KNEPP v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P.

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 28, 2025
Docket3:22-cv-00144
StatusUnknown

This text of KNEPP v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P. (KNEPP v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KNEPP v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., (W.D. Pa. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GARY D. KNEPP, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 3:22-144 ) Judge Nora Barry Fischer WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION In this premises liability case, Plaintiff Gary D. Knepp (“Knepp”) alleges that injuries he sustained on May 31, 2021 when he tripped over a low-lying pallet corner protruding from a watermelon display at the Clearfield, Pennsylvania store operated by Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. (“Walmart”) were proximately caused by Walmart’s negligence. (Docket No. 1). Walmart moves for summary judgment arguing that Knepp presented insufficient evidence to establish that the display constituted a dangerous condition and that the same was an open and obvious condition that Knepp failed to recognize by using reasonable care for his own safety. (Docket Nos. 26; 34; 38). Knepp contends that summary judgment is not warranted because there are material factual disputes between the parties and the issues of whether the display was dangerous and/or obvious to patrons such as himself raise questions that should be resolved by the jury. (Docket Nos. 31; 41). Walmart’s Motion has been fully briefed as the parties have each filed supporting briefs, concise statements of material facts and supporting appendices, including a surveillance video of the incident. (Docket Nos. 25-33). Walmart also submitted a reply and a supplement, to which Knepp responded. (Docket Nos. 34-35; 38; 41). The Hon. Kim R. Gibson was initially presiding over this case and granted Walmart leave to file its motion for summary judgment prior to the completion of expert discovery. (Docket No. 24). The matter was thereafter reassigned to the undersigned for prompt disposition. (Docket No. 42). After careful consideration of the parties’ positions and evaluating the evidence of record in light of the controlling standards, and for the following reasons, Walmart’s Motion [25] is denied. II. LEGAL STANDARD As the Court writes primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts of this matter, the Court starts with the governing legal standards. Walmart’s burden on summary judgment is to demonstrate that, based on the evidence of record, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-

movant, there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “A fact is ‘material’ under Rule 56 if its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.” Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Further, “[a] dispute is ‘genuine’ if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Clews v. County of Schuylkill, 12 F.4th 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court’s function is not to weigh the evidence, to determine the truth of the matter, or to evaluate credibility. See Montone v. City of Jersey City, et al., 709 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2013).

III. DISCUSSION In this Court’s estimation, Walmart has failed to demonstrate that summary judgment is appropriate because there are material facts in dispute between the parties as to the whether the low-lying pallet corner protruding from the watermelon display was a dangerous condition, if it was an open and obvious condition that Knepp should have avoided with the exercise of reasonable care for his own safety, and if Walmart should have anticipated that Knepp would be distracted by carrying a watermelon he obtained from the display causing him to not see or protect himself from tripping over the pallet corner. See Baloga, 927 F.3d at 752. As such, these disputes present factual issues which must be resolved by the jury at trial. Therefore, Walmart’s Motion will be denied. At the outset, the parties do not contest the principles of Pennsylvania law at issue in this lawsuit, including the Commonwealth’s adoption of §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. (Docket Nos. 26; 31; 34; 38; 41). To sustain his negligence claim, Knepp’s burden is to

prove: “(1) a duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Estate of Swift v. Northeastern Hospital of Philadelphia, 456 Pa. Super. 330, 690 A.2d 719, 722 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). Only the “duty” element is at issue in this motion. As Knepp was a business invitee, Walmart owed him “the highest duty owed to any entrant upon land” such that he “was not required to be on alert to discover defects which were not obvious” and Walmart had the responsibility to protect him “not only against known dangers, but also against those which might be discovered by [it] with reasonable care.” Robinson v. Seven Springs Mountain Resort, Inc., 323 A.3d 202, 2024 WL 2955263, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jun. 12, 2024) (internal citations omitted). With that said, “even if the danger [is] open and obvious,” Walmart “is not relieved of its duty of care for open

and obvious dangers when it ‘has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it.’” Robinson, 2024 WL 2955263, at *5 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, cmt. f.). The Court now evaluates the evidence presented in the record and the parties’ arguments. First, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Knepp, the Court holds that he has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the low-lying pallet corner protruding from the watermelon display constitutes a dangerous condition and that it was not open and obvious to patrons such as himself. See Pitslides v. Barr, 128 F. 4th 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2025). The law is well established that: “[a] danger is deemed to be ‘obvious’ when ‘both the condition and the risk are apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable man, in the position of the visitor, exercising normal perception, intelligence, and judgment.’” Carrender v. Fitterer, 503 Pa. 178, 469 A.2d 120, 123 (1983) (citations omitted). “[T]he question of whether a danger was known or obvious is usually a question of fact for the jury.” Id. at 124. A court may decide this question, however, where “reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion.” Id.

Pusateri v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 646 F. Supp. 3d 650, 654 (W.D. Pa. 2022). It is this Court’s opinion that the jury could determine that the condition was dangerous, and the record is simply not conclusive as to whether the condition was known and obvious to Knepp and other customers. See Carrender, 469 A.2d at 124.

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Scott v. Harris
550 U.S. 372 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Valerie Montone v. City of Jersey City
709 F.3d 181 (Third Circuit, 2013)
Estate of Swift Ex Rel. Swift v. Northeastern Hospital of Philadelphia
690 A.2d 719 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1997)
Carrender v. Fitterer
469 A.2d 120 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1983)
Mike Baloga v. Pittston Area School District
927 F.3d 742 (Third Circuit, 2019)
Scott Clews v. County of Schuylkill
12 F.4th 353 (Third Circuit, 2021)
George Pitsilides v. William Barr
128 F.4th 203 (Third Circuit, 2025)

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Bluebook (online)
KNEPP v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knepp-v-wal-mart-stores-east-lp-pawd-2025.