Koch v. United States

6 Ct. Cust. 534, 1916 WL 21472, 1916 CCPA LEXIS 18
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJanuary 28, 1916
DocketNo. 1590
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 6 Ct. Cust. 534 (Koch v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Koch v. United States, 6 Ct. Cust. 534, 1916 WL 21472, 1916 CCPA LEXIS 18 (ccpa 1916).

Opinion

De Vries, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court;

This appeal presents the question of the appropriate dutiable classification of certain surgical instruments. Representative samples are before the court. The record discloses that they are uniformly referred to and described as follows: Exhibit 1, Auword’s cranioclast, an instrument used in some cases of stillbirth for crushing the head [535]*535of the dead fetus to facilitate its extraction. This instrument is composed of heavy jaws between which is operated a tongue or lever', the contact jaws of which are serrated. Force is applied by a screw, operating alternately to bring each of the outer jaws into immediate contact with the interior tongue, whereupon they are locked by suitable device. The outer jaws operate upon separate fulcrums, which constitute parts of the center tongue. The force applied in operation in the crushing of the skull is effected by means of a screw, similar to the force applied to a blacksmith’s or carpenter’s vise. •Exhibit 2, Tarnier’s obstetrical forceps, used in childbirth. To this instrument is attached a mechanism Avhereby extra force may be exercised in its operation. Exhibit 5, Duplay’s tenaculum forceps. This is a hooked instrument, resembling scissors, operating upon a fulcrum, the jaws being sharp pointed, meeting at right angles, and is used in seizing the coats of a divided blood vessel and drawing it out to be tied. Exhibit 6, Pean’s artery forceps, used for holding arteries, an instrument with jaws at right angles with serrated interiors. Exhibit 7, Murphy’s button forceps, used for adjusting Murphy’s button, an appliance used in intestinal surgery. Exhibit 8, Hartman’s articulated nasal forceps, an instrument operating upon a double fulcrum. Exhibit 9, By ford’s compression f orceins, used for clamping arteries. Exhibit 9a, Tait’s artery- forceps, used for clamping arteries. Exhibit 10, Husson’s needle holder, used for holding the needle in sewing up wounds. Exhibit 11, Jones’s angular curved artery forceps, used for clamping arteries. Exhibit 12, Pean’s hysterectomy forceps, used in intestinal surgery. Exhibits 6 to 12 are similar scissors-appearing instruments with suitable jaws for the designated uses. Exhibit 13, Wieder’s needle holder, used for holding the needle in sewing up wounds. There is also in the record an illustrative Exhibit H, which is a bone-cutting instrument.

The instruments were classified for dutiable purposes by the collector at the port of New York as nippers or pliers under the provisions of paragraph 166 of the tariff act of 1913, reading:

166. Nippers and pliers of all kinds wholly or partly manufactured, * * *.

The importers, who are appellants here, make contention that they are not so dutiable but properly ratable for duty purposés as articles or wares not specially provided for, composed wholly or in chief value of iron or other metal, under the provisions of paragraph 167 of that act. The Board of General Appraisers overruled the protests.

The first issue tendered by appellants before the board and here renewed was and is that of commercial designation. The board overruled this contention. Error therefor is assigned. Were the question of commercial designation in the case, the court would [536]*536with much hesitation affirm this finding of the board under the decisions cited in this record. While the more confined doctrine of commercial designation denies its application where “ there is no reference in the statute, either expressly or by implication, to any commercial usage ” (Newman v. Arthur, 109 U. S., 132-138), the converse is presented by the language of this paragraph. “ Nippers and pliers of all lands ” expressly includes that kind commonly as well as that kind commercially so known; and, obviously, excludes ex vi termini application of the rule of commercial designation which would relate the statute to but one of possibly several Mnds of nippers and pliers. Habicht, Braun & Co. et al. v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 457; T. D. 32206).

The inquiry therefore becomes, Are these instruments “nippers and pliers ” as those terms are commonly used and understood ?

In this ascertainment the board adopted as decisive a principle of mechanical operation, concluding:

Irrespective, therefore, of the technical trade names under which they may be known, we hold all of the articles here under consideration which, in the principle of their construction, have two lever handles working on a pivot, and which operate two cutting, gripping, or pinching jaws or blades, to be properly classifiable for duty under the provisions in said paragraph 166 for “ nippers and pliers of all kinds, wholly or partly manufactured.”

The court after much deliberation finds unmistakable evidences written in the act that Congress did not adopt these words in that sense. If Congress intended by the words “ nippers and pliers of all kinds, wholly or partly manufactured,” to include at the prescribed 30 per centum ad valorem rate of duty all instruments “ which have two lever handles working on a pivot, and which operate two cutting,’ gripping, or pinching jaws or blades,” then, why did it expressly provide in paragraph 128 for “ scissors and shears, and blades for the same, finished or unfinished, 30 per centum ad valorem?” Or, since that latter provision was of both previous legislative ancestry and earlier placement in the act, if Congress was by such enumerations levying a tax upon all instruments possessing a similar mechanical operative principle, why was it necessary, after the provisions of paragraph 128, to insert those of 162? Or, if the mention of those named taxed all instruments of this mechanical principle why enumerate both nippers and pliers ? Either enumeration in that view covered the entire trade. Moreover, it is shown that in practical application and administration this principle of decision could not survive the logical test reduetio ad aksv/rdum,. Attempting to apply this principle previously announced by the board, the Treasury Department in T. D. 34270 observes:

While the department concurs in the reasoning of the board in the decisions cited and followed the principle underlying the said decision in T. D. 33094, [537]*537where it held that nail or manicure nippers were dutiable under paragraph 198 of the'tariff act of 1909, it does not follow that all jaw tools or instruments having two handles pivoted together are included within the terms “ nippers ” or “ pliers.” For instance, it would not be seriously contended that bell punches and ticket punches used by conductors on cars or buttonhole punches are nippers or pliers as these terms are ordinarily used.

There might be added to the foregoing that such articles as rivet punches, certain post-hole diggers, and numerous other similar tools are equally within this operative principle. The court is loath to attribute to Congress a purpose which at once renders other provisions of the act surplusage and the enforcement of which individually encounters numerous arbitrary exceptions.

We think the legislative concept evidences a more accurate and discriminating use of those words.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Spiegel Bros.
51 C.C.P.A. 69 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1964)
Spiegel Bros. v. United States
50 Cust. Ct. 13 (U.S. Customs Court, 1963)
John Heathcoat & Co. v. United States
20 Cust. Ct. 233 (U.S. Customs Court, 1948)
Vitelli v. United States
2 Cust. Ct. 326 (U.S. Customs Court, 1939)
Del Gaizo Distributing Corp. v. United States
24 C.C.P.A. 64 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1936)
United States v. Stone
16 Ct. Cust. 82 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1928)
Watson v. York Metal & Alloys Co.
14 Ct. Cust. 449 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1927)
Kotzin Bros. v. United States
14 Ct. Cust. 99 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1926)
Stone & Downer Co. v. United States
12 Ct. Cust. 62 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1923)
United States v. Interocean Forwarding Co.
8 Ct. Cust. 155 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1917)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 Ct. Cust. 534, 1916 WL 21472, 1916 CCPA LEXIS 18, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/koch-v-united-states-ccpa-1916.