Knight v. City of Winter Park

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJune 30, 2025
Docket6:25-cv-00245
StatusUnknown

This text of Knight v. City of Winter Park (Knight v. City of Winter Park) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knight v. City of Winter Park, (M.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER KNIGHT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:25-cv-245-CEM-LHP

CITY OF WINTER PARK,

Defendant

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form), which has been construed as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. No. 2. The matter has been referred to the undersigned and is ripe for review. Upon consideration, the undersigned will respectfully recommend that the motion (Doc. No. 2) be denied without prejudice and Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. No. 1) be dismissed with leave to amend. I. BACKGROUND. On February 14, 2025, Plaintiff Christopher Knight, appearing pro se, instituted this action against Defendant the City of Winter Park (“the City”) by filing a Complaint for Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, Due Process Violations, Extortion, Mail Fraud, and Other Federal Violations. Doc. No. 1. The complaint cites several cases, statutes, and legal doctrines, but alleges facts generally. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that the City “issued citations” in violation of his “lawful right to travel privately,” “enforce[d] commercial motor vehicle statutes” against him in excess of the City’s authority, subjected Plaintiff to “an unlawful administrative

hearing,” imposed fines, and tried to collect the fines through the mail. Id. ¶¶ 5–9. In support, Plaintiff attaches to the complaint notices setting hearings, at Plaintiff’s request, on red light violations, id. at 10–11, Notices of Red Traffic Signal Violation, id. at 13, 15, a letter from the City regarding how to contest the violation, id. at 16,

documents concerning Plaintiff’s hearing requests, id. at 17–20, and an email from Plaintiff to the City titled “Unlawful Administrative Hearing & Due Process Violations,” id. at 22.

The complaint includes claims for deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, due process violations, extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 872, and mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 876, 1341. Id. at 7–8. Plaintiff seeks $250,000.00 in damages and

declaratory/injunctive relief. Id. at 9. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

The Court must conduct a two-step inquiry when a plaintiff files a complaint and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. First, the Court must evaluate the plaintiff’s financial status and determine whether he or she is eligible to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, the Court must review the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) and dismiss the complaint if the action is

frivolous or malicious, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or the complaint seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).1 A complaint is frivolous within the

meaning of § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations must show plausibility. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 557 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citation omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A pro se complaint should be construed leniently, but a court does not have

“license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th

1 The statute governing proceedings in forma pauperis references actions instituted by prisoners, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915, but has been interpreted to apply to all litigants requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004). Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. Moreover, a pro se litigant “is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989). III. ANALYSIS.

Upon review of Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2), it appears that Plaintiff qualifies as a pauper pursuant to § 1915(a)(1). However, Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. No. 1) does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and thus it is subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the City’s issuance of citations for red light violations, in alleged violation of his right to travel. Doc. No. 1, at 7. “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the

defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted). “More

than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Hannah v. Union Corr. Inst., No. 3:12-cv-436-J-20JBT, 2012 WL 1413163, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2012) (citing L.S.T., Inc., v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556–57 (11th Cir.

1984)). Here, Plaintiff’s complaint is comprised mostly of legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations, to include bare references to citations,

administrative hearings, and attempts to collect fines, without demonstrating how said facts violated any constitutional rights. Doc. No. 1. Cf. Carpenter v. Putnam Cty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 3:20-cv-1073-J-34JRK, 2020 WL 6134218, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct.

19, 2020) (dismissing § 1983 claims that only generally alleged legal conclusions and failed to provide any factual allegations to support a claim upon which relief could be granted); see also Hurt v. Florida, No. 3:18-cv-368-J-39JRK, 2018 WL 8787782, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2018) (“Conclusory or vague allegations are insufficient to state

a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

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Knight v. City of Winter Park, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knight-v-city-of-winter-park-flmd-2025.