RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0448-24
K.M.C.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
W.E.P.,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted November 10, 2025 – Decided January 8, 2026
Before Judges Sabatino and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Warren County, Docket No. FV-21-0348-24.
Perrotta, Fraser and Forrester, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Donald B. Fraser, Jr., on the briefs).
DiFrancesco, Bateman, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, PC, attorneys for respondent (Rachel E. Campbell and Mathew C. Dorsi, on the brief).
1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the victim in these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). PER CURIAM
Defendant W.E.P. appeals from the entry of a final restraining order
("FRO") against him under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act ("PDVA"),
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, after a five-day hearing. After our careful review of
the record and application of the pertinent legal principles, we affirm based on
the cogent reasons expressed by Judge Christopher M. Troxell in his thorough
oral decision.
I.
Plaintiff K.M.C. and defendant were in a long-term dating relationship
and lived together from approximately April 2019 through January 16, 2024.
They were not married and had no children together. On January 16, 2024,
plaintiff called police, and filed a complaint alleging defendant verbally abused
her, destroyed property, assaulted and strangled her, threatened to kill her, and
inflicted physical injuries. Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order
("TRO") at that time.
In addition to specific allegations of predicate acts of domestic violence
noted above, the complaint and a subsequent amendment referenced prior
incidents including one in which defendant allegedly "got in plaintiff's face,"
screamed at her, threw a coffee cup at her ribs, further berated her, and caused
A-0448-24 2 bruising and a possible fracture. The compliant further alleged prior acts in
which defendant called plaintiff vulgar names, chased her, threw a chair, and
flipped a table onto her legs causing bruises. It also alleged further prior
incidents in which defendant told plaintiff he wanted "to take her in the backyard
and gut her like a fish," and pulled her hair, shook her, and strangled her.
Plaintiff further asserted defendant told her on multiple occasions that if she
"ever got in the way of him owning weapons, he would eliminate her."
At the FRO hearing plaintiff testified consistent with the allegations in her
amended complaint describing numerous acts of verbal, physical, and emotional
abuse, including threats to her life, strangulation, bruises, and the necessity to
relocate and use a P.O. Box out of fear for her safety. She testified that
defendant made clear that if she interfered with his weapons ownership, he
would "end her life." Defendant testified and denied committing the alleged
acts and also presented six witnesses who testified on his behalf.
The trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, plaintiff had
proven defendant had committed predicate acts of harassment, assault, and
terroristic threats, which were based on plaintiff's credible, consistent testimony
and corroborating physical evidence including photos and videos. The trial
court noted plaintiff's emotional demeanor, consistency, and supporting physical
A-0448-24 3 evidence and photographs. The court also found defendant's testimony credible
regarding the overall troubled nature of the relationship, his feelings of being
"trapped," and about both parties giving up on the civil restraint agreement
previously entered surrounding a prior incident. Concerning defendant's denial
to threatening "to terminate" plaintiff's life or committing other acts of violence,
the court found "when [defendant] said he didn't do any of it [and] he just flat
out denied it, that wasn't believable."
The court also determined there were prior acts of domestic violence
proven, including credible evidence of previous assaults substantiating such a
history. The court found plaintiff credibly testified that she remained in fear,
thought she would be killed, and had taken significant steps including moving
and obtaining a PO Box to avoid detection by defendant. The court found her
fear was genuine. The court stated, "[Plaintiff] believes she's in immediate
danger." The court further found "there's good cause for her again to be
concerned, to fear for her life, safety, or well-being . . . and that there's a need
to deter and prevent further abuse." The court further found the six witnesses
that testified for defendant were either not credible or the information they
provided was not probative to its analysis under Silver.
A-0448-24 4 The court entered an FRO, after finding the statutory factors for the
predicate acts were met and emphasizing the need to protect the victim, per
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29 and Silver.2 The record further reflects subsequent to the
trial defendant was sentenced to state prison for weapons and assault
convictions.3
On appeal, defendant contends the "FRO obtained by [plaintiff] against
[defendant] must be dismissed due to the lack of evidence to establish the second
prong of Silver, and the lack of findings by the trial court relative to same."
Defendant contends the second prong of Silver was not met because at the time
of the hearing defendant was incarcerated and he remains incarcerated and has
"zero ability to commit any 'further' direct acts of physical domestic violence
against [plaintiff.]" He claims since his arrest there has not been "even a
scintilla of any 'further' act of [d]omestic [v]iolence" either directly, nor
indirectly or through a third party. Defendant further asserts that there were not
2 Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006). 3 Defendant's briefing advises he was sentenced on March 21, 2025, on several weapons charges. Specifically, defendant was sentenced to a state prison term of six years, with forty-two months parole ineligibility. At the same time, the court also sentenced defendant to a prison term of four years on third-degree aggravated assault for the incident which is the subject of this appeal with such four-year term to run concurrent with the sentence on the weapons charges. A-0448-24 5 any contempt allegations against him and "there are simply no continuing ties
whatsoever between [the parties]" because they have "no children together. . .
