J-A20010-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
ROBERT D. KLINE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JOSEPH S. NOVICK : No. 1076 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered July 1, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Civil Division at No(s): 2022-00027
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: JANUARY 3, 2024 Robert D. Kline appeals from the order granting Joseph S. Novick’s
motion to dismiss, and dismissing the case without prejudice. We affirm.
Kline, an adult individual who lives in McClure, Pennsylvania, is a serial
litigant who has brought over four hundred lawsuits in Mifflin and Snyder
Counties, including numerous suits for alleged Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (“TCPA”) violations. Typically, the TCPA suits are based upon allegations
of telemarketing phone calls from out-of-state defendants using automatic
telephone dialing systems (“ATDS”).
On January 24, 2022, Kline filed a pro se complaint against Novick, who
is a telemarketing insurance agent with an office in Lake Worth Beach, Florida.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A20010-23
In the complaint, Kline averred that on November 29, 2021, he received a call
from a foreign sounding man who asked Kline insurance-related questions.
The man then transferred Kline to a person licensed in Pennsylvania, Novick,
who asked him further questions. Kline alleged violations of the TCPA and
related regulations, violations of telemarketing laws, trespass to chattels, and
invasion of privacy. In essence, Kline argued that Novick engaged in illegal
telemarketing to provide insurance quotes for products and services through
live, automated, or robocalls on Kline’s phone. Kline sought damages of
$3,000 and costs from Novick. Relevantly, Kline filed a similar lawsuit in
Robert Kline v. Stanley Loiselle, CP-44-CV-860-2022.
Novick and Loiselle retained the same attorney, who filed motions to
dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 in both cases. Specific to this case, Novick
noted that he was one of many individuals targeted by Kline, highlighting that
Kline had filed at least 194 pro se cases in Mifflin County since 2017 and 188
pro se cases in Snyder County since 2001. These numbers include seven
separate TCPA actions in Mifflin County filed between January 4, 2022, and
February 8, 2022. Novick emphasized that a similar federal district court case
from 2020, which involved Kline and different Florida defendants, was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. See Kline v. Advanced
Ins. Underwriters, LLP, No. 1:19-CV-00437, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110453
(M.D. Pa. 2020). Novick argued that there was no jurisdiction over him in
Pennsylvania, noting that the facts of Advanced Ins. Underwriters, LLP
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and the instant case are essentially the same. According to Novick, there were
no non-conclusory allegations in Kline’s complaint that Novick initiated any
calls to Kline, and Kline is merely engaged in repetitive litigation.
The trial court stayed the cases pending resolution of the motion to
dismiss. In response to the motion to dismiss, Kline filed a praecipe to
discontinue the case without prejudice, stating that he intended to refile the
action in Florida. The trial court then scheduled a hearing on the motions to
dismiss in both the instant case and the Loiselle case and the praecipe to
discontinue. Following the hearing, the trial court dismissed this case without
prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court did not rule on the praecipe to
discontinue. Thereafter, Kline filed a motion to vacate; however, before the
trial court could rule on the motion, Kline filed a counseled notice of appeal.
On appeal, Kline raises the following questions for our review:
1. Should the Trial Court have dismissed Novick’s Motion to Dismiss under Pa.R.C.P. 233.1, for lack of pleading sufficient elements to grant relief?
2. Did the Trial Court deny [Kline] due process by sua sponte dismissing [Kline’s] Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, without affording an opportunity to be heard?
3. Did the Trial Court err by dismissing [Kline’s] Complaint for lack of jurisdiction?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (issues renumbered).
On appeal of an order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
233.1, “our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”
Gray v. Buonopane, 53 A.3d 829, 834 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
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We will address Kline’s arguments together. Initially, Kline contends that
the trial court should have denied Novick’s motion to dismiss pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. 233.1. See Appellant’s Brief at 20. Kline argues that Novick failed
to allege Novick was the same or related to any other defendant against whom
Kline had filed a lawsuit or any settlement agreement or court proceeding in
which the claims were resolved. See id. at 20-21. Kline claims that although
the trial court found precedential value in the federal district court case, it did
not dismiss the case on Rule 233.1, but instead on lack of jurisdiction. See
id. at 21-22. According to Kline, the trial court could not address jurisdiction
in the motion to dismiss but should have waited until preliminary objections
had been filed. See id. at 11-12. Kline takes issue with the trial court
indicating during the hearing that it was not “talking about venue or
jurisdiction requirements,” but then deciding to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Id. at 22 (quoting N.T., 4/6/22, at 3).
