310 Ga. 586 FINAL COPY
S20A1195. KNIGHTON v. THE STATE.
NAHMIAS, Presiding Justice.
Appellant Quran Knighton was convicted of malice murder and
possession of a knife during the commission of a felony in connection
with the stabbing death of Markice Harris. Appellant contends that
by twice interrupting his counsel’s closing argument to provide
instructions to the jury, the trial court committed plain error and
denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial, and that his trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
interruptions and instructions. We affirm.1
1 Harris was killed on May 19, 2016. In July 2016, a Newton County
grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. At a trial from October 17 to 19, 2017, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced him to serve life in prison for malice murder and five consecutive years for the knife offense; the remaining counts were vacated or merged. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended with new counsel in June and July 2019. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion in December 2019. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2020 term and orally argued on September 15, 2020. 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at Appellant’s trial showed the following. In May
2016, Appellant, who was then 16 years old, was friends with Harris,
who was 18. On May 19, however, they argued during a group text
conversation after Appellant accused Harris of lying about where
Harris lived. Following a protracted dispute through the group text
messages, Harris sent a text saying that he and Appellant should
have a fist fight.
Around 5:30 p.m., Harris sent Appellant a text saying that he
was outside Appellant’s house and wanted to fight. Two hours later,
Appellant responded that he had been asleep, and Harris sent a text
saying that they could meet tomorrow. Harris then sent Appellant
texts saying, “no funny sh**”; “leave that dam[n] pocket knife in the
house”; “You try sum funny I’ll try sum funny”; and “I’m really
[fixing to] just kill yo Sh** . . . better hop[e] I can control myself.”
Appellant and Harris eventually agreed to meet later that night.
Appellant then sent texts to a female username (which unbeknown
to Appellant was actually used by Harris) saying that Harris was a
2 liar. When Harris (through the female username) sent a text saying,
“don’t fight [Harris],” Appellant responded “Imma shoot him And his
momma” and “We [fixing to] get ready to go to his house and light
that Sh** up.”
Briana Mosley, a 17- or 18-year-old relative who lived with
Appellant, gave the following account in her trial testimony. Later
that evening, she walked with Appellant to Harris’s gated
subdivision, where they waited for Harris outside the gate. When
Harris arrived, he walked toward Appellant and punched him.
Appellant then took off his jacket and started fighting with Harris.
They fell to the ground, where Harris began punching Appellant and
banging his head against the ground. Mosley tried to intervene, and
one of Harris’s neighbors who was driving out of the subdivision
stopped his car and asked if Mosley needed help.2 Appellant and
Harris stopped fighting, stood up, and began to walk away from each
other, and the neighbor drove away.
2 The neighbor testified that he saw Harris fighting with a “girl” and a
“smaller boy,” who was bloody and “the more battered of the two [males].” 3 Appellant then told Mosley that he needed to get his jacket,
and as he walked back toward Harris, Harris said something and
they began to fight again. Mosley got out her cell phone to call for
help; when she looked up, she saw that Harris had what she thought
was a pocket knife. Appellant and Mosley tried to take the knife
away from Harris. As Appellant wrested it away, Mosley’s hand was
sliced. Appellant then pushed Mosley out of the way and began
slashing the knife at Harris. Harris said to Mosley, “You got stabbed,
too,” before he ran a few steps and fell to the ground. As Appellant
fled, Mosley saw that Harris was not responsive. She called her
grandfather on her cell phone and ran to her house after he told her
to go there to call the police. Appellant arrived at the house about
five minutes after Mosley; he then threatened to kill himself with a
kitchen knife, which she took away from him.
Another family member called 911, and responding officers and
medical personnel soon arrived at Appellant’s house. Appellant
came out with his hands up, and Mosley led the responders to
Harris, who had died from stab wounds. Officers searched the scene
4 of the fight and Appellant’s house for the knife used to kill Harris,
but it was never recovered.
A responding officer observed that Appellant had scrapes and
bruises but no significant injuries. When the officer asked Appellant
if he was injured, he replied only that he “had some bruises and
scrapes.” Medical responders then checked him over and cleared him
to be transported to the sheriff’s office. A few hours later, an
investigator took photos of Appellant’s injuries, which included
several scrapes and some bruises and swelling, but Appellant did
not report any stab wounds and the investigator did not observe any
stab wounds or any significant amount of blood on Appellant.
