Knott v. Gonzales

Opinion

Knott v Gonzales

2026 NY Slip Op 05015

August 19, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Michael Knott, et al., appellants,

v

Eileen J. Gonzales, et al., defendants; U.S. Bank, National Association, nonparty-respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 19, 2026

2024-03246, (Index No. 726988/22)

Mark C. Dillon, J.P.

Deborah A. Dowling

Carl J. Landicino

James P. McCormack, JJ.

Michael Knott and Dave Knott, Laurelton, NY, appellants pro se.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that an assignment of mortgage is null and void and to remove a cloud on title to real property, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Ulysses B. Leverett, J.), entered December 11, 2023. The order granted the motion of nonparty U.S. Bank, National Association, as successor to Lasalle Bank National Association, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, to vacate an assignment of mortgage dated June 1, 2008, from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for First Franklin Financial Corp., to the defendant Lasalle Bank National Association (hereinafter Lasalle Bank), for a judgment declaring that assignment of mortgage and all subsequent assignments of mortgage are null and void, and to remove a cloud on title to the subject property, arising from the procurement of a judgment of foreclosure and sale in a prior action to foreclose a mortgage encumbering the subject property. The plaintiffs alleged that the assignment of mortgage dated June 1, 2008, was backdated and, therefore, defective. Following joinder of issue, nonparty U.S. Bank, National Association (hereinafter U.S. Bank), as successor to Lasalle Bank, moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action was a collateral attack on the judgment of foreclosure and sale and, thus, was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In an order entered December 11, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The plaintiffs appeal.

Under New York's transactional analysis approach to res judicata, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or seeking a different remedy (see O'Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357; SSJ Dev. of Sheepshead Bay I, LLC v Amalgamated Bank, 128 AD3d 674, 675; Dupps v Betancourt, 121 AD3d 746, 747). "'[A] judgment of foreclosure and sale entered against a defendant is final as to all questions at issue between the parties, and concludes all matters of defense which were or might have been litigated in the foreclosure action'" (Pusey v Morales, 181 AD3d 621, 623, quoting SSJ Dev. of Sheepshead Bay I, LLC v Amalgamated Bank, 128 AD3d at 675). A judgment by default that has not been vacated is conclusive for res judicata purposes and encompasses the issues that were raised or could have been raised in the prior action (see Eaddy v US Bank N.A., 180 AD3d 756, 758; Richter v Sportsmans Props., Inc., 82 AD3d 733, 734; 83-17 Broadway Corp. v Debcon Fin. Servs., Inc., 39 AD3d 583, [*2]585). Furthermore, res judicata applies both to parties and those in privity with them (see Dupps v Betancourt, 121 AD3d at 747; Grant v Aurora Loan Servs., 88 AD3d 949, 949-950). Here, the judgment of foreclosure and sale entered upon the plaintiff Michael Knott's default in the foreclosure action bars the claims now asserted in this action by Michael Knott and by the plaintiff Dave Knott, who was in privity with Michael Knott (see Eaddy v US Bank N.A., 180 AD3d at 758; Dupps v Betancourt, 121 AD3d at 747). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted U.S. Bank's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata (see Eaddy v US Bank N.A., 180 AD3d at 758; Dupps v Betancourt, 121 AD3d at 747).

The Supreme Court did not address the plaintiffs' cross-motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants. Since the cross-motion remains pending and undecided, the arguments the plaintiffs raise with respect thereto are not properly before this Court (see Hernandez-Panell v City of New York, 232 AD3d 859, 861; Katz v Katz, 68 AD2d 536).

The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.

DILLON, J.P., DOWLING, LANDICINO and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court