Kline further argues that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over
Novick. See Appellant’s Brief at 13, 19. Kline maintains that Novick directed
contacts to Pennsylvania, as he and/or his agents, employees, and
representatives engaged in telemarketing using ATDS to his number despite
being on Do-Not-Call lists. See id. at 13-15. Kline alleges that Novick is
registered as an agent in Pennsylvania to sell insurance, which established
Novick’s minimum contacts with Pennsylvania, and an expectation that he
may be haled into court in Pennsylvania. See id. at 15-17, 19.
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Rule 233.1 states, in relevant part:
(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that
(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the same or related defendants, and
(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a written settlement agreement or a court proceeding.
Pa.R.C.P. 233.1(a).
“Rule 233.1 does not require the highly technical prerequisites of res
judicata or collateral estoppel to allow the trial court to conclude that a pro se
litigant’s claims are adequately related to those addressed in prior litigation.”
Gray, 53 A.3d at 838. “Nor does it require an identity of parties or the
capacities in which they sued or were sued.” Id. “Rather, it requires a rational
relationship evident in the claims made and in the defendant’s relationships
with one another to inform the trial court’s conclusion that the bar the Rule
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J-A20010-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
ROBERT D. KLINE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JOSEPH S. NOVICK : No. 1076 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered July 1, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Civil Division at No(s): 2022-00027
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: JANUARY 3, 2024 Robert D. Kline appeals from the order granting Joseph S. Novick’s
motion to dismiss, and dismissing the case without prejudice. We affirm.
Kline, an adult individual who lives in McClure, Pennsylvania, is a serial
litigant who has brought over four hundred lawsuits in Mifflin and Snyder
Counties, including numerous suits for alleged Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (“TCPA”) violations. Typically, the TCPA suits are based upon allegations
of telemarketing phone calls from out-of-state defendants using automatic
telephone dialing systems (“ATDS”).
On January 24, 2022, Kline filed a pro se complaint against Novick, who
is a telemarketing insurance agent with an office in Lake Worth Beach, Florida.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A20010-23
In the complaint, Kline averred that on November 29, 2021, he received a call
from a foreign sounding man who asked Kline insurance-related questions.
The man then transferred Kline to a person licensed in Pennsylvania, Novick,
who asked him further questions. Kline alleged violations of the TCPA and
related regulations, violations of telemarketing laws, trespass to chattels, and
invasion of privacy. In essence, Kline argued that Novick engaged in illegal
telemarketing to provide insurance quotes for products and services through
live, automated, or robocalls on Kline’s phone. Kline sought damages of
$3,000 and costs from Novick. Relevantly, Kline filed a similar lawsuit in
Robert Kline v. Stanley Loiselle, CP-44-CV-860-2022.
Novick and Loiselle retained the same attorney, who filed motions to
dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 in both cases. Specific to this case, Novick
noted that he was one of many individuals targeted by Kline, highlighting that
Kline had filed at least 194 pro se cases in Mifflin County since 2017 and 188
pro se cases in Snyder County since 2001. These numbers include seven
separate TCPA actions in Mifflin County filed between January 4, 2022, and
February 8, 2022. Novick emphasized that a similar federal district court case
from 2020, which involved Kline and different Florida defendants, was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. See Kline v. Advanced
Ins. Underwriters, LLP, No. 1:19-CV-00437, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110453
(M.D. Pa. 2020). Novick argued that there was no jurisdiction over him in
Pennsylvania, noting that the facts of Advanced Ins. Underwriters, LLP
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and the instant case are essentially the same. According to Novick, there were
no non-conclusory allegations in Kline’s complaint that Novick initiated any
calls to Kline, and Kline is merely engaged in repetitive litigation.
