Klestinec v. Thruway Terminals, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Klestinec v. Thruway Terminals, Inc.

124 A.D.2d 988, 508 N.Y.S.2d 799, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 62308

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 10, 1986

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 124 A.D.2d 988 (Klestinec v. Thruway Terminals, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Klestinec v. Thruway Terminals, Inc., 124 A.D.2d 988, 508 N.Y.S.2d 799, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 62308 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986).

Pincite

Opinion

Memorandum: Special Term correctly ruled that the contract of indemnification under which Thruway agreed to indemnify Norfolk is limited to Thruway’s own negligence. The operative language is in paragraph 9 (b) which, insofar as relevant, covers indemnification for claims from injury to any person caused directly or indirectly by the acts or omissions of the contractor (Thruway), its agents, servants or employees. This must be read with the contrasting language of paragraph 9 (a), which covers indemnification for claims from injury to Thruway agents, servants or employees, and explicitly provides that it applies whether injury is caused directly or indirectly by the negli[989]*989gence of Norfolk, its agents, servants or employees, or otherwise. The interpretation of a contract which makes every part effective and which gives meaning to every provision is favored (22 NY Jur 2d, Contracts, § 221). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Ontario County, Kennedy, J. — partial summary judgment.) Present — Denman, J. P., Boomer, Green, Pine and Balio, JJ.

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Memorandum: Special Term correctly ruled that the contract of indemnification under which Thruway agreed to indemnify Norfolk is limited to Thruway’s own negligence. The operative language is in paragraph 9 (b) which, insofar as relevant, covers indemnification for claims from injury to any person caused directly or indirectly by the acts or omissions of the contractor (Thruway), its agents, servants or employees. This must be read with the contrasting language of paragraph 9 (a), which covers indemnification for claims from injury to Thruway agents, servants or employees, and explicitly provides that it applies whether injury is caused directly or indirectly by the negli[989]*989gence of Norfolk, its agents, servants or employees, or otherwise. The interpretation of a contract which makes every part effective and which gives meaning to every provision is favored (22 NY Jur 2d, Contracts, § 221). (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Ontario County, Kennedy, J. — partial summary judgment.) Present — Denman, J. P., Boomer, Green, Pine and Balio, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

124 A.D.2d 988, 508 N.Y.S.2d 799, 1986 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 62308, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/klestinec-v-thruway-terminals-inc-nyappdiv-1986.

Opinion

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