposed of and Kothmann has waived all claims and causes of action against Cook, save and except his claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â On April 7, 2005, Cook filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment alleging â[n]o evidence exists to show [Cook] either breached any duty owed to [Kothmann] or that [Cookâs] alleged breach caused harm to [Kothmann].â Kothmann failed to file a timely response, leading the trial court to grant summary judgment on May 20, 2005. The trial court subsequently granted Kothmann a new trial and leave to file a response. On June 24, 2005, Kothmann filed a response which consisted of (a) a copy of Plaintiffâs Fourth Amended Petition, (b) the Affidavit of Kody Kothmann dated June 24, 2005, and (c) the Affidavit of Steven L. Lee, dated June 23, 2005. Kothmannâs affidavit set forth pertinent facts and expressed the opinion that Cook had breached a fiduciary duty owed to Kothmann, thereby causing damages. Leeâs affidavit, which purported to be an expert affidavit, also expressed the opinion that Cook had breached a fiduciary duty owed to Kothmann.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Cook filed a motion objecting to these affidavits and on July 22, 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing on that motion. At that hearing, the trial court sustained objections to both affidavits, striking the Lee affidavit in its entirety and striking that portion of Kothmannâs affidavit which purported to give an expert opinion on the issue of breach of a fiduciary duty. The trial courtâs rulings were never reduced to a written order; however, they are contained in the reporterâs record of that hearing.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Thereafter, Kothmann filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Lee and a new affidavit of his own, both of which were acknowledged on July 29, 2005. On August 1, 2005, Cook filed his Response to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffâs Amended Summary Judgment Affidavits and on that same day, the trial court entered an order purporting to grant that motion. On August 16, 2005, the trial court granted Cookâs no-evidence motion for summary judgment without specifying the basis of its ruling.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â By his first issue, Kothmann alleges the trial court erred in granting Cookâs no-evidence motion for summary judgment. By his second issue, he alleges the trial court erred in striking his affidavit in its entirety. We disagree.

Standard of Review

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, this Court must apply well-established standards. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), after an adequate time for discovery, a party may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence to support at least one of the essential elements of the non-movantâs claim or defense. Western Investments, Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005). A no-evidence motion for summary judgment must specifically set forth the elements of the non-movantâs claim or defense for which there is no evidence. Id. When properly raised, the burden shifts and the trial court must grant summary judgment unless the adverse party produces sufficient summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003); Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 207 (Tex. 2002).

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because a no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict, we apply the same legal sufficiency standard we apply in reviewing a directed verdict. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. 2003); Roth v. FFP Operating Partners, 994 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex.App.âAmarillo 1999, pet denied.); Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex.App.âAustin 1998, no pet.) Accordingly, we must ascertain whether the non-movant has produced any evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue on a material issue and we must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the no-evidence summary judgment was rendered. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1119 (1998). A no-evidence summary judgment is not proper if the non-movant has presented more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d at 70-71. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence ârises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.â Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711. Â

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â When an order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds upon which it was granted, we must affirm the trial courtâs judgment if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989); Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. 1989); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Security Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex.App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ). Therefore, when the order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds upon which it is granted, a non-movant will defeat a no-evidence summary judgment only by presenting competent summary judgment evidence on every element of his claim or defense for which the movant has asserted there is no evidence.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The elements of breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant; (2) the defendant must have breached its fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; and (3) the defendantâs breach must result in injury to the plaintiff or benefit to the defendant. Punts v. Wilson, 137 S.W.3d 889, 891 (Tex.App.âTexarkana 2004, no pet.). Cook maintains the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment because there is no evidence of either the second or third elements.

