Koch Service, Inc. v. Wheeler Transport Service, Inc.

423 N.W.2d 767, 228 Neb. 631, 1988 Neb. LEXIS 203
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedMay 27, 1988
Docket86-684
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 423 N.W.2d 767 (Koch Service, Inc. v. Wheeler Transport Service, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Koch Service, Inc. v. Wheeler Transport Service, Inc., 423 N.W.2d 767, 228 Neb. 631, 1988 Neb. LEXIS 203 (Neb. 1988).

Opinion

Fahrnbruch, J.

Koch Service, Inc. (KSI), appeals the Nebraska Public Service Commission’s denial of KSI’s request for a permit to operate as a contract carrier to haul asphalt and related products for its sister corporation. We affirm.

As originally filed, KSI’s application was for a common carrier permit. At the hearing, KSI orally requested only a contract carrier permit, and the hearing proceeded upon that basis.

KSI alleges six separate assignments of error. They may be summarized as follows: (1) that the denial of the application was arbitrary, unreasonable, and unsupported by the evidence; and (2) that the commission’s finding that the granting of a permit is not consistent with the public interest was based upon improper criteria, contrary to law.

Although denying the permit, the commission found that KSI was fit, willing, and able to properly perform the services proposed and to conform with the statutes and rules of the commission. The denial was based upon a finding that a grant of the application is not consistent with the public interest as provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-311 (Reissue 1986).

KSI seeks to transport asphalt, asphalt cements, cutback asphalt, and emulsified asphalt for Koch Asphalt Company (KAC). Both KSI and KAC are owned by Koch Industries, Inc.

In reviewing the record before the Public Service Commission, the Supreme Court examines the record to determine whether the commission acted within the scope of its authority and whether the evidence shows that the order in question was unreasonable or arbitrary. In re Application of Silvey Refrig. Carr., 226 Neb. 668, 414 N.W.2d 248 (1987); In re Application of Amsberry, Inc., 220 Neb. 353, 370 N.W.2d 109 (1985).

“ ‘ “ ‘Whether we agree or disagree with the decision of the commission ... is immaterial. It is not the province of *633 this court to weigh or resolve conflicts in the evidence, or the credibility of witnesses. The Supreme Court does not act as an appellate public service commission but will sustain the action of the commission if there is evidence in the record to support it____’ ” ’ ”

In re Application of Silvey Refrig. Carr., supra at 676, 414 N.W.2d at 254; In re Application of McCarty, 218 Neb. 637, 358 N.W.2d 203 (1984).

Section 75-311 provides in part that a permit shall be issued to a qualified applicant if (1) the applicant is fit, willing, and able to properly perform the service of a contract carrier and to conform to statutory and lawful requirements, rules, and regulations of the commission and (2) the proposed operation will be consistent with the public interest by providing the services designed to meet the distinct needs of each customer or class of customers.

If KSI’s contract carrier permit was granted, it would only involve one shipper, KAC. Therefore, only that shipper’s requirements need to be considered here.

The controlling issue raised before this court is whether the commission acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in denying KSI’s application on the basis that to grant it would be inconsistent with the public interest.

Under Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp. v. Bankers Dispatch Corp., 188 Neb. 584, 198 N.W.2d 195 (1972), to obtain a permit, KSI must show that its proposed service is specialized and fits the needs of a proposed contracting shipper or shippers; that the applicant is fit, willing, and able to perform the service; and that the proposed operation will be consistent with the public interest. See, also, In re Application of Silvey Refrig. Carr., supra; Samardick of Grand Island-Hastings, Inc. v. B.D.C. Corp., 183 Neb. 229, 159 N.W.2d 310 (1968).

However, “[w]here the transportation of specified commodities can be performed as well by common carriers as by contract carriers, a need for contract carriers is not established.” Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp. v. Bankers Dispatch Corp., supra at 587, 198 N.W.2d at 198; Samardick of Grand Island-Hastings, Inc. v. B.D.C. Corp., supra. *634 Therefore, the commission is required to weigh the special needs of the shipper desiring contract carrier service against the adequacy of existing common carrier service. Wells Fargo, supra.

The effect on protesting carriers of a grant of the application and the effect on shippers of a denial are also factors to be weighed in determining if the grant of the application would be consistent with the public interest. Wells Fargo, supra; Hagen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Ross, 174 Neb. 646, 119 N.W.2d 76 (1963).

In the present case, KSI proposes to meet KAC’s special needs. They are: (1) transportation of asphalt and related products in insulated trailers, (2) immediate availability of trucking equipment, (3) tight peak-season truck schedules because of KAC’s limited dock space, (4) peak-season storage of inventory in trailers, (5) jobsite delivery and report of any delivery problems on the site, (6) return of partial excess loads, (7) drivers who maintain business confidentiality, (8) inclusion of two-way radios, (9) special training and safety program for drivers, and (10) a KSI dispatcher located in KAC’s facilities.

The evidence reflects that all of the common carrier protestants own and operate insulated trailers for transporting asphalt and its related products. This equipment, as a practical matter, has been dedicated only to the transportation of KAC’s products. This is due to the extensive costs involved in cleaning the equipment for use in hauling other products. A witness from KAC testified that, within reason, the protestants’ truck equipment has been immediately available to KAC. The equipment has been maintained in Nebraska exclusively for KAC because KAC has been the only substantial Nebraska shipper of asphalt using common carrier motor service.

With respect to KAC’s special scheduling needs, neither KSI’s witness nor the KAC witness testified to any problems which resulted in loss of sales. KAC’s witness stated that existing carriers provide immediate availability and jobsite delivery of KAC’s products. KSI’s witness testified that the dispatcher’s responsibility would be to make sure that delivery occurs on a timely basis. He stated there had been no service complaints or problems in this area.

The record reflects that KSI has a standard training program *635 for its drivers.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG
164 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Virginia, 2001)
Northland Transportation, Inc. v. Herman Bros.
479 N.W.2d 764 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1992)
Kilthau v. Molasses Haulers, Inc.
464 N.W.2d 162 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1991)
Slack v. Schroetlin Tank Line, Inc.
452 N.W.2d 538 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
423 N.W.2d 767, 228 Neb. 631, 1988 Neb. LEXIS 203, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/koch-service-inc-v-wheeler-transport-service-inc-neb-1988.