Klaus Genssler v. Harris County, Texas and the State of Texas Acting by and Through the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, a Necessary and Indispensable Party

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 7, 2010
• Docket: 01-10-00593-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued October 7, 2010

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

———————————

NO. 01-10-00593-CV

Klaus Genssler, U.S. Oil Recovery, L.P., MCC REcycling, L.L.P., Genssler Environmental Holdings, L.L.C., and U.S. Oil RecoverY, LLP, Appellants

V.

Harris County and the State of Texas, Appellees

On Appeal from the 125th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2009-32636

O P I N I O N

          In this interlocutory appeal, appellants, Klaus Genssler, U.S. Oil Recovery, L.P., MCC Recycling, L.L.P., Genssler Environmental Holdings, L.L.C., and U.S. Oil Recovery, LLP, challenge the trial court’s order appointing a receiver.[1]  Harris County and the State, acting through the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, brought suit against the appellants for environmental violations on the real property located at 200 and 400 North Richey, Pasadena, in Harris County.  After evidentiary hearings, the trial court issued a temporary injunction against appellants requiring appellants to take measures to begin removing hazardous material and prevent further hazardous materials, wastewater, or sewage from discharging from the property.  Asserting that appellants had failed to take any remedial measures and that the property posed an immediate risk of harm to the public, Harris County sought and received the appointment of a receiver who was charged with remediating the hazardous conditions on the property.  The receiver was authorized to seize and sell assets belonging to the appellants to pay for the cost of remediation and of the receivership.  We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Background

          U.S. Oil Recovery L.P. (“U.S. Oil”) operates a wastewater facility at 400 North Richey, in Pasadena, Texas.  MCC Recycling, LLP, operates a wastewater facility at 200 North Richey.  Genssler Environmental Holdings, L.L.C., and U.S. Oil Recovery, LLP are related entities that own the real and personal property used by the wastewater facilities.  We refer to these entities collectively as “the U.S. Oil Recovery parties.”  Genssler is in charge of some or all of these entities.

          Because facilities of this type can create significant environmental hazards, the operation of the facilities must be conducted in compliance with state and federal environmental laws.   Harris County filed this suit alleging that wastewater from the 200 North Richey facility had been discharged into Vince Bayou in violation of Texas Water Code section 26.121(a).  On June 8, 2009, the trial court signed a temporary injunction prohibiting unauthorized discharges from the sites at 200 North Richey and 400 North Richey and requiring the removal and disposal of hazardous waste from those sites.  Because of continuing violations at the facilities through the course of this suit, Harris County amended its petition nine times and sought further injunctive relief.

          The trial court conducted a temporary injunction hearing on March 8, 2010. Gary Fogerty of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality testified concerning evidence of releases of wastewater that he had observed at the 200 North Richey location in May, June, and August 2009, as well as January 2010.  He further testified that U.S. Oil Recovery did not obtain required storm water discharge permits and did not have required concrete barriers to keep wastewater from running off-site.

          Mike Scanlon, president of Norex Engineering, testified that he was asked to evaluate the condition of the plant at 200 North Richey and also to look at 400 North Richey.  He saw fluid running down the side of some equipment. The fluid appeared as if it had flowed over the secondary containment onto the ground at the 400 North Richey facility.  Scanlon stated that the facility had leaks and did not meet the secondary containment requirements imposed by federal regulations to operate as an oil recycling facility.  He further testified that wastewater was leaking from the facilities and that such facilities are a danger to the health and safety of Harris County citizens.

          Jennifer Wheeler, the compliance services manager for Harris County Public Health and Environmental Services, testified that the U.S. Oil Recovery parties had been cited for approximately sixty violations since the granting of the June 8, 2009 temporary injunction.  Thirteen of the violations were for illegal wastewater discharges.  Thirty-four were for hazardous and solid waste violations, while nine were for nuisances.  She further testified that a half million gallons of wastewater from the facilities had entered the bayou.

          Robert Alan, manager of the Permits and Technical Services Section of the Environmental Public Health Division of Harris County Public Health and Environmental Services, testified that there was no authorization to store hazardous waste at the 400 North Richey facility.  However, hazardous waste—benzene—was stored in 205 roll-off boxes for longer than 90 days.  The estimated cost to remove the waste in the roll-off boxes was between 1 and 1.6 million dollars.

