KJET Ventures, LLC v. Jamison, 2026 NCBC 32.
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION GASTON COUNTY 25CVS002630-350
KJET VENTURES, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER AND OPINION ON KELVIN L. JAMISON and JUAN PLAINTIFF AND THIRD-PARTY HOUSTON, DEFENDANTS’ (I) MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, TO STRIKE, AND FOR Defendants, ENTRY OF DEFAULT, AND (II) MOTIONS TO DISMISS v.
KEITH T. FLOYD and ERIC DOWNING,
Third-Party Defendants
1. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants’
motion for sanctions, to strike, and for entry of default, (ECF No. 58), Plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss Defendants’ counterclaims, (ECF No. 40), and Third-Party
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Defendants’ third-party complaint, (ECF No. 42).
2. With regard to the motion for sanctions, to strike, and for entry of default,
the movants request that the Court, pursuant to Rules 11, 26(g), 37, 41(b), and 55 of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and in its inherent authority, sanction
defendants Kelvin Jamison and Juan Houston and their former counsel, attorney
Morris McAdoo, for their failure “to abide by the applicable rules, statutes, and . . . this Court’s direct orders.” (ECF No. 59 at 1). Among other things, the movants
request that the Court strike Defendants’ pleadings, enter default against
Defendants, sanction attorney McAdoo and Defendants, award attorneys’ fees and
costs, and grant such other and further relief as is appropriate. (ECF No. 58 at 3).
3. The motions have been fully briefed, and the Court held a hearing on the
matter at which all parties were present or otherwise represented.
4. The Court has considered the motions, the competent evidence of record, the
record proper, the arguments of the parties and counsel (as applicable), and
applicable law. Having done so, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court determines
that it is appropriate to (i) sanction Defendants; (ii) strike their answer, affirmative
defenses, counterclaims, and third-party claims; and (iii) enter default against
Defendants.
5. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part without
prejudice the motion for sanctions, to strike, and for entry of default, and DENIES
as moot the motions to dismiss counterclaims and third-party complaint. In reaching
this determination, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
Vilmer Caudill, PLLC by Matthew M. Villmer, Tomi Suzuki, and Brittney Slade for Plaintiff KJET Ventures, LLC and Third-Party Defendants Keith T. Floyd and Eric Downing.
Colbert Law, PLLC by William Pete Colbert for Defendant Kelvin Jamison.
McAdoo Law Group, PLLC by Morris F. McAdoo for Defendants Kelvin Jamison and Juan Houston. FINDINGS OF FACT 1
6. This case was designated a mandatory complex business case on 13 June
2025 and assigned to the undersigned Business Court Judge the same day. (ECF Nos.
1–2).
7. Over the following months, the Court has repeatedly sanctioned, struck
filings of, or otherwise admonished or censured Defendants and attorney McAdoo for
failing to comply with the Court’s orders and other applicable rules and statutes. (See,
e.g., ECF No. 14 (striking a non-compliant filing); ECF No. 30 (striking multiple non-
compliant filings and ordering attorney McAdoo to show cause why he should not be
held in criminal contempt); ECF No. 38 (addressing false representations in attorney
McAdoo’s motion to withdraw, including a statement regarding the lack of imminent
hearing dates, despite a previous notice of hearing on a show-cause order); ECF No.
56 (addressing Defendants’ failure to respond to discovery and ordering compliance
with various requirements); ECF No. 61 (censuring attorney McAdoo for failure to
comply with the Court’s orders and applicable rules and statutes); ECF No. 71
(denying Defendants’ motion for multiple failures to follow the Business Court
Rules)).
8. Defendants’ Affidavits. 2 On 19 August 2025, Defendants filed (as a single
document) a motion to dismiss, answer, affirmative defenses, counterclaims, and
1 If any finding of fact in this Order is more properly considered a conclusion of law, or any
conclusion of law is more properly considered a finding of fact, it is so designated, notwithstanding the heading under which it might be found in this Order. 2 To the extent that the Court makes the following findings of fact about Defendants’
affidavits and about the existence of an operating agreement for KJET, those findings of fact are made only for the purposes of the Court’s analysis under Rule 11. KURE Corp. v. Peterson, third-party claims. (ECF No. 16). 3 In connection with their counterclaims and third-
party claims, Defendants filed a motion for preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 18).
