RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3136-23
K.M.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
G.M.,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Argued September 22, 2025 – Decided October 7, 2025
Before Judges Sabatino and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, Docket No. FV-02-1755-24.
Yeugenia K. Samardin (Samardin, LLC) argued the cause for appellant.
Marina Ginzburg argued the cause for respondent (Ruiz Doolan Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Marina Ginzburg, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant G.M. appeals from a May 10, 2024 Final Restraining Order
(FRO) entered against him and in favor of his spouse, K.M., following a bench
trial in the Family Part.1 G.M. argues various trial errors resulted in the entry
of the FRO, including a claim that the court relied on body-worn camera (BWC)
footage that was not admitted in evidence. We disagree and affirm.
I.
K.M. and G.M. were married in Russia in 1981 and emigrated to the
United States in 1991. They share three adult children who are all emancipated
and reside separately. Prior to the entry of the temporary restraining order
(TRO), the parties resided together in Fort Lee.
According to K.M., the circumstances leading to the entry of the TRO
began on January 27, 2024, when G.M. came home from work intoxicated and
agitated. They argued about G.M.'s inability to locate his birth certificate. The
argument escalated when G.M. grabbed her by her shirt and neck and began
choking her. K.M. was able to finally run away into her bedroom and lock the
door behind her. She took photographs of herself depicting bruising and red
1 We use initials to protect the identity of domestic violence victims pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(10). A-3136-23 2 marks on her neck and breast area, which were admitted into evidence without
objection.
On January 28, the following day, both parties engaged in another heated
argument in which K.M. accused G.M. of being verbally abusive and
increasingly agitated. Concerned that another physical altercation might occur,
K.M. contacted the Fort Lee Police Department to report G.M.'s recent episodes
of intoxicated and abusive behavior. G.M. appeared to be intoxicated and
agitated. Several officers responded to the parties' residence and the parties
were interviewed separately, as seen on the officers' BWCs. On the same day,
K.M. applied for a TRO, alleging assault arising from the January 27 incident.
On January 28, the court entered a TRO.2 G.M. was served on the same day
while at police headquarters.
On February 23, K.M. sought to amend the TRO to add allegations against
G.M. She testified that during the January 27 incident, G.M. attacked her despite
knowing she was recovering from spinal surgery, causing further post-surgical
pain, and that during his arrest the following day, he threatened her in Russian,
stating (as translated), "[y]ou will pay for this." She further alleged the
2 The February 23 amended TRO references another amended TRO dated February 16, 2024, which is not part of the record before us. A-3136-23 3 following: On January 31, G.M. returned to the marital residence to retrieve
mail; on February 2, he attempted to call her; and on February 3, he emailed her
about recurring health insurance payments. Based on this testimony, the court
amended the TRO to include predicate acts of assault, terroristic threats, and
harassment; service was effectuated on G.M. by email that same day.
The FRO hearing commenced on March 21 and concluded after five days
of testimony. The case was tried with the assistance of Russian language
interpreters. K.M., Officer Daniel Munoz, the parties' son, Sam,3 and G.M.
testified.
K.M. testified on the pervasive and regular physical abuse and financial
control G.M. asserted throughout the marriage. She explained she had not
previously sought a restraining order due to pressure from G.M., who minimized
the abuse as "normal." However, the January 27 incident prompted her to finally
call police because she feared for her life. K.M. testified this incident occurred
approximately eight-weeks after she had undergone neck surgery. She believed
G.M. was intoxicated and became angry with her after he was unable to find his
birth certificate, which he had been looking for all day. She recalled that he
3 We use a fictitious name to protect the identity of domestic violence victims pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(10). A-3136-23 4 became frustrated, grabbed her around the neck and began choking her with his
hands, causing her to cough and have difficulty breathing. When G.M. tried to
grab her shirt and released his grip around her neck slightly, she escaped into
her room, quickly gathered her belongings and took photographs, left the
apartment, and returned home later that evening.