Investigators interviewed Mosley that night. She told them
that she saw Harris with the knife first; that she did not know
whether it belonged to Appellant or Harris; and that she said to
Appellant after the stabbing, “I have to tell on you.” The next
morning, Mosley met with two probation officers in connection with
an unrelated case. She told the officers that after Harris repeatedly
banged Appellant’s head on the ground during the fight, she and
5 Appellant went back to their house, where Appellant got a knife and
then returned to the subdivision’s entrance to confront Harris.3
The medical examiner who performed Harris’s autopsy
testified that he had several incised (cutting) wounds: one on the
back of his head that penetrated his skull; one on his back; two on
the left side of his chest; and one on his finger, which the examiner
characterized as a defensive wound. Harris also had four stab
wounds: one on the right side of his face; one on his chest that
perforated his heart; and two on the right side of his body, one of
which punctured his right lung. In addition, he had abrasions on his
hands, right shoulder, back, and knees. The medical examiner
concluded that the blade of the knife used to stab Harris was at least
five-and-a-half inches long.
Appellant testified, claiming that he stabbed Harris in self-
defense. He gave the following account of the day of the incident. He
agreed to meet Harris but did not believe that they were actually
3 Both probation officers testified about what Mosley told them. Mosley
testified that she did not tell the officers that Appellant returned to their house to get the knife. 6 going to fight. When Harris arrived, he punched Appellant and they
began fighting; after the neighbor spoke to them, they stopped
fighting and Appellant turned to walk home; but when he went back
to get his jacket, Harris hit him. Appellant then saw that Harris was
holding a “pocket knife,” which Appellant recognized because he had
seen Harris buy it sometime earlier. Harris tried to stab Appellant,
who was scared and believed that Harris was going to kill him.
Appellant pulled the knife away from Harris, who was still trying to
fight him, and the next thing he remembered was “going crazy” and
Harris walking away. Appellant dropped the knife and ran straight
home, where he threatened to kill himself with a kitchen knife.4
Appellant claimed that on the day after he was arrested, he
discovered that he had a stab wound on his side. He also claimed
that he did not own a knife, and Mosley testified that she had never
seen Appellant carrying a knife.
4 When asked on cross-examination why Mosley had testified that Appellant arrived home five minutes after her, he claimed that she had not seen that he was already in the house because he was upstairs using the phone to call his stepfather. The prosecutor later argued that Appellant actually did arrive later, using the time to throw the murder weapon in a nearby lake. 7 Appellant does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, in accordance
with this Court’s waning practice in murder cases, we have reviewed
the record and conclude that, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presented at trial and
summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to
reject Appellant’s claim that he killed Harris in self-defense and to
instead find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of
which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(III) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Shaw v. State, 292
Ga. 871, 872 (742 SE2d 707) (2013) (“‘[I]ssues of witness credibility
and justification are for the jury to decide, and the jury is free to
reject a defendant’s claim that he acted in self-defense.’” (citation
omitted)).5
2. Shortly after beginning his closing argument, Appellant’s
5 We remind litigants that this Court will end its practice of considering
the sufficiency of the evidence sua sponte in non-death penalty cases with cases docketed to the term of court that begins in December 2020. See Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 399 (4) (846 SE2d 83) (2020). The Court began assigning cases to the December term on August 3, 2020. 8 counsel said:
This case, as I sort of mentioned in the beginning boils down to one thing: Do you believe from the evidence that [Appellant] brought this knife to the fight and attacked Mr. Harris with it, or do you believe that Mr. Harris brought the knife and in the fight [Appellant] took it away from him? You might think that well, maybe he did, but maybe is not enough. The State has to prove, the State has to prove that [Appellant] brought the knife to the fight and it was his knife.
The trial court interjected, “Counsel, that’s simply not true,” and
asked the lawyers to approach the bench. The bench conference was
not transcribed. When it concluded, the court addressed the jury:
Let me say what I said to them up here. At the moment of the stabbing the issue is formed who did the stabbing; secondly, was [it] justified who did the stabbing under the laws of self defense. There will be other laws I give you about other things, so his statement that if you found that the victim brought the knife to the fight that ends your determination is what I was saying is not accurate. It’s at the time of the stabbing those two things I told you; is that clear to everybody? Okay. You may proceed.