Attached to the motion for preliminary injunction were two affidavits, one signed by
each Defendant. (ECF No. 18, Exs. A and B). In both affidavits, Defendants expressly
and unambiguously affirmed that there has never been an operating agreement for
KJET. (ECF No. 18, Ex. A, ¶ 5 (“Despite our agreement, no operating agreement was
ever executed between the members.”); ECF No. 18, Ex. B, ¶ 5 (same)). In their motion
for a preliminary injunction and memorandum in support signed by attorney McAdoo,
Defendants advanced arguments to the Court premised on these representations by
Defendants. (E.g., ECF No. 18 at 12 (“Here, the Articles of Organization, is [sic] the
only document that is signed by all four incorporating members of KJET Ventures,
LLC.”)).
9. To be clear, Defendants did not assert that an operating agreement existed
and that there were simply disagreements about it or that the operating agreement
was merely invalid or ineffective. Rather, in their affidavits to the Court, Defendants
affirmatively represented that no operating agreement was ever executed.
10. Several weeks later, on 11 September 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel sent attorney
McAdoo a letter alerting him of “material [mis]representations” in Defendants’
2017 NCBC LEXIS 1, at *15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2017) (“The Court makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT solely for the purpose of resolving the Rule 11 Motion. Such findings shall not be binding on the parties at a trial on the merits.”). 3 The putative motion to dismiss failed to comply with the Business Court Rules and was
thus ineffective since it was not filed before the answer, was not filed as a separate document, and was not accompanied by a supporting brief. N.C. R. Civ. P. 12; BCR 7.2, 7.5; see Ordoñez Cordero v. Ordoñez Cordero, 2026 NCBC LEXIS 49 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2026) (summarily denying a putative motion to dismiss for failure to comply with BCR 7.2). motion for a preliminary injunction, supporting memorandum, and affidavits. (ECF
No. 27.5 at 2–3). Specifically, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed attorney McAdoo that
Defendants had made fraudulent representations in their affirmations when they
claimed that “no operating agreement was ever executed between the members.”
(ECF No. 27.5 at 2 (citations omitted)).
11. Thus, as of 11 September 2025, attorney McAdoo was aware, or reasonably
should have been aware, that Defendants’ representations contained in their
affidavits were false.
12. In fact, the evidence of record reflects that (i) an operating agreement for
KJET did exist and was signed; (ii) both Defendants were aware of that operating
agreement; (iii) both Defendants signed the agreement, as did other putative
members of Plaintiff; (iv) defendant Jamison contributed to the drafting of the
agreement; and (v) the operating agreement originated from defendant Jamison’s
own email address. (ECF Nos. 27, 27.2, 27.3, and 27.4).
13. The Court finds for purposes of this Order and the Rule 11 motion at issue
that an operating agreement was executed by Defendants and the other putative
members of Plaintiff––i.e., the Third-Party Defendants.
14. Defendants knew and were aware of the operating agreement signed by the
members of Plaintiff, and their statements to the contrary were false.
15. Given the opportunity to address the sworn representations in their
affidavits, Defendants did not assert that the operating agreement provided by
Plaintiff was inaccurate or falsified, nor did they contend that the signatures were forged or that the documents at issue did not exist. Indeed, at no time since Plaintiff’s
counsel apprised attorney McAdoo of the misrepresentation by letter has either
Defendant corrected or amended their respective affidavit to reflect the existence of
the signed operating agreement for KJET originating from defendant Jamison’s own
email address.
16. Defendants lacked a good-faith basis in fact for asserting in an affidavit that
“no operating agreement was ever executed between the members,” and the
statement was not well-grounded in fact.
17. Further, in light of Defendants’ and their attorney’s conduct throughout this
action, it is apparent that the affidavits were filed for the improper purposes of (i)
misleading the Court, (ii) perpetuating this litigation and Defendants’ counterclaims
and defenses, and (iii) delaying proceedings and a resolution of this action.
18. Discovery. On 25 November 2025, the Court conducted a BCR 10.9
conference concerning certain deficiencies in Defendants’ discovery productions,
including Defendants’ failure to provide full and complete responses to discovery
requests from Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 56). The parties were all represented through
their counsel of record during that conference.
