Knox v. Town of Scituate Zoning Bd. of Review, 00-1219 (2001)

CourtSuperior Court of Rhode Island
DecidedAugust 17, 2001
DocketC.A. No. 00-1219
StatusPublished

This text of Knox v. Town of Scituate Zoning Bd. of Review, 00-1219 (2001) (Knox v. Town of Scituate Zoning Bd. of Review, 00-1219 (2001)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knox v. Town of Scituate Zoning Bd. of Review, 00-1219 (2001), (R.I. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

DECISION
This is an appeal from a decision of the Zoning Board of Review ("Board") of the Town of Scituate. The appellants, Robert and Carol Knox and Candace Caluori (collectively "appellants") are appealing the orders, determinations, and requirements of the Building Inspector regarding property located at 129 Danielson Pike, North Scituate, Rhode Island ("property") owned by Mr. and Mrs. Anthony Morra and Bisco Properties, LLC ("Morras" or "Owners"). The appellants are appealing the Board's February 17, 2000 decision denying their appeal of the Building Inspector's determinations with regard to the construction of a hair salon on the subject property.

Facts/Travel
In August of 1999, Mr. and Mrs. Anthony Morra began construction on their property. The property is located at 129 Danielson Pike and is described as Assessor's Plot 16, Lot 20. The Morras intended to convert the existing residential use of their home located on the property to a commercial use, namely, a hair salon. In doing so, the Morras filed applications with both the Village Review Committee ("VRC") and the Town Planning Commission. In September, the Planning Commission stayed the Morras' application, pending the Department of Environmental Management's (DEM) approval of an Individual Sewage Disposal System (ISDS) permit. Subsequently, the Morras then submitted their plans to the Building Inspector to allow for renovations to the building which included a building permit, electrical permit and plumbing permit.

Despite their failure to receive DEM approval, the Morras began construction of the hair salon. The neighboring landowners began objecting to the construction in early August. The appellants objected to the construction on several grounds. The appellants were especially concerned with the conversion of the Morras' property from residential to commercial without first obtaining a special use permit from the Board. Appellants also complained that Mr. Morra listed himself as the master plumber and electrical contractor in each of those permits, and he did not perform the work and was not licensed by the Department of Public Health. In November, the Morras sought permission from the Building Inspector to install a parking lot, which he orally authorized.

As part of the construction of the parking lot, the Morras began to remove trees from the property, clearing land for the installation of the parking lot. This involved removal of trees from virtually the entire lot, which appellants thought was excessive. Also, in November, the Morras sought permission to install a sidewalk and lighting fixtures at the front of the property. The Building Inspector orally approved the installation of the sidewalk and lighting absent VRC approval. The appellants also complained to the zoning official that the Morras had installed unapproved windows.

Despite appellants' complaints regarding the above actions, no action was taken to enforce the ordinance with respect to the development of the property from August to early December of 1999. On December 8, 1999, the Zoning Inspector issued a Cease and Desist Order regarding the parking lot, lighting and sidewalk. However, he did not order removal of any of the completed work.

The appellants filed a notice of appeal with the Zoning Board of Review on December 15, 1999. On February 17, 2000, the Board issued its final decision. The Board denied the appellants' appeal. In denying the appeal, the Board found that "there is no recorded decision from which to make an appeal." The Board further decided:

"To ratify the Building/Zoning Inspector's decision of stopping the project and that all work is and shall remain stopped until all necessary approvals are obtained from the appropriate authorities before whom these matters are pending. This may also include the decision to reverse some of the work that has been done and to include appearing before the Zoning Board for a determination as to whether a beauty parlor is a permitted use in this zone under the zoning ordinance. . . ."

On appeal, the appellants complain that the Zoning Inspector "unjustifiably and unreasonably" failed to enforce the ordinance with respect to the development of the property. Specifically, appellants complain that the Zoning Inspector: 1) did not have authority to approve the clear cutting of trees prior to consent of the VRC and the Planning Commission; 2) failed to require the owners to obtain a special use permit allowing them to alter the use of the property from residential to commercial; 3) failed to prevent improper building renovations, specially that owners obtain an ISDS approval by DEM and to investigate the claim that unlicensed persons were performing the electrical and plumbing work; and, 4) failed to enforce the zoning ordinance by allowing the Morras to install unapproved windows on the front of the home. Finally, appellants argue that parking lot, lighting and sidewalk installation usurped the Planning Commission and VRC's power to regulate the installation of parking lots, sidewalks, and exterior lighting. The appellants also complain that the Board's decision to deny their appeal on the grounds that there was no recorded decision from which to appeal was erroneous.

Standard of Review
The Superior Court review of a Zoning Board decision is controlled by G.L. 1956 (1991 Reenactment) § 45-24-69(D), which provides:

"(D) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the Zoning Board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the Zoning Board of Review or remand the case for further proceedings, or may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because of findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions which are:

(1) In violation of constitutional, statutory, or ordinance provisions;

(2) In excess of the authority granted to the Zoning Board of Review by statute or ordinance;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error of law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record; or

(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

When reviewing a decision of a Zoning Board, a justice of the Superior Court may not substitute his or her judgment for that of the Zoning Board if he or she conscientiously finds that the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Apostolou v. Genovesi, 120 R.I. 501, 507, 388 A.2d 821, 825 (1978). "Substantial evidence as used in this context means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and means an amount, more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Caswell v. George Sherman Sand and Gravel Co. Inc., 424 A.2d 646, 647 (R.I. 1981) (citing Apostolou, 120 R.I. at 507, 388 A.2d 824-825). The reviewing court "examines the record below to determine whether competent evidence exists to support the tribunal's findings." New England Naturist Ass'n. Inc. v. George,648 A.2d 370, 371 (R.I. 1994) (citing Town of Narragansett v.

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Related

Hardy v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Town of Coventry
321 A.2d 289 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1974)
New England Naturist Association, Inc. v. George
648 A.2d 370 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1994)
Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co.
424 A.2d 646 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1981)
State v. Wilshire
509 A.2d 444 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1986)
Gott v. Norberg
417 A.2d 1352 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1980)
Zeilstra v. Barrington Zoning Board of Review
417 A.2d 303 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1980)
Town of Narragansett v. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters
380 A.2d 521 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1977)
Apostolou v. Genovesi
388 A.2d 821 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1978)
Hartunian v. Matteson
288 A.2d 485 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1972)

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Bluebook (online)
Knox v. Town of Scituate Zoning Bd. of Review, 00-1219 (2001), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knox-v-town-of-scituate-zoning-bd-of-review-00-1219-2001-risuperct-2001.