Biddick, J.,
(after stating the facts). This is an action on a promissory note by the German Bank of Little Bock against the Park Hotel Company of Hot Springs and certain other parties residing there, who had joined in executing the note, and several questions are presented by the appeal.
On the question as to whether three of the defendants had the right to take a change of venue over the objection of another defendant who refused to join in such application, we are of the opinion that they did not have such right. Our statute (Sand. & H. Dig. §7382) directs that, upon a change of venue being ordered in a civil action, the papers in the ease “shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court to which the venue is changed,” thus showing that it was not intended that one defendant to a civil action should have the right to sever his case from the others, and take a change of venue, without removing the case as to all the defendants. There is no reason why the wishés of one defendant as to a change of Venue should be given preference over others, and when defendants properly joined in an action against them differ as to the expediency of a change of venue, and some of them refuse to join in the application, it is not error for the court to overrule the application. The words in the statute “any party to a civil action” may obtain a change of venue (Sand. & H. Dig. § 7379) do not mean that any individual defendant may obtain such order; but these words refer to the defendants as a class, and include all on that side. To be entitled to the change of venue, they must all join in or favor the application, with the exception,' perhaps, of mere nominal or formal defendants having no real interest in that side. Wolcott v. Wolcott, 32 Wis. 63; Levy v. Martin, 48 ib. 198; Whitaker v. Reynolds, 14 Bush (Ky.), 616; Peters v. Banta, 120 Ind. 422.
The next contention is that the court erred in permitting the note to be read in evidence without first requiring the alterations apparent on its face to be explained. It is said that this threw the burden of proof upon the defendants. But we do not concur in this contention. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to make out his case, and to do this he must, of course, show that the defendants executed the note sued on; but, when he shows that the signatures to the instrument are those of the defendants, he has the right to introduce the instrument in evidence, and, if there be no further evidence, he has made out a case sufficient to go to the jury. “The view best supported by reason, and the one to which the authorities seem tending, is that the mere fact of an interlineation or erasure appearing in an instrument does not per se raise any presumption either for or against the validity of the writing; and the question when, by whom, and with what intent an alteration was made is one of fact, to be submitted to the jury upon the whole evidence.” 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d. Ed.), 274; Gist v. Gans, 30 Ark. 285; Simpson v. Davis, 119 Mass. 269; Wilson v. Hayes, 40 Minn. 531, 12 Am. St. Rep. 754; Willett v. Shepard, 34 Mich. 106; Stayner v. Joyce, 120 Ind. 99.
This is in substance the rule already declared by this court. Gist v. Gans, supra.
The introduction of the note, and proof of the signatures thereto, did not shift the burden of proof, or put it upon the defendants, though, in the- absence of rebutting evidence, this might have been sufficient to make out plaintiff’s case. But in some of the instructions given at the request of plaintiff it seems to be assumed that the burden was on the defendants to show that the alterations were made after the execution of the note,, yet the same thing can be said of those given on the request of the defendants. The presiding judge did not tell the jury, and was not asked to tell them, directly upon whom the burden of proof rested, but stated that it was for them to determine from all the evidence, including the appearance of the note, whether or not the same was altered after its execution by defendants." It is not contended that the judge committed any error in giving instructions on this point, but if he did it Was error invited by the defendants as well as the plaintiff, and of which they have no right to complain. Standard Life Co. v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 088; Elliott, Appellate Pro. § 626.
It is next said that Hogaboom had no authority to execute the note for the Hotel Company, and that, as it was made payable to his own order, this was notice to every one of his want of authority. Quoting the language of Lord Denman, counsel say the note “bears its death wound on its face." It must be conceded that, as Hoga-boom had no authority to execute notes for the Hotel Company, the bank was not in the position of an innocent purchaser. But the evidence, we think, clearly shows that it acted in good faith, and took the note relying on the statements of Hogaboom that he did have authority, and trusting also to the signatures of the other defendants to the note, two of whom were officers in the Hotel Company; one being secretary, and the other director. The Hotel Company, it is true, was not bound by the statements of Hogaboom, nor by the fact that the other defendants had signed the note; and the circuit judge therefore properly directed a verdict in its favor, but this did not release the sureties. There was nothing in the character of this contract forbidden by law. The Hotel Company could have executed such a note, had it chosen to do so, and the mere fact that the party assuming to act for it had no authority does not release the sureties. These sureties had the same notice of the want of authority on the part of Hogaboom that the banks had. Indeed, their opportunities for knowing the extent of Hogaboom’s authority were much superior to those of the bank. As before stated, one was secretary, another a director, of the Hotel Company, and all of them lived in the city where the company and its hotel were located. When they executed the note to Hogaboom, and made it payable in Little Rock, the purpose was to enable him to obtain money on it, and they must have known that any party to lending money on it had the right, as against them, to rely, upon their signatures, and believe that the note was valid. The very object they had in view in signing the note was to give it currency, and, when that purpose has been carried out, and the money obtained, they cannot escape liability by showing that what they in effect represented to be true was not true. Defendants say that they relied upon the statements of Hogaboom that he had authority to execute the note for the Hotel Company. If so, they can look to Hogaboom. But the bank relied not only on the statements of Hoga-boom, but upon the signatures defendants placed on the note expressly to give it value, and it has the right to hold not only Hogaboom but defendants liable for money loaned on their faith and credit. Maledon v. Leflore, 63 Ark. 388; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1306 a; 2 "Randolph, Com. Paper, § 915.