Appellant’s counsel resumed his closing argument, clarifying
that “[i]f you . . . find that [Appellant] had to take the knife away
from him, Mr. Harris[,] to protect and save his life, you would have
to acquit.” Counsel proceeded to argue that Mosley was credible and 9 that the probation officers were not credible and then said:
They have got to show, they got to somehow show that my client, it wasn’t self defense, that he had a knife, you know, when I said a minute ago it turns on who brought the knife, well it turns on how, I will say it a little better, how [Appellant] got the knife. When the Government knows, the Government knows that this case, that that’s the most critical point in the whole case and that’s why they didn’t —
The court interrupted:
Counselor, I will again say, it doesn’t matter how he got the knife, it’s when the stabbing occurred, was the defendant justified in using self defense as the defense? You said it’s how he got the knife. It’s not how he got the knife; am I — is everybody clear on that? Okay. You can go ahead.
Appellant’s counsel then continued his argument, primarily
asserting that Appellant acted in self-defense because he reasonably
believed that Harris was going to kill him.
In this Court, Appellant contends that the trial court’s two
instructions to the jury amounted to plain error; that the court’s
interrupting closing argument to provide those instructions denied
him his constitutional right to a fair trial; and that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
10 interruptions and instructions. We will address each of these claims
in turn.
(a) Appellant argues first that the trial court essentially
instructed the jury to ignore evidence that Harris brought the knife
to the fight and attacked Appellant with it. He asserts that the
court’s first instruction told the jury to focus only on the moment of
the stabbing and that the second instruction said that how
Appellant got the knife was irrelevant. As Appellant acknowledges,
his trial counsel did not object to the instructions, so we review this
claim for plain error, meaning that we will reverse the trial court
only if the alleged instructional error was not affirmatively waived;
was clear and obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute;
likely affected the outcome of the trial; and seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See
Stripling v. State, 304 Ga. 131, 135 (816 SE2d 663) (2018). See also
OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). An appellant must establish all four elements
of the test in order to demonstrate plain error, see Stripling, 304 Ga.
at 135, so satisfying this test “‘is difficult, as it should be.’” Hood v.
11 State, 303 Ga. 420, 426 (811 SE2d 392) (2018) (citation omitted).
The trial court’s first instruction was prompted by defense
counsel’s argument that “the State has to prove that [Appellant]
brought the knife to the fight and it was his knife.” As Appellant
candidly concedes in his brief, that assertion was a misstatement of
the law, because the State was not required to demonstrate that
Appellant owned the knife used in the killing or brought that knife
to the fight in order to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt his claim
of self-defense. Although at a trial the State must disprove a
defendant’s claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, see
Gardhigh v. State, 309 Ga. 153, 157 (844 SE2d 821) (2020), “‘there
is no requirement that [the State] prove its case with any particular
sort of evidence.’” Dobbins v. State, 309 Ga. 163, 165 (844 SE2d 814)
(2020) (citation omitted). In many cases, a defendant has been found
guilty of murder and the conviction upheld on appeal even when
there was some evidence that he disarmed the victim and then used
the victim’s weapon in self-defense. See, e.g., Parks v. State, 300 Ga.
303, 303-305, 308 (794 SE2d 623) (2016); Ruffin v. State, 296 Ga.
12 262, 262-264 (765 SE2d 913) (2014); Jimmerson v. State, 289 Ga.
364, 365-367 (711 SE2d 660) (2011).
And although the trial court could have dealt with counsel’s
misstatement in a number of ways, the court was authorized to
interrupt his closing argument to prevent his continuing to misstate
the law and to correct any confusion that he may have caused the
jury. See Davis v. State, 234 Ga. 730, 731 (218 SE2d 20) (1975) (“It
has long been within the realm of a judge’s authority to correct
misstatements made by counsel as to what the law is.”). See also
Venturino v. State, 306 Ga. 391, 400 (830 SE2d 110) (2019)
(explaining that “attorneys are not permitted to misstate the law to
the jury”); Battle v. State, 305 Ga. 268, 275-276 (824 SE2d 335)
(2019) (concluding that after defense counsel objected to the
prosecutor’s misstatements of the law during his closing argument,
the trial court took “appropriate corrective action” by admonishing
the prosecutor and instructing the jury on the points that had been
misstated); Jones v. State, 110 Ga. 252, 252 (34 SE 205) (1899)
(holding that when defense counsel asserted in argument that if the
13 victim had used a certain vile epithet, the defendant would be
justified in fatally stabbing him, the trial court did not err by
interjecting to instruct the jury that there was no such law and that
no opprobrious words or abusive language could justify a killing).6
The trial court then explained that the jury would have to
make a determination of whether Appellant acted in self-defense
“[a]t the moment of the stabbing,” and that a finding that Harris
brought the knife to the fight would not end that determination.
