Klamath Housing Authority v. Weiser

697 P.2d 227, 72 Or. App. 760, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 2698
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedMarch 20, 1985
Docket84-0081; CA A32637
StatusPublished

This text of 697 P.2d 227 (Klamath Housing Authority v. Weiser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Klamath Housing Authority v. Weiser, 697 P.2d 227, 72 Or. App. 760, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 2698 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

ROSSMAN, J.

Defendant appeals the judgment entered in this FED action, ordering that she be evicted from public housing for unpaid rent. We reverse.

Plaintiff is a Public Housing Authority (PHA), providing public housing in the Klamath Falls area. Defendant entered into a lease for a four-bedroom dwelling unit in September, 1983. It is undisputed that, by February, defendant’s rent was in arrears. Plaintiff sent three different notices to defendant, demanding that she pay the overdue rent and advising her that action would be taken if she failed to do so. The rent was not paid, and on March 21,1984, this suit was initiated.

Tenants in public housing are entitled to due process of law before they may be evicted. Rudder v. United States, 226 F2d 51, 53 (DC Cir 1955). Due process protections for public housing tenants have been codified in the federal regulations. Under 24 CFR 866.4, certain provisions must be included in every lease entered into by a PHA and its tenants. The relevant provisions were incorporated into the lease in this case, providing, in pertinent part:

“(2) That the PHA shall give written notice of termination of the lease of:
“(i) 14 days in the case of failure to pay rent;
* * * *
“(3) That the notice of termination to the tenant shall state reasons for the termination, shall inform the tenant of his right to make such reply as he may wish and of his right to request a hearing in accordance with the PHA’s grievance procedure.” 24 CFR 866.4(1).

The regulations clearly require that a tenant be given 14 days from the time of the notice of termination in which to request a hearing or assert any defense she may have. During that time, the PHA may not terminate the lease or initiate eviction proceedings. Metro Management Co. v. Parker, 247 Ga 625, 278 SE2d 643 (1981). Defendant claims that plaintiff did not send her the notice required by the regulations and the lease.1 On the other hand, plaintiff contends that the three [763]*763notices it sent, taken together, substantially complied with the federal requirement. We agree with defendant.

The first letter, dated February 21, reprimanded defendant for failing to report a change in income and indicated that her rent was overdue in the amount of $304. It further said that, if her rent was not paid by noon on February 24, she would be evicted. The second letter, dated March 6, stated that a recent inspection had disclosed damages to her dwelling of $1,014.92, for which she was to be held responsible. That letter also said that the overdue rent had increased to $402 and that she must pay it immediately or request a hearing within seven days, or else plaintiff would “take further legal action.” The last notice, dated March 16, said that she must pay the rent in three days or the lease would be terminated.2

Defendant was not allowed the specific 14-day grace period that both the lease and the law require. Each of the three notices that she did receive threatened eviction or other unspecified legal action in as few as three, but not more than seven, days unless payment was made. Only one advised her of the right to a hearing. Each letter, on its face, appeared to be the last word on the matter.

The notices did not apprise defendant of the full extent of her rights. Rather, she was notified of three separate and independent time periods, none of which offered her the required opportunity to fight the termination. Because all three notices appeared to be final, each one necessarily conflicted with the other two. Plaintiff would have us take [764]*764portions of each notice and, by tacking them together, hold that it complied with the regulation. The regulation is clear and unambiguous and does not permit compiling of a series of notices to meet its requirements.

Reversed.

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Related

Metro Management Co. v. Parker
278 S.E.2d 643 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
697 P.2d 227, 72 Or. App. 760, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 2698, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/klamath-housing-authority-v-weiser-orctapp-1985.