Kleinschmidt v. Greiser

37 P. 5, 14 Mont. 484, 1894 Mont. LEXIS 72

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: June 25, 1894
• Status: Published

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The purpose of this action is to adjudicate and determine a controversy between plaintiffs and defendants regarding their priority of right, by appropriation, to use the waters of Prickly Pear creek and its tributary, Cañón creek, situate in Lewis and Clarke county, for irrigation of agricultural lands adjacent thereto.

Plaintiffs allege appropriation about November 11, 1882, of four thousand inches of water from Cañón creek, a tributary of Prickly Pear creek, diverted by means of a dam and ditch, whereby that quantity of said water is conveyed to the lands of divers persons, who own said dam and ditch in common; that such appropriation on the part of plaintiffs is prior to defendants’ appropriation of the waters of said creek; that defendants have wrongfully interfered with and removed said dam, thereby preventing plaintiffs’ diversion of the waters from said creek, and threaten to continue so to do, thus depriving plaintiffs of the use and enjoyment of their alleged prior right to the use of said waters. Wherefore, they seek judgment establishing their alleged right as prior to that of defendants, with permanent injunction forbidding defendants’ interference therewith.

Defendants, by answer, allege appropriation and diversion of diverse quantities of the waters of Prickly Pear creek by them, respectively, or their predecessors, aggregating nineteen hundred inches, according to statutory measurement, all of which appropriations on the part of defendants are alleged as of dates several years prior to the appropriation by plaintiffs. Defendants also allege that their several appropriations were and are necessary for the irrigation of the agricultural lands owned by them, respectively. The jury sitting in the trial appear to have returned findings satisfactory to defendants, awarding them, severally, about the amount of water claimed prior to plaintiffs’ appropriation; but the court modified the findings of the jury, and supplemented the same by some further findings, whereby the quantity of water found by the jury to have been appropriated by defendants, prior to the appropriation by plaintiffs, was diminished to three hundred and twenty inches, distributed among them as follows: Greiser, sixty inches by appropriation of 1871; Leedy, forty inches by appropriation of 1871, and forty inches by appropriation in 1868; Ken ok, Duffy, and Coppler, jointly, one hundred and eighty inches by appropriation March 1, 1882. Following those appropriations, in order of time, the court found plaintiffs appropriated seventeen hundred and sixty inches of water of said creek, necessary for their use in the irrigation of their agricultural lands. There were some further appropriations found in favor of defendants, but of dates subsequent to the appropriation by plaintiffs. Decree was entered accordingly. Defendants appeal, insisting that the court erred in several points specified, all of which have been carefully considered in the light of the record.

The first proposition urged by appellants is that, notwithstanding this case is properly classified as in the nature of an action in equity, the court is bound, by virtue of the peculiar provisions of section 250 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to make its decree in conformity with the verdict of the jury. This proposition has been several times argued to this court, and given due consideration, resulting on each occasion in the conclusion, remarked in Arnold v. Sinclair, 12 Mont. 248, that it will not be presumed, from any devious or uncertain language, that the legislature undertook to prune away one of the most distinctive and important jurisdictional functions of the equity court; and when a statute is found clearly expressing that intention, it will be time enough to inquire as to whether the legislature possessed power to that end.

Passing to a consideration of the points of error specified in relation to the findings of fact, we find that the record, which purports to contain a transcript of all the evidence introduced, does not disclose evidence sufficient to support the finding by the court that defendant Greiser abandoned, in the year 1877, all but sixty inches of his original appropriation of the waters of said creek. According to the evidence shown by the record defendant Greiser constantly used the waters appropriated for his ranch, but from time to time diverted the same through different ditches, and in 1877 he abandoned an older ditch formerly used for the same purpose. This does not constitute abandonment of his water right, or any part thereof, nor does any evidence in the record support such finding. Nor is there evidence in the record sufficient to warrant the finding by the court to the effect that defendants Duffy and Coppler did not acquire an interest in the Tierney ditch until May, 1885. The undisputed evidence, as disclosed by the record, shows that they acquired an interest in said Tierney ditch in June, 1882, and that testimony is corroborated by the joint notice of appropriation of the waters of said creek by Tierney, Duffy, and Coppler, introduced in evidence, which bears date May 25, 1882, and declares their appropriation as of that date. Nor is there evidence in the record sufficient to warrant the finding that, after Duffy and Coppler acquired interests in said Tierney ditch, they enlarged the same to a capacity sufficient to divert the water by them appropriated. The testimony of witnesses on this point is emphatically to the contrary effect, except that of witness Ford, who, under contract, for the owners, continued the excavation of said ditch after Duffy and Coppler acquired interests therein. In his testimony he describes his work upon said ditch, and says that he enlarged or widened the excavation of a portion of the ditch, where the work of Tierney in the excavation thereof was left off; that Tierney directed Ford to widen the ditch in that part, explaining that the last of his excavation was done in the winter, and was not made of sufficient width at that part. But Ford distinctly testifies that it was only the portion of the excavation towards the end, where Tierney left off, that he enlarged. His testimony, under such explanation, becomes consistent with that of other witnesses on this point, all of which is insufficient to support the finding that the part of said ditch already excavated by Tierney was enlarged after Duffy and Coppler acquired interests therein. The effect of the finding by the court on this point would place the appropriation of Duffy and Coppler as of May, 1883, subsequent to that of plaintiffs.