Again, it is said that the bank knew that the note was executed for the accommodation of the Hotel Company, and yet permitted Hogaboom to divert it from its pro'per purpose. But, though the bank knew that the money was wanted for the-IIotel Company, the money was payable to Hogaboom individually. The note on its face shows that the intention of the makers was that the money should be paid to him. While the bank refused to loan the full amount of the note, it offered to loan ten thousand dollars for the benefit of the Hotel Company.
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Biddick, J.,
(after stating the facts). This is an action on a promissory note by the German Bank of Little Bock against the Park Hotel Company of Hot Springs and certain other parties residing there, who had joined in executing the note, and several questions are presented by the appeal.
On the question as to whether three of the defendants had the right to take a change of venue over the objection of another defendant who refused to join in such application, we are of the opinion that they did not have such right. Our statute (Sand. & H. Dig. §7382) directs that, upon a change of venue being ordered in a civil action, the papers in the ease “shall be transmitted to the clerk of the court to which the venue is changed,” thus showing that it was not intended that one defendant to a civil action should have the right to sever his case from the others, and take a change of venue, without removing the case as to all the defendants. There is no reason why the wishés of one defendant as to a change of Venue should be given preference over others, and when defendants properly joined in an action against them differ as to the expediency of a change of venue, and some of them refuse to join in the application, it is not error for the court to overrule the application. The words in the statute “any party to a civil action” may obtain a change of venue (Sand. & H. Dig. § 7379) do not mean that any individual defendant may obtain such order; but these words refer to the defendants as a class, and include all on that side. To be entitled to the change of venue, they must all join in or favor the application, with the exception,' perhaps, of mere nominal or formal defendants having no real interest in that side. Wolcott v. Wolcott, 32 Wis. 63; Levy v. Martin, 48 ib. 198; Whitaker v. Reynolds, 14 Bush (Ky.), 616; Peters v. Banta, 120 Ind. 422.
The next contention is that the court erred in permitting the note to be read in evidence without first requiring the alterations apparent on its face to be explained. It is said that this threw the burden of proof upon the defendants. But we do not concur in this contention. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to make out his case, and to do this he must, of course, show that the defendants executed the note sued on; but, when he shows that the signatures to the instrument are those of the defendants, he has the right to introduce the instrument in evidence, and, if there be no further evidence, he has made out a case sufficient to go to the jury. “The view best supported by reason, and the one to which the authorities seem tending, is that the mere fact of an interlineation or erasure appearing in an instrument does not per se raise any presumption either for or against the validity of the writing; and the question when, by whom, and with what intent an alteration was made is one of fact, to be submitted to the jury upon the whole evidence.” 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d. Ed.), 274; Gist v. Gans, 30 Ark. 285; Simpson v. Davis, 119 Mass. 269; Wilson v. Hayes, 40 Minn. 531, 12 Am. St. Rep. 754; Willett v. Shepard, 34 Mich. 106; Stayner v. Joyce, 120 Ind. 99.
This is in substance the rule already declared by this court. Gist v. Gans, supra.
The introduction of the note, and proof of the signatures thereto, did not shift the burden of proof, or put it upon the defendants, though, in the- absence of rebutting evidence, this might have been sufficient to make out plaintiff’s case. But in some of the instructions given at the request of plaintiff it seems to be assumed that the burden was on the defendants to show that the alterations were made after the execution of the note,, yet the same thing can be said of those given on the request of the defendants. The presiding judge did not tell the jury, and was not asked to tell them, directly upon whom the burden of proof rested, but stated that it was for them to determine from all the evidence, including the appearance of the note, whether or not the same was altered after its execution by defendants." It is not contended that the judge committed any error in giving instructions on this point, but if he did it Was error invited by the defendants as well as the plaintiff, and of which they have no right to complain. Standard Life Co. v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 088; Elliott, Appellate Pro. § 626.
