KNIGHT v. WILLIAMS

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedOctober 20, 2023
Docket5:23-cv-00369
StatusUnknown

This text of KNIGHT v. WILLIAMS (KNIGHT v. WILLIAMS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KNIGHT v. WILLIAMS, (M.D. Ga. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

WILLIAM JAMES KNIGHT, : : Plaintiff, : : VS. : NO. 5:23-CV-00369-TES-CHW : WARDEN JOE WILLIAMS, et al., : : Defendants. : ________________________________ :

ORDER Plaintiff William James Knight, an inmate presently incarcerated in the Special Management Unit in Jackson, Georgia, has filed a pro se Complaint seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action (ECF No. 2). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, and Plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee of $20.00 if he wishes to proceed with this action. In addition, Plaintiff may recast his Complaint on the Court’s standard form to state his claims against the Defendants identified in the body of his Complaint, as explained in more detail below. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS Plaintiff has moved for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee in this action (ECF No. 2). Because Plaintiff’s submissions demonstrate that Plaintiff is presently unable to pay the cost of commencing this action, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Even if a prisoner is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, however, he must still pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee in installments based on funds in the prisoner’s account. When a prisoner has funds in his

account, he must pay an initial partial filing fee of twenty percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). A review of Plaintiff’s prison trust fund account certification shows an average monthly balance of $100.00 over the last six months and a present balance on hand of $64.88. Attach. 1 to Mot. Proceed IFP 1, ECF No. 2-1.

Twenty percent of $100.00 is $20.00. Plaintiff is therefore ORDERED to pay an initial partial filing fee of $20.00 if he wishes to proceed with this action. Following payment of the initial partial filing fee, money will be deducted from Plaintiff’s account until the filing fee ($350.00) is paid in full as set forth in § 1915(b) and explained below. It is accordingly DIRECTED that the CLERK forward a copy of this

ORDER to the business manager of the facility in which Plaintiff is incarcerated so that withdrawals from his account may commence as payment towards the filing fee. The district court’s filing fee is not refundable, regardless of the outcome of the case, and must therefore be paid in full even if the Plaintiff’s complaint (or any part thereof) is dismissed prior to service.

I. Directions to Plaintiff’s Custodian It is hereby ORDERED that the warden of the institution wherein Plaintiff is incarcerated, or the sheriff of any county wherein he is held in custody, and any successor

2 custodians, each month cause to be remitted to the Clerk of this Court twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s account at said institution until the

$350.00 filing fee has been paid in full. In accordance with provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Plaintiff’s custodian is hereby authorized to forward payments from the prisoner’s account to the Clerk of Court each month until the filing fee is paid in full, provided the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. It is further ORDERED that collection of monthly payments from Plaintiff’s trust fund account shall continue until the entire $350.00 has been collected, notwithstanding the dismissal of

Plaintiff’s lawsuit (or any part thereof) or the granting of judgment against him prior to the collection of the full filing fee. II. Plaintiff’s Obligations on Release An individual’s release from prison does not excuse his prior noncompliance with the provisions of the PLRA. In the event Plaintiff is hereafter released from the custody

of the State of Georgia or any county thereof, he shall remain obligated to pay those installments justified by the income to his prisoner trust account while he was still incarcerated. Collection from Plaintiff of any balance due on these payments by any means permitted by law is hereby authorized in the event Plaintiff is released from custody and fails to remit such payments. Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal if he has

the ability to make such payments and fails to do so or if he otherwise fails to comply with the provisions of the PLRA.

3 Plaintiff has FOURTEEN (14) DAYS from the date shown on this Order to pay a partial filing fee of $20.00. If circumstances have changed and Plaintiff cannot pay the

initial partial filing fee as ordered, Plaintiff should file a renewed motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, accompanied by an updated prison trust fund account statement, explaining such change in circumstances within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of the date of this Order. ORDER TO RECAST COMPLAINT Plaintiff’s claims arise from his present incarceration in the Special Management

Unit in Jackson, Georgia. Compl. 5, ECF No. 1. According to the Complaint, Joe Williams, the prison’s warden, and Tyrone Oliver, the Georgia Department of Corrections Commissioner, “refused to provide the names of potential defendants for a 42 USC § 1983 claim that [he is] attempting to file, preventing [him] from being able to do so.” Id. Plaintiff further submits that his “primary 42 USC § 1983 suit is under a time constraint

that the statute of limitations poses and the appeal process can take up to 120 days, therefore, [he] opted to go ahead and file suit.” Attach. 1 to Compl. 1, ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff’s allegations give rise to a claim that Defendants Williams and Tyrone have impeded his access to the courts. “Access to the courts is clearly a constitutional right, grounded in the First Amendment, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the

Fifth Amendment, and/or the Fourteenth Amendment.” Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n. 12 (2002)). “To have standing to seek relief under this right, however, a plaintiff must show actual

4 injury by ‘demonstrat[ing] that a nonfrivolous legal claim ha[s] been frustrated or . . . impeded.’” Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 331 F.3d 790, 797 (11th Cir.

2003) (alterations and omission in original) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 (1996)). In other words, “[t]he injury requirement means that the plaintiff must have an underlying cause of action the vindication of which is prevented by the denial of access to the courts.” Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for Escambia Cnty., 592 F.3d 1237, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that Defendants have caused him

an actual injury. Plaintiff’s claims are based on his assertion that Defendants have prevented him from discovering the names of the individuals he wishes to name in another lawsuit. It is true that generally, “fictitious party pleading is not permitted in federal court.” Richardson v.

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Related

Richardson v. Johnson
598 F.3d 734 (Eleventh Circuit, 2010)
Lewis v. Casey
518 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Christopher v. Harbury
536 U.S. 403 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Chappell v. Rich
340 F.3d 1279 (Eleventh Circuit, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
KNIGHT v. WILLIAMS, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knight-v-williams-gamd-2023.