Kitchen v. Carter

66 N.W. 855, 47 Neb. 776, 1896 Neb. LEXIS 677
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedApril 7, 1896
DocketNo. 5935
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 66 N.W. 855 (Kitchen v. Carter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kitchen v. Carter, 66 N.W. 855, 47 Neb. 776, 1896 Neb. LEXIS 677 (Neb. 1896).

Opinion

Harrison, J.

The plaintiff in error, during the year 1886 and prior and subsequent thereto, was a part owner and had control of the premises known as the “Paxton Hotel property” in the city of Omaha. In 1886 the southwest portion of the building was what was called an “annex” to the main body of the building and this annex was fifty feet long, twenty-two feet wide, and two stories high. During the year stated the plaintiff caused an additional or third story to be built upon the annex. For this third story there were no plans and specifications made and no architect was employed to superintend its construction. A pencil sketch of the desiréd improvement was made and given by plaintiff in error to an experienced contractor and builder with directions to furnish the material and perform the labor, or have the necessary labor performed, the payment to be the reasonable value of the labor and material, or such sum as could be agreed upon between the parties. During the early part of the night of April 12, 1891, fire was discovered in the southwestern lower room of the annex, then being used as a kitchen. A fire-alarm was turned in and was promptly responded to by some of the organizations or companies belonging to the fire department, the members of which, as soon as they reached the premises, took active measures for stopping the fire. Some of them discovering, as they believed, evidences of fire in the upper northwest corner or room in the third [780]*780story of the annex, a ladder was raised from a vacant portion of an adjoining lot and placed so that the. upper end reached or rested against the window sill of the room; and some of the firemen, — among them Michael J. Carter, — started up the ladder with a line of hose. They had proceeded but a short distance when a portion of the brick wall, against and by which the ladder was supported, fell outward and struck and injured the firemen who were upon the ladder; From the effect of injuries so received, Michael J. Carter soon afterward died, and this suit was instituted by Delia Carter, his wife and the administratrix of his estate, to recover damages under the provisions of our statute for the pecuniary loss resulting from his death. The right to recover in the action was predicated upon the alleged negligence of plaintiff in error in procuring or allowing the use of poor, inferior material in the building of the third story of the annex and its faulty and defective construction in certain particulars specifically designated in the petition. These statements all and singular of the petition in relation to negligence imputed to plaintiff in error and defects of any nature in the construction of the additional story to the annex, were denied in the answer. The result of a trial in the district court was a verdict and judgment in favor of defendant in error in the sum of $5,000, and to secure a review of the proceedings in that court the case has been removed to this court by petition in error.

Counsellor plaintiff in error, in a reply brief, state, or assume it to be proven, that the deceased fireman was in or on the premises or building of plaintiff in error and was there a mere licensee, [781]*781and hence the plaintiff in error owed him no duty, and even conceding that negligence had been shown, yet no liability accrued. That a licensee, in entering upon property, assumes the risks of injury resulting to him from any defective, imperfect, or dangerous conditions of the premises, but this we need not discuss or decide as we do not think the question is taised by either the pleadings in the case or the facts. It was alleged in the petition that the fireman, when injured, was on a vacant lot adjoining the Paxton Hotel property, and the evidence discloses that he, with other firemen, went on the vacant lot first referred to, and reared a ladder against the hotel building, or more properly speaking, the annex, and was in the act of ascending it to go upon or into the building, when the brick wall fell on them and they were not in or on the premises of plaintiff in error. It was alleged in the petition that a part of the wall of the building,— the third story of the annex, — for no sufficient cause except its own defects and inherent weakness, fell westward and outward and injured the firemen. The theory of this portion of the cause of action was based upon the proposition that in erecting the building, the third story, if it was so defectively constructed, to the knowledge of the proprietor, as to be dangerous, and because of weakness it fell and injured anyone lawfully in its vicinity, or, as in this case, on the adjoining lot, the owner of the building was liable for any damage so suffered. Carter, the fireman, was lawfully on the adjoining lot. He had a right to go and be there for the purpose of fighting fire in this or any other of the buildings in that portion of the city. With regard to insecure build[782]*782ings and liability attaching to the owners thereof it is said in Wood, Nuisances, p. 140, sec. 109, “While a man has a right to follow his own tastes and inclinations as to the style and character of the building that he will erect upon his own land, yet he has no right to erect and maintain there a building that is dangerous, by reason of the materials used in, or the manner of its construction, or that is inherently weak or in a ruinous condition and liable to fall and do injury to an adjoining owner or the public. Such a building on a public street is a public nuisance, and is a private nuisance to those owning property adjoining it; and if the building falls and inflicts injury upon the adjoining owners or their property, or to any one who is lawfully in its vicinity, the owner is liable for all the consequences that ensue therefrom.” (See authorities cited in support of the text.) “The owner of a building is not an insurer against accident from its condition, but so far as the exercise of ordinary care will enable him to do so he is bound to keep it in such condition that it will not, by any insecurity or insufficiency for the purpose to which it is put, injure any person rightfully in, around, or passing it.” (Ryder v. Kinsey, 64 N. W. Rep. [Minn.], 94.)

But it is urged by counsel for plaintiff in error that the evidence is insufficient to support á finding of defective construction of the third story of this building, and the falling as a consequence thereof; and further, that if it be conceded that the structure was not of the safest character, or was not safe, the proximate cause of the falling of the wall was the effect of the fire; that this was an intervening cause, and the immediate and principal one, and not within the reasonable contení[783]*783plation of the proprietor of the premises when building or having built the third story to the annex, including the wall in question, or set in motion by him or arising from the construction of the wall or the manner of its erection; that he was not bound to foresee and so guard against any but natural and probable consequences, — things likely to follow his acts; or, in other words, the fire and the resultant falling of the wall, not being in any manner or degree connected with or referable to him or the construction of the wall, he was relieved from any liability for injuries caused thereby. It appears from the evidence that the portion of the wall which fell was of a side wall of a third story, which had been built during the year 1886, on the top of one of the walls of a two-story brick building theretofore built and existing; that the first story had what some witnesses called “a sixteen-inch wall,” and some a seventeen-inch.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
66 N.W. 855, 47 Neb. 776, 1896 Neb. LEXIS 677, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kitchen-v-carter-neb-1896.