Kniffin v. State

257 A.D. 43, 12 N.Y.S.2d 422, 1939 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7664
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMay 10, 1939
DocketClaim No. 21770
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 257 A.D. 43 (Kniffin v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kniffin v. State, 257 A.D. 43, 12 N.Y.S.2d 422, 1939 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7664 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1939).

Opinion

Hill, P. J.

C. H. Earle, Inc., in August, 1928, contracted with the State of New York to construct about one and a half miles of bituminous macadam and one mile of reinforced concrete pavement, together with two bridges, all being a part of the Jones Beach Causeway on Long Island. The work continued until about July 25, 1929, when a petitioil in involuntary bankruptcy was filed against the corporation and the State suspended operations [44]*44under the contract. The trustee in bankruptcy has presented a claim to the Court of Claims demanding $181,788.58. The court gave judgment for $1,192.50, with interest amounting to $391.14. The claimant appeals.

Errors are urged concerning the following items.

Claimant asks $32,516.73, unpaid installment of moneys assigned before bankruptcy. A subcontractor obtained a judgment for this amount against the State, which has been paid and deducted from the balance due the claimant. The contractor, on May 17, 1929, assigned to a subcontractor moneys due and to become due under the contract, to be paid from the three succeeding estimates made by the State. Four estimates and payments were made after the assignment and before the bankruptcy, but only the first two installments were paid to the assignee. While the assignment recited that the three succeeding payments from the State would “ become due on or about respectively, June 1, July 1 and August 1, 1929, the four payments after the assignment were made by the State respectively on May 22 (from which the first installment under the assignment was paid), June 7, June 19 and the last July 9 (from which the second installment was paid). The trustee of the bankrupt contractor argues that the last installment not having been paid at the time of the bankruptcy, the subcontractor was a general creditor for that amount, and should not have been paid in full, being only entitled to the same percentage which other general creditors received, and that the State should pay the amount to the trustee for the benefit of all the creditors. With this we do not agree, but rather are in accord with the Court of Claims. General creditors through bankruptcy obtain liens comparable with those of judgment creditors with executions issued. An assignee of the money due or to become due under a contract for a public improvement has priority over all lienors whose claims are subsequently filed. (McCorkle v. Herrman, 117 N. Y. 297; Bates v. Salt Springs National Bank, 157 id. 322: Riverside Contracting Co. v. City of New York, 218 id. 596; Anderson v. Hayes Construction Co., 243 id. 140; Arrow Iron Works, Inc., v. Greene, 260 id. 330; Scarsdale Nat. B. & T. Co. v. U. S. F. & G. Co., 264 id. 159.) Under the Riverside case (supra) the assignee became the owner of the assigned moneys, which were not subject to claims of general creditors through bankruptcy or otherwise.

Claim for excavating 71,233 cubic yards of earth disallowed by the Court of Claims. The plans required the pavement to be laid on an embankment about ten feet high, the minimum width at the bottom to be eighty feet, the top seventy feet, [45]*45forty feet to be occupied by the paved driveway with shoulders fifteen feet wide on either side. The material for the embankment was obtained by hydraulic dredging from the ocean bottom, a specified distance away from the embankment. The contract in reference to this item reads: “Item 121, approximate quantities 1,150,000 cubic yards in place for fifteen cents per cubic yard.” The highway was to be constructed through a swampy area, in which the mud was ten to thirty feet deep. Through experience in other similar areas, it had been learned that an embankment of the kind projected would sink into the subsoil from one and a half to two feet. The claimant, in anticipation of this, pumped sufficient silt and sand from the sea bottom to raise the embankment from one and a half to several feet above the grade upon which the pavement was to be laid. After all of the settling had taken place, a considerable quantity of this excess material was removed and placed in piles at the side of the forty-foot roadbed, and it remained there until after the bankruptcy and the contract had been terminated. The State, in completing the work, moved these piles of material to the shoulders and slopes at a cost slightly in excess of fifteen cents a cubic yard. The claimant asserts that it should be paid for excavating the 71,233 cubic yards so used by the State under a provision of the contract, “ Item No. 4, quantity 7700 cubic yards unclassified excavation for one dollar a cubic yard,” as this yardage was excavated either when it was dredged from the ocean bottom or when removed from the top of the embankment to permit the laying of the pavement at the grade fixed by the engineers. “ Unclassified excavation ” is defined in the specifications which are a part of the contract. It is the removal of earth and other material originally on the line of the proposed highway to obtain the given grade, and from the places for incidental structures like culverts, underdrains and catch basins, and for the emplacement of the piers, abutments and wings in connection with bridges. This yardage does not come within that classification. It was pumped by the dredges in anticipation of a possible settling of the embankment and with the thought that the excess would be available for shoulders and slopes. It was ultimately used for this, but the cost to the State was such as to preclude a recovery even at fifteen cents a cubic yard. The decision of the Court of Claims should be affirmed.

Claim for $4,932, additional compensation for the excavation and removal of 1,233 cubic yards of material from the bottom of cofferdams built in connection with the construction of the piers to support the bascule span of bridge No. 3, shown in many photo[46]*46graphic exhibits. It is stipulated “ that the fair and reasonable cost to the contractor for the performance of such excavation work was $6,165.” Claimant has received only $1,233, leaving the balance mentioned, and it is further stipulated that if the court determines it to be wet excavation ” claimant is entitled to the amount asked. The specifications provide, Wet excavation * * * will be paid for only in the building of walls, abutments and piers in connection with bridge structures. * * * It shall cover only the excavation below the water surface at the time excavation is made.” A witness for the State describes the cofferdams, Well, as the sheet piling was driven around the center well frames, as they call them— We treat that as the well. And sheet piling was driven down so that the elevation of the top came to elevation plus 4 about. Well, then the cofferdam was de-watered and piles driven — timber piles were driven down to the approximate grade. And then the material — when the piles were driven, the confined material had no place to go and it latterly was all heaved up over the piles and it had to be removed in order to get the excavation down to elevation minus 20, which was the bottom of the pier.” The excavation was done by hand, some of the men wearing rubber boots. There were 240 piles driven inside each pier. The following evidence was also given by the same witness: “ Q. The work had to be done by hand? A. It had to be done by hand, yes, sir. Q. Now I ask you if the plans show any excavation at this particular point? A. Yes, sir. Q. Can you find it readily; so that we can just put the general information on the record? [Witness examines plans.] Q.

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Bluebook (online)
257 A.D. 43, 12 N.Y.S.2d 422, 1939 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7664, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kniffin-v-state-nyappdiv-1939.