It is next said that Hogaboom had no authority to execute the note for the Hotel Company, and that, as it was made payable to his own order, this was notice to every one of his want of authority. Quoting the language of Lord Denman, counsel say the note “bears its death wound on its face." It must be conceded that, as Hoga-boom had no authority to execute notes for the Hotel Company, the bank was not in the position of an innocent purchaser. But the evidence, we think, clearly shows that it acted in good faith, and took the note relying on the statements of Hogaboom that he did have authority, and trusting also to the signatures of the other defendants to the note, two of whom were officers in the Hotel Company; one being secretary, and the other director. The Hotel Company, it is true, was not bound by the statements of Hogaboom, nor by the fact that the other defendants had signed the note; and the circuit judge therefore properly directed a verdict in its favor, but this did not release the sureties. There was nothing in the character of this contract forbidden by law. The Hotel Company could have executed such a note, had it chosen to do so, and the mere fact that the party assuming to act for it had no authority does not release the sureties. These sureties had the same notice of the want of authority on the part of Hogaboom that the banks had. Indeed, their opportunities for knowing the extent of Hogaboom’s authority were much superior to those of the bank. As before stated, one was secretary, another a director, of the Hotel Company, and all of them lived in the city where the company and its hotel were located. When they executed the note to Hogaboom, and made it payable in Little Rock, the purpose was to enable him to obtain money on it, and they must have known that any party to lending money on it had the right, as against them, to rely, upon their signatures, and believe that the note was valid. The very object they had in view in signing the note was to give it currency, and, when that purpose has been carried out, and the money obtained, they cannot escape liability by showing that what they in effect represented to be true was not true. Defendants say that they relied upon the statements of Hogaboom that he had authority to execute the note for the Hotel Company. If so, they can look to Hogaboom. But the bank relied not only on the statements of Hoga-boom, but upon the signatures defendants placed on the note expressly to give it value, and it has the right to hold not only Hogaboom but defendants liable for money loaned on their faith and credit. Maledon v. Leflore, 63 Ark. 388; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 1306 a; 2 "Randolph, Com. Paper, § 915.
Again, it is said that the bank knew that the note was executed for the accommodation of the Hotel Company, and yet permitted Hogaboom to divert it from its pro'per purpose. But, though the bank knew that the money was wanted for the-IIotel Company, the money was payable to Hogaboom individually. The note on its face shows that the intention of the makers was that the money should be paid to him. While the bank refused to loan the full amount of the note, it offered to loan ten thousand dollars for the benefit of the Hotel Company. Hogaboom, assuming to act for the company, accepted the offer, gave his own note for the amount, and transferred the note sued on as collateral security to the bank. As this note was made payable to Hogaboom, and delivered to him to negotiate and raise money upon, we are of the opinion it was immaterial whether he obtained the money by a sale of the note or a deposit of the same as collateral. In either case there was no diversion of the note, for he obtained the money for the benefit of the Hotel Company, and accomplished the purpose for which the note was executed. The bank had no notice of his intention to divert the funds to a wrongful purpose, and was not responsible for such misappropriation. The defendants, having trusted Hogaboom with a note payable to his own order, upon which to raise money, must, as we said in a recent case, be held to have trusted him to make a proper application of the proceeds. Evans v. Speer Hardware Co., 65 Ark. 213; Duncan v. Gilbert, 29 N. J. Law, 521; Jackson v. First National Bank, 42 N. J. Law, 177; Maitland v. Citizens’ Bank, 40 Md. 561; Proctor v. Whitcomb, 137 Mass. 303.
Nor is it a matter of any moment that, instead of paying Hoga-boom money in hand, the bank, at his request, gave him credit íot it on the books of the bank. This was, in effect, the same thing as a payment. He at that time owed the bank nothing. It was understood that the money was to be used at once, and it was drawn out, nine thousand of it on the same day, and the remainder two days afterwards.
There are other points raised, but we deem it unnecessary to discuss them. The evidence as to the alteration of the note was conflicting, but it was sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury. The conduct of the defendants themselves seems rather inconsistent with their own contention on this point. Although they say that this note was executed to the Citizens’ Bank, yet, when it was presented for payment by the German Bank, they expressed no surprise, and gave no intimation to the bank that it had been altered.
It was about a year and a half afterwards, and a year after suit had been brought, and nearly a year after the filing of their original answer, before by an amendment thereto the defendants first notified plaintiff of their contention that the note had been altered. For this reason, it is not strange that the jury felt disinclined to credit their statements on that point. While it seems to us that the preponderance of evidence on this question of alteration was in favor of the defendant, still we are clearly of the opinion that, under the circumstances in proof, it was a question for the jury, and their finding must stand.
This ease has been well argued by able counsel, but the sum 'of it is that these defendants were induced by the president of a Hotel Company to become sureties on a note which he claimed to have power to execute for the company. The company, when sued on the note, successfully disputed his authority, and he proved to be insolvent, and they are now bound for the payment of the note. It may be a hardship, but, as between them and the bank, from whom the money was obtained on their note, it seems to us that the bank has the best of the argument. On the whole case, we think that the judgment was right, and it is therefore affirmed.