Knox v. Amazon.com Services, LLC

• Court: District Court, D. Maryland
• Decided: October 23, 2024
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00126
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND * SHEILA KNOX, * Plaintiff, . □

v. . * Civil No. 24-126-BAH AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC, . . . Defendant. x * * * * * * * elk kk * MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Sheila Knox (“Plaintiff’) brought suit against Amazon.com Services, LLC (“Defendant”) alleging discrimination and retaliation. ECF 1,' Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion.”). ECF 10. Plaintiff filed an opposition, ECF 15, and Defendant filed a reply, ECF 16. Plaintiff also filed a letter with an update on the case on October 3, 2024. ECR 17. All filings include memoranda of law? The Court has reviewed all relevant filings and finds that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff's complaint alleges that she was hired to work at Defendant’s “Fulfillment [Cjenter” on October 20, 2020. ECF 1, at 1. She alleges that that on February 20, 2023, her manager “called [her] the N word.” /d@. Plaintiff alleges she “reported the incident.to the Human

' Plaintiff also filed a “supplement” to her complaint on January 25, 2024. ECF 4. That filing included several attachments. Jd. at ECF 4-2 through ECF 4-7. 2 The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF- generated page numbers at the top of the page.

- Resource sealer and to a “Senior Operations Manager.” Jd. She also alleges that she ‘reported the □□□ to her employer through a telephone hotline, and to the “General Manager” of her facility. Jd. After fvesioion of the incident was launched, Plaintiff was contacted by a company representative to arrange for an interview to “discuss what had happened.” ECF 1, at 1. The interview occured on March 6, 2023. id. Plaintiff alleges that after she “never heard back” from the vepresentate she took it upon herself to reach out and inquire into the status of the

investigation. li Plaintiff alleges that she texted the company representative on March 29, 2023 and informed ny that the manager who allegedly uttered the offensive term was “still [Plaintiff s] manager” and ss “taunting [Plaintiff].” /d. Plaintiff allegedly told the company representative that she would file an “EEOC complaint against Amazon” if the company failed to take action. Id. On avai 27, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that she filed an EEOC complaint against Amazon. fd. Plaintiff alleges that on June 16, 2023, she “was called to the Human Resource Department” and told she was “filed for passing a car in the parking lot on June 14, 2023.” Jd. Plaintiffalleges she.

_ informed the hoc of her termination. Jd. On hy 12, 2023, Plaintiff alleges she filed a “Wrongful Workplace Termination against Amazon” in state court. ECF 1, at 2. She alleges the matter was “transferred” to this Court and dismissed withbut prejudice because she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Id.

Plaintiff ina on September 27, 2023, the EEOC “transferred [Plaintiff's] case over to the Maryland State Civil [R]ights Commission,” which Plaintiff claims is “broken right now.” /d. Plaintiff stose claims under “Article 4 of the Baltimore City Code[,] Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17 (race, color, gender, religion, national

origin)[,] and theatation” ao

_ Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to. Federal Rule ‘of Civil Procedure 12(b){5). Defendant alleges that the proposed summons attached to her complaint named “G. Bethany Ingle and Laura Saracina of Littler Mendelson, P.C., 1800 Tysons Boulevard Suite 500, Tysons Corner, VA 22102, as the persons to be served.” ECF 10-1, at 1. The Court cautioned Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se and informa pauperis, that she had provided a summons “that directs the response to‘be served on an attorney who has not entered an appearance in this case” and directed Plaintiff to provide a new summons with the proper resident agent for Defendant. See ECF 5. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff continued to direct service to be made on the law firm of Littler Mendelson, P.C., see ECF 10-1, at 2. The docket reflects the veracity of Defendant’s claims. See ECF 8; ECF 9 (noting the issuance and service of a summons for Littler Mendelson, P.C.). Defendant alleges that its registered agent for service of process in Maryland is “CSC-Lawyers Incorporating Service Company, 7 St. Paul Street, Suite 820, Baltimore, MD 21202,” not Littler Mendelson, P.C. Id Plaintiff responds by alleging that Defendant’s “law firm took full responsibility? when they accepted the summons and Plaintiff appears to argue that the Court provided her with the address of Littler Mendelson, P.C. as the registered agent for Defendant. ECF 15, at 3. Plaintiff.

_ appears to acknowledge that the proper agent is CSC - Lawyers Incorporating Service Company, but rhetorically inquires of the Court whether dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiff took a “short cut and went straight to [Defendant’s] firm.” Id. Plaintiff also appears to allege that counsel for Defendant might seek an extension in responding to her suit based on the unreliability of the mail system, a “plan” she disrupted by sending her summons directly to Defendant’s counsel. Jd. I. LEGAL STANDARD Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), a defendant may challenge the validity of service by filing a motion to dismiss. Once invalid service is alleged, the burden rests with the

plaintiff to establish valid service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. See Miller v. Baltimore City bd of Sch. Com’rs, 833 F. Supp. 2d 513, 516 (D. Md. 2011) (quoting O ’Meara v. □