19. After hearing from counsel for the parties and considering all appropriate
matters of record, the Court determined that Defendant had, in fact, failed to fully
respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests and had failed to produce responsive
documents. 20. Accordingly, the Court entered an Order that same day requiring that
Defendants supplement their discovery responses and productions (the “BCR 10.9
Order”). (ECF No. 56). In relevant part, the Court ordered as follows:
b. Not later than 5:00 pm ET, 5 December 2025, defendant Jamison is DIRECTED to fully (i) supplement his written responses and produce all “responsive, non-privileged documents” related to KJET’s third, fourth, fifth, sixth seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth requests for production, and (ii) supplement his responses to KJET’s second, fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth interrogatories;
c. Not later than 5:00 pm ET, 5 December 2025, defendant Houston is hereby DIRECTED to fully (i) supplement his written responses and produce all “responsive, non-privileged documents” related to KJET’s second, sixth, eighth, and ninth requests for production, and (ii) supplement his responses to KJET’s second, third, fifth, and seventh interrogatories;
d. Not later than 5:00 pm ET, 5 December 2025, Defendants shall both thoroughly review their prior responses and objections to all of Plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories and first set of requests for production to each of them and shall SUPPLEMENT (i) each response to a request for production for which any responsive documents, ESI, or other requested materials that are now in Defendants’ custody, control, or possession and have not been produced to Plaintiff, and (ii) each interrogatory response for which the prior response is––as of the deadline––no longer accurate or complete;
e. Not later than 5:00 pm ET, 5 December 2025, Defendants shall SERVE verifications of their responses to Plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories;
f. Not later than 5:00 pm ET, 5 December 2025, Defendants shall FILE and SERVE a verification confirming that Defendants have (i) complied with this Order, (ii) produced all documents, ESI, and other materials in their custody, control, or possession that are responsive to any of Plaintiff’s first requests for production, (iii) fully supplemented and provided complete and truthful responses to each of Plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories, and (iv) not withheld any materials from production on the basis of any objection; and
g. To the extent that either Defendant contends no such supplemental documents, ESI, materials, or information exist with respect to any request for production or interrogatory, the verification shall so state and shall be accompanied by a summary of the circumstances justifying that response (e.g., that all such materials were previously produced and that no additional information exists, that any such information is not in Defendants’ custody, control, or possession, etc.). (ECF No. 56, ¶ 8(b)–(g)).
21. Defendants did not provide complete written supplemental responses to
KJET’s interrogatories or requests for production by 5 December 2025 as required by
the Court. While Defendants provided minimal discovery supplementation after
entry of the Court’s Order, the production was not a complete production as required
by the Court.
22. Defendants did not supplement “(i) each response to a request for production
for which any responsive documents, ESI, or other requested materials that [were
then] in Defendants’ custody, control, or possession and ha[d] not been produced to
Plaintiff, and (ii) each interrogatory response for which the prior response [wa]s––as
of the deadline––no longer accurate or complete” by 5 December 2025 as required by
the Court. (ECF No. 56, ¶ 8(d)).
23. As reflected on the Court’s own docket, despite the Court’s BCR 10.9 Order
and its requirement that they do so by 5 December 2025, Defendants undisputedly
did not file and serve a verification confirming their compliance with the Court’s
Order or confirming that they had “(ii) produced all documents, ESI, and other
materials in their custody, control, or possession that [we]re responsive to any of Plaintiff’s first requests for production, (iii) fully supplemented and provided
complete and truthful responses to each of Plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories, and
(iv) not withheld any materials from production on the basis of any objection[.]” (ECF
No. 56, ¶ 8(f)).
24. Defendants also did not file a verification asserting that no “supplemental
documents, ESI, materials, or information exist[ed] with respect to any request for
production or interrogatory” to which the Court had ordered supplementation, nor
did Defendants otherwise file a verification suggesting that they were unable to
supplement the responses or productions for any other reason. (ECF No. 56, ¶ 8(g)).
25. On 19 December 2025, well after Defendants’ time to comply with the
Court’s discovery Order had expired, Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant filed the
instant motion for sanctions and a corresponding brief in support of the motion,
seeking sanctions against Defendants and attorney McAdoo pursuant to, among
other things, Rules 11 and 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Court’s inherent authority. (ECF Nos. 58 and 59).