Those were accurate statements of the law. Even if the jury found
6 We note, however, that particularly when opposing counsel does not
deem a misstatement of the law worthy of objection, the trial court may not be required to interrupt the closing argument to correct the misstatement. See Venturino, 306 Ga. at 399 (holding that misstatements of the law are “outside the purview of OCGA § 17-8-75,” which requires the trial court to interpose and prevent counsel from making in front of the jury only “ ‘statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence’”). See also Varner v. State, 306 Ga. 726, 734-735 (832 SE2d 792) (2019) (explaining that counsel may have valid strategic reasons for not objecting to opposing counsel’s argument misstating the law). Among other things, the court might see how the other party addresses the misstatement during argument or might wait for the final jury instructions to address the issue. See, e.g., Varner, 306 Ga. at 735 (holding that a misstatement of law during closing argument caused no prejudice where the court instructed the jurors that the court would charge them on the law and correctly instructed them on the law at issue during the final charge). Nevertheless, the possibility or even the preferability of dealing with an issue differently when viewed in hindsight does not render a court’s decision in the moment at trial an abuse of the court’s broad discretion to supervise the proceeding. 14 that Harris brought a knife to the fight, in order to determine that
Appellant acted in self-defense, the jury would have to find — among
other things — that he reasonably believed that it was necessary to
defend himself against Harris’s “imminent use of unlawful force.”
OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) (emphasis added). See also Rammage v. State,
307 Ga. 763, 766 (838 SE2d 249) (2020) (“[T]he doctrine of
reasonable fear does not apply to any case of homicide where the
danger apprehended is not urgent and pressing, or apparently so, at
the time of the killing.” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis
added)); Jimmerson, 289 Ga. at 367 (explaining that “‘[a] homicide
is not justified if the force used by the defendant exceeds that which
a reasonable person would believe was necessary to defend against
the victim’s unlawful act,’” so if a defendant uses excessive force to
kill a victim after disarming him, the defendant may be found guilty
of murder (citation omitted)).
Thus, the trial court correctly instructed the jury to determine
whether Appellant acted in self-defense at the time of the stabbing.
And although Appellant argues otherwise, nothing in this
15 instruction told the jury to disregard evidence pertaining to the time
before and after the stabbing. The court instead properly directed
the jury not to confine its determination of self-defense to the issue
of whether Harris brought the knife to the fight. Accordingly, we see
no obvious error in the first instruction. See Stripling, 304 Ga. at
135.
A closer question is presented by the trial court’s second
instruction, which was given in response to defense counsel’s
contentions that the State was required to show that Appellant “had
a knife,” that the case “turn[ed] on” how Appellant got the knife, and
that the State knew that how Appellant got the knife was “the most
critical point in the whole case.” Although the latter two statements
were not improper when considered in isolation, the first statement
essentially repeated the argument that the court had already
correctly deemed inappropriate. See Styles v. State, 309 Ga. 463, 470
(847 SE2d 325) (2020) (“A closing argument is to be judged in the
context in which it is made.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
The court was therefore authorized (but, again, not required) to
16 interrupt counsel to provide a second instruction to the jury. See
Davis, 234 Ga. at 731.
Unlike the first instruction, which the trial court gave after
time for reflection during a bench conference with counsel, this time
the court immediately said, “[I]t doesn’t matter how [Appellant] got
the knife, it’s when the stabbing occurred, was [he] justified in using
self defense,” and “It’s not how he got the knife . . . is everybody clear
on that?” The court’s statement about the knife not “matter[ing]”
incorrectly suggested that all of the evidence about how Appellant
got the knife was irrelevant, and the court’s asking if the jury was
“clear on that” emphasized that point. Those parts of the instruction
were inartful, but viewed in light of the instruction that preceded
them and the jury instructions as a whole, we conclude that they did
not rise to the level of obvious or harmful error. See Foster v. State,
306 Ga. 587, 590 (832 SE2d 346) (2019) (explaining that an allegedly
erroneous jury instruction must be evaluated “in the context of the
instructions as a whole”).
To begin, it appears that the court’s second instruction —
17 which started with, “Counselor, I will again say” — was an attempt
to restate the first instruction. Both instructions correctly informed
the jury that it had to make the determination of whether Appellant
acted in self-defense at the time of the stabbing. The first
instruction, however, said that a finding that Harris brought the
knife to the fight would not “end[ the jury’s] determination” of self-
defense, while the second instruction went a step further, saying
that whether Harris or Appellant brought the knife to the fight did
not “matter.” That difference in language is problematic, but
Appellant did not bring this concern to the court’s attention during
the trial, and given the other similarities in the two instructions, the
court (as well as the parties and the jury) might well have viewed
the second instruction as a reiteration of the first one it had given.
See Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680, 684-685 (2) (724 SE2d 366)
(2012) (explaining that under the plain error test, the error must be
so obvious that “‘the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in
countenancing it, even absent the defendant’s timely assistance in
detecting it’” (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (102
18 SCt 1584, 71 LE2d 816) (1982))).
Moreover, during its final charge of the jury after the closing
arguments, the trial court fully and accurately instructed on
justification, self-defense, no duty to retreat, and excessive force.
The court also repeatedly directed the jury to consider all of the
circumstances of the case, saying that the facts are for the jury to
determine “from all of the evidence presented” and “given all of the
circumstances of the case”; that the jurors must acquit Appellant if
their minds are unsettled after giving consideration “to all the facts
and circumstances of this case”; that the jury must determine
whether or not the killing was done “in circumstance[s] that would
be justifiable”; and that the standard for self-defense “is whether the
circumstances were such they would excite . . . the fears of a
reasonable person.” These instructions were repeated nearly
verbatim when the trial court recharged on justification after the
jury requested clarification about the charge. The jury was therefore
fully informed that it was to consider all of the circumstances and
evidence in the case.
19 In sum, the trial court’s statement about the knife not
“matter[ing],” when evaluated in the context of the first instruction
and the charge as a whole, did not create a clear and obvious error
beyond reasonable dispute with respect to the jury’s understanding
that it was to consider all of the evidence presented at trial in
determining whether Appellant acted in self-defense when he fatally
stabbed Harris. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 706, 712-713 (832
SE2d 809) (2019) (holding that after considering the charge as a
whole, the trial court’s “unfortunate slip-of-the-tongue” resulting in
one improper instruction on malice murder would not have misled
or confused the jury and did not amount to plain error); Jackson v.
State, 303 Ga. 487, 490 (813 SE2d 372) (2018) (concluding that the
trial court’s failure to give a separate instruction on proximate
causation was not an obvious error because the jury charge as a
whole adequately instructed on the element of causation for the
crimes of which the defendant was convicted); Hood, 303 Ga. at 426
(holding that the alleged errors in jury instructions on justification
were not obvious when viewed in light of the instructions as a
20 whole).7
For the same reasons, Appellant has not shown that, but for
the trial court’s isolated improper statement, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been more
favorable to him. See, e.g., Jackson, 306 Ga. at 713 (holding under
plain error review that because the charge as a whole would not
have misled or confused the jury, the trial court’s one incorrect
instruction was not harmful); Hood, 303 Ga. at 426 (holding that the
appellant could not show that the trial court’s failure to provide
additional jury instructions regarding his justification defense likely
affected the outcome of his trial, because the instructions as a whole
provided the jury with sufficient direction to evaluate that defense).
Accordingly, Appellant has not met his high burden of establishing
7 In support of his argument that the trial court committed plain error
by giving the two instructions, Appellant cites several cases in which there was some evidence that a defendant killed a victim in self-defense after they struggled over a weapon. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 494, 496 (651 SE2d 702) (2007); Koritta v. State, 263 Ga. 703, 704 (438 SE2d 68) (1994). Those cases hold nothing, however, about jury instructions on self-defense of the sort at issue in this case, and to the extent Appellant argues that they demonstrate the jury’s duty to examine all of the circumstances in determining whether a defendant acted in self-defense, we have just explained that the trial court repeatedly instructed on that duty during its final charge. 21 plain error.
(b) Appellant next contends that the trial court deprived him
of a fair trial because the two interruptions and instructions
prevented his counsel from making a full closing argument. We may
assume without deciding that this claim is preserved for appellate
review, because Appellant has not shown that his right to a fair trial
was violated.
The trial court’s interruptions and instructions did not
preclude Appellant’s counsel from robustly arguing that Harris
brought the knife to the fight and used it to attack Appellant.
Indeed, counsel focused his closing argument on the evidence that
Harris brought the knife to the fight and attempted to discredit the
evidence that Appellant went back to his house to get the knife.