K.M. further testified that the next day, she believed G.M. was in the
apartment and that he was again intoxicated. G.M. demanded she give him her
sole credit card, the one she used for groceries and her medical needs, and
accused her of overspending. She complied but tried to talk with him and
explain that she needed the credit card to pay for post-surgery physical therapy.
G.M. refused. Instead, he told her that was her problem and that he wanted a
divorce and began to swear at her, stating, "you're the bitch. You're con-bitch
motherf[-----]." K.M. described feeling frustrated that she had endured G.M.'s
"crap and stuff like that" and him "telling [her] you're nobody," and that "I'm
not going to give you [a] penny, you're going to be on the street. You're going
to be a bum." Thinking she had endured enough, and afraid for her safety,
having only recently had spinal surgery, K.M. stated that is when she decided to
contact the police and her two sons.
A-3136-23 5 K.M. next testified about prior incidents of abuse involving G.M.,
including incidents from June, August and October 2023. She testified the abuse
was a regular occurrence, "[e]verytime my husband had a bad mood, something
happened to the rest of his family. . . Something happened in the market.
Something happened to his work. I was the trigger." On a separate point, K.M.
testified about the contents of the photographs, which were admitted into
evidence without objection. Although she had difficulty recalling specific
timing of these occurrences, she did recall that she suffered these injuries as a
result of her husband hitting her. On cross-examination, G.M.'s counsel
questioned the veracity of the evidence given K.M.'s inability to recall specific
dates and times related to several prior incidents of abuse.
Officer Munoz testified that he and another officer arrived at the parties'
apartment at approximately 1:40 p.m. on January 28 and when they entered, he
announced that their BWCs had been activated. He initially interviewed K.M.
in the kitchen area while the other officer interviewed G.M., and then they
switched. Officer Munoz observed that G.M. "seemed a little comfortable for
the situation," however, G.M. admitted he and K.M. had a dispute over his birth
certificate and he grabbed her blouse, an admission which was captured on the
BWC. He subsequently arrested G.M. and as he was leading him outside, G.M.
A-3136-23 6 turned toward K.M. and the adult children and said "something in a different
language." He was then transported to police headquarters. Officer Munoz did
not observe any marks on K.M. and did not note any in his report.
Sam testified he feared for K.M.'s life, stating "I think if there aren't
measures put in place to protect her, that it's going to get worse." Although he
was not a witness to the events that gave rise to the TRO complaint, he testified
that he witnessed weekly arguments between his parents that often turned
physical, and when K.M. called him on January 28, he left his residence within
five minutes to meet her. Sam also disputed G.M.'s assertion he had difficulty
understanding or communicating in English, recounting the many times he had
observed his father communicate in English with his friends, at banks, and at
stores.
G.M. denied all allegations of assault. Regarding the events of January
27, he testified K.M. blocked his access to her room where he believed his birth
certificate was located and he "probably grabbed her by her T-shirt so [he] could
move her" out of the doorway, but did not intend any harm. He denied grabbing
K.M. by her neck, striking or choking her. Rather, he testified K.M. started
yelling and shouting and became "unstable and aggressive," and he retreated to
his own room. He also denied drinking prior to the January 27 incident and
A-3136-23 7 testified that he went back into his room where he slept. As for the events of
January 28, G.M. testified he did not initially see K.M. when he woke up but
that after she came home, she "started saying that she wanted a divorce and . . .
wants [him] to get, get out of th[e] apartment," and she called him derogatory
names. He further testified that he told K.M. "if you want a divorce [,] we'll get
a divorce," and because she continued to appear unstable and aggressive, he
realizing it was "pointless to talk," retreated into his room and later he heard the
police arrive. G.M. stated he was interviewed by police without an interpreter,
noting "[he] tried to explain something to the police officer. But because of
[his] poor English command, [he] couldn't explain it to him fully." G.M. further
testified that at the police station he asked for and was initially denied a Russian
interpreter. He was subsequently connected with an interpreter who explained
the TRO; "what it meant and what [he] needed to do."