26. On 8 January 2026, merely one day after he was permitted to withdraw from
the case at his own insistence, (ECF No. 61, ¶ 120(e)), attorney McAdoo made a
purported “limited appearance” 4 on behalf of Defendants for the purpose of
4 As this Court has explained, limited appearances, outside the context of objecting to personal jurisdiction, are generally “ineffective and unwarranted,” and “a purported notice of ‘limited appearance’ does not relieve counsel of [its] obligation” to represent its client until the final disposition of the action or until the Court otherwise grants counsel leave to withdraw from the matter. Mary Annette, LLC v. Crider, 2026 NCBC LEXIS 33, at *9–12 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2026) (citations omitted). Accordingly, attorney McAdoo is, “once again, counsel of record for [Defendants] in this matter, at least with regard to proceedings in this Court, subject to all of the responsibilities of counsel of record,” unless and until the responding to the motion for sanctions. (ECF Nos. 62 and 63). The filing by attorney
McAdoo generally posits, without supporting evidence, that Defendants have
complied with the Court’s BCR 10.9 Order and that Defendants should therefore not
be subject to sanctions. (See generally ECF No. 62).
27. On 4 February 2026, almost two months after the motion for sanctions was
filed, defendant Jamison filed a “Motion to Seek Leave of Court to Grant Additional
Time.” (ECF No. 69). The motion consists of one paragraph, which reads as follows:
Defendants Kelvin L. Jamison and Juan Houston (hereinafter referred to as “Defendants”) respectfully are hereby asking the court for additional time to comply with the November 25, 2025, as well as any additional orders or actions for sixty days until the Defendants can seek, retain and bring new counsel up to date on this matter. At such times if granted, the Defendants will fully comply and stay in compliance with the matter as it continues to go forward along with the court’s schedule.
(ECF No. 69 at 1). 5
28. In seeking “additional time to comply with the November 25, 2025” Order,
Defendants not only conceded that they had failed to comply with the Court’s BCR
10.9 order for nearly two months but indicated that they would be unable to do so for
another two months. (ECF No. 69 at 1; see ECF No. 71, ¶ 2). Troublingly, Defendants
Court grants another motion to withdraw. Foster Biodevice, LLC v. Cantrell, 2016 NCBC LEXIS 53, at *14 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 11, 2016). 5 The motion contains the names of both defendants but was not actually signed by either
Defendant, though it was filed under defendant Jamison’s account. (ECF No. 69). Absent a signature, the Court may properly strike it pursuant to Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See N.C. R. Civ. P. 11. Moreover, inasmuch as the motion was filed by defendant Jamison but purportedly made on behalf of both Defendants, such a filing is impermissible and constitutes the unauthorized practice of law by defendant Jamison as to defendant Houston. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84–4. offered no explanation for their continuing failure to comply. (ECF No. 69; see ECF
No. 71, ¶ 2).
29. In the BCR 10.9 Order, the Court provided notice to Defendants that “their
failure to fully and timely respond as required by this Order may subject them to
sanctions under the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the Business Court
Rules, the Court’s inherent authority, and other applicable law.” (ECF No. 56, ¶ 8(h)).
30. The Court held a hearing on the instant sanctions motion and other motions
on 20 February 2026. Plaintiff, third-party defendants Floyd and Downing, and
defendant Jamison were represented by their respective counsel, and defendant
Houston and attorney McAdoo 6 were also present. (ECF No. 65).
31. At the hearing, Defendants at various times conceded or otherwise did not
dispute that, following the Court’s BCR 10.9 Order, (i) their document
supplementation was minimal; (ii) they did not send written supplementation of their
discovery responses; and (iii) they did not file the verification statement as explicitly
required by the BCR 10.9 Order, the absence of which is also reflected on the Court’s
docket. (See ECF No. 56, ¶ 8(b)–(g)).
32. Defendants (personally, through attorney McAdoo when he represented
them, or both) were aware of the BCR 10.9 Order and its requirements and were
aware of their discovery obligations, including the obligation to supplement their
discovery responses and productions.
6 At the beginning of the hearing, attorney McAdoo indicated that he was unsure why he was
present for the hearing. At his request, with no objection, and with the Court’s leave, attorney McAdoo was excused from further participation in the hearing. He was not, however, relieved of his representation obligations accruing based on his recent re-appearance in the case. 33. Defendants suggested that they had provided some information to attorney
McAdoo but that they were unaware why there had not been full compliance with the
BCR 10.9 Order. Even if Defendants provided some minimal information to their
attorney (an assertion of which the Court is skeptical and of which Defendants have
provided no evidence), Defendants failed to reasonably and timely ensure that that
information and related materials were ultimately processed and served in
compliance with the Court’s BCR 10.9 Order.
