Kobir Ahmed v. Shah Jahan Shiraj

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1857-24

KOBIR AHMED,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SHAH JAHAN SHIRAJ,

Defendant-Respondent. ________________________

Submitted January 14, 2026 – Decided July 22, 2026

Before Judges Gummer and Paganelli.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-2821-24.

John Vincent Saykanic, attorney for appellant.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

In this 2024 lawsuit involving an alleged 2012 breach of an oral contract

between family members, plaintiff Kobir Ahmed appeals an order dismissing

his complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). The trial court found plaintiff's causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

Based on our de novo review, we affirm.

I.

On September 23, 2024, plaintiff filed a verified complaint against his

nephew, defendant Shah Jahan Shiraj. Plaintiff alleged that in May 2010

defendant told him about property defendant "claimed to have owned with a

friend" that "was fast approaching foreclosure." According to plaintiff,

defendant advised him the deed to the property was in his friend's "name, while

the [m]ortgage was in [defendant]'s name." Plaintiff alleged he and defendant

"agreed that . . . [p]laintiff would spend all the money and time necessary to get

the mortgage refinanced" and "[i]f he did so, [defendant] would then transfer the

[p]remises to . . . [p]laintiff."

Plaintiff asserted that on June 29, 2010, he "facilitated [the friend's

d]eeding [of] the [p]remises to" defendant; in July 2012, his "efforts . . . proved

fruitful and the bank approved a refinance of the [p]remises"; and defendant

received "the [m]odification" of the mortgage on July 16, 2012. According to

plaintiff, his efforts to obtain the refinancing included addressing the bank's

concern about defendant, who was a taxi driver and did not have a steady

income, by arranging for his business to hire defendant "in title only" and issue

A-1857-24 2 to him "paychecks for no purpose other than to show an ability to pay the

mortgage." Plaintiff asserted defendant had agreed "he would owe the money

back to" plaintiff's business.

Plaintiff alleged defendant "stopped answering [his] calls and text

messages" after the bank approved the refinancing. Plaintiff asserted

defendant's "family and friends and especially his sister, implored [him] not to

take any legal action before they intervened and spoke with" defendant , but

plaintiff "could get no response from" defendant. According to plaintiff, "he

realized . . . [d]efendant had breached or was planning to breach the agreement

by selling the [p]remises to a third party" when he learned in October 2023 about

defendant's plan to sell.

Plaintiff pleaded the following causes of action: unjust enrichment,

breach of contract,1 breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

1 In the breach-of-contract count, plaintiff stated "[b]etween the date of refinance and 2023, [defendant] actively led and misled . . . [p]laintiff into believing that he would convey the [p]remises to him and return the 'wages' to" plaintiff's business. That bald statement is not supported by any allegation in the "FACTS" section of the complaint. To the contrary, plaintiff alleged defendant stopped communicating with him after the refinancing, failing to respond to his calls or texts. Plaintiff has not alleged a single communication he had with defendant between the date of refinance and 2023. "[P]leadings reciting mere conclusions without facts . . . do not justify a lawsuit." Neuwirth v. State, 476 N.J. Super. 377, 390 (App. Div. 2023) (alteration and omission in

A-1857-24 3 dealing, fraud, civil conspiracy, "accounting," and specific performance. In the

civil-conspiracy count, plaintiff claimed defendant and "other family members

. . . intended to induce [him] into taking no legal action." Plaintiff more

specifically alleged "family members [had] told [him] repeatedly that they

would address and remedy the situation with [defendant] as soon as they were

physically back in the United States" and "utilized cultural pressure against

[him], telling him that legal action would only bring disrepute and shame to the

family." According to plaintiff, in the parties' Bangladeshi culture, "litigation

is strongly disapproved of" and "[a]lmost all disputes are settled amicably

between parties, . . . with . . . family . . . or friends . . . intervening to work things

out." Plaintiff contended he had "refrained from initiating any sort of legal

proceeding" due to "his family's assurances and their cultural norms."

Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).

Defendant argued plaintiff's causes of action accrued in July 2012 when

defendant did not convey the property after receiving the mortgage modification

and were barred by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-

1. Defendant also argued plaintiff had failed to plead any facts that warranted

original) (quoting Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., 317 N.J. Super. 574, 582 (App. Div. 1998)). A-1857-24 4 the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and that cultural norms and

requests from non-party family members to forgo litigation did not rise to the

extraordinary circumstances or deception required to toll the statute of

limitations. After hearing argument on February 5, 2025, the trial court entered

an order with an accompanying statement of reasons granting the motion and

dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

On appeal, plaintiff argues the court erred in finding his causes of action

time-barred because they did not accrue until October 2023 when he discovered

defendant's plan to sell the property, any statute of limitations were equitably

tolled by "the intentional inducement and trickery by [d]efendants," and the

twenty-year time period under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-7 was the applicable statute of

limitations. Unpersuaded by those arguments, we affirm.