Counsel argued that Mosley, “the only eye witness,” told
investigators and testified at trial that Harris “brought the knife to
the fight and had the knife first,” which was a “huge problem” for
the State’s case. Counsel also asserted that the prosecutor did not
inform the jury that Mosley told the same story to investigators that
22 she told at trial. In addition, counsel argued that the probation
officers who testified that Mosley said that Appellant went back to
their house to get the knife were not credible, because the officers
did not have Mosley write and sign a statement and because it would
have taken Appellant about 20 minutes to go home to get the knife
while Harris waited for them to resume their fight, which was
implausible. Counsel discussed the law of self-defense and
repeatedly argued that the State could not prove that Appellant had
the knife first; that Harris “brought [the] knife to the fight” and
“tried to kill” Appellant, who was afraid and fought “to save his life”;
and that Appellant had “the right to not retreat” and to respond with
lethal force “to stop [Harris].”
Appellant has not established that the trial court prevented his
counsel from fully arguing his theory of self-defense. Thus,
Appellant has not shown that the court violated his right to a fair
trial. See, e.g., Terrell v. State, 271 Ga. 783, 786-787 (523 SE2d 294)
(1999) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
preventing defense counsel from arguing “that the State had
23 something to hide,” because the “court has discretion to determine
the range of proper closing argument” and counsel was permitted to
and did argue that the State did not adequately investigate the case
and that its witnesses were not credible), disapproved on other
grounds by Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 686 (820 SE2d 640) (2018);
Massey v. State, 272 Ga. 50, 51 (525 SE2d 694) (2000) (holding that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting the
defendant’s closing argument by admonishing defense counsel not
to misstate the law).8
(c) Finally, Appellant claims that his trial counsel provided
8 Relying on cases holding that prejudice to a defendant is presumed
when the trial court errs by violating the statutory requirement that counsel be given two hours for closing argument in a murder case, see, e.g., Ricketts v. State, 276 Ga. 466, 470-471 (579 SE2d 205) (2003), Appellant asserts that we should presume prejudice in this case. But those cases do not apply here, because Appellant does not argue and the record does not indicate that the trial court improperly limited the amount of time for closing argument. Also, to the extent Appellant asserts that certain remarks during the prosecutor’s closing argument exacerbated the alleged errors in the trial court’s interruptions and instructions, his counsel did not object to those remarks, so the issue is not preserved for review on appeal, even under a plain error standard, see Norman v. State, 298 Ga. 344, 347 (781 SE2d 784) (2016), and Appellant does not enumerate as error that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in this respect.
24 ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court’s
interruptions and instructions. To prevail on this claim, Appellant
must prove both that his counsel’s performance was professionally
deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
To establish deficient performance, Appellant must show that
counsel performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way,
considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing
professional norms. See id. at 687-690. To prove prejudice, Appellant
must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been
different. See id. at 694. We need not address both parts of the
Strickland test if Appellant makes an insufficient showing on one.
See id. at 697.
Appellant claims first that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the interruptions and instructions
on the ground that the trial court prevented him from making a full
closing argument. Because we concluded in Division 2 (b) above that
25 the court did not err in that respect, counsel did not perform
deficiently by failing to make such an objection. See Smith v. State,
308 Ga. 81, 89 (839 SE2d 630) (2020) (“‘[D]eficient performance is
not shown by counsel’s failure to raise a meritless objection.’”
(citation omitted)).
Appellant argues next that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the trial court’s instructions on the ground that
they told the jury to ignore evidence that Harris brought the knife
to the fight. As discussed in Division 2 (a) above, the trial court
initially interrupted counsel’s closing argument to correct his
misstatement of the law and to provide an accurate instruction on
the law of self-defense. An objection to that instruction would have
been meritless, so trial counsel did not perform deficiently by
deciding not to object. See id.
As we also discussed above, the trial court in its second
instruction improperly said that it did not matter how Appellant got
the knife, although we have already explained why that part of the
instruction did not amount to an obvious or harmful error under
26 plain error review. Even if we assume that trial counsel performed
deficiently by failing to object to that aspect of the instruction,
Appellant has not established that any such deficiency resulted in
prejudice, as “the test for prejudice in the ineffective assistance
analysis is equivalent to the test for harm in plain error review.”
Roberts v. State, 305 Ga. 257, 265 (824 SE2d 326) (2019) (citation
and punctuation omitted).
For these reasons, Appellant’s ineffective assistance claims
lack merit.
Judgment affirmed. Melton, C. J., and Boggs, Peterson, Bethel, Ellington, and McMillian, JJ., concur. Warren, J., not participating.
DECIDED DECEMBER 21, 2020. Murder. Newton Superior Court. Before Judge Ott. Brian Steel, for appellant. Layla H. Zon, District Attorney, Bailey R. Simkoff, Candice L. Branche, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.