Klaber v. Unity School of Christianity

51 S.W.2d 30, 330 Mo. 854, 1932 Mo. LEXIS 465
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedJune 13, 1932
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 51 S.W.2d 30 (Klaber v. Unity School of Christianity) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Klaber v. Unity School of Christianity, 51 S.W.2d 30, 330 Mo. 854, 1932 Mo. LEXIS 465 (Mo. 1932).

Opinion

*858 ATWOOD, J.

This ease comes to the writer on reassignment. It is a suit in equity to set aside a contract dated April 4, 1924, between Clara C. Austin and Unity School of Christianity, a corporation, purporting to convey to said corporation $11,100 in bonds and $900 in cash, and for the recovery of said bonds and cash. Clara C. Austin died September 15, 1924, and this suit was instituted by her administrator who appealed from a general finding and judgment for defendant.

The grounds of attack indicated in plaintiff’s petition are mental incapacity of Clara C. Austin, and undue influence and fraud exercised and practiced upon her by the officers and agents of defendant Unity School of Christianity. Defendant’s answer was a general denial.

In presenting this appeal counsel for the administrator frankly say that we need not find that Clara C. Austin was non compos mentis. and the fact, if it be a fact, that the evidence shows her mind was weakened is apparently stressed only as “an element going to the establishment of the fiduciary relationship.” The points first urged by appellant are that she bore the relationship of confidante and fiduciary to defendant, and, that relationship existing, undue influence is presumed. Plaintiff’s pleading with reference to her mental incapacity and the fiduciary relationship is chiefly as follows:

“That on the said 4th day of April, 1924, said Clara C. Austin, was an old woman, more than ninety years of age, weak and frail, in body, and that for some time prior to said date, in addition to the deafness and defect in eyesight as aforesaid she was suffering from infirmities of mind; that her memory had become weakened and fallible, and that her rational processes were impaired and weakened, and that she was unable to exercise sound judgment with respect to her business and financial affairs; that she had consulted the officers and agents of said defendant corporation, and particularly its preshlent, Charles Fillmore, and its treasurer and manager, Lowell Fillmore, with respect to her business and financial *859 affairs, as well as her bodily and mental infirmities, and had received and accepted advice from said officers of said defendant corporation with respect to her said financial affairs, and with respect to property and business, and that she reposed in them confidence and trust as to each and all of these matters. ’ ’

Appellant asserts that the relations of doctor and patient and priest and penitent are classical instances of a fiduciary or confidential status, and that the evidence abundantly shows the existence of these relations between defendant and Clara C. Austin at the time the contract in question was executed. Such a relation, however, does not in and of itself prove the existence of a fiduciary status in the sense that a presumption of undue influence necessarily flows therefrom. On this subject Judge Vaxli.vnt, speaking for th's court in Studybaker v. Cofield, 159 Mo. 596, 612, 613, 61 S. W. 246, said:

“The law is as cautious in defining a fiduciary relation in the sense in which we are now using that term r,s it is in limiting by definition the boundaries within which fraud may be pursued. There are certain technhal relations that are readily comprehended as fiduciary, such as guardian and ward, attorney and client, priest and communicant, etc., but there are other relations not falling in either of those specified classes that are in fact fiduciary, and, conversely, it is not every guardian, attorney or priest, quia eo nomin»-, who is to be adjudged to hold a fiduciary relation with the party in regard to a particular subject. It is in each case a question of fact. The law regards the real rather than the nominal conditions. The principle is thus stated in 27 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 460: ‘The origin of the confidence and the source of the influence are immaterial. The rule embraces both technical fdueiary relations and those informal relations that exist whenever one trusts in and relies upon another. The only question is, does such a relation in fact exist?’ While the relation of nurse and patient may raise the question, yet it does not in itself answer that question, but the inquiry is still one of fact. Was trust reposed?”

In 25 Corpus Juris, page 1119, in connection with note 41, it is said that this relation “exists in all cases where there has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith, and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence.”

The burden of proving the existence of such relation between the donor and donee is upon the person asserting it (27 C J. 46), but when the relation is shown an adverse presumption arises and the recipient of the gift has the burden of establishing its absolute fairness. [12 R. C. L. p. 953, sec. 28; n. 6.] In Hall v. Knappenberger, 97 Mo. 509, 511, 11 S. W. 239, cited with approval in Mun- *860 day v. Knox, 9 S. W. (2d) 960, 966, 321 Mo. 168, and other cases, we said:

“The rule ‘stands upon a general principle applying to all the variety of relations in which dominion may be exercised by one person over another.’ ”

Hence, the donor s state of health and strength of mind may be proper subjects of inquiry in determining whether or not such special trust was reposed in the donee (28 R. C. L. pp. 146, 147, sec. 100, n. 14), and, as already observed, appellant urges these matters for that purpose only. However, the presumption of undue influence arising upon proof of such confidential relation “is at most but one of fact and not of law, and it drops out of the case when evidence to the contrary appears.” [Munday et al. v. Knox et al, 9 S. W. (2d) 960, 966, 321 Mo. 168; Bushman v. Barlow, 292 S. W. 1039, 1053, 316 Mo. 916; Goodman v. Griffith, 238 Mo. 706, 719, 142 S. W. 259.]

But, it is said there can be no application of the foregoing rule that a presumption of undue influence arises upon proof of the existence of a fiduciary relation unless the gift of the donor goes to the other party in this relation or such other party thereby acquires some beneficial interest therein. [40 Cyc. 1152, 1153, n. 14; Ryan v. Rutledge (Mo. Sup.), 187 S. W. 877; Barkley et al. v. Cemetery Association, 153 Mo. 300, 315, 54 S. W. 482.]

The gift in the instant case was made to defendant corporation, while the fiduciary relation pleaded and sought to be proved was between the donor and the officers and agents of the corporation, particularly Charles Fillmore, Myrtle Fillmore, his wife, and Lowell Fillmore, his son, who were the president, vice-president and treasurer, respectively, of defendant corporation. It appears from the evidence that this corporation was formed in 1914 under the laws of Missouri governing manufacturing and business corporations. Its capital stock then was and still is $5,000, all subscribed and owned by the above named members of the Fillmore family and another son of Charles Fillmore. The purposes and powers stated in the original articles of incorporation are as follows:

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Bluebook (online)
51 S.W.2d 30, 330 Mo. 854, 1932 Mo. LEXIS 465, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/klaber-v-unity-school-of-christianity-mo-1932.