34. Based on the Court’s review of the record, the Court finds that Defendants
have repeatedly refused and otherwise failed to comply with their discovery
obligations in this case and with the Court’s Orders, including the BCR 10.9 Order.
35. Defendants’ conduct has created an undue burden on Plaintiff and Third-
Party Defendants in their effort to have Defendants comply with Defendants’
discovery obligations.
36. Further, Defendants’ conduct has unduly delayed these proceedings and
impeded the efficient administration of justice, necessitating hearings and
conferences before the Court, motion practice, and other proceedings based on
Defendants’ failures to comply with the Court’s Orders and applicable rules.
37. Moreover, Defendants’ conduct has prejudiced Plaintiff and Third-Party
Defendants in this action by preventing those parties and their counsel from
obtaining appropriate discovery regarding the factual and documentary bases for the
claims and defenses at issue in this lawsuit, thereby impairing those parties’ ability
to adequately pursue their claims and defenses, as applicable. 38. Notwithstanding Defendants’ filings to the contrary, Defendants have failed
to timely and fully supplement their document production, failed to timely and fully
supplement their written discovery responses, failed to timely file or serve the
verification required by the Court, and failed to timely file or serve a written
explanation of their failures or inability to comply with the Court’s BCR 10.9 Order.
39. Defendants’ overall discovery responses, production, and supplementation
remain incomplete.
40. In advance of, and at the time of, the hearing before the Court, Defendants
had the ability and opportunity to comply with the BCR 10.9 Order and were able to
take reasonable measures that would enable them to comply with the Order, yet they
failed to do so.
41. Defendants and their counsel failed to make reasonable efforts to comply
with the BCR 10.9 Order and the rules applicable to this action.
42. Defendants’ repeated (and ongoing) failures and refusals to fully comply
with the BCR 10.9 Order were unjustified, improper, and unreasonable.
43. No good cause exists for Defendants’ failures to comply with the Court’s BCR
10.9 Order.
44. The BCR 10.9 Order remains in full force and effect, and Defendants
(whether personally, through their counsel, or both) at all relevant times knew and
understood the terms of that Order.
45. Having heard from Defendants and attorney McAdoo in the course of
various hearings and having otherwise considered all competent matters of record properly before the Court, the Court finds that Defendants and attorney McAdoo are
not credible in their arguments and representations to the Court.
46. The Court has considered all reasonable and potentially available sanctions
for Defendants’ conduct in this action, including lesser sanctions than those imposed
by this Order.
47. As set forth below, based on the factual circumstances of this action, the
Court finds that no sanctions less severe than those imposed by this Order would be
reasonable or sufficient to address Defendants’ conduct and that the sanctions
imposed by this Order are reasonable and just.
48. As reflected in the record, the Court previously sanctioned attorney McAdoo,
as Defendants’ counsel of record and representative, in this action under Rule 11 of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and in the Court’s inherent authority for
making filings on behalf of Defendants that were not well grounded in fact and that
were signed and filed for improper purposes. (See generally ECF No. 61).
49. As a result, the Court has already sanctioned attorney McAdoo in this
action, as counsel and representative for Defendants, in the amount of $3,632.50,
along with a censure and referral to the North Carolina State Bar. (See generally ECF
No. 61).
50. These failures and deficiencies are only a portion of those attributable to
Defendants and their counsel in this action. At various times, as confirmed in
conferences, hearings, and other proceedings before the Court, attorney McAdoo has
indicated that Defendants have failed to provide information to him, that he has signed or served documents without their input, and that he has served documents
without substantive inquiry.
51. Defendants and attorney McAdoo were given appropriate notice and an
opportunity to be heard on potential sanctions as set forth in this Order.
52. Defendants and attorney McAdoo have, on various occasions in this action,
blatantly ignored the Court’s Orders, the Business Court Rules, and other applicable
rules and requirements applicable to this action.
53. Even if the Court had not taken such actions previously and even if
Defendants’ and attorney McAdoo’s prior conduct were disregarded, with the conduct
addressed in this Order considered their first violations, the sanctions set forth in
this Order still are and would be reasonable under the circumstances of this
particular case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
54. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this
action.