G.M. admitted on cross-examination that as he was leaving the apartment
following his arrest, he said to K.M., in Russian, "you'll regret it," but denied
saying he would make her "pay for this." He explained his statement referred
only to the financial consequences K.M. might face living without him, and
denied intending it as a threat of physical harm.
A-3136-23 8 Throughout the trial, G.M. objected to the admission of the BWC footage,
arguing that his statements to police were involuntary and, in the alternative, he
was entitled to Miranda warnings and an interpreter. 4 The absence of both
Miranda warnings and an interpreter, according to G.M., should have warranted
exclusion of the footage as evidence in the civil domestic violence trial. The
trial court overruled these objections and admitted thirteen minutes of the body-
worn camera footage in evidence.
Following the conclusion of the trial, on May 10, 2024, the court issued a
thorough oral decision, concluding K.M. had met her burden of proof and
entered a FRO. The court began by addressing jurisdiction and the predicate
acts as alleged in the amended TRO complaint: harassment, assault, terroristic
threats, and the applicable law with respect to each predicate act.
The court next addressed the credibility of the parties and witnesses,
finding K.M. and Sam largely credible. With respect to K.M.'s testimony, the
court acknowledged that she had an interest in the outcome of the case, including
a potential motivation to gain an advantage in the divorce proceedings.
Nevertheless, the court found K.M. to be knowledgeable and credible in her
description of the marital history. As to the January 27 incident, K.M. testified
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-3136-23 9 "with detail and without hesitation, she was able to shape her hands . . . to show
where [G.M.]'s hands had been placed around her neck or throat and chest area.
And, [it is] consistent with the redness in the pictures in P-2 and P-3." She was
emotional, and even tearful at times. The court further stated:
As to the accuracy of her recollection, I find her to be accurate in the description of the stories. I understand that there may be some questioning as to timing or dates, and as to the timing of the pictures of past history relevant to or related to when the incidents that she spoke about occurred in the past.
With respect to Sam's testimony, the court emphasized Sam's demeanor
and admission he had learned a lot from his father, despite the abuse he had
witnessed his father perpetrate and his concern for K.M.
The court concluded G.M. was less credible. The court observed that
G.M. admitted to police on the BWC footage that he had grabbed K.M.'s shirt,
and further considered his demeanor and the inconsistencies between his trial
testimony and prior statements. The court also rejected G.M.'s claim that a
language barrier had prevented him from understanding or adequately
explaining himself to the officers. The court further stated:
[B]y observing and watching the body camera footage repeatedly. And I watched it multiple times. In fact, G.M.'s command of the English language is good enough to make jokes with the officers. To say to them that if they take him to jail it would be better than the
A-3136-23 10 life he's living there at home. And so I don’t find that credible at all.
The court found G.M.'s testimony to be "completely contradictory to what
he [told] the officers in the moment, without having had time to prepare, without
having had time to think about it," relying on the inconsistencies between his
trial testimony and the body-worn camera footage. The court concluded G.M.
committed the predicate acts of simple assault and harassment against K.M. on
January 27 and 28, 2024 and demonstrated an ongoing danger to K.M., based on
the history of domestic violence, threats, and financial control. However, the
court did not find the predicate act of terroristic threats occurred because there
was no showing of a threat to commit a crime of violence with the purpose to
terrorize.
G.M. appealed. In response to G.M.'s argument that the trial court
expressly referenced reviewing body-worn camera footage beyond the thirteen
minutes played and admitted at trial, the court filed an Amplification pursuant
to Rule 2:5-1(b) on June 18, 2025. The court clarified that its reference in the
decision to review the BWC footage multiple times was "specifically referring
to the portions of the body camera footage played during trial on March 21,
2024." The court stated its "reliance on only those thirteen-minutes of [BWC]
footage is portrayed in pages fourteen through sixteen of the [t]rial [c]ourt
A-3136-23 11 transcript o[f] March 21, 2024. The [c]ourt narrated, in detail, the [thirteen]
minutes of [BWC] footage which was played during trial and admitted into
evidence." The court expressly denied having referenced or relied upon any
video beyond the admitted thirteen minutes presented at trial. The court's
Amplification was untimely, having been filed more than twenty days following
G.M.'s appeal.