Summary Judgment Evidence

(A) Steven L. Lee Affidavits

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â As part of his summary judgment response evidence, Kothmann submitted the June 23, 2005, affidavit of his expert witness, Steven L. Lee. Cook moved to strike this affidavit. The trial court conducted a hearing on Cookâs motion to strike and orally pronounced that the affidavit would be stricken in its entirety; however, the court never signed an order to that effect. Prior to the enactment of Rule 33.1(a)(2)(A) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, it was clear that unless an order sustaining an objection to summary judgment evidence was reduced to writing, signed, and entered of record, the evidence remained part of the summary judgment evidence for consideration by the trial court. Banowsky v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 876 S.W. 2d 509, 513 (Tex.App.âAmarillo 1994, no writ); Eads v. American Bank, N.A., 843 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.App.âWaco 1992, no writ). However, where a hearing has been held on the motion, and the trial court has clearly and unequivocally sustained the objection, the objected to evidence does not form part of the summary judgment evidence. Crocker v. Paulyneâs Nursing Home, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 416, 421 (Tex.App.âDallas 2002, no pet.); Rogers v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 196, 200 (Tex.App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Kothmann did not assign error to the exclusion of Steven L. Leeâs affidavit of June 23rd.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â After the trial court orally struck Leeâs June 23rd affidavit, Kothmann filed a second affidavit of Steven L. Lee dated July 29, 2005. On August 1, 2005, the trial court entered its Order Granting Defendantâs Response to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffâs Amended Summary Judgment Affidavits striking the July 29th affidavit. Kothmann did not assign error to the exclusion of Steven L. Leeâs affidavit of July 29th.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Evidence which has been excluded by written order or ruling of the court is not part of the summary judgment evidence to be considered. Rayl v. Borger Econ. Dev. Corp., 963 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Tex.App.âAmarillo 1998, no pet.). Therefore, neither of the two Steven L. Lee affidavits constitute part of the competent summary judgment evidence in this case.

(B) Kody Kothmann Affidavits

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â As part of his summary judgment response evidence, Kothmann also submitted his own affidavit dated June 24, 2005. Cook moved to strike this affidavit. The trial court conducted a hearing on that motion and orally pronounced that the affidavit would be stricken as to those portions wherein Kothmann attempted to give a legal opinion as to whether Cook breached a standard of care owed to him. Kothmann did not assign error to the exclusion of this portion of that affidavit.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â After the trial court orally struck portions of Kothmannâs June 24th affidavit, he also filed a second affidavit dated July 29, 2005. This second affidavit was struck in its entirety by the August 1, 2005 order. By his second issue, Kothmann alleges that the trial court erred by excluding his July 29^th affidavit. Kothmann contends that this affidavit would have raised a genuine fact issue precluding Cookâs no-evidence motion for summary judgment.

Analysis

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because the order granting Cookâs motion for summary judgment did not specify the grounds upon which it was granted, this Court must affirm the judgment if any of the theories advanced by Cook are meritorious. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 569.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Cookâs motion for summary judgment specifically sets forth the elements which he contends there is no evidence of, to wit: (1) breach of a duty owed, and (2) causation of damages. Having properly pleaded a no-evidence summary judgment claim, the burden shifted to Kothmann to show a scintilla of summary judgment evidence raising a genuine fact issue as to each of these elements.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Claims based upon a breach of fiduciary duty require expert testimony on the issues of breach and causation of damages where the determination of those issues âis not one that lay people would ordinarily be competent to make.â Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239, 252 (Tex.App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 1997), affâd in part, revâd in part on other grounds, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.1999); Alexander v. Turtur & Associates, Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 199-20 (Tex. 2004). Thus, the question before us is whether the breach, causation, and damages issues in this case are plainly within the common knowledge of laymen.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Kothmannâs claim against Cook is predicated on a lengthy set of circumstances involving questions of legal representation and fiduciary duties. The facts at issue transcend a period of over five years, involving litigation in multiple counties, before several different judges, on numerous legal theories. The seminal dispute centers around Cookâs appearance at a hearing on the motion of Kothmannâs ex-wife to revoke an order suspending imposition of a contempt sentence in suit affecting the parent-child relationship. The hearing at issue also involved a determination of the priority of interests in property which was the subject of a turnover order. Under those circumstances, as a matter of law, a layman could not be expected to ascertain, without guidance from a legal expert, whether Cook breached a fiduciary duty owed to Kothmann arising from their attorney-client relationship, or whether there was a cause in fact relationship between Cookâs conduct and Kothmannâs claimed damages. Therefore, expert testimony was required to raise a fact issue as to whether Cook breached a fiduciary duty owed to Kothmann, as well as whether such a breach, if any, proximately caused Kothmannâs damages.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â As a layman, Kothmann could not provide relevant summary judgment evidence on an issue requiring expert testimony. Because Kothmannâs affidavits could not provide the requisite summary judgment evidence, we conclude the trial court did not err by excluding his July 29^th affidavit. Kothmannâs second issue is overruled.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Furthermore, because the two affidavits of Steven L. Lee were excluded from consideration, we conclude Kothmann failed to raise a scintilla of expert evidence as to whether Cook breached a fiduciary duty owed to Kothmann. Without expert testimony, Kothmann also failed to raise a scintilla of evidence as to whether such a breach, if any, proximately caused him to suffer any damages. Issue one is overruled.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in granting Cookâs motion for summary judgment. The order of the trial court granting summary judgment is affirmed.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Patrick A. Pirtle