[t]hey were not married to each other; hence, there is no financial issue[s]
between them." Defendant contends due to his continuing incarceration . . .
[both] at the time of trial and [through] today, [plaintiff] simply lacked any
reasonable, objective fear of 'further' domestic violence committed against her
by [defendant]" and therefore the second prong of Silver has not been met.
Therefore, defendant concludes, "there is simply zero reason for [the parties] to
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RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0448-24
K.M.C.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
W.E.P.,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted November 10, 2025 – Decided January 8, 2026
Before Judges Sabatino and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Warren County, Docket No. FV-21-0348-24.
Perrotta, Fraser and Forrester, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Donald B. Fraser, Jr., on the briefs).
DiFrancesco, Bateman, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, PC, attorneys for respondent (Rachel E. Campbell and Mathew C. Dorsi, on the brief).
1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the victim in these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). PER CURIAM
Defendant W.E.P. appeals from the entry of a final restraining order
("FRO") against him under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act ("PDVA"),
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, after a five-day hearing. After our careful review of
the record and application of the pertinent legal principles, we affirm based on
the cogent reasons expressed by Judge Christopher M. Troxell in his thorough
oral decision.
I.
Plaintiff K.M.C. and defendant were in a long-term dating relationship
and lived together from approximately April 2019 through January 16, 2024.
They were not married and had no children together. On January 16, 2024,
plaintiff called police, and filed a complaint alleging defendant verbally abused
her, destroyed property, assaulted and strangled her, threatened to kill her, and
inflicted physical injuries. Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order
("TRO") at that time.
In addition to specific allegations of predicate acts of domestic violence
noted above, the complaint and a subsequent amendment referenced prior
incidents including one in which defendant allegedly "got in plaintiff's face,"
screamed at her, threw a coffee cup at her ribs, further berated her, and caused
A-0448-24 2 bruising and a possible fracture. The compliant further alleged prior acts in
which defendant called plaintiff vulgar names, chased her, threw a chair, and
flipped a table onto her legs causing bruises. It also alleged further prior
incidents in which defendant told plaintiff he wanted "to take her in the backyard
and gut her like a fish," and pulled her hair, shook her, and strangled her.
Plaintiff further asserted defendant told her on multiple occasions that if she
"ever got in the way of him owning weapons, he would eliminate her."
At the FRO hearing plaintiff testified consistent with the allegations in her
amended complaint describing numerous acts of verbal, physical, and emotional
abuse, including threats to her life, strangulation, bruises, and the necessity to
relocate and use a P.O. Box out of fear for her safety. She testified that
defendant made clear that if she interfered with his weapons ownership, he
would "end her life." Defendant testified and denied committing the alleged
acts and also presented six witnesses who testified on his behalf.
The trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, plaintiff had
proven defendant had committed predicate acts of harassment, assault, and
terroristic threats, which were based on plaintiff's credible, consistent testimony
and corroborating physical evidence including photos and videos. The trial
court noted plaintiff's emotional demeanor, consistency, and supporting physical
A-0448-24 3 evidence and photographs. The court also found defendant's testimony credible
regarding the overall troubled nature of the relationship, his feelings of being
"trapped," and about both parties giving up on the civil restraint agreement
previously entered surrounding a prior incident. Concerning defendant's denial
to threatening "to terminate" plaintiff's life or committing other acts of violence,
the court found "when [defendant] said he didn't do any of it [and] he just flat
out denied it, that wasn't believable."
The court also determined there were prior acts of domestic violence
proven, including credible evidence of previous assaults substantiating such a
history. The court found plaintiff credibly testified that she remained in fear,
thought she would be killed, and had taken significant steps including moving
and obtaining a PO Box to avoid detection by defendant. The court found her
fear was genuine. The court stated, "[Plaintiff] believes she's in immediate
danger." The court further found "there's good cause for her again to be
concerned, to fear for her life, safety, or well-being . . . and that there's a need
to deter and prevent further abuse." The court further found the six witnesses
that testified for defendant were either not credible or the information they
provided was not probative to its analysis under Silver.
A-0448-24 4 The court entered an FRO, after finding the statutory factors for the
predicate acts were met and emphasizing the need to protect the victim, per
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29 and Silver.2 The record further reflects subsequent to the
trial defendant was sentenced to state prison for weapons and assault
convictions.3
On appeal, defendant contends the "FRO obtained by [plaintiff] against
[defendant] must be dismissed due to the lack of evidence to establish the second
prong of Silver, and the lack of findings by the trial court relative to same."