Waters, 464 F. Supp. 2d 474, 476 (D. Md. 2006)). When assessing whether a plaintiff has met that burden, “plat requirements for the means of effecting service of process may not be ignored.” O'Meara, 464 F, Supp. 2d at 476. “Generally, when service of process gives the defendant actual notice of the ring action, the courts may construe Rule 4 liberally to effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction of the court.” Jd. “While pro se litigants are typically afforded greater

leniency than represented litigants, ‘[p]ro se status ... is insufficient to establish good cause’ for failure to compl with Rule 4, ‘even where the pro se plaintiff mistakenly believes that service was made propery. Davis v. Baltimore City Cmty. Coll, No, 19-cv-2194-ADC, 2019 WL 5636362,. □ at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2019) (quoting Tann v. Fisher, 276 F.R.D. 190, 193 (D. Md. 2011)). “ Absent waiver or consent, a failure to obtain proper service on the defendant deprives the court of poi jurisdiction over the defendant. Moreover, any judgment entered against a □ defendant over ftom the court does not have personal jurisdiction is void.” Koehler v. Dodwell, 152 F.3d 304, 06-07 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Armeo, Inc. v. Penrod—Stauffer Bldg. Sys., Ine., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984)). The relevant rule further provides that: If a Defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or on order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff ‘shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. Fed. R. Civ. P./4(m). □□ 1. ANALYSIS Service ‘of process on a corporation is governed by Federal Rule of.Civil Procedure 4(h). Under Rule wy “unless federal law provides otherwise or the defendant’s waiver has been filed, a domestic . . | corporation ... that is subject to suit under a common name, must be served ... □□ repens etm

a judicial district of the United States” by either the “manner prescribed by Rule 4(e){1) for serving an individual; or . . . by. delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process and--if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires--by also □ mailing a copy of each to the defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P 4(h). To serve an individual under Rule 4(e), the plaintiff must follow “state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made” or may deliver a copy of the summons to “an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive such service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) and (2)(C). Similarly; Maryland law requires “that service 1s made upon a limited liability company by serving its resident agent.” Md. Rule 2-124(h). There appears to be no debate that Plaintiff has failed to properly serve Defendant as required by the relevant federal (or state) rules. Plaintiff acknowledges that she chose to “short cut” the process by directing that the summons be served on Defendant’s attorneys in Virginia

. instead of the resident agent in Maryland. ECF 15, at3. The record here reflects that counsel was not the resident agent for Defendant and was never authorized by Defendant to receive service. See Royal v. Kirschling, Civ. No. CCB-19-2825, 2020 WL 2732043, at *2 (D. Md. May 26, 2020) (“Royal also attempted to serve Seifert through his attorney, but it is not clear that the attorney was an ‘agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process for the individual.’”) (citing Md. R. 2-124); United States v. Ziegler Bolt & Parts Co., 111 F.3d 878, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The mere relationship between a defendant and his attorney does not, in itself, convey authority to accept service.”); Reinhold v, Tisdale, Civ. No. 06-3311, 2007 WL 2173368, at *2 (DS.C. July 26, 2007) (“[W]ithout evidence that Defendant actually authorized Arnold to accept

process for | the January 26, 2007 delivery of the documents constitutes insufficient process under Rule “oP Plaintiff fise fails to establish good cause for her failure. Plaintiffs concerns that Amazon might seek exterisions to respond to her complaint do not justify non-compliance with the relevant rules. torcovel she was warned by the Court that service must be made on the registered agent, ‘not counsel for Defendant. The record reflects that the Court directed Plaintiff to the State Department of Assessments and Taxation to “obtain the name and service address for the resident agent ofa sorplate defendant.” ECF 5, at 2. As to the argument that the law firm accepted service on behalf of Dyn it is unclear from the record who, exactly, accepted the summons since the “preen card” associated with service is illegible, ECF 9, at 3. Even if acceptance of the summons put setendan on notice of the suit — as it obviously did given the filing of the motion to dismiss — salen notice does not equate to sufficient service of process, even under the liberal

construction of i rules applicable to a pro se plaintiff.” Scott v. Maryland State Dep 't of Lab., 673 F. App’x 299, 305 (4th Cir. 2016). Since an is pro se, the Court could ordinarily retain the case on the docket and give Plaintiff an opportunity to cure her error. See Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 576 (4th Cir, 9) However, the Court explicitly warned Plaintiff that she must serve process on the “resident neent president, secretary, or treasurer.” ECF 5, at 2 (citing Md. Rule 2-124(d)). Plaintiff ignored this admonition and requested, for a second time, that service be made on counsel for Defendant in Virginia. See ECF 8, at 1. This clear refusal to follow the Court’s instruction merits ssi Scott, 673 F. App’x at 299, 307 (finding that dismissal was appropriate when □ pro se plaintiff failed to properly serve process “for the-sole reason that [they] refused to follow ~

the district sola’ specific instructions about how to find the proper service address for [the °

defendant]”). Plaintiff acknowledges that she purposefully served the wrong party, and her stated reasons for doing so fail to establish good cause. As such, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5) and the case is dismissed without prejudice. IV. CONCLUSION . For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 10) is GRANTED and the case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate implementing Order will issue.

Dated: October 23, 2024 /s/ . Brendan A. Hurson United States District Judge -