As a preliminary matter, we reject G.M.'s assertion that we should not
consider the court's Amplification. We do so noting that the Amplification
clarifies and refutes G.M.'s argument on appeal that the court based its decision
on proofs not in evidence. Accordingly, relaxation of the rule requiring filing
within twenty days of an appeal is warranted. 5
II.
Our review of a court's grant of an FRO is limited. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463
N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). "We accord substantial deference to
Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are
5 Rule 1:1-2 reads in pertinent part, "[u]nless otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice." The trial court possesses this seldom-invoked reservoir of discretion, which permits it to waive a rule , or a portion of a rule, when strict adherence would otherwise produce an unjust result. Kellam v. Feliciano, 376 N.J. Super. 580, 587 (App. Div. 2005). A-3136-23 12 'specially trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and more
ordinary differences that arise between couples.'" Ibid. (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F.,
207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)).
Deference is particularly warranted where, as here, "the evidence is
largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J.
108, 117 (1997)). This is because it is the trial judge who "sees and observes
the witnesses," thereby possessing "a better perspective than a reviewing court
in evaluating the veracity of witnesses." Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33
(1988) (quoting Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1961)). Therefore,
a reviewing court will not disturb a judge's factual findings unless convinced
"they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice."
Rova Farms Resort v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone
v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)).
Consequently, "findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when
supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J.
414, 428 (2015) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12). A reviewing court does
A-3136-23 13 not, however, accord such deference to the court's legal conclusions, which are
reviewed de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016).
The entry of an FRO under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act
(PDVA) requires the trial court to make certain findings pursuant to the two-
step analysis in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006).
Initially, the court "must determine whether K.M. has proven, by a
preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts
set forth in [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)] has occurred." Id. at 125 (citing N.J.S.A.
2C:25-29(a)).
If a predicate offense is proven, the judge must then assess "whether a
restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the facts set forth in
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an immediate
danger or to prevent further abuse." J.D., 207 N.J. at 475-76 (quoting Silver,
387 N.J. Super. at 127). Whether a restraining order should be issued depends
on the seriousness of the predicate offense, on "the previous history of domestic
violence between K.M. and G.M. including previous threats, harassment[,] and
physical abuse[,] and [on] whether immediate danger to the person or property
is present." Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1995)
(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)).
A-3136-23 14 G.M. raises several arguments on appeal. He contends that the trial
judge’s belated submission violated Rule 2:5-1(b) and underscored the court’s
inconsistent handling of the police BWC footage. That inconsistency left the
record unclear as to whether the judge reviewed thirteen minutes or forty
minutes of footage, creating irregularities that warrant reversal. He further
argues that the court repeatedly viewed the forty-minute BWC recording off the
record, which "mandates reversal of the FRO in the interest of justice" because
the decision rested on evidence never admitted at trial.
G.M. further argues that the court's decision is not supported by adequate
credible evidence in the record. He contends that the BWC footage formed the
basis of the court's credibility determinations and that the court erred by
considering his statements shown on the footage. G.M. asserts that the FRO
must be reversed in the interest of justice because the parties' son who served as
a witness did not witness any of the incidents of domestic violence contained in
the TRO. Plaintiff's "version of the events defies logic and is contradicted by
the trial record and police [BWC] footage." Finally, due process mandates
reversal of the FRO because G.M. was denied a fair trial when the court refused
to permit sur-rebuttal testimony of Sam.
A-3136-23 15 We reject G.M.'s arguments, finding no support in the record for any of
his sweeping contentions that the court erred in granting the FRO. Rather, G.M.
misapplied the legal standard applicable to the entry of FROs and misread the
trial court’s Amplification letter. We thus affirm, substantially for the reasons
stated by the trial court in its oral opinion and as further amplified by its
correspondence on appeal.
