Knights of the Modern MacCabees v. Gillis

144 S.W. 713, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 964
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided January 24, 1912·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

KEY, C. J.

Appellee Mary F. Gillis, joined by her husband, A. W. Gillis, brought this suit upon a beneficiary certificate or insurance policy, issued by appellant to Furman A. Gillis, and payable at his death to his mother, Mary F. Gillis. The defendant’s answer included a general denial and a special plea, not necessary to be set out. The case has been tried several times, and at the last trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant has appealed. At the last trial the case was submitted to the jury upon a written agreement of the parties, together with certain other testimony. The fifth and sixth paragraphs of the agreement referred to read as follows:

“(5) That the said Furman A. Gillis, or his representatives, paid all assessments levied, except assessments 134 and 135. That assessment 134 was duly levied by defendant, and notice thereof given in the manner as provided by defendant’s laws, and became due October 1, 1906, and the last day of payment thereof was October 30, 1906. That assessment 135 was duly levied by defendant, and notice thereof given in the manner as provided by defendant’s laws and became due Novembec 1, 1906, and the last day of payment was November 30, 1906. That under defendant’s laws, if either of said assessments were not paid on or before the last day as above set forth, the said Fur-man A. Gillis stood suspended, ipso facto, from all rights and benefits under said certificate and could only reinstate in case of suspension and become in good standing by the payment of said assessments and by furnishing a certificate that he was in good health.
“(6) It is agreed that the subject-matter of the controversy in this suit is whether assessment 134 was paid to the defendant, or to some one duly authorized to receive the same for the defendant on or before October 30, 1906, and whether assessment 135 was paid to the defendant or to some one duly authorized to receive the same for the defendant on or before November 30, 1906; the plaintiffs contending and agreeing to tender proof to show that the same were paid within the time above specified; the defendant denying payment of the receipt of the money by it or by any one duly authorized to receive the same for it, and claiming that if the insured or any one for him paid assessments 134 and 135, they were paid after the dates above set forth respectively, and at a time when the assured stood suspended from all rights and benefits of the order, and could not reinstate without, in addition to the payment of such assessments, furnishing a certificate of good health, and that on and after October 30, 1906, the insured was not in good health and could not furnish the certificate of good health and did not furnish any.”

[1] We overrule all the assignments of error presented in appellant’s brief except the one which challenges the verdict as being contrary to and unsupported by the testimony. We hold that the court did not err in refusing to give the special instructions requested by appellant and set out in its brief. While decisions made in other jurisdictions and cited by appellant seem to support the contentions urged, it seems to us that the charges referred to, if given, would have infringed upon the statute of this state which prohibits a trial judge from commenting upon the weight of testimony. But a careful consideration of the statement of facts has forced upon us the conclusion that the verdict of the jury is. not supported by satisfactory evidence, and is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the testimony that the trial judge committed error when he refused to set it aside and award a new trial. While it is true that when a case is submitted to a jury that body, in so far as its action is concerned, is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses, still, if the verdict rendered by the jury is clearly wrong and manifestly against the whole weight of evidence, it is not only the duty of the trial judge, but also of the appellate court, to set the verdict aside. Willis v. Lewis, 28 Tex. 191; Chandler v. Meckling, 22 Tex. 41; Dimmitt v. Robbins, 74 Tex. 441, 12 S. W. 94; M. P. Ry. Co. v. Somers, 78 Tex. 441, 14 S. W. 779; Railway v. Brice, 111 S. W. *714 1094; Railway v. Ives, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 53, 78 S. W. 36.

[2] The controlling issue in the case was whether assessment 134 was paid on or be; fore October 30, 1906, and 135 was paid on or before November 30, 1906. If either of these assessments was not paid by the time referred to, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, and the burden rested upon them' to furnish proof of the time of such payments. The plaintiffs claim that they were both paid at the same, time, to wit, October 8, 1906; and, unless the proof shows such payment, the verdict is not supported by testimony, and appellant’s motion for a new trial should have been granted.

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Knights of the Modern MacCabees v. Gillis, 144 S.W. 713, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 964 (Tex. Ct. App. 1912).

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