24-977 Knight v. City of New York
United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term 2025
Argued: December 8, 2025 Decided: January 13, 2026
No. 24-977
CAVALIER D. KNIGHT, Managing Member of Cavalier Knight LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK, JESSICA TISCH, as the Statutory Handgun Licensing Officer and the Police Commissioner of New York City, and her successors in office,
Defendants-Appellees. *
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York No. 22-cv-3215, Valerie E. Caproni, Judge.
Before: CHIN, SULLIVAN, and KAHN, Circuit Judges.
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above. Cavalier D. Knight, a would-be gun dealer residing in New York City, appeals from an order of the district court dismissing for lack of Article III standing his challenges to two New York City regulations governing the purchase and sale of firearms. The first regulation prohibits purchasers from buying more than one gun every ninety days. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-302.1(b) (“No person shall acquire a firearm if such person has acquired a firearm within the previous ninety days.”). The second requires applicants for firearms dealer licenses to “maintain a place of business in the city,” id. § 10-302(c)(1), which effectively requires the applicant to maintain a brick-and-mortar location, see 38 R.C.N.Y. § 4-03(k), (t)(1), (t)(3)–(5). Knight alleges that both regulations violate the Second Amendment as well as various other federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions.
The magistrate judge to whom the case had been referred, the Honorable Valerie Figueredo, recommended that the district court dismiss Knight’s complaint either for lack of Article III standing or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation regarding standing and thus declined to reach the magistrate judge’s recommendation concerning whether Knight had alleged sufficient facts to state a claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day rule, vacate its dismissal of his challenges to the place-of-business requirement, and remand for the district court to consider in the first instance the merits of his challenges to the latter provision.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART.
CAVALIER D. KNIGHT, pro se, New York, NY.
CHASE HENRY MECHANICK (Devin Slack, Martin K. Rowe III, on the brief), for Muriel Goode-Trufant, Acting Corporation Counsel, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants- Appellees.
2 PER CURIAM:
Cavalier D. Knight, a would-be gun dealer residing in New York City,
appeals from an order of the district court dismissing for lack of Article III standing
his challenges to two New York City regulations governing the purchase and sale
of firearms. The first regulation prohibits purchasers from buying more than one
gun every ninety days. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-302.1(b) (“No person shall
acquire a firearm if such person has acquired a firearm within the previous ninety
days.”). The second requires applicants for firearms dealer licenses to “maintain
a place of business in the city,” id. § 10-302(c)(1), which effectively requires the
applicant to maintain a brick-and-mortar location, see 38 R.C.N.Y. § 4-03(k), (t)(1),
(t)(3)–(5). Knight alleges that both regulations violate the Second Amendment as
well as various other federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions.
The magistrate judge to whom the case had been referred, the Honorable
Valerie Figueredo, recommended that the district court dismiss Knight’s
complaint either for lack of Article III standing or, in the alternative, for failure to
state a claim. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation
regarding standing and thus declined to reach the magistrate judge’s
recommendation concerning whether Knight had alleged sufficient facts to state a
3 claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day rule, vacate its dismissal of his challenges to
the place-of-business requirement, and remand for the district court to consider in
the first instance the merits of his challenges to the latter provision.
I. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of
Article III standing. Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods v. Vill. of Chestnut
Ridge, 98 F.4th 386, 391 (2d Cir. 2024). At the pleading stage, the plaintiff must
“allege[] facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [he] has standing to
sue.” Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a plaintiff has carried that
burden, we assume that all well-pleaded factual allegations in the operative
complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.
Where, as here, a non-lawyer plaintiff chooses to represent himself, “his pleadings
and other filings are interpreted to raise the strongest claims they suggest.”
Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024).