First, we address G.M.'s claim that the court viewed, considered, and
relied upon BWC footage not admitted in evidence. We reject this speculative
and unsupported contention. Although the transcript reflects a single reference
to "forty minutes" of BWC footage, the court never indicated that it reviewed
anything beyond the thirteen minutes properly admitted into evidence. In fact,
G.M. acknowledges the thirteen-minute video was played on the record and
marked as an exhibit. We note that our review of the record evidences no
reference to any additional BWC footage being played or viewed. We therefore
discern the sole reference to forty minutes of footage to be attributed to a mistake
or a transcription error. In any case, this issue was squarely addressed and
clarified in its Amplification in which the court clarifies that in reaching its
decision, it reviewed and referenced only the thirteen-minutes of BWC footage
discussed at trial. Thus, G.M.'s claims to the contrary have no basis in the
A-3136-23 16 record. Moreover, because this argument is repeated throughout his brief and is
a common thread in his presentation, we similarly reject this issue as a basis for
several of his remaining arguments.
We next turn to G.M.'s contention the court's decision is not supported by
adequate, credible evidence. We reject this argument based on our review of
the record which shows the court made specific factual findings that G.M.
committed the predicate acts of assault and harassment related to the January 27
and 28 incidents based on the respective statutory provisions. Under N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(a)(1), a person commits the disorderly persons offense of simple assault
if by "[a]ttempt[ing] to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another."
Bodily injury is defined as "physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition." N.J.S.A. 2C:11- 1(a). Not much is required to show bodily injury. For example, the stinging sensation caused by a slap is adequate to support an assault. State v. Downey, 242 N.J. Super. 367, 371 (Law Div. 1988); see also New Jersey v. Bazin, 912 F. Supp. 106, 115 (D.N.J. 1995) ("Even the slightest physical contact, if done intentionally, is considered a simple assault under New Jersey law.").
[N.B. v. T.B., 297 N.J. Super. 35, 43 (App. Div. 1997).]
In support of its findings, the court cited the testimony of K.M. and Sam,
which it found largely credible, as well as photographic evidence documenting
A-3136-23 17 the plaintiff’s injury. The court concluded that the facts and law were properly
applied and found it persuasive that G.M. grabbed K.M.'s shirt and, in doing so,
attempted to cause or did purposely, knowingly, or recklessly cause her injury .
The court also justifiably found harassment occurred under N.J.S.A.
2C:33-4. The court based its conclusion on plaintiff's credible testimony that
she was subjected to striking, kicking, shoving or other offensive touching,
specifically being grabbed, and that G.M.'s actions were done, "with the purpose
to harass or because he was angry that she didn't have or couldn't find or
wouldn’t let him find the birth certificate."
Applying our deferential standard of review, we discern no error in the
court's findings of fact and conclude G.M. committed acts of simple assault and
harassment; both predicate acts under the PDVA. The court's findings were
predicated on the substantial credible evidence in the record, including G.M.'s
own admission that he grabbed K.M.'s blouse multiple times. Against this
backdrop, we have no basis to second guess the court's findings.
Further, having found that G.M. committed predicate acts of domestic
violence, the court also correctly concluded the entry of a FRO was necessary
to protect K.M. from G.M. Pursuant to Silver, in all cases, "the guiding standard
is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set
A-3136-23 18 forth in [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)] to . . . (6), to protect the victim from an
immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." 387 N.J. Super. at 126. The
court rejected G.M.'s self-serving assertion that K.M. was motivated to obtain
an FRO to gain an upper hand in the pending divorce.
Moreover, "[w]hen the predicate act is an offense that inherently involves
the use of physical force and violence, the decision to issue an FRO [under the
second prong of Silver] 'is most often perfunctory and self-evident.'" A.M.C. v.
P.B., 447 N.J. Super. 402, 418 (App. Div. 2016). See also Silver, 387 N.J.
Super. at 126-27.
To the extent we have not addressed a particular argument, it is because
either our disposition of the appeal renders it unnecessary, or the argument was
without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-3136-23 19