          On March 11, 2010, the trial court granted a second temporary injunction.  The court found that Harris County is likely to prevail at the trial on the merits of its various claims, including its claim that Genssler is the person in charge of the subject operations and has caused, suffered, allowed, or permitted violations of the law that have resulted in the conditions at 200 North Richey and 400 North Richey, Pasadena, Texas.  The court ordered Genssler and the U.S. Oil Recovery parties to remove and dispose of the hazardous waste within 60 days of the effective date of the order.  Genssler and the U.S. Oil Recovery parties did not appeal the temporary injunction.

          At the hearing on the application to appoint a receiver in this case the trial court heard testimony from Norm Williamson, Jr., a fire prevention investigator and inspector with the Fire Marshall’s Office.  Williamson inspected the 400 North Richey facility on June 8, 2010.  He found hazardous material, electrical hazards, and flammable liquids in the same area as oil waste products.  He also found leaking drums.  Williamson stated that the facilities contained fire hazards that are dangerous and in need of immediate attention.  Williamson further stated that there is no containment of chemicals inside the buildings at the facilities and the chemicals can be washed into the bayou next to the site.

          The trial court had previously heard testimony at the temporary injunction hearing on March 8, 2010 from Adele Pollard, a former employee of U.S. Oil.  Pollard testified that vessels and equipment were not being maintained at U.S. Oil and MCC Recycling.  Pollard said that he saw spillage from the tanks at the 400 North Richey location.  He stated that hazardous waste was stored in leaking drums at the 400 North Richey location and there was a danger of the equipment failing and releasing wastewater into the bayou.  He further testified that U.S. Oil emits air contaminants from a slurry dryer and there were frequent discharges from spills or overflows at the 200 North Richey location.  He said that Genssler could barely make payroll and he did not believe that Genssler had the funds to fix the things that needed to be fixed to “get the place in order.”  Similarly, Robert Brown, the controller at U.S. Oil Recovery, said that U.S. Oil had had problems making payroll and had laid off about 20 employees in the three months prior to the temporary injunction hearing.  He said that he did not know of any way that U.S. Oil could borrow any of the funds necessary to get $1.6 million to remove the roll-off boxes.  He further stated that U.S. Oil has no equity in the land or buildings.  Brown told the trial court that as of March 11, 2010, U.S. Oil Recovery L.P. was not an adequately capitalized business and that Genssler controls the activities of all employees of U.S. Oil directly or indirectly.

          At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court granted the application to appoint a receiver, requiring a $100 bond from Harris County, the applicant, and a $100 bond from the receiver.  The court stated in the order that it took judicial notice of all testimony and evidence at the receivership hearing and previous hearings in the case.  The order concerning “Defendants Klaus Genssler, individually, and d/b/a U.S. Oil          Recovery, L.P., MCC Recycling, L.L.P., Genssler Environmental Holdings, L.L.C., and U.S. Oil Recovery, LLP, a/k/a U.S. Oil Recovery, L.L.P.,” reads as follows:

1.       [They] are violating environmental laws and putting the health and safety of residents of Harris County at risk by storing hazardous and flammable waste in conditions that have created an imminent fire and flood hazard at their facilities at 200 and 400 North Richey Road in Pasadena, Texas;

2.       [They] have violated this Court’s temporary injunction order signed on March 11, 2010, by failing to remove the hazardous and flammable waste and all industrial waste and wastewater from their properties at 200 and 400 North Richey Road;

3.       [They] have failed to appear for two depositions ordered by this Court and have refused to accept service to appear in court upon court order to show cause in response to plaintiffs Motions for Contempt;

. . .

8.       [S]ince the receivership was filed, [they] have caused or have allowed or permitted others to remove valuable industrial equipment from their possession from 200 North Richey Road and 400 North Richey Road in Pasadena, Texas to places unknown;

          In its order, the trial court also makes specific findings concerning Genssler, individually, as follows:

4.       [His] current whereabouts are unknown and he effectively has abandoned the facilities at 200 and 400 North Richey Road in Pasadena, Texas;

5.       [He]  has indicated in his reports to Harris County and the State of Texas that he and his companies have no money to clean up the properties pursuant to the terms of the Temporary Injunction, but is not in bankruptcy;

6.       [He] has previously been found to be causing, suffering, allowing or permitting pollution to take place at 200 and 400 North Richey Road;

7.       [He] has taken approximately $10,000,000.00 per year from the defendant businesses for the past 3-4 years, and has not reinvested this money into these companies. As a result, the physical plants at defendants’  200 and 400 North Richey Road facilities have fallen into disrepair to such a degree that they now pose a serious threat to the safety of the residents and the environment in Harris County, Texas;

          The trial court also makes findings concerning the receiver.