55. Without good cause, Defendants failed to timely comply with the Court’s
10.9 Order and applicable rules and statutes and have failed to make reasonable
attempts to comply with the BCR 10.9 Order.
56. Defendants have repeatedly failed to provide or permit discovery as required
by the Court and applicable rules.
57. Despite ample opportunity to do so, Defendants failed to reasonably or
adequately explain their failure and refusal to comply with the Court’s BCR 10.9 Order or their failure and refusal to (i) identify, produce, or otherwise disclose the
documents, information, and other materials responsive to the discovery requests; (ii)
provide written supplemental responses required by the Court; or (iii) provide the
verification required by the Court.
58. Defendants failed to obey or otherwise comply with the BCR 10.9 Order,
which is an order to provide or permit discovery and was previously entered pursuant
to Rule 37 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and properly served on
59. Defendants’ failures to comply with the BCR 10.9 Order are unjustified,
improper, and unreasonable.
60. Without any good-faith basis, Defendants have also made demonstrable
misrepresentations in signed affidavits filed with the Court in violation of Rule 11 of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants’ filings were not well-
grounded in fact and, indeed, were made for the improper purposes of misleading the
Court, perpetuating this litigation, and delaying the ultimate resolution of the case,
as set forth above.
61. Thus, the Court determines that Rules 37, 41, 11, and the Court’s inherent
authority are implicated, and in the exercise of its discretion, the Court determines
that sanctions are appropriate as set forth in this Order.
62. In reaching this determination, the Court has considered all lesser potential
and available sanctions and determines that they would not adequately serve to
address Defendants’ conduct. 63. Rules 37 and 41. Under Rule 37(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure, if a party “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,” the Court
“may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2);
Dunhill Holdings, LLC v. Lindberg, 282 N.C. App. 36, 56 (2022) (citations omitted).
64. In the Court’s discretion, this may include an order sanctioning the non-
compliant party by directing (i) “that the matters regarding which the order was
made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes
of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order,” and (ii)
“striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order
is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(a) and
37(b)(2)(c); Dunhill Holdings, 282 N.C. App. at 56 (citations omitted); see Out of the
Box Devs., LLC v. LogicBit Corp., 2014 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar.
20, 2014) (“Rule 37 should be construed liberally to provide trial courts with flexibility
to impose sanctions.” (citation omitted)).
65. The Court’s 10.9 Order is “an order to provide or permit discovery” within
the meaning of Rule 37 and remains in full force and effect. (ECF No. 56); N.C. R.
Civ. P. 37(b). Accordingly, failure to comply with the 10.9 Order implicates Rule 37.
N.C. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
66. Similarly, Rule 41(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure permits
the Court to dismiss an action or any claim for a party’s failure “to comply with these
rules or any order of court” on a party’s motion. N.C. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Out of the Box, 2014 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *2 n.1 (noting that Rule 41 “permits dismissal of an action
or claim for failure ‘to comply with . . . any [court] order.’” (alterations in original)
(citations omitted)).
67. Defendants have failed to comply with the Court’s 10.9 Order in myriad
respects, as set forth above, and, despite their time for compliance having expired,
have acknowledged with subsequent filings their past failure to comply by seeking
additional time to comply in the future. (See ECF No. 56, ¶ 8(b)–(g); ECF No. 69 at 1;
ECF No. 71, ¶ 2)).
68. In its discretion, the Court determines that sanctions under Rule 37(b) and
Rule 41(b) are appropriate given Defendants’ numerous failures to comply with the
Court’s 10.9 Order, particularly considering their inexplicable pattern of non-
compliance with other applicable Orders, statutes, and rules.
69. While the Court imposes sanctions on multiple bases in this Order, the
violations of Rules 37 and 41, as set forth above, constitute valid independent bases
upon which to impose sanctions in this action, irrespective of any further wrongful
conduct (such as Rule 11 violations) otherwise set forth in this Order.
70. Accordingly, the sanctions imposed in this Order are imposed on each
independent basis on which they may be imposed under applicable law.
71. Rule 11. Rule 11 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
relevant part as follows:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated . . . . The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation . . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
N.C. R. Civ. P. 11(a).
72. Thus, when signing a pleading, motion, or other paper submitted to the
Court, an attorney or party “certifies that three distinct things are true: the pleading
is (1) well grounded in fact; (2) warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law (legal sufficiency); and (3)
not interposed for any improper purpose.” Davis v. Durham Mental Health/Dev.