Defendant contends the second prong of Silver was not met because at the time
of the hearing defendant was incarcerated and he remains incarcerated and has
"zero ability to commit any 'further' direct acts of physical domestic violence
against [plaintiff.]" He claims since his arrest there has not been "even a
scintilla of any 'further' act of [d]omestic [v]iolence" either directly, nor
indirectly or through a third party. Defendant further asserts that there were not
2 Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006). 3 Defendant's briefing advises he was sentenced on March 21, 2025, on several weapons charges. Specifically, defendant was sentenced to a state prison term of six years, with forty-two months parole ineligibility. At the same time, the court also sentenced defendant to a prison term of four years on third-degree aggravated assault for the incident which is the subject of this appeal with such four-year term to run concurrent with the sentence on the weapons charges. A-0448-24 5 any contempt allegations against him and "there are simply no continuing ties
whatsoever between [the parties]" because they have "no children together. . .
[t]hey were not married to each other; hence, there is no financial issue[s]
between them." Defendant contends due to his continuing incarceration . . .
[both] at the time of trial and [through] today, [plaintiff] simply lacked any
reasonable, objective fear of 'further' domestic violence committed against her
by [defendant]" and therefore the second prong of Silver has not been met.
Therefore, defendant concludes, "there is simply zero reason for [the parties] to
ever again have any contact with each other and "this was true at the time of
trial." We disagree.
II.
The scope of appellate review of a Family Part court's findings following
a bench trial is limited. N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215 (App. Div.
2015) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998)). We owe substantial
deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of its special expertise in
family matters. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413 (citations omitted). Such deference is
particularly proper "when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves
questions of credibility." Id. at 412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D.,
149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).
A-0448-24 6 We will not disturb a trial court's factual findings unless "they are so
manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and
reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154
N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J.
474, 484 (1974)). However, we do not accord such deference to legal
conclusions and review such conclusions de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme,
227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016).
The PDVA authorizes an FRO to be issued if two criteria are met. Silver,
387 N.J. Super. at 125. The plaintiff seeking the FRO must prove that (1) "one
or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred,"
and (2) that the order is necessary to protect plaintiff "from an immediate danger
or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 125, 127.
When evaluating the second prong, which is the only prong contested
before us, the court must consider:
(1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse; (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property; (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; (4) The best interests of the victim and any child; (5) In determining custody and parenting time the protection of the victim's safety; and
A-0448-24 7 (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another jurisdiction. [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).]
Moreover, when the predicate act is an offense that inherently involves
the use of physical force and violence, the decision to issue an FRO "is most
often perfunctory and self-evident." Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127. And a
single predicate act involving the use of physical force or violence is sufficient
to grant an FRO if there is a chance of immediate or continuing danger. See C.C.
v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 435-36 (App. Div. 2020) (rejecting the argument
that no history of violence negates the necessity for an FRO and holding the
plaintiff's fear combined with the defendant's offensive conduct was sufficient).
We conclude defendant's argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion and we affirm for the reasons set forth in Judge
Troxell's oral decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only that we reject
defendant's contention the second prong of Silver has not been met because he
will be incarcerated for a substantial period of time and no reason exists to
support plaintiff has a continuing need for an FRO.
An FRO entered under the PDVA remains in effect until it is dissolved by
a court for good cause pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(d); see Carfagno v.
Carfagno, 288 N.J. Super. 424 (Ch. Div. 1995); see also T.M.S. v. W.C.P., 450
A-0448-24 8 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 2017) (adopting the trial court's legal analysis in
Carfagno).
Initially, we observe defendant was sentenced to a state prison term of six
years, with forty-two months parole ineligibility for the weapons charges with a
four-year concurrent sentence imposed for the conviction surrounding the acts
of domestic violence committed against plaintiff. Therefore, at some point,
defendant will be released and presumably will have the ability to contact
plaintiff once outside of prison if an FRO is not in effect. In addition, defendant
will seemingly have the opportunity to contact outside individuals from prison
by way of phone calls, correspondence, or other permitted mediums and
therefore, he would be capable of contacting plaintiff if an FRO is not in effect
barring such. Since under the PDVA an FRO is a permanent order unless
otherwise dissolved, we find no merit to defendant's assertion, that because he
is imprisoned and will not be capable of making contact with or hurting plaintiff,
an FRO is not necessary to protect her.
We conclude Judge Troxell's detailed findings supporting his decision that
the second prong of Silver was met were based on substantial, credible evidence
in the record and he did not abuse his discretion.
Affirmed.
A-0448-24 9