Knight Publishing Co. v. United States Department of Justice

608 F. Supp. 747, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20972
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedDecember 26, 1984
DocketC-C-84-510-P
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 608 F. Supp. 747 (Knight Publishing Co. v. United States Department of Justice) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knight Publishing Co. v. United States Department of Justice, 608 F. Supp. 747, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20972 (W.D.N.C. 1984).

Opinion

ORDER

ROBERT D. POTTER, Chief Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to compel preparation of a Vaughn index, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, Defendant’s motion for a protective order and Defendant’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative for an enlargement of time.

A. Motion to Dismiss

The Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The statutory language of the Freedom of Information Act (the Act) conferring jurisdiction on the courts provides as follows:

On complaint, the District Court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the Court shall determine the matter de novo ... and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The Supreme Court accordingly has held that jurisdiction is dependent upon a showing that an agency has (1) “improperly”; (2) “withheld”; (3) “agency records”. Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 150, 100 S.Ct. 960, 968, 63 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980).

In the instant ease the Complaint clearly alleges that agency records were improperly withheld from the Plaintiff. Furthermore, the parties appear to agree that agency records have been withheld. The Defendant’s sole basis for the dismissal, either for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, is its *749 unsupported bare bones conclusory assertion that records have not been “improperly withheld”. In support of the motion to dismiss the Defendant filed three affidavits, which affidavits evidently are offered to show that records have not been improperly withheld. The affidavits, however, only set forth the circumstances of processing the Plaintiffs FOIA requests and assert that the requests were processed under Defendant’s standard operating procedure in the normal course of business. The affidavits completely fail to address the circumstances surrounding the agency’s decision not to disclose. Except for submitting the correspondence between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, there is not one iota of substantive information about the withheld materials and the circumstances justifying the nondisclosure or the basis for the exemption. Processing a request through a routine procedure has absolutely no bearing on whether the agency’s ultimate decision to withhold the document was proper or improper. The Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the motion to dismiss should be denied in that Defendant’s bare bones assertion that it has not improperly withheld requested records does not divest the Court of subject matter jurisdiction or establish that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).

B. Motion to Compel Preparation of a Vaughn Index

On September 11, 1984 the Plaintiff filed a motion to compel preparation of a Vaughn index and the Plaintiff attached a proposed order covering the matters sought in the Vaughn index. The motion encompasses FOIA requests made by the Plaintiff to the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the Executive Office for the United States Attorneys (“EOUSA”). The Defendant initially objected to preparation of a Vaughn index as to all three agencies. The Defendant, however, subsequently informed the Court that there is no objection to preparation of the Vaughn index as set forth in the Plaintiff’s proposed order with respect to the FBI and the DEA. The Defendant does object to the preparation of a Vaughn index relating to the FOIA request to EOUSA.

Prior to bringing this action, the DEA and the FBI made an “initial determination” denying the Plaintiff’s FOIA requests. Although the EOUSA received the FOIA requests on December 27, 1983 it has completely failed to make an “initial determination.” Since the EOUSA never made a determination, the Defendant argues that preparation of a Vaughn index, which index details in an organized manner the agency’s justifications for its decisions, is premature.

The Court is inclined to agree with the Defendant that the indexing request as to EOUSA is untimely. The Court, however, is further of the opinion that although preparation of the index may be premature, EOUSA is not forever exempt from the requirement of compiling a Vaughn index because it failed to timely respond to the Plaintiff’s FOIA request. There is not any dispute that the Plaintiff exhausted its administrative remedies under FOIA with respect to EOUSA. EOU-SA received the Plaintiff’s first FOIA request on December 27, 1983 and almost a year has passed and EOUSA has still not responded to this request. It would be absurd to allow EOUSA to avoid filing a Vaughn index on the basis that it failed to respond to the FOIA requests in accordance with the Act in the first place. The Court is, therefore, of the opinion that EOUSA should be ordered to issue its response to the request and if the request is denied the Defendant is on notice that it will have to timely submit a Vaughn index.

C. Motion for Protective Order

On September 11, 1984 the Defendant received the Plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents. The Defendant filed a motion for a protective order asking that it be relieved from having to answer, object, or respond to any of the requested discovery. *750 The Defendant sets forth two grounds for its motion. One, the Court should postpone discovery until the motion to dismiss is resolved. Two, “the Plaintiff through his interrogatories seeks to discover information outside the purview of his request for records and clearly beyond that which he would receive if ultimately successful in this lawsuit.”

As the Court has denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss it is no longer an arguable justification for a blanket postponement of discovery. Further, although the Defendant conclusorily asserts that the requested discovery is “outside the purview” of the Plaintiff’s FOIA requests, the Defendant completely fails to state how or why the discovery is too broad, which questions, if any, are too broad, or to set forth any specifics as to the “objectionable” nature of the discovery request. In addition, the Court has reviewed the discovery request and the interrogatories to cover the factual circumstances pertinent to the agency withholding of the records.

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Bluebook (online)
608 F. Supp. 747, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20972, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knight-publishing-co-v-united-states-department-of-justice-ncwd-1984.