Disabilities/Substance Abuse Area Auth., 165 N.C. App. 100, 108 (2004) (quoting
Bryson v. Sullivan, 330 N.C. 644, 655 (1992) (internal quotation marks and
punctuation omitted)).
73. “A breach of the certification as to any one of these three [requirements] is
a violation of the Rule.” Hill v. Hill, 173 N.C. App. 309, 313 (2005) (quoting Bryson,
330 N.C. at 655) (alterations in original) (internal punctuation omitted)).
74. In evaluating whether a document is well grounded in fact under Rule 11,
the Court “must [determine]: (1) whether the [movant] undertook a reasonable inquiry into the facts and (2) whether the [movant], after reviewing the results of his
inquiry, reasonably believed that his position was well grounded in fact.” Id. at 314
(quoting McClerin v. R-M Indus., Inc., 118 N.C. App. 640, 644 (1995)).
75. Defendants knew and were both aware of the operating agreement for KJET
signed by all putative members, despite the explicit affirmation to the contrary.
(Compare ECF No. 18, Ex. A, ¶ 5 and ECF No. 18, Ex. B, ¶ 5, with ECF Nos. 27.2,
27.3, and 27.4).
76. As set forth above, Defendants’ statements in their affidavits were false—
demonstrably so—and Defendants have provided no substantive response concerning
that falsity.
77. Ultimately, the Court concludes that Defendants’ statements in their
affidavits were not well-grounded in fact in that they affirmatively misrepresented
that no operating agreement had been signed. Hill, 173 N.C. App. at 314 (citation
omitted).
78. Further, as set forth above, the Court concludes that these
misrepresentations contained in Defendants’ affidavits were made for the improper
purposes of (i) misleading the Court, (ii) perpetuating this litigation and Defendants’
counterclaims and defenses, and (iii) delaying proceedings and a resolution of this
79. Thus, the Court concludes that, in signing and submitting their respective
affidavits in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction, Defendants violated
Rule 11. 80. Further, Defendants’ motion for preliminary injunction and corresponding
memorandum, which both contain attorney McAdoo’s signature, are premised in
large part upon Defendants’ false statements contained in their affidavits regarding
the existence of a signed operating agreement. (E.g., ECF No. 18 at 12).
81. Even generously assuming that attorney McAdoo reasonably believed the
facts on which he relied to be well-grounded when he initially filed the motion and
memorandum, he was aware—or reasonably should have been aware—from at least
11 September 2025 that his clients’ affidavits, and therefore the motion and
memorandum based on them, were not well grounded in fact and have been
maintained without supplementation for improper purposes. (ECF No. 27.5) (alerting
attorney McAdoo to falsities in his Defendants’ affidavits).
82. To date, despite ample opportunity to do so, neither attorney McAdoo nor
Defendants have corrected, amended, or supplemented either the motion for
preliminary injunction or the corresponding memorandum in support to withdraw or
otherwise address their reliance on Defendants’ misrepresentations, nor have
Defendants provided any reason for their false statements.
83. Accordingly, the motion for preliminary injunction and the memorandum in
support also are not well-grounded in fact and were filed (or at least maintained) for
improper purposes like the affidavits upon which they were based.
84. The filings are in violation of Rule 11 and are attributable to Defendants.
85. Defendants may appropriately be sanctioned based on attorney McAdoo’s
signatures on the motion and memorandum. Pritchett v. Dudek, 299 N.C. App. 821, 2025 N.C. App. LEXIS 507, at *10–11 (2025) (unpublished) (“It is clear both in statute
and case law that a represented party may be sanctioned for improper purpose
violations under Rule 11 at the discretion of the trial court.”); Al-Hassan v. Salloum,
2021 NCBC LEXIS 62, *4–5 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 2, 2021) (“[T]he acts of the attorney
are usually imputed to the client.”).
86. Therefore, in the Court’s discretion and independent of Defendants’ Rule 37
violations, sanctions are also appropriate under Rule 11.
87. Inherent Authority. Even if Defendants’ and attorney McAdoo’s conduct
were not sanctionable under Rules 11, 37, and 41 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure, the same sanctions would be (and are) appropriate in the exercise of the
Court’s inherent authority.
88. Through its inherent powers, the Court has the “authority to do all things
that are reasonably necessary for the proper administration of justice.” Beard v. N.C.
