1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 DAVID M. KISSNER, Case No. 22-cv-00949-CRB
9 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING SECOND 10 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 11 LOMA PRIETA JOINT UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., 12 Defendants. 13
14 This lawsuit stems from Plaintiff David Kissner’s dismissal from his position as a 15 6th grade math and science teacher at CT English Middle School, in the Loma Prieta Joint 16 Union School District (“District”). See Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (dkt. 16). 17 Initially, there were nineteen claims and thirteen named defendants and Does in the case. 18 See Compl. (dkt. 1). Now all that remains is the “stigma-plus” defamation claim, which 19 Kissner brings against former District superintendents Lisa Fraser and Kevin Grier in 20 connection with their disclosure of the charges against Kissner prior to his termination. 21 See Order on MSJ (dkt. 106) at 34–35. Fraser and Grier move for summary judgment on 22 that claim, arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity. MSJ (dkt. 115). Because 23 it was not clearly established that disclosure alone would violate Kissner’s rights, or that 24 the process Kissner received was inadequate, the Court GRANTS the motion. 25 26 27 I. BACKGROUND1 1 A. Relevant Factual History 2 On February 12, 2021, Fraser, then superintendent, issued Kissner a Notice of 3 Proposed Intent to Dismiss. Kissner Depo. Ex. 13 (dkt. 115-10). The Notice attached a 4 nineteen-page “Statement of Charges,” which charged Kissner with Immoral Conduct, 5 Unprofessional Conduct, Unsatisfactory Performance, Evident Unfitness for Service, and 6 “Persistent violation of or refusal to obey the school laws of the state or reasonable 7 regulations prescribed for the government of the public schools by the state board or by the 8 governing board of the school district employing him or her,” in violation of the Education 9 Code. Id. at 4. The Statement of Charges included the allegation that Kissner engaged in 10 “Potential grooming behavior, such as: singling out a minor and being alone with a minor; 11 offering alcohol; asking about sex/sexual encounters; and posting images of youth partially 12 unclothed on the internet.” Id. at 7. Attached to the Statement of Charges was a 200-plus- 13 page “Confidential Investigation Report” prepared by an attorney. Id. at 48–255. 14 On March 22, 2021, counsel for Kissner wrote to the District, demanding removal 15 of the grooming allegation. Becker Decl. Ex. 5 (dkt. 117-7) at 4 (“These slanderous 16 charges lack any substance and are shamelessly based on nothing more than anonymous 17 inadmissible hearsay.”). He added that “Should these accusations remain in these 18 proceedings or otherwise find their way toward republication, we will not hesitate to hold 19 the District and each person involved accountable.” Id. Defendants did not respond to this 20 demand. Becker Decl. (dkt. 117-1) ¶ 7. 21 On March 25, 2021, the Board met in a closed session to determine whether to 22 proceed with termination proceedings against Kissner. RJN Ex. C (dkt. 97-4) (“the Board 23 approved by a 5–0 vote to authorize moving forward with the dismissal of a certificated 24 employee”). Kissner and his counsel appeared at the Board meeting and presented their 25 26
27 1 The Court included a lengthy background section in its earlier order on summary 1 reasons why the Board should not move forward with the termination. MSJ Ex. N at 70– 2 71. The Board voted to move forward with termination proceedings. Id. at 71. 3 On April 16, 2021, the District received a California Public Records Act (“PRA”) 4 request from an individual named Dan Dale, seeking a copy of the Statement of Charges. 