The trial court stayed the cases pending resolution of the motion to
dismiss. In response to the motion to dismiss, Kline filed a praecipe to
discontinue the case without prejudice, stating that he intended to refile the
action in Florida. The trial court then scheduled a hearing on the motions to
dismiss in both the instant case and the Loiselle case and the praecipe to
discontinue. Following the hearing, the trial court dismissed this case without
prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court did not rule on the praecipe to
discontinue. Thereafter, Kline filed a motion to vacate; however, before the
trial court could rule on the motion, Kline filed a counseled notice of appeal.
On appeal, Kline raises the following questions for our review:
1. Should the Trial Court have dismissed Novick’s Motion to Dismiss under Pa.R.C.P. 233.1, for lack of pleading sufficient elements to grant relief?
2. Did the Trial Court deny [Kline] due process by sua sponte dismissing [Kline’s] Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, without affording an opportunity to be heard?
3. Did the Trial Court err by dismissing [Kline’s] Complaint for lack of jurisdiction?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (issues renumbered).
On appeal of an order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
233.1, “our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”
Gray v. Buonopane, 53 A.3d 829, 834 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
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We will address Kline’s arguments together. Initially, Kline contends that
the trial court should have denied Novick’s motion to dismiss pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. 233.1. See Appellant’s Brief at 20. Kline argues that Novick failed
to allege Novick was the same or related to any other defendant against whom
Kline had filed a lawsuit or any settlement agreement or court proceeding in
which the claims were resolved. See id. at 20-21. Kline claims that although
the trial court found precedential value in the federal district court case, it did
not dismiss the case on Rule 233.1, but instead on lack of jurisdiction. See
id. at 21-22. According to Kline, the trial court could not address jurisdiction
in the motion to dismiss but should have waited until preliminary objections
had been filed. See id. at 11-12. Kline takes issue with the trial court
indicating during the hearing that it was not “talking about venue or
jurisdiction requirements,” but then deciding to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Id. at 22 (quoting N.T., 4/6/22, at 3).
Kline further argues that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over
Novick. See Appellant’s Brief at 13, 19. Kline maintains that Novick directed
contacts to Pennsylvania, as he and/or his agents, employees, and
representatives engaged in telemarketing using ATDS to his number despite
being on Do-Not-Call lists. See id. at 13-15. Kline alleges that Novick is
registered as an agent in Pennsylvania to sell insurance, which established
Novick’s minimum contacts with Pennsylvania, and an expectation that he
may be haled into court in Pennsylvania. See id. at 15-17, 19.
-4- J-A20010-23
Rule 233.1 states, in relevant part:
(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that
(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the same or related defendants, and
(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a written settlement agreement or a court proceeding.
Pa.R.C.P. 233.1(a).
“Rule 233.1 does not require the highly technical prerequisites of res
judicata or collateral estoppel to allow the trial court to conclude that a pro se
litigant’s claims are adequately related to those addressed in prior litigation.”
Gray, 53 A.3d at 838. “Nor does it require an identity of parties or the
capacities in which they sued or were sued.” Id. “Rather, it requires a rational
relationship evident in the claims made and in the defendant’s relationships
with one another to inform the trial court’s conclusion that the bar the Rule
announces is justly applied.” Id.
Further, “[i]n the Rule’s requirement that the matter have been
‘resolved pursuant to a written settlement agreement or a court proceeding,’
the language assures that the pro se litigant is availed of a chance to address
his claim subject to the contractual guarantee of a settlement agreement or
to the procedural safeguards that attend a court proceeding.” Id. at 836.
However, it does not require that the matter has progressed to a final
judgment on the merits, nor does it require the defendant to identify “the
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quality or capacity in the persons for or against whom the claim is made[.]”
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
As noted, the theory of relief in Kline’s complaint is based upon the
TCPA. The TCPA “was intended to combat, among other things, the
proliferation of automated telemarketing calls (known as ‘robocalls’) to private
residences, which Congress viewed as a nuisance and an invasion of
privacy.” Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat. Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316, 322 (3d Cir. 2015)
(citation omitted). The TCPA prohibits initiating a robocall to a cell phone
unless the call is made for “emergency purposes,” the recipient has given their
prior express consent, or the call falls within an exemption created by the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”). See 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(1).
