Kliesing v. Del Barto

282 S.W.2d 249, 1955 Tex. App. LEXIS 2035
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 14, 1955
Docket12858
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 282 S.W.2d 249 (Kliesing v. Del Barto) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kliesing v. Del Barto, 282 S.W.2d 249, 1955 Tex. App. LEXIS 2035 (Tex. Ct. App. 1955).

Opinion

HAMBLEN, Chief Justice.

This suit was instituted in the District Court of Harris County, by P. C. Del Barto, joined by James C. Boone, Trustee, against R. V. Kliesing, R. S. Johnson, Wm. B. T. Simmons, and Ray Hay, upon a promissory note in the sum of $28,000 executed by the named defendants, payable to the order of James C. Boone, Trustee, and by him endorsed to P. C. Del Barto. The trial resulted in a joint and several judgment against the defendants in favor of James *250 C. Boone, Trustee, and P. C. Del Barto for the amount of such note plus interest, and for foreclosure of a lien upon a voting trust certificate pledged to secure payment of same. From such judgment R. V. Kliesing alone has appealed.

The trial in the court below was to a jury, which, in response to special issues submitted, found that no valuable consideration was given by P. C. Del Barto to R. V. Kliesing for the execution and delivery of the $28,000 note, and further found facts to exist upon which appellant contends that he is entitled to an offset against the amount due upon the note in the sum of $10,000. Upon motion by appellee Del Barto, the trial court entered judgment non obstante veredicto in favor of appellee. The action of the trial court in disregarding such findings by the jury is the basis of appellant’s two points of error. Ap-pellee answers that the undisputed proof shows that the note sued upon is supported by a valuable consideration, and that the claim asserted by appellant as an offset had been fully and completely .released by him at the time of the execution of the note sued upon. After reviewing the record here presented, this Court is of the opinion that appellee is correct in his answering contentions, and that the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. For that reason we deem it unnecessary to discuss appellees’ counter point wherein it is contended that appellant waived any defense which he may have had to such note.

The material facts are substantially as follows: The appellee Del Barto, the appellant Kliesing, and the other makers of the note sued upon, who were defendants in the trial court, were stockholders in and directors of a corporation by the name of Regent Aircraft, Inc., which had been created for the purpose of manufacturing and selling aircraft. For some period of time prior to the execution of the note sued upon, such corporation had been in financial difficulties, being indebted to, among other creditors, a corporation known as Regent Aircraft Corporation, of Henderson, Texas, in the amount of $27,729.24 representing the purchase price of one airplane, and various machine tools. Various meetings were held among the directors and stockholders of Regent Aircraft, Inc., for the purpose of improving its financial condition. These meetings culminated in an agreement between the above named individuals which was reduced to writing in the form of a letter dated June 27, 1952. Because such letter is so material to the determination of this appeal, a copy thereof is attached as Exhibit A to this opinion.

As we understand the appellant’s contention relative to his defense of failure of consideration, it is premised upon the proposition that P. C. Del Barto, the beneficial owner of the $28,000 note here sued upon, had individually guaranteed to the Regent Aircraft Corporation of Henderson the payment of the obligation due it by Regent Aircraft, Inc., and that therefore the $28,000 ostensibly loaned by him to the appellant and others, amounted to no more than the payment by him of a debt which he already owed. The record does not appear to this Court to sustain appellant’s contention. When construed in the light most favorable to appellant’s contention, it appears that the only obligation undertaken by appellee Del Barto relative to the debt due by Regent Aircraft, Inc., to Regent Aircraft Corporation of Henderson, was that of guaranteeing the return of the airplane and machine tools to the selling corporation, in the event of default in the payment of the purchase price by the buying corporation. It is undisputed in the record that at the time of the execution of the note sued upon Del Barto had caused the airplane to be redelivered to the Henderson corporation, and that the machine tools were in a Houston warehouse subject to his order for redelivery.

However, aside from the consideration represented by the $28,000 paid by appellee, it is well settled that it devolves upon one relying upon the defense of want of consideration to prove the absence of all the elements which, in law, may constitute a valid consideration. Shaw v. McShane, Tex.Com.App., 50 S.W.2d 278. When the agreement between the parties, evidenced by Exhibit A hereto, is examined, it is apparent that in addition to the sum of $28,000 advanced by Del Barto, the *251 note is additionally supported by the delivery by Del Barto of 114,000 shares of stock in Regent Aircraft, Inc., a release by Del Barto of any and all claims held by him against Regent Aircraft, Inc., the resignation of Del Barto as an officer and director of the corporation, and the delivery by Del Barto of all books and records belonging to Regent Aircraft, Inc. The record proves without dispute the performance of each of such undertakings by Del Barto. Appellant therefore has failed to discharge his burden and his plea of want of consideration must fail as a matter of law.

Appellant’s claim of an offset of $10,000 against the amount of the note grows out of his assertion that appellee Del Barto guaranteed that appellant would suffer no loss in his purchase of $10,000 worth of stock in Regent Aircraft, Inc. From paragraph 2 of Exhibit A it will be noted that the agreement between the parties to the note included the execution by appellant Kliesing of a full and complete release of all claims, demands and causes of action against Del Barto. The record conclusively establishes that such a release was executed by appellant and delivered to appellee. Such release was pleaded by appellee in defense of appellant’s claim of offset. Until set aside upon the ground of fraud, accident or mistake, it stands as a bar to appellant’s claim. 36 Tex.Jur. 819, Sec. 21. Appellant neither plead nor proved fraud, accident or mistake. His only proof relative to escaping the effect of the release is his testimony that he did not read it before he signed it. Such proof is insufficient. Harvey v. Elder, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 686.

Judgment affirmed.

Exhibit A

“Houston, Texas, June 27, 1952.
“Mr. T. E. Mosheim
“Shell Building
“Houston, Texas
“Dear Sir:
“Under date of June 18, 1952, P. C. Del Barto wrote you a letter setting but certain provisions with provisions with regard to Regent Aircraft, Inc., with which letter we are both familiar. On June 23, 1952, you advised the undersigned that the sum of $27,500.00 plus interest, required to be paid Regent Aircraft Corporation was available, in accordance with the provisions of such letter, but on the afternoon of June 24, 1952, you advised me your clients had been unable to raise that amount, and you requested that my client, Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
282 S.W.2d 249, 1955 Tex. App. LEXIS 2035, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kliesing-v-del-barto-texapp-1955.