Knight v. York

Fourth Circuit

Knight v. York

32 F. App'x 118

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedApril 16, 2002

Docket01-7760

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 32 F. App'x 118 (Knight v. York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Knight v. York, 32 F. App'x 118 (4th Cir. 2002).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Kenneth M. Knight, Sr., seeks to appeal the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.2001). The district court’s final order was entered on July 20, 2001. Knight filed a notice of appeal dated October 5, 2001, well after his time for noting an appeal had expired under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). In this document Knight claimed he did not receive notice of entry of final judgment until September 24, 2001. Even if the notice of appeal were considered as a motion for extension of time under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6), cf. Shah v. Hutto, 722 F.2d 1167, 1168-69 (4th Cir.1983), it was filed more than seven days after the date Knight claims to have received notice of the district court’s order and is, therefore, untimely. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6)(A); Hensley v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 651 F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir.1981). Because we are without jurisdiction, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. See Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED.

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PER CURIAM.

Kenneth M. Knight, Sr., seeks to appeal the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.2001). The district court’s final order was entered on July 20, 2001. Knight filed a notice of appeal dated October 5, 2001, well after his time for noting an appeal had expired under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). In this document Knight claimed he did not receive notice of entry of final judgment until September 24, 2001. Even if the notice of appeal were considered as a motion for extension of time under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6), cf. Shah v. Hutto, 722 F.2d 1167, 1168-69 (4th Cir.1983), it was filed more than seven days after the date Knight claims to have received notice of the district court’s order and is, therefore, untimely. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6)(A); Hensley v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 651 F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir.1981). Because we are without jurisdiction, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. See Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED.

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Bluebook (online)

32 F. App'x 118, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knight-v-york-ca4-2002.

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