The TCPA provides a private cause of action against violators of its
provisions. See id. § 227(b)(3). Plaintiffs are permitted to recover actual
damages or $500 per violation, whichever is greater; moreover, damages are
trebled for willful or knowing violations. See id. Pursuant to TCPA authority,
the FCC has promulgated regulations concerning the national do-not-call
registry and internal do-not-call lists maintained by telemarketers. See 47
C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) (noting that it is unlawful to “initiate any telephone
solicitation” to a “residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or
her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry ....”); see also 47
U.S.C.A. § 227(c).
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In his complaint, Kline averred that Novick is a telemarketing insurance
agent with offices in Lake Worth Beach, Florida. See Complaint, 1/24/22, at
1-2 (unnumbered). Kline alleged that Novick and/or his agents,
subcontractors, or employees utilized an ATDS to conduct illegal telemarketing
to people on the Do Not Call registry in violation of the TCPA. See id. at 1-3,
6 (unnumbered); see also id. at 3 (unnumbered) (noting that he did not give
Novick written permission to call his phone). Kline maintained that he received
an ATDS phone call from a foreign sounding male, identified as “Daniel,” who
indicated he would transfer the call to an agent licensed in Pennsylvania, who
turned out to be Novick. See id. at 6 (unnumbered). However, Kline
acknowledges that Novick was not registered as a telemarketer in
Pennsylvania. See id. at 5 (unnumbered). Kline alleged various violations of
the TCPA and related regulations, as well as, trespass to chattels, violation of
the Pennsylvania Telemarketer Registration Act, and invasion of privacy. See
id. at 5-11 (unnumbered).
In Novick’s motion to dismiss under Rule 233.1, he cites to Advanced
Ins. Underwriters, noting that Kline filed essentially the same complaint in
that case as the facts and claims alleged herein. In Advanced Ins.
Underwriters, Kline asserted claims against Florida-based defendants for
violations of TCPA, arguing that he received several calls from an automatic
telephone dialing system (ATDS). See Advanced Ins. Underwriters, No.
1:19-CV-00437, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110453, at **2-5. Kline maintained he
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received a call from “Erica” who transferred the call to a named defendant
who attempted to sell him health insurance. See id. at *3. Kline alleged
numerous causes of action, including TCPA violations and trespass to chattels
claim. See id. at *5.
The named defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. See id. at *6. Specifically, the defendants claimed the
principal place of business of Advanced Insurance was Florida, no business
was conducted in Pennsylvania, neither defendant directed phone calls into
Pennsylvania for the purpose of soliciting insurance business, and no one
directed anyone to make a sales call to Kline. See id. at *11. Ultimately, the
federal district court found Kline did not have general jurisdiction over the
defendants because Kline failed to specify the number of calls he received
from the defendants to his mobile phone number or indicate that the calls
were of a continuous and systematic nature to exercise general jurisdiction
over the defendants. See id. at **14-15. Likewise, the court found that Kline
did not establish specific jurisdiction over the defendants, noting he failed to
show defendants directly initiated the call to him in violation of the TCPA, and
Kline failed to provide any proof that defendants purposefully directed contact
at Kline in response to their motion to dismiss. See id. at **15-16.
Here, Kline has repeatedly brought lawsuits against various defendants
raising claims of TCPA violations. See Motion to Dismiss, 2/14/22, at 3-4
(pointing out that Kline has filed seven additional cases between January 4,
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2022, and February 8, 2022, against various defendants alleging TCPA
violations). There is no need for extended litigation in Pennsylvania in this
particular case where Kline’s jurisdictional claims have already been addressed
in a substantive manner and resolved in the federal court proceeding. The
record reflects that there is a rational relationship between the instant case
and Kline’s case in Advanced Ins. Underwriters, as the defendants are
similar and the causes of actions in each case are largely the same. The fact
that Novick was not a party to the previous federal litigation is not required
under Rule 233.1, as the rule does not require highly technical prerequisites
for a trial court to conclude that a pro se litigant’s claims are adequately
related to those addressed in prior litigation. See Gray, 53 A.3d at 838.