There is another finding by the court to the effect that only a portion of certain ranches owned by defendants were available for irrigation, and apparently upon that theory the quantity of water allotted to them by the findings of the court was very considerably diminished from the amount appropriated and diverted through their ditches, and claimed to be necessary to irrigate their lands. It is always proper to inquire into the question of the necessity and ability to use the quantity of water appropriated and diverted. If it should appear from proper evidence that a portion of defendants’ lands are so situate that the water claimed by such defendants could not be diverted thereto, or that the land is of such character or condition as that crops of grass, grain, or vegetables could not be grown thereon with the aid of irrigation, it would seem proper to take such conditions into consideration, in determining the amount of water to which such defendants were entitled. But the evidence in this ease does not warrant the finding that only the portions of the lands owned by defendants, as designated by the court, were “available for irrigation.” It does not appear from the evidence that there was contention by the litigants that certain portions of the ranches of defendants were of such character, or so situate, as not to be available for irrigation.

There was much evidence introduced on the question as to the quantity of water necessary, per acre, to irrigate certain, lands owned by defendants, and how the quantity varied when applied to different characters of soil. There was also considerable evidence introduced on the inquiry as to how much land defendants had under cultivation at the date of plaintiff’s appropriation out of the waters of said creek, in the fall of 1882; and some findings by the court tend to indicate that it proceeded, in determining the quantity of water to which defendants were entitled prior to plaintiffs’ appropriation, on the theory that defendants were entitled to hold, prior to plaintiffs’ appropriation, only a sufficient quantity to irrigate the lands which defendants actually had under cultivation at the date plaintiffs initiated their appropriation. It is not shown with clearness and certainty that the court proceeded on such theory, but certain findings by the court, stating particularly that the defendants named had under cultivation at the date of plaintiffs’ appropriation a stated acreage of land, tend to indicate that the court proceeded on the theory that defendants’ appropriation of water prior to plaintiffs’ should be cut down to a quantity sufficient to irrigate the land of defendants actually cultivated at that time. Such theory, if followed, is, we think, without doubt, erroneous. Thereby a prior appropriator of water would be cut down to the quantity necessary to irrigate the land he actually had under cultivation when the subsequent appropriation was made, although the first appropriator’s land was all available for production of crops by aid of irrigation, but, at the time of making the appropriation of water necessary for its irrigation, he had not subdued all of it to the plow. The priority under such rule would depend largely upon the time appropriators brought their lands under cultivation, and not upon the priority of appropriation and diversion of the water necessary to irrigate the land owned by the appropriator, as the law provides.

A further objection urged by appellants is that the decree maintaining the dam against defendants’ interference would, in certain seasons, in effect, withhold all the water of said creek from appellants—even that awarded them by the decree prior to the appropriation of plaintiffs. Respondents answer this objection by admitting that the intention of the decree was to have the dam so constructed and operated as to allow the volume of water awarded defendants prior to the right of plaintiffs to pass it at all times, if so much water flowed in the creek, and concede that if the decree is not thus conditioned it may be modified to that effect.

Appellants also urge that the decree does not provide at what point they may take the water awarded to them in several amounts. It appears to be agreed that the appropriator of water should have the amount to which he is entitled at the place where his ditch taps the creek, and appellants concede that if the decree in this case does not provide that respondents shall allow sufficient water to flow past their dam to give the appellants, at the points where their-several ditches tap said creek, the amount of water awarded them, the decree may be modified to so provide. In our opinion that would be a proper provision, and the decree,should be conditioned accordingly-

For the reasons above set forth the judgment entered ought to be reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court for revised findings in conformity with the views herein expressed, upon the evidence already before the court, supplemented by such other evidence as may be necessary to ascertain and determine the respective rights involved. The order of this court will be enter accordingly.

Reversed.

Harwood and De Witt, JJ., concur.