In reviewing the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss Knight’s
complaint for lack of standing, the district court determined that the clear-error
4 standard applied and that, in the alternative, Knight’s objections thereto failed
under de novo review. As we recently explained, a district court may review a
report and recommendation for clear error when a party’s “objections are
nonspecific or merely perfunctory responses argued in an attempt to engage the
district court in a rehashing of the same arguments set forth in the original
petition.” Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th 349, 361 (2d Cir. 2025)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But “[w]here a litigant’s objections take issue
with a specific legal conclusion in the report and recommendation, they should be
considered de novo, even if they repeat an argument raised before the magistrate
judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
With respect to Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day requirement, the
district court accurately observed that Knight’s objections were “unrelated to
Judge Figueredo’s conclusions” or were otherwise “perfunctory, conclusory, and
not substantive.” Sp. App’x at 18. Thus, the district court correctly reviewed
that portion of the report and recommendation for clear error.
The same cannot be said of Knight’s challenges to the place-of-business
requirement. In objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, Knight
argued that his inability to obtain a dealer license exposed him to a “risk [of]
5 criminal prosecution” if he started his business; he also argued that the magistrate
judge had “misunderst[ood]” the nature of his injury, which he claimed was
redressable through an order granting his “requested relief” – namely, an
injunction requiring Defendants to grant him a state dealer license. Dist. Ct. Doc.
No. 93 at 27, 34.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
24-977 Knight v. City of New York
United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term 2025
Argued: December 8, 2025 Decided: January 13, 2026
No. 24-977
CAVALIER D. KNIGHT, Managing Member of Cavalier Knight LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK, JESSICA TISCH, as the Statutory Handgun Licensing Officer and the Police Commissioner of New York City, and her successors in office,
Defendants-Appellees. *
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York No. 22-cv-3215, Valerie E. Caproni, Judge.
Before: CHIN, SULLIVAN, and KAHN, Circuit Judges.
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above. Cavalier D. Knight, a would-be gun dealer residing in New York City, appeals from an order of the district court dismissing for lack of Article III standing his challenges to two New York City regulations governing the purchase and sale of firearms. The first regulation prohibits purchasers from buying more than one gun every ninety days. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-302.1(b) (“No person shall acquire a firearm if such person has acquired a firearm within the previous ninety days.”). The second requires applicants for firearms dealer licenses to “maintain a place of business in the city,” id. § 10-302(c)(1), which effectively requires the applicant to maintain a brick-and-mortar location, see 38 R.C.N.Y. § 4-03(k), (t)(1), (t)(3)–(5). Knight alleges that both regulations violate the Second Amendment as well as various other federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions.
The magistrate judge to whom the case had been referred, the Honorable Valerie Figueredo, recommended that the district court dismiss Knight’s complaint either for lack of Article III standing or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation regarding standing and thus declined to reach the magistrate judge’s recommendation concerning whether Knight had alleged sufficient facts to state a claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day rule, vacate its dismissal of his challenges to the place-of-business requirement, and remand for the district court to consider in the first instance the merits of his challenges to the latter provision.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART.
CAVALIER D. KNIGHT, pro se, New York, NY.
CHASE HENRY MECHANICK (Devin Slack, Martin K. Rowe III, on the brief), for Muriel Goode-Trufant, Acting Corporation Counsel, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants- Appellees.
2 PER CURIAM:
Cavalier D. Knight, a would-be gun dealer residing in New York City,
appeals from an order of the district court dismissing for lack of Article III standing
his challenges to two New York City regulations governing the purchase and sale
of firearms. The first regulation prohibits purchasers from buying more than one
gun every ninety days. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-302.1(b) (“No person shall
acquire a firearm if such person has acquired a firearm within the previous ninety
days.”). The second requires applicants for firearms dealer licenses to “maintain
a place of business in the city,” id. § 10-302(c)(1), which effectively requires the
applicant to maintain a brick-and-mortar location, see 38 R.C.N.Y. § 4-03(k), (t)(1),
(t)(3)–(5). Knight alleges that both regulations violate the Second Amendment as
well as various other federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions.
