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Knutson v. Lambert

51 N.W.2d 580, 235 Minn. 328, 1951 Minn. LEXIS 782
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedDecember 28, 1951
Docket35,566, 35,572
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 51 N.W.2d 580 (Knutson v. Lambert) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knutson v. Lambert, 51 N.W.2d 580, 235 Minn. 328, 1951 Minn. LEXIS 782 (Mich. 1951).

Opinion

Loring, Chief Justice.

This is a companion case to No. 35,341, Nepstad v. Lambert and others (the same defendants), 235 Minn. 1, 50 N. W. (2d) 614, in which an opinion was filed August 3, 1951, and in which an application for rehearing was denied. In the case at bar, the jury returned a verdict of $100,000 in favor of plaintiff against all the defendants. The facts presented to the jury were, so far as the issues herein are concerned, practically identical with those disclosed by the record in the Nepstad case; and, to avoid repetition, reference is made to the opinion in that case for a statement of the controlling facts.

*330 The first issue presented for decision is whether the loaned-servant doctrine applies to the relation of the truck crane operators to the Arnold Construction Company (hereinafter called the construction company), which engaged the truck crane and operators from Lambert and the defendant company which he managed (hereinafter referred to collectively as Lambert). On this problem, the Nepstad opinion sets out the facts substantially as they appear in the record now before us; and, for reasons announced in the Nepstad opinion, we arrive at the same conclusion as we did in that case, namely, that the men sent by Lambert to Menomonie with the truck crane were loaned servants of the construction company ¿ Upon the facts disclosed by the record, reasonable minds functioning judicially could arrive at no other conclusion, and this question should not have been left to the jury. Therefore, Lambert, as a matter of law, is not liable for the negligence, if any, of the servants operating the crane.

An issue litigated (though not properly raised by pleadings) was the liability of Lambert for failure to furnish grounding equipment with the crane. In its charge to the jury, the trial court read from paragraph 2 of Order 3537, Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, General Orders on Safety in Construction (effective, July 15, 1933, reprinted, 1947) p. 51 (see, Wisconsin Red Book, Administrative Rules and Orders, 1950 [6 ed.] p. 286):

“All parts of equipment, such as steam shovels, derricks and similar machinery and devices, which are moved or put in use in the vicinity of conductors carrying electrical current, shall be grounded so far as practicable.”

Since we have determined that Pasma was a loaned servant of the construction company, even if we assume that the crane should have been grounded, under the charge of the court (not excepted to by plaintiff 2 ), Lambert is not liable for failure to ground it.

We come, then, to the question of the liability of defendant Northern States Power Company (hereinafter called the power *331 company) for negligence in the operation of its power line at Menom-onie. The case against that company was submitted to the jury on two theories: (1) Common-law negligence, and (2) violation of the Wisconsin statute requiring a notice reading: “Danger— High Voltage.” (Wis. Stat. 1945, § 196.67.) Such notice was required to be painted on each pole that supported wires transmitting electric current of 6,000 or more volts. 3

We find no evidence in the record which would justify a jury in finding'the power company at fault for not exercising ordinary care with reference to plaintiff commensurate with the situation. The record does not disclose that it had any reason to anticipate any unusual use of the highway near its high-tension transmission line which would expose anyone to danger from that line. The presence of the crane near the aluminum plant was not of itself sufficient to put the company on the alert for danger to anyone from the power line. It was bound to anticipate only the ordinary and usual use of the highway, unless it became aware of an anticipated unusual use. 4 The following general rule has been often announced by this court:

“* * * If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that his act would or might result in injury to anybody, then he was not negligent.” Kayser v. Jungbauer, 217 Minn. 140, 145, 14 N. W. (2d) 337, 340.

*332 Again, in the syllabus to Tracey v. City of Minneapolis, 185 Minn. 380, 241 N. W. 390, this court interpreted its opinion as follows:

“1. It is the duty of municipalities maintaining a bridge as a part of a highway to use ordinary, reasonable care in the maintenance thereof so as to make same safe for reasonably anticipated, ordinary travel; not extraordinary and unanticipated use.”

In Briglia v. City of St. Paul, 134 Minn. 97, 100, 158 N. W. 794, 796, L. R. A. 1916F, 1216, we said:

“* * * We think the city should not be required to anticipate such unusual occurrences or to guard against them. It provided a roadway safe for all ordinary hazards of travel, and in that we think it performed its full duty. The city was not negligent.”

This rule of care with reference to the users of a roadway is only part of the general rule of negligence as stated by Mr. Justice Mitchell in Christianson v. C. St. P. M. & O. Ry. Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97, 69 N. W. 640, 641, to the effect that if injury to someone could not reasonably be anticipated there was no negligence. The rule is the same as to those transmitting power on wires. In Kieffer v. Wisconsin Ry. L. & P. Co. 137 Minn. 112, 115, 162 N. W. 1065, 1066, this court said:

“* * * The trouble is that defendant could not reasonably anticipate any accident at this point. It is plainly a case of no liability.”

In Keep v. Otter Tail Power Co. 201 Minn. 475, 480, 277 N. W. 213, 216, this court said:

“The general rule applicable to those who transmit high voltage electricity is that they must exercise a degree of care to guard against injury commensurate with the danger to be apprehended but are not insurers against injury.”

Bunten v. Eastern Minnesota Power Co. 178 Minn. 604, 608, 228 N. W. 332, 334, was a case involving a concrete mixer with an attached boom, which was loaded on a flatcar. Climbing up the boom, plaintiff was injured when he received an electric shock from the power lines of defendant. This court said:

*333 “But where an electric company maintains its wires at a height at which they would not come in dangerous proximity to such persons or things as it reasonably ought to anticipate might rightfully come under or near them, it is not chargeable with negligence because someone doing an act which it had no reason to expect suffers an injury which might not have been sustained if the wires had been higher.”

For other cases, see i Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 7008, and note 26.

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Bluebook (online)
51 N.W.2d 580, 235 Minn. 328, 1951 Minn. LEXIS 782, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knutson-v-lambert-minn-1951.