Both cases involve claims that the defendants violated the TCPA by
making phone calls from outside Pennsylvania to Kline in Pennsylvania. Like
the defendants in Advanced Ins. Underwriters, who resided and had the
principal place of business in Florida, Novick resides in Florida. In each action,
Kline raised various TCPA claims and related regulations and state law claims.
Moreover, the district court resolved Kline’s claim by finding a lack of
general and specific jurisdiction due to the paucity of his complaint. See
Advanced Ins. Underwriters, No. 1:19-CV-00437, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
110453, at **14-16. As in Advanced Ins. Underwriters, when viewing the
evidence of record in a light most favorable to Kline, he did not establish
general jurisdiction over Novick. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301(a)(1); see also
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Sulkava v. Glaston Finland Oy, 54 A.3d 884, 889 (Pa. Super. 2012) (noting
that “when deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction[,] the
court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.” (citation omitted)). Although Kline provides a conclusory
allegation in his complaint that the initial caller was transferring Kline to a
licensed agent, Kline does not identify Novick as licensed in Pennsylvania in
the complaint1 or establish general jurisdiction over Novick due to the alleged
licensure. Additionally, like Advanced Ins. Underwriters, Kline did not
establish specific jurisdiction over Novick, as he only alleges he received a
single phone call and admits that Novick did not initiate the call. See Mey v.
All Access Telecom, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80018, at *8 (N.D. W.Va.
2021) (collecting cases and stating that “[i]n TCPA cases, courts generally find
that specific jurisdiction exists when a defendant makes a call or sends a
message into the forum state by targeting a telephone number within the
particular forum.”). Most importantly, Kline seemingly admitted to the lack of
jurisdiction over Novick in Pennsylvania when he filed a praecipe to dismiss
1 On appeal, Kline argues that Novick was licensed in Pennsylvania. Although
he did not explicitly raise this allegation in his complaint, he raised it in a motion to vacate, with an attached exhibit, after the trial court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Notably, “we do not allow new evidence to be presented in a motion for reconsideration” Ford-Bey v. Pro. Anesthesia Servs. of N. Am., LLC, 229 A.3d 984, 990 (Pa. Super. 2020). Moreover, and in any event, Kline filed his notice of appeal before the trial court could address the motion to vacate.
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this case to file the action in Florida.2 See Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/22, at 6
(noting that “it is perplexed why [Kline] on February 25, 2022, would file to
discontinue this action for the purpose of re-filing this action in Florida where
[Novick] resides prior to th[e trial court’s] dismissal without prejudice, if
[Kline] also did not share concerns about improper jurisdiction.” (emphasis in
original)).
Therefore, based upon the similarity of the instant case to Advanced
Ins. Underwriters, and Kline’s apparent recognition of the jurisdiction issue
in his praecipe to dismiss to refile the action in Florida, we conclude that the
trial court properly dismissed the case without prejudice.3
Order affirmed.
2 We note that Kline contends that he was not afforded the opportunity to establish jurisdiction over Novick in Pennsylvania. See Appellant’s Brief at 9- 12. Here, following the filing of Kline’s complaint, Novick filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 233.1, arguing that Advanced Ins. Underwriters had found Kline had no jurisdiction to raise his claims against that defendant. Kline had an opportunity to respond to this allegation. Moreover, as noted above, Kline filed a praecipe to dismiss and refile the action in Florida in response to the motion to dismiss.
3 Although the trial court dismissed the case, it reviewed the jurisdictional issue because that court had not previously addressed the jurisdictional issue. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/22, at 4 n.2. However, this Court has found a federal action can be the basis of dismissal of a state action under Rule 233.1. See, e.g., Coulter v. Lindsay, 159 A.3d 947, 952 (Pa. Super. 2017) (per curiam). Nevertheless, we note that this Court can affirm on any valid basis. See Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse SA v. Fin. Software Sys., Inc., 99 A.3d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “we may affirm the decision of the trial court on any valid basis appearing of record.”).
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 01/03/2024
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