The magistrate judge to whom the case had been referred, the Honorable
Valerie Figueredo, recommended that the district court dismiss Knight’s
complaint either for lack of Article III standing or, in the alternative, for failure to
state a claim. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation
regarding standing and thus declined to reach the magistrate judge’s
recommendation concerning whether Knight had alleged sufficient facts to state a
3 claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day rule, vacate its dismissal of his challenges to
the place-of-business requirement, and remand for the district court to consider in
the first instance the merits of his challenges to the latter provision.
I. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of
Article III standing. Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods v. Vill. of Chestnut
Ridge, 98 F.4th 386, 391 (2d Cir. 2024). At the pleading stage, the plaintiff must
“allege[] facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [he] has standing to
sue.” Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a plaintiff has carried that
burden, we assume that all well-pleaded factual allegations in the operative
complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.
Where, as here, a non-lawyer plaintiff chooses to represent himself, “his pleadings
and other filings are interpreted to raise the strongest claims they suggest.”
Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024).
In reviewing the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss Knight’s
complaint for lack of standing, the district court determined that the clear-error
4 standard applied and that, in the alternative, Knight’s objections thereto failed
under de novo review. As we recently explained, a district court may review a
report and recommendation for clear error when a party’s “objections are
nonspecific or merely perfunctory responses argued in an attempt to engage the
district court in a rehashing of the same arguments set forth in the original
petition.” Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th 349, 361 (2d Cir. 2025)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But “[w]here a litigant’s objections take issue
with a specific legal conclusion in the report and recommendation, they should be
considered de novo, even if they repeat an argument raised before the magistrate
judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
With respect to Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day requirement, the
district court accurately observed that Knight’s objections were “unrelated to
Judge Figueredo’s conclusions” or were otherwise “perfunctory, conclusory, and
not substantive.” Sp. App’x at 18. Thus, the district court correctly reviewed
that portion of the report and recommendation for clear error.
The same cannot be said of Knight’s challenges to the place-of-business
requirement. In objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, Knight
argued that his inability to obtain a dealer license exposed him to a “risk [of]
5 criminal prosecution” if he started his business; he also argued that the magistrate
judge had “misunderst[ood]” the nature of his injury, which he claimed was
redressable through an order granting his “requested relief” – namely, an
injunction requiring Defendants to grant him a state dealer license. Dist. Ct. Doc.
No. 93 at 27, 34. Although somewhat cryptically presented, these objections were
enough to warrant de novo review of the portion of the report recommending
dismissal of Knight’s challenges to the place-of-business requirement, especially
given the liberal standard under which his submissions must be read. See
Whitfield v. City of New York, 96 F.4th 504, 518 (2d Cir. 2024).
II. Discussion
To satisfy Article III’s standing requirement, “a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) injury-in-fact, which means ‘an actual or imminent’ and ‘concrete and
particularized’ harm to a ‘legally protected interest’; (2) causation of the injury,
which means that the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the challenged action of the
defendant; and (3) redressability, which means that it is ‘likely,’ not speculative,
that a favorable decision by a court will redress the injury.” Nat. Res. Def. Council
v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 894 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). For an injury in fact to be concrete
6 and particularized, it must “actually exist” and “affect the plaintiff in a personal
and individual way.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339–40 (2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Because ‘standing is not dispensed in gross,’ a
plaintiff ‘must demonstrate standing for each claim that he presses and for each
form of relief that he seeks (for example, injunctive relief and damages).’” Doe v.
Hochul, 139 F.4th 165, 185 (2d Cir. 2025) (alterations adopted) (quoting TransUnion
LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021)).
The district court correctly held that Knight failed to allege an Article III
injury attributable to the ninety-day rule. Knight does not allege that he
personally wishes to buy more than one gun every ninety days. Instead, he
appears to claim that the ninety-day rule injures him economically by decreasing
the rate at which potential customers could lawfully purchase firearms from him.