9.       A receivership is necessary because there is no other adequate remedy at law as defendants have failed to comply with two temporary injunctions, and have failed to appear in court when ordered to do so. In addition, there is an imminent threat to the residents of Harris County because defendants’ facilities have limited fire protection and are illegally storing hazardous and other industrial waste, as well as flammable waste, on property that is partially in the floodplain and floodway;

10.     If any portion of the Receiver’s compensation under this order exceeds the Defendants’ assets which are under receivership, Harris County agrees to compensate the Receiver up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for these services under this order. These funds are already authorized by Harris County Commissioners Court. Any additional amount this Court determines Harris County is to pay the Receiver is subject to approval by Commissioners Court.  The Receiver will be compensated at three hundred fifty dollars ($350) per hour, subject to approval by Commissioners Court.  Harris County is ordered to place ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in the Court's registry as a deposit against the Receiver’s fees.

          The trial court also granted the receiver the following power, among others:

That the Receiver is authorized to use any means allowed under the statute to bring the defendants’ facilities at 200 North Richey Road and 400 North Richey Road in Pasadena, Texas permanently into compliance with environmental laws,[2] including:

a)       seizing all assets in possession or control of defendants, Klaus Genssler, individually, and d/b/a U.S. Oil Recovery, LP., MCC Recycling, L.L.P., Genssler Environmental Holdings, L.L.C., and U.S. Oil Recovery,  LLP a/k/a U.S. Oil Recovery, L.L.P., including any entities controlled or managed by Klaus Genssler, or monies received for the benefit of Klaus Genssler; and,

b)      using the assets obtained to pay the Receiver’s fees, and to hire an environmental remediation company to [remediate the property].

Law of Receivership and Standard of Review

          We should affirm a trial court’s interlocutory order appointing a receiver unless the trial court clearly abused its discretion.  Benefield v. State, 266 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citing Mueller v. Beamalloy, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet); Abella v. Knight Oil Tools, 945 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ)).  A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard to guiding legal principles, or without supporting evidence.  See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied).  Under the abuse of discretion standard, legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds for asserting error, but they are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion.  Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 214.  The trial court does not abuse its discretion when its decision is based on conflicting evidence and some evidence in the record reasonably supports the trial court’s decision.  Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002).

          “The appointment of a receiver . . . is a harsh, drastic, and extraordinary remedy, to be used cautiously.”  Benefield, 266 S.W.3d at 31 (citing Hunt v. Merch. Mart, Inc., 391 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.­—Dallas 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Balias v. Balias, Inc., 748 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied)).  A trial court should not appoint a receiver if another remedy exists, either legal or equitable.  Id. (citing Rowe v. Rowe, 887 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied)).  Our review focuses on whether the pleadings and evidence are sufficient to justify a receivership.  Id. (citing Covington Knox, Inc. v. State, 577 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no pet.)).  If the decision to appoint a receiver was within the trial court’s discretion, we may not reverse simply because we might have reached a different decision.  Id. (citing Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)). 

Receivership against Non-Parties

          In his fifth issue, and several times within his other issues, Genssler contends the trial court erred by appointing a receiver to seize assets of non-party entities.  However, Genssler has provided no evidence to establish his standing to assert the rights of a non-party.  See Birnbaum v. Alliance of American Insurers, 994 S.W.2d 766, 779 (Tex. App.—Austin, 1999), abrogated on other grounds by In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003).  We hold that Genssler lacks standing to appeal an order concerning non-parties.  See Goffney v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 01-08-00063-CV, 2009 WL 2343250, *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 30, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant lacked standing on appeal to challenge alleged procedural due process violations against third party).

          We overrule Genssler’s fifth issue.

Receiver over Genssler’s Personal Estate

          In his third issue, Genssler contends that the trial court erred by appointing a receiver over his personal assets when there has been no showing that he owns any of the real or personal property at 200 or 400 North Richey.

          In its petition, the only theory of liability that Harris County alleged against Genssler, individually, is that the U.S. Oil parties are his “alter ego.”  Generally, a business entity exists as a separate legal entity, insulating the individuals who own ownership interests from personal liability.  Country Village Homes, Inc. v. Patterson, 236 S.W.3d 413, 428 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.).  The alter ego theory allows the individual to be liable for the business entity when there is such a unity between the business entity and the individual that the business entity has ceased to be a separate entity, and allowing the individual to avoid liability through the use of the business entity would work an injustice.  See id.  Evidence relevant to prove an alter ego theory includes: (1) payment of alleged business debts with personal funds or other commingling of funds, (2) representations that the individual will financially back the business entity, (3) diversion of profits for the individual’s personal use, (4) inadequate capitalization, and (5) other failures to keep business and personal assets separate.  Id.  A showing that an individual is an officer, director, or majority owner of the ownership interest is insufficient to support a finding of alter ego.  Id. 