State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 129 (1987) (citations omitted); Window World of Baton
Rouge, LLC v. Window World, Inc., 2022 NCBC LEXIS 58, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. June
13, 2022) (discussing inherent authority).
89. This inherent authority includes “the power . . . to sanction parties for
failure to comply with court orders[.]” Out of the Box, 2014 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *9
(alterations in original) (quoting Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669,
674 (1987)). 90. Among other things, the Court has inherent authority and discretion to
sanction Defendants on the same bases set forth above for the Rule 11 and Rule 37
violations. See In re Small, 201 N.C. App. 390, 394 (2009).
91. Attorney McAdoo and Defendants were given appropriate notice and an
opportunity to be heard on potential sanctions in the Court’s inherent authority.
92. In the exercise of judicial discretion, in addition to being appropriate for each
of the other reasons set forth above, the Court determines that the sanctions set forth
in this Order are appropriate pursuant to the Court’s inherent “authority to do all
things that are reasonably necessary for the proper administration of justice,” Beard,
320 N.C. at 129; to sanction counsel and parties for failure to comply with court
orders, Out of the Box, 2014 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *9; and otherwise “to manage its
affairs, to see that justice is done, and to see that the administration of justice is
accomplished as expeditiously as possible[.]” Small, 201 N.C. App. at 394 (citations
93. Appropriate Sanctions. The Court has previously imposed sanctions or
otherwise taken remedial actions less severe than those imposed by this Order for
Defendants’ and attorney McAdoo’s repeated failures to abide by the Court’s Orders
and applicable rules and statutes. These include admonishments and censures,
striking documents, and financial sanctions, among other things. (E.g., ECF Nos. 14,
30, 61). 94. Those actions have not curtailed Defendants’ or attorney McAdoo’s failures
to comply with the Court’s various Orders, the Business Court Rules, or the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
95. Even if this were Defendants’ and attorney McAdoo’s first failures to comply
with the Court’s Orders and applicable rules, the sanctions set forth in this Order
would be appropriate.
96. The Court has again considered all available sanctions, including those less
serious than those imposed by this Order, and concludes that any lesser sanctions
would be insufficient and inadequate to address Defendants’ dilatory and improper
conduct, to remedy the prejudice to Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants, or
otherwise to address the matters at issue, particularly considering the extent of
Defendants’ failures, the procedural posture of the case, and related facts and
circumstances of record.
97. The conduct at issue warrants substantial sanctions against Defendants
directly, including (i) striking Defendants’ answer, affirmative defenses,
counterclaims, and third-party claims; and (ii) entering default against Defendants
on KJET’s affirmative claims.
98. As to attorney McAdoo individually, time and again throughout this case,
his conduct has been egregiously improper and has demonstrated a remarkable
disregard for the Court’s Orders and applicable rules, resulting in sanctions against
him. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 30 and 61). Those sanctions are matters of public record.
While further sanctions against attorney McAdoo might be warranted, they would also serve little value in the current context of this action. Accordingly, in the exercise
of its discretion, the Court determines that it is neither useful nor productive to
further individually sanction attorney McAdoo yet again.
99. Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants have
outstanding motions to dismiss Defendants’ counterclaims and third-party causes of
action. Since the Court has already fully resolved those claims via its resolution of
the motion for sanctions, the Court need not reach the merits of their respective
motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Am. Transp. Grp. Ins. Risk Retention Grp. v. MVT Ins.
Servs., 2021 NCBC LEXIS 11, at *16 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2021) (denying Rule
12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions to dismiss as moot “[s]ince the entire matter before
the Court c[ould] be resolved through the Court’s inherent authority to impose
sanctions on a party engaging in misconduct”).
ORDER
100. Therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court GRANTS in part the
motion for sanctions and hereby (i) STRIKES Defendants’ answer, affirmative
defenses, counterclaims, and third-party claims, (ECF No. 16), and (ii) ENTERS
default against Defendants as to the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint, (ECF
No. 6). The Court otherwise DENIES without prejudice the remainder of the
motion for sanctions.
101. Further, the Court DENIES as moot KJET’s motion to dismiss Defendants’
counterclaims and Third-Party Defendants’ motion to dismiss Defendants’ third-
party complaint. SO ORDERED, this 14th day of April 2026.
/s/ Matthew T. Houston Matthew T. Houston Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases