UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN,
Plaintiff, No. 06-cv-670-CKK-MAU v.
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC. et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Larry Klayman’s (“Klayman”) Motion to Stay Enforcement
of Judgment Pending Appeal Without Bond (“Motion”). ECF No. 695. On May 3, 2023, the
District Court issued an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Defendants Judicial Watch,
Inc. (“Judicial Watch”) and Thomas J. Fitton (“Fitton”), in the amount of $707,131.91 (“Fees
Order”). ECF No. 669 (adopting Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 657). Klayman seeks to
stay enforcement of the Fees Order. ECF Nos. 695 & 700. Defendants Judicial Watch, Fitton,
Paul J. Orfanedes, and Christopher J. Farrell (together, “Defendants”) oppose the Motion. ECF
No. 698. On July 15, 2024, the District Court referred the Motion to the undersigned for resolution
pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2. ECF No. 701. For the following reasons, Klayman’s Motion
is DENIED.
Klayman requests that the Court stay enforcement of the Fees Order while his appeal of
that decision is pending before the D.C. Circuit. ECF No. 695 at 1. 1 Klayman further requests
that, in issuing a stay, the Court waives his requirement to post a supersedeas bond, which he states
is “financially prohibitive.” Id. at 2. In opposition, Defendants argue that Klayman fails to meet
1 Citations are to the page numbers in the ECF headers.
1 his burden to demonstrate entitlement to a stay without a bond. ECF No. 698 at 2–4. Although
the District Court previously denied Klayman’s request to stay enforcement of the judgment
entered against him pending appeal without bond (ECF No. 615), Klayman renews many of his
previous arguments here. Just as before, none are availing. The Motion is denied for several
reasons. 2
First, Klayman’s Motion is moot. Klayman requests a stay until he has “had an opportunity
to have his appeal heard before” the D.C. Circuit. ECF No. 695 at 1. That has already happened.
Since Klayman filed this Motion, the D.C. Circuit has reviewed and denied Klayman’s appeal of
the Fees Order, among other issues he raised on appeal. Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., No. 23-
7119, 2025 WL 502039 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2025) (per curiam).
Second, to the extent that Klayman would argue his Motion is not moot because he has
sought rehearing en banc, the Court also denies the Motion for failure to post a supersedeas bond.
Under Rule 62(b), “a party may obtain a stay by providing a bond or other security.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 62(b). Rule 62(b) “entitles the appellant who files a satisfactory supersedeas bond to a stay of
money judgment as a matter of right.” Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d
755, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing former Rule 62(d), which the Advisory Committee amended
as current Rule 62(b) in 2018). Here, it is undisputed that Klayman has not provided a bond or
any security. Accordingly, he is not entitled to a stay as a matter of right.
Third, Klayman fails to meet his burden to show that the Court should waive the
supersedeas bond requirement. A supersedeas bond is required under “normal circumstances,”
2 In his Reply, Klayman argues for the first time that the “purported writs of garnishment and attempted service thereof by the Defendants” were defective and, thus, void. ECF No. 700 at 2. It is not clear to which writs of garnishment Klayman is referring or how this argument relates to Klayman’s Motion in any way. Because Klayman raises this argument for the first time on Reply and because it appears unrelated to the Motion, the Court declines to address it.
2 such as “where there is some reasonable likelihood of the judgment debtor’s inability or
unwillingness to satisfy the judgment in full.” Id. at 760. The Court may only waive this
requirement in “unusual circumstances,” and only if the stay “do[es] not unduly endanger the
judgment creditor’s interest in ultimate recovery.” Id. at 760–61. The moving party bears the
burden to “objectively demonstrate the reasons for” a departure from the normal rule. Godfrey v.
Iverson, No. 05-cv-2044, 2007 WL 3001426, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2007) (quoting Grand Union
Co. v. Food Emps. Lab. Rels. Ass’n, 637 F. Supp. 356, 357 (D.D.C. 1986)). The Court must
consider: “(1) the amount of the money award; (2) the documented net worth of the judgment
debtors; and (3) whether the judgment debtors are D.C. residents, and if so, whether there is any
indication that they may leave the jurisdiction before the completion of the appeals process.” Id.
(citing Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 760).
Here, the Fees Order requires Klayman to pay Judicial Watch and Fitton approximately
$707,000. ECF No. 669. Klayman, however, fails to document his net worth or provide any
evidentiary support for his request that the Court depart from “normal circumstances.” Fed.
Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 760. Moreover, as Defendants argue, Klayman is not a D.C.
resident and does not own any D.C. real estate. ECF No. 698 at 1. Klayman argues his “ties to
this jurisdiction remain strong,” but he cannot meet his burden with this unsubstantiated statement
alone. ECF No. 695 at 2; see ECF No. 700 at 7; see, e.g., Grand Union Co., 637 F. Supp. at 357–
58 (finding plaintiff failed to meet burden when it stated nothing about its residency status, among
other reasons). In any event, Klayman admits he “simply cannot afford to post bond” and makes
no argument that he would be able to fulfill the judgment at a later time. ECF No. 695 at 2. Thus,
there is a reasonable likelihood that Klayman will be unable or unwilling to satisfy the Fees Order
3 pending final disposition of his appeal, making a supersedeas bond necessary to protect Judicial
Watch and Fitton’s interest in ultimate recovery. See Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 760–61.
Fourth, to the extent Klayman argues that he is entitled to a stay pending appeal as part of
the Court’s equitable powers separate from the Rule 62(b) mechanism, he also fails to meet this
burden. ECF No. 700 at 4–8. When deciding whether to stay a judgment pending appeal, the
Court should consider the following factors:
“(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.”
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434–35 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776
(1987)). The first two factors are the “most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434; see, e.g., Mann v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 185 F. Supp. 3d 189, 194–96 (D.D.C. 2016) (denying stay
because plaintiff failed to show likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, as plaintiff
only argued economic loss).
Klayman does not satisfy the first two factors. First, Klayman is plainly unlikely to succeed
on the merits when the D.C. Circuit has already denied his challenge to the Fees Order. See
Klayman, 2025 WL 502039.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LARRY ELLIOT KLAYMAN,
Plaintiff, No. 06-cv-670-CKK-MAU v.
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC. et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Larry Klayman’s (“Klayman”) Motion to Stay Enforcement
of Judgment Pending Appeal Without Bond (“Motion”). ECF No. 695. On May 3, 2023, the
District Court issued an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Defendants Judicial Watch,
Inc. (“Judicial Watch”) and Thomas J. Fitton (“Fitton”), in the amount of $707,131.91 (“Fees
Order”). ECF No. 669 (adopting Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 657). Klayman seeks to
stay enforcement of the Fees Order. ECF Nos. 695 & 700. Defendants Judicial Watch, Fitton,
Paul J. Orfanedes, and Christopher J. Farrell (together, “Defendants”) oppose the Motion. ECF
No. 698. On July 15, 2024, the District Court referred the Motion to the undersigned for resolution
pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.2. ECF No. 701. For the following reasons, Klayman’s Motion
is DENIED.
Klayman requests that the Court stay enforcement of the Fees Order while his appeal of
that decision is pending before the D.C. Circuit. ECF No. 695 at 1. 1 Klayman further requests
that, in issuing a stay, the Court waives his requirement to post a supersedeas bond, which he states
is “financially prohibitive.” Id. at 2. In opposition, Defendants argue that Klayman fails to meet
1 Citations are to the page numbers in the ECF headers.
1 his burden to demonstrate entitlement to a stay without a bond. ECF No. 698 at 2–4. Although
the District Court previously denied Klayman’s request to stay enforcement of the judgment
entered against him pending appeal without bond (ECF No. 615), Klayman renews many of his
previous arguments here. Just as before, none are availing. The Motion is denied for several
reasons. 2
First, Klayman’s Motion is moot. Klayman requests a stay until he has “had an opportunity
to have his appeal heard before” the D.C. Circuit. ECF No. 695 at 1. That has already happened.
Since Klayman filed this Motion, the D.C. Circuit has reviewed and denied Klayman’s appeal of
the Fees Order, among other issues he raised on appeal. Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., No. 23-
7119, 2025 WL 502039 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 2025) (per curiam).
Second, to the extent that Klayman would argue his Motion is not moot because he has
sought rehearing en banc, the Court also denies the Motion for failure to post a supersedeas bond.
Under Rule 62(b), “a party may obtain a stay by providing a bond or other security.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 62(b). Rule 62(b) “entitles the appellant who files a satisfactory supersedeas bond to a stay of
money judgment as a matter of right.” Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d
755, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing former Rule 62(d), which the Advisory Committee amended
as current Rule 62(b) in 2018). Here, it is undisputed that Klayman has not provided a bond or
any security. Accordingly, he is not entitled to a stay as a matter of right.