          Here, the trial court found that Genssler “has taken” $10,000,000 per year from the U.S. Oil Recovery parties.  The only evidence that Harris County identifies in support of the alter ego theory is the testimony of a former employee of U.S. Oil and the testimony of a current employee.  Adele Pollard, the former employee, testified that Genssler is the president of U.S. Oil, “the man in charge” of U.S. Oil, and “makes all the decisions” at U.S. Oil.  Robert Brown, the Controller for U.S. Oil testified that Genssler controls U.S. Oil and directly or indirectly controls the activities of U.S. Oil employees.  Brown further testified that U.S. Oil was not adequately capitalized as of the March 8, 2010 temporary injunction hearing.

          No evidence shows, however, that the U.S. Oil Recovery parties’ profits were diverted for Genssler’s individual use or that there was a failure to keep Genssler’s assets separate from the U.S. Oil Recovery parties assets.  No evidence shows that Genssler owns any interest in any of the U.S. Oil Recovery parties.  There is no evidence in the record of Genssler personally paying debts owed by the U.S. Oil Recovery parties.  Furthermore, Genssler’s status as an officer or director is insufficient, standing alone, to support an alter ego theory.  See id.  Because there is no evidence that Genssler owns an interest in any of the U.S. Oil Recovery parties or that the U.S. Oil Recovery parties are his alter ego, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing a receiver over property owned by Genssler individually.

          We sustain Genssler’s third issue.  Because we sustain this issue, we need not address Genssler’s other issues. 

Bond

          In their first issue, the U.S. Oil Recovery parties assert the trial court erred by appointing a receiver because the requirements of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 695a have not been met.  Specifically, they contend that the trial court’s setting the bond in the amount of $100 is insufficient to cover their likely damages in the event they prevail at trial.

          Rule 695a provides, in pertinent part,

No receiver shall be appointed with authority to take charge of property until the party applying therefor has filed with the clerk of the court a good and sufficient bond, to be approved by such clerk, payable to the defendant in the amount fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of all damages and cost in such suit, in case it should be decided that such receiver was wrongfully appointed to take charge of such property.  The amount of such bond shall be fixed at a sum sufficient to cover all such probable damages and costs.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 695a.  Courts have held that the applicant’s failure to file a bond in compliance with rule 695a requires reversal of the order appointing a receiver.    Rubin v. Gilmore, 561 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]  1977, no writ); O’Connor v. O’Connor, 320 S.W.2d 384, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1959, writ dism’d).  As this Court stated, 

The trial court was not, however, authorized to appoint a receiver in the absence of an applicant’s bond filed in compliance with Rule 695a, Tex. R. Civ. P.  Neither the filing of the receiver’s bond nor the filing of the temporary injunction bond satisfied this requirement.  The requirement of an applicant’s bond is mandatory, and non-compliance with Rule 695a requires the reversal of the order appointing the receiver.

Rubin, 561 S.W.2d at 234 (citations omitted).

          Generally, the amount of a bond rests in the trial court’s discretion.  See Childre v. Great Southwest Life Ins. Co., 700 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, no writ) (bond for receiver); see also Maples v Muscletech, Inc., 74 S.W.3d 429, 431 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (bond for temporary injunction).[3]  Here, the U.S. Oil Recovery parties contend the amount of the bond is insufficient.  They employ the following reasoning.  First, the receiver has been appointed to remediate the property at issue.  The receiver has been empowered to sell assets of the U.S. Oil Recovery parties to raise funds to pay for remediation.  Harris County “stated in open court that even $90,000 would not be enough to get started.”  The U.S. Oil Recovery parties conclude that their minimum damages will be $90,000.  Therefore, they contend a bond for $100 is “clearly insufficient” and the trial court’s order must be reversed.   

