Knight v. Elko County

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Case No.: 3:22-cv-00331-MMD-CSD WADE ALAN KNIGHT, 4 Order Plaintiff 5 Re: ECF Nos. 37, 38 v. 6 ELKO COUNTY, et al. 7 Defendants 8

9 Before the court are Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment against defendant 10 Ricks (ECF No. 37) and Ricks motion to set aside the clerk’s entry of default (ECF No. 38). 11 I. BACKGROUND 12 Plaintiff is an inmate in custody of the Elko County Detention Center (ECDC). The court 13 screened his first amended complaint, and allowed him to proceed with an Eighth or Fourteenth 14 Amendment medical care claim that Ricks and Crowther were deliberately indifferent to his 15 serious medical need based on allegations they did not treat his hepatitis C. He was also allowed 16 to proceed against Elko County under a theory of municipal liability for an alleged policy not to 17 treat hepatitis C due to cost. He was allowed to proceed with a claim under the Eighth and 18 Fourteenth Amendment for conditions of confinement related to the showers at the jail against 19 Parry. Finally, he was also allowed to proceed with a Fourteenth Amendment claim for violation 20 of bodily privacy related to camera placement and video-access policies at ECDC against Parry, 21 Narvaiza and Elko County. (ECF No. 8.) 22 Summonses were issued for the defendants. (ECF No. 9.) The summons was returned 23 executed for defendant Ricks. The proof of service states the individual was personally served at 1 Medallus Medical. (ECF No. 11-3 at 2.) Ricks did not appear in the case, and on Plaintiff’s 2 motion, the court directed the Clerk to enter default against Ricks, and the Clerk did so on 3 February 3, 2023. (ECF Nos. 33, 34.) 4 On February 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed his motion for entry of default judgment against

5 Ricks. (ECF No. 37.) 6 On February 18, 2023, Ricks filed a motion to set aside the entry of default. (ECF No. 7 38.) Ricks asserts that she was not personally served with the summons and complaint, but some 8 other person at her employer was served. After some investigation, her employer contacted its 9 insurer, and counsel in Utah was retained to defend her on February 16, 2023. Utah counsel then 10 located local counsel in Reno, Nevada, and this motion was filed shortly thereafter. 11 II. DISCUSSION 12 Preliminarily, it is appropriate to grant Ricks’ motion because Plaintiff did not oppose the 13 request to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default. LR 7-2(d). Moreover, Ricks’ motion sets forth 14 good cause for setting aside the entry of default.

15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) provides that “[w]hen a party against whom a 16 judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defendant, and that 17 failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. 18 P. 55(a). 19 “The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). “To 20 determine ‘good cause,’ a court must ‘consider[ ] three factors: (1) whether [the party seeking to 21 set aside the default] engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default; (2) whether [the party] 22 had [no] meritorious defense; or (3) whether reopening the default judgment would prejudice’ 23 the other party.” U.S. v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted, alteration original) (Mesle). “A finding that any one of 2 these factors is true is sufficient reason for the district court to refuse to set aside the default.” Id. 3 (citation omitted). That said, the “rules for determining when a default should be set aside are 4 solicitous towards movants, especially those whose actions leading to the default were taken

5 without the benefit of legal representation.” Id. at 1089 (citations omitted). 6 “[J]udgment by default is a drastic step appropriate only in extreme circumstances; a case 7 should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits.” Id. (citations omitted). 8 First, insofar as culpable conduct is concerned, “a defendant’s conduct is culpable if he 9 has received actual or constructive notice of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to 10 answer.” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1092 (citations omitted, emphasis original). “[I]n this context the 11 term ‘intentionally’ means that a movant cannot be treated as culpable simply for having made a 12 conscious choice not to answer; rather, to treat a failure to answer as culpable, the movant must 13 have acted with bad faith, such as an ‘intention to take advantage of the opposing party, 14 interfering with judicial decisionmaking, or otherwise manipulate the legal process.’” Id.

15 (citation omitted). Courts have “‘typically held that a defendant’s conduct was culpable for 16 purposes of the [good cause] factors where there is no explanation of the default inconsistent 17 with a devious, deliberate, willful, or bad faith failure to respond.’” Id. (citation omitted). 18 “[S]imple carelessness” is typically not sufficient. Id. (citations omitted). 19 As soon as an investigation was made into the lawsuit after someone at Ricks’ employer 20 was served, counsel was retained for Plaintiff, and this motion was filed. There is no culpable 21 conduct on Ricks’ part. 22 Second, “‘[a] defendant seeking to vacate a default judgment must present specific facts 23 that would constitute a defense. But the burden on a party seeking to vacate a default judgment is 1 not extraordinarily heavy.’” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1094 (citation omitted). “All that is necessary to 2 satisfy the ‘meritorious defense’ requirement is to allege sufficient facts that, if true, would 3 constitute a defense[.]” Id. “‘[T]he question whether the factual allegation [i]s true’ is not to be 4 determined by the court when it decides the motion to set aside the default.” Id. (citation

5 omitted). That is the subject of later litigation. Id. 6 Here, Ricks asserts that she will deny the factual allegations of the complaint and assert 7 she complied with all relevant standards of care. 8 The court finds this is sufficient to demonstrate a meritorious defense for purposes of 9 setting aside the entry of default. 10 Finally, to be prejudicial, setting aside the default must “‘result in greater harm than 11 simply delaying resolution of the case.’” Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1095 (citation omitted). “‘[T]he 12 standard is whether [plaintiffs’] ability to pursue [their] claim will be hindered.’” TCI Group Life 13 Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds, (citing 14 Falk v. Allen, 739 F.3d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)). Merely being forced to litigate on

15 the merits is not prejudicial. Id. 16 Plaintiff would not be prejudiced by an order setting aside default because he has not 17 opposed the motion to set forth any purported prejudice. Moreover, this case is in its early stages 18 and Plaintiff has plenty of time to conduct discovery and pursue his claim as to Ricks. The fact 19 that Plaintiff does not oppose Ricks’ motion, coupled with the brief amount of time that Ricks 20 was in default, leads the court to conclude that setting aside the default would not be prejudicial 21 to Plaintiff. 22 In sum, these factors, coupled with the public policy of deciding cases on their merits, 23 weigh in favor of setting aside the Clerk’s entry of default against Ricks. 1 Ill. CONCLUSION 2 Ricks’ motion to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default (ECF No. 38) is GRANTED and 3|| Plaintiff's motion for entry of default judgment (ECF No. 37) is DENIED AS MOOT. 4 5 6 IT ISSO ORDERED. Dated: March 6, 2023 CS oy Craig S. Denney 10 United States Magistrate Judge 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23