CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 25-11313 FMO (ADSx) Date August 31, 2026 Title KNF International Co., Ltd. v. SPARC Group LLC, et al.
Present: The Honorable Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge Vanessa Figueroa None None Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorney Present for Plaintiff: Attorney Present for Defendants: None Present None Present Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Remanding Action On October 22, 2025, KNF International Co., Ltd. (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior Court against SPARC Group LLC (“SPARC”) and Catalyst Brands LLC (“Catalyst”) (collectively, “defendants”), asserting state law claims. (See Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at ¶ 1); (Dkt. 1-1, Complaint at ¶¶ 22-57). Defendants removed the action on diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(b). (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 8). Having reviewed the pleadings, the court hereby remands this action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near- canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”). If there is any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding the action to state court.1 See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). Indeed, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v.Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and, indeed, we have held that the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.”); Washington v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 1519894, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (a district court may remand an action where the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction “either by CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 25-11313 FMO (ADSx) Date August 31, 2026 Title KNF International Co., Ltd. v. SPARC Group LLC, et al. motion or sua sponte”). When federal subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), complete diversity must exist between the opposing parties, see Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68, 117 S.Ct. 467, 472 (1996) (stating that the diversity jurisdiction statute “applies only to cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant”), and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, the court’s review of the NOR and the attached state court Complaint makes clear that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”) (footnote omitted). In other words, plaintiff could not have originally brought this action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts supplying diversity jurisdiction.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 569, 124 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 (2004) (noting that “requisite diversity was . . . absent” where defendant was a Mexican corporation and plaintiff, a limited partnership, included two partners that were also citizens of Mexico). Defendants allege that plaintiff is a citizen of Republic of Korea, (see Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 9), and that they are limited liability companies, (see id. at ¶¶ 13, 18) “organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware.” (Id.). They also allege that none of SPARC’s or Catalyst’s members are citizens of the Republic of Korea. (See id. at ¶¶ 16, 20). As an initial matter, defendants’ contention that they are “organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware,” (id. at ¶¶ 13, 18), is irrelevant to the determination of their citizenship. See Buschman v. Anesthesia Business Consultants LLC, 42 F.Supp.3d 1244, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“An LLC’s principal place of business [or] state of organization is irrelevant” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction). This is because LLCs are treated like partnerships rather than corporations for the purpose of determining citizenship, and are deemed “a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.” Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006); see Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 569, 124 S.Ct. at 1923 (“[A] partnership . . . is a citizen of each State or foreign country of which any of its partners is a citizen.”). “There is no such thing as a [state name] limited partnership for purposes of . . . diversity jurisdiction. There are only partners, each of which has one or more citizenships.” Hart v. Terminex Int’l, 336 F.3d 541, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, defendants’ contention that they have no members that are citizens of the Republic of Korea, (see Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶¶ 16, 20), is insufficient to show that complete diversity of the parties exists. See, e.g., Lindley Contours, LLC v. AABB Fitness Holdings, Inc., 414 F.Appx. 62, 65 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that an allegation that no member of a defendant LP “is an Oregon citizen,” without identifying the actual state of citiz
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 25-11313 FMO (ADSx) Date August 31, 2026 Title KNF International Co., Ltd. v. SPARC Group LLC, et al.
Present: The Honorable Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge Vanessa Figueroa None None Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorney Present for Plaintiff: Attorney Present for Defendants: None Present None Present Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Remanding Action On October 22, 2025, KNF International Co., Ltd. (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles County Superior Court against SPARC Group LLC (“SPARC”) and Catalyst Brands LLC (“Catalyst”) (collectively, “defendants”), asserting state law claims. (See Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at ¶ 1); (Dkt. 1-1, Complaint at ¶¶ 22-57). Defendants removed the action on diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(b). (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 8). Having reviewed the pleadings, the court hereby remands this action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In general, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near- canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”). If there is any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding the action to state court.1 See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). Indeed, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v.Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and, indeed, we have held that the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.”); Washington v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 1519894, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (a district court may remand an action where the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction “either by CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 25-11313 FMO (ADSx) Date August 31, 2026 Title KNF International Co., Ltd. v. SPARC Group LLC, et al. motion or sua sponte”). When federal subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), complete diversity must exist between the opposing parties, see Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68, 117 S.Ct. 467, 472 (1996) (stating that the diversity jurisdiction statute “applies only to cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant”), and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, the court’s review of the NOR and the attached state court Complaint makes clear that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant.”) (footnote omitted). In other words, plaintiff could not have originally brought this action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts supplying diversity jurisdiction.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 569, 124 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 (2004) (noting that “requisite diversity was . . . absent” where defendant was a Mexican corporation and plaintiff, a limited partnership, included two partners that were also citizens of Mexico). Defendants allege that plaintiff is a citizen of Republic of Korea, (see Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 9), and that they are limited liability companies, (see id. at ¶¶ 13, 18) “organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware.” (Id.). They also allege that none of SPARC’s or Catalyst’s members are citizens of the Republic of Korea. (See id. at ¶¶ 16, 20). As an initial matter, defendants’ contention that they are “organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware,” (id. at ¶¶ 13, 18), is irrelevant to the determination of their citizenship. See Buschman v. Anesthesia Business Consultants LLC, 42 F.Supp.3d 1244, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“An LLC’s principal place of business [or] state of organization is irrelevant” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction). This is because LLCs are treated like partnerships rather than corporations for the purpose of determining citizenship, and are deemed “a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.” Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006); see Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 569, 124 S.Ct. at 1923 (“[A] partnership . . . is a citizen of each State or foreign country of which any of its partners is a citizen.”). “There is no such thing as a [state name] limited partnership for purposes of . . . diversity jurisdiction. There are only partners, each of which has one or more citizenships.” Hart v. Terminex Int’l, 336 F.3d 541, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, defendants’ contention that they have no members that are citizens of the Republic of Korea, (see Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶¶ 16, 20), is insufficient to show that complete diversity of the parties exists. See, e.g., Lindley Contours, LLC v. AABB Fitness Holdings, Inc., 414 F.Appx. 62, 65 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that an allegation that no member of a defendant LP “is an Oregon citizen,” without identifying the actual state of citizenship of the LP’s members or whether the members were composed of another layer of CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 25-11313 FMO (ADSx) Date August 31, 2026 Title KNF International Co., Ltd. v. SPARC Group LLC, et al. business entities, was insufficient to establish complete diversity); Amescua v. Peacock TV LLC, 2024 WL 39192, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (remanding action where LLC defendant “fail[ed] to specifically identify [its] member’s members and allege each one’s citizenship”).3 Given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court, see Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court is not persuaded, under the circumstances here, that defendants have met their burden. Therefore, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. The above-referenced action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court. 3. Any pending motion is denied as moot.
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3 In opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendants again fail to set forth the citizenship of their members. (See Dkt. 18, Opposition at 3, 13). For instance, defendants state that SPARC has one member, SPARC Group Holdings LLC, which is headquartered in New York. (See id.). But defendants do not identify SPARC Group Holdings LLC’s members and their citizenship. (See id.). The same is true with respect to Catalyst. That is, defendants identify Penney Holdings LLC as a member of Catalyst, (see id. at 13), but do not identify Penney Holdings LLC’s members or