          We disagree with this reasoning for two reasons.  First, if the receiver sells assets and then applies the proceeds to remediate the property, the U.S. Oil Recovery parties have not been truly damaged.  Rather, the U.S. Oil Recovery parties will be in the position they should be now—assets will have been sold and money spent, but in return the appellants will receive property that complies with the trial court’s unappelaed injunction order.  The U.S. Oil Recovery parties do not explain how a receiver to bring the property in conformity with the applicable laws and with the trial court’s unappealed injunction causes them any harm. Second, other than the statement by Harris County that “$90,000 would not be enough to get started,” the U.S. Oil Recovery parties identify no evidence showing what their damages would be in the event the receiver was wrongfully appointed.  Without some evidence in the record that supports a higher bond amount, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.  See IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 191, 203 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting temporary injunction bond at $350,000 when appellant presented no evidence its damages would exceed that amount); Speedman Oil Co. v. Duval County Ranch Co., 504 S.W.2d 923, 931 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Defendants’ argument that the amount of the bond is insufficient is not unpersuasive.  However, the record furnishes no reliable information which would guide us in setting the proper amount.”); see also Connell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Carter, No. 01-94-00595-CV, 1994 WL 525902, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 29, 1994, no writ) (not designated for publication) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting temporary injunction bond at $1000 when appellant asserted amount was “patently an abuse of discretion” but failed to introduce any evidence to show possible damages from injunction); Taylor v. Parker, No. 01-87-00393, 1988 WL 10770, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 11, 1988, no writ) (not designated for publication) (stating, in appeal from interlocutory order appointing receiver, “appellant bore the burden of showing that the circumstances dictated a more substantial bond”).  

          We overrule the U.S. Oil Recovery parties’ first issue.

Mueller Case

          The U.S. Oil Recovery parties contend that the trial court’s order is an impermissible order granting a “liquidating receivership,” citing this Court’s opinion in Mueller v. Beamalloy, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).  

          In Mueller, this Court held that section 64.001(a)(6) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not authorize the appointment of a liquidating receiver over a corporation.  In Mueller, this Court addressed the authority of the trial court’s appointing a receiver authorized to carry out “the liquidation of the assets and business of the corporation.”  Id. at 859 (quoting former Tex. Bus. Corp. Act. Ann. art. 7.06A); compare Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 11.405 (Vernon 2010) (current version of statute, stating court may appoint a receiver charged with “liquidation of the property and business of the domestic entity”). Here, the receiver has not been charged with liquidation of the property and business of the U.S. Oil Recovery parties.  Rather, the receiver is charged with remediating the property and has been authorized to sell assets as necessary to fund the remediation efforts.  This is not a “liquidating receiver” as discussed in Mueller.  We hold that Mueller does not apply to this case. 

          We overrule the U.S. Oil Recovery parties’ second issue.

Conclusion

          We affirm that portion of the trial court’s order appointing a receiver over U.S. Oil Recovery, L.P., MCC Recycling, L.L.P., Genssler Environmental Holdings, L.L.C., and U.S. Oil Recovery, LLP for the purposes of remediating the properties at 200 and 400 North Richey in Pasadena.  We reverse that portion of the trial court’s order appointing a receiver over the assets and estate of Klaus Genssler, individually, and remand this cause for the trial court to modify the order appointing a receiver by removing references to Klaus Genssler, individually, in accordance with this opinion.

                                                                   Elsa Alcala

                                                                   Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Alcala.

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[1]           See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(1) (Vernon 2008) (authorizing appeal of interlocutory order appointing receiver).

[2]           At oral argument, the panel discussed the phrase “permanent compliance” contained in the order appointing a receiver with the parties.  Harris County explained that, as used in the order, the phrase means “complete compliance.”  The U.S. Oil Recovery parties have not challenged the use of that phrase on appeal; we, therefore, do not address it.

[3]           As the Dallas court of appeals noted in a case dealing with the sufficiency of a temporary injunction bond, “Surprisingly, there is little authority to guide us . . . .”  Currie v. Int’l Telecharge, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ).  The cases cited by the U.S. Oil Recovery parties all concern the absence of an applicant’s bond, not the insufficiency of the amount of the bond.  See, e.g., Rubin v. Gilmore, 561 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]  1977, no writ).  We, therefore, look to cases involving bonds for a temporary injunction or for a receiver because the bonds in each of those circumstances serve a similar purpose to the bond required of an applicant for a receivership.  Compare Tex. R. Civ. P. 695a (applicant’s bond must be conditioned on payment of “all damages and cost in such suit, in case it should be decided that such receiver was wrongfully appointed to take charge of such property” with Tex. R. Civ. P. 684 (injunction bond must be conditioned on payment  of “all sums of money and costs that may be adjudged against him if the restraining order or temporary injunction shall be dissolved in whole or in part”); see also Fite v. Emtel, Inc., No. 01-07-00273-CV, 2008 WL 4427676, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct 2, 2008, pet denied) (stating purpose of applicant’s and receiver’s bonds “is to ensure that the defendant can be reimbursed for any damages caused by the appointment of the receiver in the event that the receiver was wrongfully appointed”).