Knights of the Modern MacCabees v. Gillis

144 S.W. 713, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 964
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJanuary 24, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 144 S.W. 713 (Knights of the Modern MacCabees v. Gillis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knights of the Modern MacCabees v. Gillis, 144 S.W. 713, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 964 (Tex. Ct. App. 1912).

Opinion

KEY, C. J.

Appellee Mary F. Gillis, joined by her husband, A. W. Gillis, brought this suit upon a beneficiary certificate or insurance policy, issued by appellant to Furman A. Gillis, and payable at his death to his mother, Mary F. Gillis. The defendant’s answer included a general denial and a special plea, not necessary to be set out. The case has been tried several times, and at the last trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant has appealed. At the last trial the case was submitted to the jury upon a written agreement of the parties, together with certain other testimony. The fifth and sixth paragraphs of the agreement referred to read as follows:

“(5) That the said Furman A. Gillis, or his representatives, paid all assessments levied, except assessments 134 and 135. That assessment 134 was duly levied by defendant, and notice thereof given in the manner as provided by defendant’s laws, and became due October 1, 1906, and the last day of payment thereof was October 30, 1906. That assessment 135 was duly levied by defendant, and notice thereof given in the manner as provided by defendant’s laws and became due Novembec 1, 1906, and the last day of payment was November 30, 1906. That under defendant’s laws, if either of said assessments were not paid on or before the last day as above set forth, the said Fur-man A. Gillis stood suspended, ipso facto, from all rights and benefits under said certificate and could only reinstate in case of suspension and become in good standing by the payment of said assessments and by furnishing a certificate that he was in good health.
“(6) It is agreed that the subject-matter of the controversy in this suit is whether assessment 134 was paid to the defendant, or to some one duly authorized to receive the same for the defendant on or before October 30, 1906, and whether assessment 135 was paid to the defendant or to some one duly authorized to receive the same for the defendant on or before November 30, 1906; the plaintiffs contending and agreeing to tender proof to show that the same were paid within the time above specified; the defendant denying payment of the receipt of the money by it or by any one duly authorized to receive the same for it, and claiming that if the insured or any one for him paid assessments 134 and 135, they were paid after the dates above set forth respectively, and at a time when the assured stood suspended from all rights and benefits of the order, and could not reinstate without, in addition to the payment of such assessments, furnishing a certificate of good health, and that on and after October 30, 1906, the insured was not in good health and could not furnish the certificate of good health and did not furnish any.”

[1] We overrule all the assignments of error presented in appellant’s brief except the one which challenges the verdict as being contrary to and unsupported by the testimony. We hold that the court did not err in refusing to give the special instructions requested by appellant and set out in its brief. While decisions made in other jurisdictions and cited by appellant seem to support the contentions urged, it seems to us that the charges referred to, if given, would have infringed upon the statute of this state which prohibits a trial judge from commenting upon the weight of testimony. But a careful consideration of the statement of facts has forced upon us the conclusion that the verdict of the jury is. not supported by satisfactory evidence, and is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the testimony that the trial judge committed error when he refused to set it aside and award a new trial. While it is true that when a case is submitted to a jury that body, in so far as its action is concerned, is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses, still, if the verdict rendered by the jury is clearly wrong and manifestly against the whole weight of evidence, it is not only the duty of the trial judge, but also of the appellate court, to set the verdict aside. Willis v. Lewis, 28 Tex. 191; Chandler v. Meckling, 22 Tex. 41; Dimmitt v. Robbins, 74 Tex. 441, 12 S. W. 94; M. P. Ry. Co. v. Somers, 78 Tex. 441, 14 S. W. 779; Railway v. Brice, 111 S. W. *714 1094; Railway v. Ives, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 53, 78 S. W. 36.

[2] The controlling issue in the case was whether assessment 134 was paid on or be; fore October 30, 1906, and 135 was paid on or before November 30, 1906. If either of these assessments was not paid by the time referred to, the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, and the burden rested upon them' to furnish proof of the time of such payments. The plaintiffs claim that they were both paid at the same, time, to wit, October 8, 1906; and, unless the proof shows such payment, the verdict is not supported by testimony, and appellant’s motion for a new trial should have been granted.

We shall first consider certain undisputed nd conceded facts. On November 27, 1906, W. G. Bell, a deputy of appellant, was at Morgan, and, finding the local lodge in a disordered condition, took up the records and blank receipt books and carried them away with him. It is admitted by the plaintiffs that this occurred on November 27, 1906, and that date is of vital importance in considering the weight to be given to Mr. Gillis’s testimony, which will be hereafter discussed. On the 11th day of December, 1906, O. D. White, acting as finance keeper of defendant, undertook to remit to the defendant for Furman Gillis and himself assessments 134 and 135. This was done by writing a letter to the secretary of defendant and inclosing a draft issued by the bank in Morgan. In that letter Mr. White said, “I was out of town when Mr. Bell was here the other day.” Appellant replied to that letter under date of December 17, 1906, stating that a certificate of health was necessary in order to reinstate Furman Gillis and himself. No certificate of health was furnished as to Furman Gillis, and no further correspondence occurred in reference to him until after his death, which occurred January 15, 1907, and the proof of death was not presented until June following. The proof of death contained two affidavits, one-made by Mrs. Gillis, the plaintiff, and the other by O. D. White, finance keeper of the local lodge. Mrs. Gillis stated in her affidavit that assessments 134 and 135 were paid December 1, 1906, and O. D. White stated in his affidavit that they were paid November 1, 1906. Attached to the proof of death were four receipts, given on Maccabee blanks; one being a receipt for assessments 134 and 135, and dated November 1st. It was shown by uncontroverted testimony that, while a Maccabee printed receipt was used in its preparation, it was of a different type from the Maccabee blanks used in making out the other receipts. Mr. Bell, the district deputy, who had general supervision of the field work, testified as follows: “When I went there I did take away the books and papers of the tent; that is, the receipt book and the cashbook of the Bosque tent of the Maccabees there at Morgan. That was on the 27th day of November. The receipt book was a blank book, made out for general use as a receipt book, and about half of it had been used I suppose. The receipt book was 'similar to the one you show me here, Exhibits J and K. It was one of these books. It was Exhibit K. This Exhibit K is the particular receipt book that I took up that time when I was at Morgan. After I took up this book, Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
144 S.W. 713, 1912 Tex. App. LEXIS 964, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knights-of-the-modern-maccabees-v-gillis-texapp-1912.