Third, Klayman fails to meet his burden to show that the Court should waive the
supersedeas bond requirement. A supersedeas bond is required under “normal circumstances,”
2 In his Reply, Klayman argues for the first time that the “purported writs of garnishment and attempted service thereof by the Defendants” were defective and, thus, void. ECF No. 700 at 2. It is not clear to which writs of garnishment Klayman is referring or how this argument relates to Klayman’s Motion in any way. Because Klayman raises this argument for the first time on Reply and because it appears unrelated to the Motion, the Court declines to address it.
2 such as “where there is some reasonable likelihood of the judgment debtor’s inability or
unwillingness to satisfy the judgment in full.” Id. at 760. The Court may only waive this
requirement in “unusual circumstances,” and only if the stay “do[es] not unduly endanger the
judgment creditor’s interest in ultimate recovery.” Id. at 760–61. The moving party bears the
burden to “objectively demonstrate the reasons for” a departure from the normal rule. Godfrey v.
Iverson, No. 05-cv-2044, 2007 WL 3001426, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2007) (quoting Grand Union
Co. v. Food Emps. Lab. Rels. Ass’n, 637 F. Supp. 356, 357 (D.D.C. 1986)). The Court must
consider: “(1) the amount of the money award; (2) the documented net worth of the judgment
debtors; and (3) whether the judgment debtors are D.C. residents, and if so, whether there is any
indication that they may leave the jurisdiction before the completion of the appeals process.” Id.
(citing Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 760).
Here, the Fees Order requires Klayman to pay Judicial Watch and Fitton approximately
$707,000. ECF No. 669. Klayman, however, fails to document his net worth or provide any
evidentiary support for his request that the Court depart from “normal circumstances.” Fed.
Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 760. Moreover, as Defendants argue, Klayman is not a D.C.
resident and does not own any D.C. real estate. ECF No. 698 at 1. Klayman argues his “ties to
this jurisdiction remain strong,” but he cannot meet his burden with this unsubstantiated statement
alone. ECF No. 695 at 2; see ECF No. 700 at 7; see, e.g., Grand Union Co., 637 F. Supp. at 357–
58 (finding plaintiff failed to meet burden when it stated nothing about its residency status, among
other reasons). In any event, Klayman admits he “simply cannot afford to post bond” and makes
no argument that he would be able to fulfill the judgment at a later time. ECF No. 695 at 2. Thus,
there is a reasonable likelihood that Klayman will be unable or unwilling to satisfy the Fees Order
3 pending final disposition of his appeal, making a supersedeas bond necessary to protect Judicial
Watch and Fitton’s interest in ultimate recovery. See Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 760–61.
Fourth, to the extent Klayman argues that he is entitled to a stay pending appeal as part of
the Court’s equitable powers separate from the Rule 62(b) mechanism, he also fails to meet this
burden. ECF No. 700 at 4–8. When deciding whether to stay a judgment pending appeal, the
Court should consider the following factors:
“(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.”
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434–35 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776
(1987)). The first two factors are the “most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434; see, e.g., Mann v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 185 F. Supp. 3d 189, 194–96 (D.D.C. 2016) (denying stay
because plaintiff failed to show likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, as plaintiff
only argued economic loss).
Klayman does not satisfy the first two factors. First, Klayman is plainly unlikely to succeed
on the merits when the D.C. Circuit has already denied his challenge to the Fees Order. See
Klayman, 2025 WL 502039. Second, Klayman’s unsupported assertion that he cannot afford the
bond (and presumably the fees) without being pushed “into financial ruin and potential
bankruptcy” fails to meet the extraordinary irreparable harm standard. ECF No. 700 at 7; see Wis.
Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 758 F.2d 669, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“[T]he
injury must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.”); Va. Petroleum
Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (“Mere
injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the
4 absence of a stay, are not enough.”). Klayman simply does not present any evidence to support
his assertion that he will suffer irreparable harm. Indeed, if “the Court of Appeals were to reverse
this court’s grant of [fees], Plaintiff could be made whole by return of the costs awarded.” Mann,
185 F. Supp. 3d at 195. Because Klayman fails to satisfy the first two factors, the Court need not
consider the remaining two. See, e.g., id. (declining to consider additional stay factors upon failure
of factors one and two); Baker v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 810 F. Supp. 2d 90,
97 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[F]ailure to make any showing of irreparable harm is grounds for refusing to
grant a stay, even if the other three factors merit relief.”).
For the foregoing reasons, Klayman’s Motion is DENIED.
Date: March 13, 2025 ___________________________________ MOXILA A. UPADHYAYA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE