KODWO

24 I. & N. Dec. 479
CourtBoard of Immigration Appeals
DecidedJuly 1, 2008
DocketID 3606
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 24 I. & N. Dec. 479 (KODWO) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Board of Immigration Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KODWO, 24 I. & N. Dec. 479 (bia 2008).

Opinion

Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 2008) Interim Decision #3606

Matter of Francis KODWO, Beneficiary of a visa petition filed by Idelle Monique Hamilton, Petitioner File A99 245 589 - Fairfax, Virginia

Decided March 26, 2008

U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals

While a court order remains the preferred method of establishing the dissolution of a customary tribal marriage under Ghanaian law, affidavits executed by the heads of household, i.e., the fathers of the couple, that meet specified evidentiary requirements may be sufficient to establish a divorce for immigration purposes. Matter of Kumah,19 I&N Dec. 290 (BIA 1985), modified.

FOR PETITIONER: Charles Okyere, Esquire, New York, New York

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Jason Raphael, Associate Regional Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: PAULEY, Board Member; MANN and GUENDELSBERGER, Temporary Board Members.

MANN, Temporary Board Member:

In a decision dated May 15, 2007, the Acting District Director (“Director”) of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied the visa petition filed by the petitioner on behalf of the beneficiary to accord him immediate relative status as the spouse of a United States citizen under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2000). The Director found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that her marriage to the beneficiary was valid, concluding that the beneficiary was not eligible to legally marry at the time of their marriage. The petitioner has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded for further proceedings. The record reflects that the petitioner and the beneficiary were married on November 22, 2004, in the State of Virginia. On January 21, 2005, the petitioner filed a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) on the beneficiary’s behalf. In order to establish eligibility for a spousal visa petition, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any previous marriages of both the petitioner and the beneficiary have been legally terminated.

479 Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 2008) Interim Decision #3606

8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(2) (2007). The beneficiary, a Ghanaian citizen, was previously married in Ghana according to local tribal custom. As evidence of the termination of the beneficiary’s prior marriage, the petitioner submitted a statutory declaration before the Superior Court of Judicature, of the High Court of Justice in Accra, executed on October 29, 2004, by the fathers of both the bride and the groom. The fathers declared that the customary marriage contracted between the couple on June 20, 1998, was dissolved on January 23, 2004, in the presence of elders of both parties. On May 16, 2006, the USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the visa petition based on the petitioner’s failure to provide acceptable evidence of the dissolution of the beneficiary’s prior customary marriage. The notice stated the following: Proper documentation of the dissolution of a customary marriage is a decree, issued by a high court, circuit court or district court under the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1971 (Act 367), Section 41(2), stating that the marriage in question was dissolved in accordance with customary law. Affidavits or “statutory declarations” attesting to a divorce under customary law, even when duly sworn, do not constitute proper documentation of the dissolution of a Ghanaian customary marriage. See Matter of Kumah, 19 I&N Dec. 290 (BIA 1985).

It further noted that the divorce decree submitted by the petitioner from the High Court of Justice in Accra, Ghana, was “under the Statutory Declaration Act [No. 389 of 1971] and is therefore not acceptable as evidence that [the beneficiary’s] former marriage had been terminated when [the marriage of the petitioner and the beneficiary] was contracted.” In response to the notice, the petitioner submitted a new divorce decree issued by the District Magistrate Court in Koforidua, Ghana, under section 41(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1971 (Acts 367), indicating that the marriage was dissolved based on the joint affidavit submitted by the fathers of the beneficiary and his former spouse. The decree, which was executed on June 26, 2006, confirmed that the marriage had been dissolved on January 23, 2004, at Kumasi “and since that time any of the parties had the liberty to re-marry anybody anywhere and at anytime in the world and that such customary marriage and divorce are recognized under the laws of Ghana.” In her decision, the Director considered the new divorce decree but concluded that the attempt in the new decree to backdate the divorce to January 23, 2004, would not be recognized. Therefore, the Director determined that since the valid date of the divorce was June 26, 2006, the beneficiary was not legally free to marry the petitioner on November 22, 2004. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the Board recognizes customary Ghanaian divorces, even when a court decree is unavailable, and that statutory declarations of the dissolution of a customary marriage, and a decree from the district magistrate court confirming that dissolution, should be sufficient proof

480 Cite as 24 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 2008) Interim Decision #3606

of the termination of the beneficiary’s prior marriage. In addition, the petitioner states that the decree she submitted does not attempt to backdate the divorce but rather confirms the nonjudicial divorce of January 23, 2004, in conformity with the rulings in Matter of Akinola, 15 I&N Dec. 359 (BIA 1975), and Matter of DaBaase, 16 I&N Dec. 39 (BIA 1976). In Matter of Kumah, supra, we modified our previous holdings in Matter of Akinola and Matter of DaBaase and concluded that a Ghanaian court decree that either grants or confirms a Ghanaian customary divorce is an essential element of proof in substantiating a claimed customary divorce under the immigration laws of the United States. We relied on changes in the Foreign Affairs Manual, which instructed that the preferred documentation for the dissolution of a customary marriage is an application by the parties concerned to the appropriate Ghanaian court under the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1971(Act 367), section 41(2), for a decree of divorce, and that the affidavits attesting to a divorce under customary law provided by the heads of the respective families are of minimal reliability.

Matter of Kumah, supra, at 294. In this case, counsel for the USCIS takes the position on appeal that Matter of Kumah, supra, was superseded by amendments to statutory Ghanaian divorce law and that the law no longer requires Ghanaians to register divorce affidavits with a court. As evidence of the new Ghanaian law, USCIS counsel submitted a letter from a Foreign Law Specialist of the Library of Congress.1 The letter explains the following in regard to Ghanaian law: The Ghanaian customary marriage and divorce registration law consists of the Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Law of 1985 (P.N.D.C.L.112) and the Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) (Amendment) Law of 1991 (P.N.D.C.L. 263). One important change that the 1991 amendment introduced was making registration of customary marriage and divorce, which was mandatory under the 1985 law, optional.

The Customary Marriage and Divorce Law of 1985 required Ghanaians to register customary marriages. The 1991 amendment, however, made it no

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24 I. & N. Dec. 479, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kodwo-bia-2008.