But Knight does not allege that he actually has (or imminently will have) a single
New York City customer whose efforts to purchase firearms from him are stymied
by the ninety-day rule. Accordingly, Knight’s complaint does not plausibly show
that the ninety-day rule affects him in a “personal and individual way.” Spokeo,
578 U.S. at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court therefore
correctly dismissed Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day rule for lack of standing.
7 We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to the district court’s
dismissal of Knight’s challenges to the place-of-business requirement. As
alleged, the City informed Knight that without a brick-and-mortar location, he
would be ineligible for a dealer license. The district court, however, held that this
aspect of Knight’s claim is not redressable because even with a dealer license,
unchallenged New York City zoning provisions would prohibit Knight’s
contemplated business. As the magistrate judge observed, Knight plans to
handle the administrative aspects of his business from his Manhattan apartment
while storing his inventory at an off-site location. But under the City’s zoning
laws, a residence may not be used to sell products manufactured elsewhere than
in the home and offsite storage of inventory is prohibited. See N.Y.C. Zoning
Resolution §§ 12-10, 22-10. According to the district court and magistrate judge,
any prospective relief with respect to the place-of-business requirement would
therefore make no material difference to Knight’s ability to run his business. We
disagree, and conclude that the district court’s understanding of Knight’s alleged
injuries, and thus of its ability to provide effective relief, was too narrow.
It is well-established that a credible threat of criminal prosecution can give
rise to a discrete, redressable injury under Article III. See Susan B. Anthony List v.
8 Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158–59 (2014). To demonstrate such an injury, the plaintiff
must “allege[] an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with
a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a
credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Id. at 159 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Vitagliano v. County of Westchester, 71 F.4th 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2023).
Here, Knight alleges just such an injury. He plans to run a commercial gun
dealing business in New York and has taken several concrete steps toward that
goal, including obtaining a federal firearms license and consulting with federal
and local agencies regarding his contemplated business. Because the commercial
availability of firearms is often “necessary to a citizen’s effective exercise of Second
Amendment rights,” Gazzola v. Hochul, 88 F.4th 186, 196 (2d Cir. 2023), Knight’s
proposed course of conduct is at least arguably affected with a constitutional
interest. But without the dealer license Knight seeks – which he cannot obtain by
virtue of the challenged place-of-business requirement – such conduct is
specifically prohibited by state law. See N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1-a), (16).
Knight therefore has plausibly alleged that if he starts running his business
without a dealer license, he will face a credible threat of criminal prosecution. See
Vitagliano, 71 F.4th at 138 (explaining that a credible threat of prosecution may be
9 presumed “where a statute specifically proscribes conduct” in which the plaintiff
intends to engage (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Indeed, Knight alleges that a City law-enforcement official personally threatened
him with criminal prosecution for unlicensed gun dealing.
Because Knight’s vulnerability to criminal prosecution for running an
unlicensed gun business gives rise to a cognizable Article III injury, we next
consider whether that injury is plausibly redressable through his challenges to the
place-of-business requirement. It is.
Redressability depends on the substance of the plaintiff’s claims and the
breadth of relief sought in his complaint. See Gutierrez v. Saenz, 606 U.S. 305, 316–
19 (2025). Here, Knight alleges that the lack of a dealer license will expose him to
a risk of criminal prosecution if he starts up his contemplated gun business and
that the reason why he cannot obtain a dealer license is Defendants’ enforcement
of the place-of-business requirement. Knight’s requested injunction requiring
Defendants to grant him a dealer license (or simply requiring them to evaluate his
license application without requiring a brick-and-mortar location) is therefore
likely to relieve him of the threat of felony prosecution for running an unlicensed
gun dealership. See N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20(10) (generally exempting licensed
10 dealers from New York’s criminal laws against the commercial sale and possession
of firearms); id. § 400.00(1-a) (authorizing licensed dealers to engage in the
commercial sale of firearms). Eliminating that significant threat of criminal
prosecution would provide Knight with a sufficiently meaningful benefit to satisfy
Article III’s redressability prong. See Vitagliano, 71 F.4th at 140.
