Klotz v. Rubinstein

37 F. Supp. 1008, 49 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 165, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3632
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedMarch 31, 1941
DocketCivil No. 1489
StatusPublished

This text of 37 F. Supp. 1008 (Klotz v. Rubinstein) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Klotz v. Rubinstein, 37 F. Supp. 1008, 49 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 165, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3632 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).

Opinion

GALSTON, District Judge.

This suit involves the alleged infringement of two patents relating to brief bags. The earlier one is to Trager, No. 1,768,496. granted June 24, 1930; the other to Klotz, No. 2,043,833, on June 9, 1936.

The usual defenses of invalidity and non-infringement are urged.

Trager sought to design a brief bag which would dispense with the usual stitching operations. To accomplish that he described a bag in which the bottom and ends or gussets are reinforced by metallic strips, the strips being attached in such a manner as to dispense with the stitching of the material. Claims 1, 2, and 3 of the Trager patent are in issue. It will suffice to discuss the first. It reads: “A brief bag or case of the class described comprising a front' face, a rear face having a top flap, end gussets and a bottom and metallic clamping means for joining the edges of the gussets and bottom to the edges of the said front and rear faces, said clamping means extending throughout the height of the gussets and length of the bottom of said bag or case.”

The defendant’s bags show stitching of the parts as well as the employment of a metal frame. The frame on defendant’s cases, if used without the stitching, would not hold the bags together, at any rate not beyond a very short period of time. The normal strain is on the stitches which lie inside the inner edges of the frame. Apparently the only purpose served by the metal frame as employed on the defendant’s bags is to protect the edges of the front and back sections from wear and [1009]*1009tear and to preserve the shape of the case. It is true that the three claims in suit make no specific elimination of stitching. The means indicated are just a metal clamping extending throughout the height of the gussets and the length of the bottom of the bag. In terms, therefore, that is to say-as a mere matter of literal application of the claims in suit to the defendant’s bags, infringement would be found and the stitching would be regarded then as mere addition or improvement of the invention of the Trager patent. Nachman Spring-Filled Corporation v. Spring Products Corporation, 2 Cir., 68 F.2d 829; Temco Electric Motor Co. v. Apco Manufacturing Co., 275 U.S. 319, 48 S.Ct. 170, 72 L.Ed. 298.

However, the Trager patent is entitled to no such broad interpretation nor to such literal comparison of the terms of the claims with the challenged structure of the defendant, for the stated object of Trager was to 'dispense with the usual stitching operations. This appears not only from repeated reference thereto in the specifications; but the same insistence is urged in the file wrapper of the application. Therein, in order to avoid the citation of the Charsky patent No. 1,424,152, Trager directed the attention of the examiner to the stated object of his invention as calling for the elimination of stitching and the substitution therefor of metallic strips. Of course it has been said that a patentee is not to be bound by the argument of counsel adopted during the prosecution of his application for a patent. Such is the general rule. In this case, however, the argument of counsel places merely additional emphasis upon the patentee’s own specification. Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co. et al., 311 U.S. 211, 61 S.Ct. 235, 85 L.Ed. -. In view of the patent to Charsky the Trager invention is one of very narrow scope. That patent discloses metal reinforcements at the lower corners of the bag to meet the strains of wear and tear. Fig. 4 of the Charsky patent shows the reinforcing element, and the specification describes it, as a fairly stiff sheet metal stamped into an L piece, and U shaped in cross section. Such frames went into commercial use, as appears from the advertisements of the Presto Metal Stamping Corporation. It does not seem that the extension of the L shaped strip of Charsky throughout the length of bottom and sides would require any high order of mechanical skill. In any event, to concede that the elimination of the stitching was the object of Trager is to narrow the .scope of the claims to a device in which no stitching is used. In other words, Trager, having taken a position not only through the argument of his attorney but in his own specification, must be held to a narrow contruction of his claims. See Greene v. Buckley, 2 Cir., 135 F. 520; Lewis v. Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp., 2 Cir., 12 F.2d 345; Dey Time Register Co. v. Syracuse Time-Recorder Co., 2 Cir., 161 F. 111; Superior Skylight Co. v. Zerbe Const. Co., D.C., 5 F.2d 982; Bragg v. Fitch, 121 U.S. 478, 7 S.Ct. 978, 30 L.Ed. 1008; American Grass Twine Co. v. Choate et al., 7 Cir., 159 F. 429; Shawmut Engineering Co. v. Crompton & Knowles Loom Works, 1 Cir., 16 F.2d 685. That being so, defendant’s use of stitching must be held to avoid infringement.

The patent to Klotz also described the advantage of a metal protector on a brief case for the purpose of framing the edges. It is stated in the specification that such edges would be protected from rough wear and tear and that ragged and shabby edges would be eliminated. This patent seemingly was not designed to avoid the stitching, for the patentee says: “The usual stitching will be enclosed and be kept from opening, tearing or bursting.” He also indicated that the use of the metal frames would maintain the shape of the case, adding to its durability, and would permit the case to be placed in upright position.

Only Claim 1 of the Klotz patent is in issue. It reads: “A case constructed of sections of sheet material having lapped end and bottom edge portions secured continuously therealong at the front and rear of the case, and a metal protecting frame of cross-sectionally channel construction applied exteriorly to said edge portions at the front and rear of the case, the opposite longitudinal edges of the frame being offset and bent toward the lapped edge portions of the sections, thus impinging and crimping said edge portions of said sections.”

This claim is infringed by the defendant as illustrated in the exhibits the defendant manufactured, 1 to 4 inclusive, introduced by the plaintiff in the trial of the case.

The essence of the invention lies in the offsetting of the edge of one wall with re[1010]*1010spect to the opposite wall so that by bending one wall toward the lapped portion the walls impinge and crimp the material. The defendant claims that its frames do not embody the patented construction because the overlap on the exhibits extends approximately but an inch or an inch and a half at one end of the case only. It is contended that the slight overlap will not serve the same purpose as the contemplated continuous overlap of the patent. In exhibits 1, 2 and 3 the frames at the trial were sawed through at one or more points so as to permit the inspection of an intermediate portion of the frame. At those points it does appear that the longitudinal edges are offset.

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Bragg v. Fitch
121 U.S. 478 (Supreme Court, 1887)
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Temco Electric Motor Co. v. Apco Manufacturing Co.
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292 U.S. 69 (Supreme Court, 1934)
Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co.
311 U.S. 211 (Supreme Court, 1940)
Superior Skylight Co. v. Zerbe Const. Co.
5 F.2d 982 (E.D. New York, 1925)
Lewis v. Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp.
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Greene v. Buckley
135 F. 520 (Second Circuit, 1904)
American Grass Twine Co. v. Choate
159 F. 429 (Seventh Circuit, 1907)

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Bluebook (online)
37 F. Supp. 1008, 49 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 165, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3632, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/klotz-v-rubinstein-nyed-1941.