Knollman Lumber Co. v. Hillenbrand

29 N.E.2d 61, 64 Ohio App. 549
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 1, 1940
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 29 N.E.2d 61 (Knollman Lumber Co. v. Hillenbrand) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knollman Lumber Co. v. Hillenbrand, 29 N.E.2d 61, 64 Ohio App. 549 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940).

Opinion

Matthews, J.

These appeals on questions of law present a controversy between the owners, a mortgagee, and various materialmen, arising out of the construction of a residence.

The owners (Lanes) entered into a contract with *551 one Hillenbrand, whereby in consideration of the construction of the residence by Hillenbrand the owners agreed to pay $6,775, upon the following terms:

“Six hundred dollars ($600) with the signing of this contract, and an additional one hundred seventy-five dollars ($175) within 60 days from the deed of this contract and a construction loan from the liberal association which has been approved on my plans and specifications, and shall pay said Lone Star Construction from the proceeds of said residence in accordance with said plans and specifications.”

After the excavation for the building had been begun, the owner executed a mortgage to The Liberal Savings & Loan Company, to secure the payment of a note for $6,000, and this mortgage was duly recorded. The work that had been done at that time was such that the mortgagee must be taken to have had notice of it. In the mortgage was a recital that: 11 This mortgage is given to improve the premises herein described. The mortgagors hereby consent and agree with the mortgagee that the fund secured by this mortgage may be paid out by the mortgagee as provided in Section 8321-1 of the General Code of Ohio,” and also “The grantee is authorized and empowered to do all things provided to be done by a mortgagee under Section 8321-1 of the General Code, and under the act of the Legislature passed May 27, 1915, 106 Ohio Laws, pages 522-534, and any amendments or supplements thereto.”

In addition to these provisions in the mortgage, the owner signed several authorizations, in which the amount and name of payee were left blank, to the mortgagee to make payments from this mortgage fund.

As work progressed, disbursements were made by the mortgagee. These disbursements were made after an inspection of the work and'in proportion to the work done to the total, and in accordance with sworn statements, required by Sections 8312 and 8313, General Code, averring that the work and material de *552 scribed were actually applied to improve the mortgaged real estate. There is no evidence in the record tending to disprove this. The most that the record shows is that the amount expended by the mortgagee and owner, plus the amount of the unpaid liens, exceeds the contract price, $6,775. A total sum of $5,583.47 was thus disbursed from this mortgage fund. Of this total $3,205.90 was paid directly to the head contractor (Hillenbrand) for work and material furnished by him, and the balance to subcontractors and materialmen, all in accordance with sworn statements, regular in form.

Payments were made by the owners directly to materialmen and subcontractors slightly in excess of the difference between the contract price and the amounts disbursed by the mortgagee, so that the owners are not indebted to the head contractor in any amount.

In no case was any certificate filed by the owner with the mortgagee that any payments to be made were required to meet pay rolls.

No notice such as is authorized by Section 8313, General Code, was furnished to the owner.

The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the mortgagee was authorized by Section 8321-1, General Code, to make disbursements to meet pay rolls only, and this only when the owner had certified to it that such disbursement was necessary for that purpose, and, that, therefore, it could claim no priority over the liens of subcontractors and materialmen, for materials and labor furnished in the construction of the house, which liens had been perfected in accordance with Section 8310 et seq., General Code. Prom the judgments, giving effect to this conclusion, these appeals were taken. Other details appear in the evidence, but as the cases depend upon the construction of Section 8321-1, General Code, as applied to the terms of this construction mortgage, we do not deem it necessary to mention them.

It is argued that this mortgage provided for a cash *553 payment of $600, and that no further payments were due until completion of the building, and, that, therefore, all payments other than the payment of $600 were premature and not in conformity to the terms of the mortgage, and for that reason alone the mortgagee is not entitled to the priority to which it would otherwise be entitled. We do not accept this construction of the terms of the mortgage relating to payment. While it is a rule of construction that when a contract provides for the doing of an act in consideration of the doing of another act, the implication is that the performance is intended to be concurrent, that rule is entirely inapplicable here to postpone payment until the completion of the work. It would nullify the purpose of the parties. The owners gave their note and mortgage and thereby obligated themselves for the very purpose of providing a fund from which payments could be made as the work progressed. It is a construction mortgage and that fact alone is sufficient to negative the idea of withholding payment until the building had been completed, and this was in compliance with the contract between the owner and the head contractor. There is no provision in the mortgage that would justify others dealing with the head contractor in believing that payments would be postponed until completion of the building. We, therefore, hold that this provision in the mortgage does not invalidate the lien or affect its priority in any particular.

It is asserted that notwithstanding all disbursements were made to contractors, subcontractors, materialmen, and laborers,' the priority of the mortgage lien must fail as to all payments except those made to meet unpaid pay rolls, duly and formally certified by the owner to the mortgagee, because Section 8321-1, General Code, dedicates the entire mortgage debt to that purpose. If that is what the General Assembly meant, it seems to us to be an instrument crudely *554 fashioned to facilitate building construction. Let us examine this section.

By its first paragraph, the section clearly provides that “the lien of a mortgage given in whole or in part to improve real estate, or to pay off prior encumbrances thereon, or both, the proceeds of which are actually used in such improvement in the manner contemplated in Sections 8310 and 8311 of the General Code, * * * and which mortgage contains therein * * * a covenant between the mortgagor and mortgagee authorizing and empowering the mortgagee to do all things in this act provided by said mortgagee to be done, shall be prior to all mechanics’, materialmen’s and similar liens and all liens provided for in this chapter that are filed for record after said improvement mortgage is filed for record, to the extent that the proceeds thereof are used and applied for the purposes aforesaid.”

So far there would seem to be no ambiguity. It clearly states that the construction mortgage shall be a prior lien to the extent that the proceeds are actually used in the improvement of the real estate.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
29 N.E.2d 61, 64 Ohio App. 549, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knollman-lumber-co-v-hillenbrand-ohioctapp-1940.