The possibility that Knight could still be subject to enforcement proceedings
under the City’s zoning laws does not defeat redressability. To satisfy Article III,
a plaintiff must show that his requested relief would provide meaningful redress
for an injury, not that it would relieve him of every injury. Am. Cruise Lines v.
United States, 96 F.4th 283, 286 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
243 n.15 (1982)). And even when a plaintiff’s requested relief “cannot provide
full redress” with respect to an injury, a federal court’s “ability to effectuate a
partial remedy satisfies the redressability requirement.” Uzuegbunam v.
Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 291 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Elias
Bochner, 287 7th Ave. Realty LLC v. City of New York, 118 F.4th 505, 521 (2d Cir. 2024)
(“[T]he law of standing does not require that the relief sought by a plaintiff
completely redress the asserted injury.”). We therefore agree with the well-
reasoned view of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that a district court’s ability to
11 reduce the plaintiff’s aggregate criminal exposure can satisfy redressability. See
Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Rokita, 147 F.4th 720, 729 (7th Cir. 2025)
(“[R]emoving an additional layer of criminal liability [is] a form of redress
sufficient to confer standing, even though the underlying behavior [is] still subject
to prosecution.”); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 89 F.4th 1071, 1078 (8th Cir.
2024) (similar).
Here, with a dealer license in hand, Knight could not be criminally
prosecuted for unlicensed commercial gun dealing. Thus, his risk of prosecution
“would be reduced to some extent,” even if not eliminated entirely, if he had a
dealer license. Massachusetts v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007). And
in the event that the City were to target Knight for separate violations of its zoning
laws, the range of possible penalties would likely be lower than the penalties he
would face for being an unlicensed gun dealer. Compare, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law
§ 265.13(2) (class B felony to sell a total of three or more firearms in any one-year
period), with N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 28-203.1 (misdemeanor offense to commit an
“immediately hazardous” zoning violation; even lower penalties for “major
violation[s]” and “lesser violation[s]”). We also observe that Knight has
consistently taken the position in this litigation that the City’s zoning laws would
12 not bar his contemplated gun business. Knight may be wrong about that, but it is
the lack of a dealer license – and the attendant threat of criminal prosecution for
running an unlicensed gun dealership – that matters for purposes of the
redressability of his asserted injury, not a local zoning restriction. 1
Accordingly, Knight has plausibly alleged that his asserted injury – a risk of
criminal prosecution for running an unlicensed gun business – is redressable
through his challenges to the place-of-business requirement. And for that reason,
Knight has also satisfied Article III’s traceability requirement. See Food & Drug
Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 380 (2024) (“The second and third
standing requirements—causation and redressability—are often flip sides of the
same coin.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we agree with the district court that Knight lacks Article
III standing to challenge the ninety-day rule but conclude that he has sufficiently
1 Defendants suggest in passing that section 400.00(1-a) and (8) of the Penal Law would independently prevent them from granting Knight a dealer license. See N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1-a) (requiring applicants to “maintain a place of business in the city or county where the license is issued”); id. § 400.00(8) (providing that “[a] license as gunsmith or dealer in firearms shall be prominently displayed on the licensed premises”). But the Penal Law does not, by its terms, exclude residences from the definition of a place of business. And in any event, Knight’s complaint seeks relief from “all . . . laws, regulations, policies, practices and customs” related to the place-of-business requirement. Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 62 ¶ 184 (emphasis added); see Schoenthal v. Raoul, 150 F.4th 889, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2025) (crediting similar allegations).
13 alleged standing to challenge the place-of-business requirement. We therefore
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day rule,
vacate the district court’s dismissal of his challenges to the place-of-business
requirement, and remand this case for further proceedings.