II.

We review de novo a trial court's decision granting a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 4:6-2. See ACLU of N.J. v. Cnty. Prosecutors Ass'n of N.J.,

257 N.J. 87, 100 (2024). In performing that de novo review, "[w]e apply the

same standard that governs the trial court in that inquiry," assuming the

allegations in the pleadings are true and affording the pleading party all

reasonable factual inferences. Ibid.; Sparroween, LLC v. Twp. of West

A-1857-24 5 Caldwell, 452 N.J. Super. 329, 339 (App. Div. 2017) (same). "Although the

review of the factual allegations of a complaint on a motion to dismiss is to be

'undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach,' '[a] pleading should be

dismissed if it states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one.'"

Mueller v. Kean Univ., 474 N.J. Super. 272, 283 (App. Div. 2022) (alteration in

original) (first quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J.

739, 746 (1989); and then quoting Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP v. Borough of

Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 113 (App. Div. 2011)).

"[W]hether a cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations is a

question of law, [which] we review de novo." Save Camden Pub. Schs. v.

Camden City Bd. of Educ., 454 N.J. Super. 478, 487 (App. Div. 2018); see also

Barron v. Gersten, 472 N.J. Super. 572, 576 (App. Div. 2022) (reviewing de

novo the trial court's dismissal of a complaint as barred by a statute of

limitations). We "owe[] no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions,"

Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237

N.J. 91, 108 (2019), including its "'legal interpretations' in dismissing [a] . . .

complaint as time-barred," Save Camden Pub. Schs., 454 N.J. Super. at 488

(quoting Giannakopoulos v. Mid State Mall, 438 N.J. Super. 595, 600 (App. Div.

2014)).

A-1857-24 6 "A statute of limitations is what its name indicates: a statute enacted by

the Legislature to limit the time period in which a lawsuit can be filed." Barron,

472 N.J. Super. at 576. "Statutes of limitations, by their nature, are intended to

compel plaintiffs to file their lawsuits within a prescribed time to allow

defendants a fair opportunity to respond and safeguard their interests." Id. at

576-77 (quoting The Palisades at Fort Lee Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. 100 Old

Palisade, LLC, 230 N.J. 427, 443 (2017)). "They also 'encourage diligence and

penalize dilatoriness by allowing the dismissal of stale claims.'" Id. at 577

(quoting The Palisades, 230 N.J. at 443).

Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to their oral contract, defendant agreed to

transfer the property to him upon his successfully refinancing the mortgage. The

bank issued a mortgage modification on July 16, 2012. Defendant not only

failed to transfer the property to plaintiff, he "stopped answering [p]laintiff's

calls and text messages." Plaintiff waited more than twelve years to file his

complaint.

Plaintiff relies on two equitable doctrines – the discovery rule and the

doctrine of equitable tolling – to explain that delay.2 "While the discovery rule

2 We consider plaintiff's equitable arguments, setting aside any concerns we may have that plaintiff's agreement to have his business provide defendant with

A-1857-24 7 postpones the accrual of a cause of action, equitable tolling acknowledges the

accrual of the action but tolls the statute of limitations because the plaintiff

lacked vital information that was withheld by a defendant." Freeman v. State,

347 N.J. Super. 11, 31 (App. Div. 2002). Neither saves plaintiff's claims.

"Equitable principles—principles that comport with notions of

fundamental fairness—govern the accrual date of a legal claim." The Palisades,

230 N.J. at 443. New Jersey courts have long recognized the application of the

discovery rule to "prevent the sometimes harsh result of a mechanical

application of the statute of limitations." Martinez v. Cooper Hosp.-Univ. Med.

Ctr., 163 N.J. 45, 52 (2000).3 "The fundamental question in a discovery rule

case . . . is 'whether the facts presented would alert a reasonable person,

a position "in title only" and paychecks defendant had to pay back with the goal of convincing the bank defendant had a job with a steady income violates the equitable maxims "he who seeks equity must do equity," Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 384 (2007) (quoting Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 132 N.J. Eq. 398, 401 (E. & A. 1942)), and "[a] suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands," Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 158 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246 (1949)). 3 The discovery rule "generally does not apply to contract actions." County of Hudson v. State, Dep't of Corr., 208 N.J. 1, 16 (2011) (quoting County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 110-11 (1998)). However, in the interest of completeness, we consider plaintiff's discovery-rule argument as to all of his causes of action. A-1857-24 8 exercising ordinary diligence, that he or she was injured due to the fault of

another.'" J.P. v. Smith, 444 N.J. Super. 507, 527 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting