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Justice

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NO. 07-10-00274-CV

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL D

APRIL 8, 2011

UNIFUND CCR PARTNERS, APPELLANT

GUS MORELAND, APPELLEE

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY;

NO. 2010-078591-2; HONORABLE SIDNEY C. FARRAR, JR., JUDGE

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Appellant Unifund CCR Partners appeals the trial courtÂs order sustaining the plea to the jurisdiction of appellee Gus T. Moreland and dismissing the case.Â We will reverse and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Unifund sued Moreland.Â In its live petition Unifund alleged: ÂIn the usual course of business, CITIBANK SOUTH DAKOTA NA, advanced funds to [Moreland] pursuant to credit card #5491130088816632.Â [Unifund] is the assignee of this credit card agreement.ÂÂ On March 5, 2010, Moreland filed a plea to the jurisdiction alleging Â[w]ithout some admissible evidence of the assignment, [Unifund] lacks standing to bring its claims.ÂÂ Moreland filed no evidence supporting his plea.

The clerkÂs record contains UnifundÂs response, with attached evidence, to MorelandÂs plea.Â The response, under a cover letter from UnifundÂs attorney dated May 12, was received by the county clerk on May 14, 2010.Â On the same day, the trial court signed an order dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.Â In part, the order states Â[a]fter hearing arguments of counsel and reviewing the documents filed in this cause, the Court finds that [MorelandÂs] Plea should be GRANTED.ÂÂ Unifund did not file a motion for new trial but timely perfected this appeal.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Analysis

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Today, on virtually identical facts and arguments,[1] we decided Unifund CCR Partners v. Watson, No. 07-10-0273-CR (Tex.App.--Amarillo, Apr. 8, 2011).Â Based on the reasoning and conclusions expressed by our opinion in Watson, we hold in the present case Unifund sufficiently plead its standing by alleging it was the assignee of MorelandÂs credit card account.Â When, by plea to the jurisdiction Moreland challenged the facts supporting UnifundÂs allegation, Moreland was obligated to present evidence conclusively negating the challenged allegation.Â See Texas DepÂt of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004) (the standard generally mirrors that of a traditional motion for summary judgment); Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).Â But Moreland offered no evidence and therefore did not discharge his evidentiary burden.Â Thus it was unnecessary for Unifund to present a response with evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an issue of fact on its claimed status as assignee of MorelandÂs account.Â As we further concluded in Watson, we also conclude here UnifundÂs claim of error was sufficiently preserved for appellate review and it was unnecessary for Unifund to bring forward a court reporterÂs record of the plea to the jurisdiction hearing conducted by the trial court.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We sustain UnifundÂs issue and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â James T. Campbell

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Justice

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â

[1] Watson and Moreland are represented by the same attorney.Â Unifund, likewise, appears in both cases by the same attorney.Â The briefs filed in the two cases are essentially mirror images.Â

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Kody Kothmann v. Clint Cook, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kody-kothmann-v-clint-cook-texapp-2007.

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