Knoth v. Keith

District Court, S.D. Mississippi·Decided November 2, 2021·No. 5:18-cv-00049·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI WESTERN DIVISION

STEPHANIE S. KNOTH PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:18-cv-49-DCB-MTP

APOLLO ENDOSURGERY US, INC DEFENDANT

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen Discovery [224]. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the Motion [224] should be denied. BACKGROUND

This is a products liability dispute arising from the implant of an ORBERA gastric balloon manufactured by Defendant Apollo Endosurgery US, Inc. (“Apollo”). On May 4, 2018, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action against Apollo.1 Thereafter, Plaintiff retained counsel and on January 9, 2019, amended her Complaint to plead state-law claims that “parallel” federal law. This amendment was precipitated by the Medical Device Amendments Act (“MDA”), which contains an express provision preempting state-law claims that impose requirements which differ from federal requirements. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). A two-pronged test determines whether the MDA preempts a state-law claim: (1) whether the federal government has established requirements applicable to the medical device, and (2) if so, whether the state law

1 Plaintiff also asserted claims against Dr. Stephen Keith, Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center, and Gastroenterology Associates, but Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are no longer pending in this action. claim would impose requirements that are “different from or in addition to” the federal requirements. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321-22 (2008). The parallel claims doctrine allows plaintiffs to employ state tort law as a “mechanism for enforcing federal requirements.” See Raab v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 150 F.Supp.3d 671, 686 (S.D. W.Va. 2015). Thus, the claim must “parallel” the federal regulations.

The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulates medical devices, and devices such as the gastric balloon at issue are considered Class III devices and are subject to a strenuous pre- market approval process. In her Amended Complaint [30], Plaintiff alleges that Apollo received pre-market approval for the subject gastric balloon. Plaintiff asserted several state-law claims in her Amended Complaint [30], but only two parallel state-law claims remain: manufacturing defect and breach of express warranty. See Pretrial Order [190]. On April 22, 2019, the Court entered a Case Management Order [45], which set a discovery deadline of December 16, 2019. On August 21, 2019, the Court stayed discovery pending a ruling on Apollo’s Motion to Dismiss [46]. See Order [66]. On November 8, 2019, the

Court granted in part and denied in part the Motion to Dismiss [46], leaving only Plaintiff’s manufacturing defect and breach of express warranty claims. See Order [67].2 On November 13, 2019, the Court lifted the stay, set a discovery deadline of August 7, 2020, and set the trial for February 1, 2021. See Order [68]. Discovery closed on August 7, 2020, and on August 28, 2020, Apollo filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [126]. On December 9, 2020, the Court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment [126]. See Order [149]. Thereafter, the Court conducted a pretrial conference, entered a Pretrial Order [190], and set the trial for June 7, 2021.

2 The Court dismissed the following claims: negligence, failure to warn, implied warranty, unjust enrichment, lack of informed consent, negligent training and proctoring and negligent certification, violation of the Mississippi Deceptive Trade Practice Act. On March 2, 2021, the Court continued the trial to August 30, 2021, at the behest of the parties. See Order [193]. On August 17, 2021, the Court continued the trial indefinitely due to the increase in COVID-19 cases in Mississippi. See Order [221]. On September 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion [224], requesting that the Court reopen discovery for a period of ninety days. According to Plaintiff, additional discovery is

needed to obtain information concerning whether the subject gastric balloon had FDA approval and to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to produce additional medical records. Apollo opposes the Motion [224]. See Response [232]. ANALYSIS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) governs scheduling orders and provides that “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “The good cause standard requires a showing by the movant that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.” Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 997 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2021). In determining whether Rule 16(b)(4)’s good cause standard has been met, courts consider four factors: (1) the explanation for the failure to meet the deadline; (2) the importance of the requested relief; (3) the potential prejudice in granting the relief sought; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2020). As previously mentioned, Plaintiff requests that the Court reopen discovery to allow the parties to obtain information concerning whether the subject gastric balloon had FDA approval and to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to produce additional medical records. Beginning with medical records, Plaintiff argues that discovery should be reopened because on October 20, 2020, she received a diagnosis from a neuropsychologist, Dr. Susan Andrews, following diagnostic testing and treatment for brain hypoxia and damage.3 Additionally, Plaintiff argues that discovery should be reopened because she was hospitalized from June 1, 2021, to June 5, 2021, for a gastric leak. The Court will first address Plaintiff’s explanation for her failure to comply with the scheduling order. “Courts within the Fifth Circuit have described the explanation for needing

more time as the most important factor.” Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 2021 WL 3134909, at *2 (S.D. Miss. July 23, 2021). Plaintiff points out that the developments in her medical condition occurred after the discovery deadline of August 7, 2020. While that is true, it is also true that Plaintiff was aware of these developments long before she filed the instant Motion [224]. Plaintiff received a diagnosis from a neuropsychologist on October 20, 2020, but waited nearly a year—until September 20, 2021—to request the reopening of discovery. Likewise, Plaintiff completed her hospitalization for a gastric leak on June 5, 2021, but waited more than 100 days to request the reopening of discovery. Plaintiff asserts that she did not move for the reopening of discovery following the

diagnosis from a neuropsychologist because she hoped to keep the February 1, 2021, trial date. That is not a reasonable justification for the delay, especially considering the fact that on January 5, 2021, the Court continued the trial to May 17, 2021. “[T]he good-cause standard will not be satisfied if the court concludes that the party seeking relief (or that party’s attorney) has not acted diligently in compliance with the schedule.” Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1522.2 at 322 (3d ed. 2010); see also Smith v. Transocean Offshore USA, Inc., 2021 WL 1534503, at *10 (E.D. La. Apr. 19, 2021) (finding that a plaintiff

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