Caravaggio v. D'Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 246 (2001)); see also The Palisades,

230 N.J. at 444 (same).

"The doctrine of equitable tolling, though similar to the discovery rule, is

slightly different. It may be available 'when a plaintiff is misled . . . and as a

result fails to act within the prescribed time limit.'" Bustamante v. Borough of

Paramus, 413 N.J. Super. 276, 299 (App. Div. 2010) (omission in original)

(quoting Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J. Super. 38, 50 (App. Div. 2001)). Only

under very limited circumstances may a statute of limitations be equitably tolled:

"(1) [if] the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff, (2) if the plaintiff has in

some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his [or her] rights, or (3)

if the plaintiff has timely asserted his [or her] rights mistakenly in the wrong

forum." Barron, 472 N.J. Super. at 577 (alterations in original) (quoting F.H.U.

v. A.C.U., 427 N.J. Super. 354, 379 (App. Div. 2012)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

"Absent a showing of intentional inducement or trickery by a defendant,

[equitable tolling] . . . should be applied sparingly and only in the rare situation

where it is demanded by sound legal principles and in the interest of justice."

A-1857-24 9 Ibid. (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Binder v. Price Waterhouse

& Co., L.L.P., 393 N.J. Super. 304, 313 (App. Div. 2007)). "[E]quitable tolling

requires plaintiffs to diligently pursue their claims because although it affords

relief from inflexible, harsh or unfair application of a statute of limitations, [it]

does not excuse claimants from exercising the reasonable insight and diligence

required to pursue their claims." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Binder,

393 N.J. Super. at 313) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Considering those equitable principles de novo, we reject plaintiff's

assertion his causes of action did not accrue until 2023 and discern no basis to

equitably toll the applicable statute of limitations. The discovery rule does not

save plaintiff's claims. Instead of conveying the property to plaintiff in

accordance with their alleged oral argument, defendant ceased all contact with

plaintiff. Despite plaintiff's multiple efforts to communicate with defendant,

defendant "stopped answering [his] calls and text messages" and plaintiff "could

get no response from" him. "[A] reasonable person, exercising ordinary

diligence," would have known long before 2023 that, contrary to their alleged

oral argument, defendant was not conveying the property to plaintiff.

Caravaggio, 166 N.J. at 246. Based on the facts alleged by plaintiff, a

conclusion his causes of action accrued in 2012 is neither inequitable nor unfair.

A-1857-24 10 Plaintiff also has not demonstrated he was "actively misled" or was "in

some extraordinary way . . . prevented from asserting his . . . rights." Barron,

472 N.J. Super. at 577 (quoting F.H.U., 427 N.J. Super. at 379). Defendant did

not respond to his calls or texts, and other family members "implored" plaintiff

not to take legal action until they had the opportunity to speak with defendant.

Neither constitute "intentional inducement or trickery."4 Binder, 393 N.J. Super.

at 313. And a general aversion to litigation – whether cultural, societal, or

familial – does not warrant equitable tolling.

Finally, we reject plaintiff's assertion the twenty-year statute of

limitations set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-7 applies to his claims. As the Court held

in J & M Land v. First Union Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 506 (2001), "N.J.S.A. 2A:14-

6 and -7 bar a landowner's right of entry or action for real estate if those actions

are not brought within twenty years of the accrual of such right, title of entry, or

cause of action." Plaintiff never owned the property, held title to it, or had a

4 These allegations also do not support a civil-conspiracy claim. Main St. at Woolwich, LLC v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super. 135, 152 (App. Div. 2017) (finding "[a] civil conspiracy occurs when 'two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in damage'" (quoting Morgan v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 268 N.J. Super. 337, 364 (App. Div. 1993))). A-1857-24 11 right of entry. Instead, as he alleges, he was a party to a breached contract

regarding the property. The statute of limitations for that claim, as well as his

other substantive claims, is six years. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 (requiring action

for tortious injury, conversion, or express or implied contractual claims to "be

commenced within six years next after the cause of any such action shall have

accrued"); see also Nester v. O'Donnell, 301 N.J. Super. 198, 204 (App. Div.

1997) (finding "the limitations period for fraud is six years"); Kopin v. Orange

Prods., Inc., 297 N.J. Super. 353, 373-74 (App. Div. 1997) (finding the six-year

limitation under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applicable to quasi-contract claims, including

unjust-enrichment claims).

In sum, we conclude the court correctly applied a six-year statute of

limitations to plaintiff's claims, declined to apply the discovery rule or the

doctrine of equitable tolling, and found plaintiff's claims untimely.

Accordingly, we affirm the February 5, 2025 dismissal order.

Affirmed.

A-1857-24 12