Koch v. Unum Group

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedNovember 7, 2025
Docket24-6634
StatusUnpublished

This text of Koch v. Unum Group (Koch v. Unum Group) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Koch v. Unum Group, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 7 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TOM KOCH, No. 24-6634 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:20-cv-01948-JCM-BNW v. MEMORANDUM* UNUM GROUP; COLONIAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 7, 2025 Las Vegas, Nevada

Before: BENNETT, SANCHEZ, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges. Dissent by Judge BENNETT. Thomas Koch appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of UNUM Group (“UNUM”) and Colonial Life & Accident Insurance

Company in an action alleging retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Reviewing the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo, Maner v.

Dignity Health, 9 F.4th 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2021), we reverse and remand.

1. A claim of retaliation under Title VII is governed by the three-step

burden-shifting framework under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792, 802–05 (1973). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of

retaliation by proving that “(1) [he] engaged in an activity protected under Title

VII; (2) [his] employer subjected [him] to adverse employment action; and (3)

there was a causal link between the protected activity and the employer’s action.”

Kama v. Mayorkas, 107 F.4th 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). “Under the

McDonnell Douglas framework, the requisite degree of proof necessary to

establish a prima facie case on summary judgment is minimal and does not even

need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” Opara v. Yellen, 57

F.4th 709, 722 (9th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).

The district court erred in holding that Koch had presented insufficient

evidence of causation to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The court

mischaracterized Koch’s evidence of a causal link as resting solely on the timing of

his termination. Koch presented other evidence of retaliation by UNUM.

UNUM’s investigation began when Koch reported incidents of sexual harassment

in June 2019 by his supervisor Scott Webb against another co-worker, Heather

Schoenwald. But the company soon began investigating Koch for alleged

2 24-6634 misconduct in December 2018 and February 2019, which had not been reported by

any employee prior to the start of UNUM’s investigation. Koch also offered

evidence that Webb had threatened to retaliate against him or Schoenwald if either

one reported him to human resources. Webb allegedly told Koch: “I’ll make her

life a living hell. My guys will say anything I need them to say. . . . I’ll throw my

weight around and this will never go anywhere. And if you support her, then

you’re against me and basically I’m doing the same thing to you.” The district

court erred by failing to address Koch’s additional evidence that UNUM

terminated Koch’s employment on the basis of Koch’s report to human resources.

Even the timing of Koch’s termination—less than a month after his

harassment complaint—is sufficient to raise a strong causal inference of retaliation.

“[C]ausation can be inferred from timing alone where an adverse employment

action follows on the heels of protected activity.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air,

Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the close temporal proximity

between Koch’s harassment complaint on May 31, 2019, and his termination on

June 28, 2019, suffices to meet the prima facie requirement. See, e.g., Yartzoff v.

Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (less-than-three-month interval

sufficient to establish the causation element of a prima facie case); Reynaga v.

Roseburg Forest Prods., 847 F.3d 678, 694 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding a one-month

interval indicated a “strong” prima facie case).

3 24-6634 The district court compounded its mistake by requiring Koch to establish

that “defendants terminated Koch based solely on his complaint against Webb.”

As the Supreme Court explains, “[o]ften, events have multiple but-for causes[,]”

and “[w]hen it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation

standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor

that contributed to its challenged employment decision.” Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,

590 U.S. 644, 656 (2020). In other words, Koch need only raise a triable dispute

that his protected activity was “a but-for cause,” not the sole but-for cause, of his

termination. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).

Koch readily cleared that threshold.

2. Having concluded that Koch failed to establish a prima facie case, the

district court did not expressly reach the next two steps of the McDonnell Douglas

framework. It instead found that the timing of Koch’s termination was insufficient

to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because “defendants had an

independent basis for Koch’s termination: the corroborated evidence of his

misconduct with Schoenwald.” That analysis skipped the second step of the

McDonnell Douglas framework, which shifts the burden to the employer to assert a

“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the termination. Kama, 107 F.4th at

1059 (quoting Opara, 57 F.4th at 723). “If such a reason is asserted, then the

burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the asserted reason is merely a

4 24-6634 pretext for retaliation.” Id.

Even assuming the district court had proceeded beyond the prima facie stage

and UNUM had asserted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination,

material factual disputes exist as to whether UNUM’s stated reasons for firing

Koch are pretextual. “A plaintiff can establish pretext (1) directly, by showing that

unlawful discrimination more likely than not motivated the employer; or (2)

indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of

credence because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable; or via a

combination of these two kinds of evidence.” Kama, 107 F.4th at 1059 (cleaned

up). The timing of Koch’s termination itself constitutes evidence of pretext. See

Dawson v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In some cases, temporal

proximity can by itself constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliation

for purposes of both the prima facie case and the showing of pretext.”); see also

Reynaga, 847 F.3d at 694.

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