5 Fraser Depo. Ex. 30 (dkt. 115-6) at 1. The District’s response that same day, signed by 6 Fraser, stated that the request for “the charges for Mr. Kissner’s dismissal” did “not meet 7 the requirement for a proper PRA request in that it fail[ed] to identify records with 8 reasonable particularity.” Fraser Depo. Ex. 31 (dkt. 115-7) at 1–2. The response 9 continued that the District was “not able to produce records that are exempt from 10 disclosure under the PRA and/or state and federal law,” and that “the California Court of 11 Appeals held that records of complaints or investigations against a public employee can be 12 disclosed only if ‘the complaint is of a substantial nature and there is reasonable cause to 13 believe the complaint or charge of misconduct is well-founded.’” Id. at 2. The response 14 nonetheless enclosed the Notice of Proposed Intent to Dismiss with Statement of Charges. 15 Id. at 3.2 The grooming allegation was not redacted. Becker Decl. Ex. 3 (dkt. 117-5) 16 (Fraser Depo.) at 173 (“I presented the report as it was written.”). Fraser subsequently 17 testified that she had no independent basis for including the grooming allegation in the 18 Statement of Charges but had relied on the attorney’s report. Id. at 110. 19 That same day, Dale posted the Statement of Charges online. Kissner Decl. (dkt. 20 117-2) ¶ 3; Becker Decl. Ex. 6 (dkt. 117-8). The post received critical attention from the 21 community. Kissner Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. 1 (dkt. 117-15). An individual named Allan 22 Hessenflow posted the Statement of Charges to Facebook. Kissner Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. 2 (dkt. 23 117-16). 24 On May 26, 2021, counsel for Kissner wrote to the District with a settlement 25 demand. See Becker Decl. Ex. 8 (dkt. 117-10). Among Kissner’s demands was a name- 26 clearing hearing. Id. at 2. Kissner’s counsel wrote: “the right to a name-clearing hearing 27 1 may be triggered if the employee is disciplined based on a charge of misconduct that 2 stigmatizes the employee’s reputation or seriously impairs the employee’s reputation to 3 earn a living, or might seriously damage the employee’s standing or association in the 4 community.” Id. He added, “[a]t minimum, notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to 5 the termination must be provided.” Id. 6 The District amended the Statement of Charges on June 11, 2021. Kissner Depo. 7 (dkt. 115-8) at 59. 8 On June 17, 2021, the District received a PRA request from Hessenflow, seeking a 9 copy of the amended Statement of Charges. Becker Decl. Ex. 9 (dkt. 117-11). The 10 District’s July 6, 2021 response, this time signed by Grier, again noted the limitations 11 under the law. See id. at 2–3. That response also had an enclosure, though its contents are 12 not part of the record. See id. at 3 (“Enclosure”).3 It is Kissner’s understanding that the 13 District disclosed the Amended Statement of Charges in the enclosure. Kissner Depo. at 14 59–60. 15 The District voluntarily dropped the allegation of grooming and associated conduct 16 before Kissner’s dismissal proceedings began, and the allegation did not appear in the 17 heavily redacted Statement of Charges presented to the Commission on Professional 18
19 3 Defendants assert that “the record does not clearly establish what, if anything, was 20 disclosed in response to the second PRA request. Defendants do not concede that plaintiff can meet his burden of proof to establish that defamatory material was contained in the 21 disclosure.” MSJ at 8 n.1; see also Reply (dkt. 119) at 4 (“as detailed in the moving papers, plaintiff has no evidence as to what, if anything, was disclosed in the July 2021 22 PRA response.”). Kissner does not address this point, though his counsel declares that Hessenflow “appears to be the creator of a website featuring a link to the unredacted 23 amended statement of charges.” Becker Decl. ¶ 13. If true, that assertion would support the inference that Hessenflow received the amended Statement of Charges. But 24 Defendants properly oppose this assertion as lacking foundation. See Reply at 2. Although Hessenflow appears to have commented, on August 20, 2021, on the website 25 Kissner’s counsel references, it is not clear whether Hessenflow was “the creator of” the website. See https://davidmichaelkissner.wordpress.com/ (last viewed 1/13/2024). In 26 addition, while Hessenflow posted the Statement of Charges to Facebook, Kissner Decl. ¶ 3, that posting apparently occurred on April 16, before Hessenflow’s own PRA request, 27 see Kissner Decl. Ex. 2 (Allan Hessenflow April 16 post: “Here are the David Kissner dismissal charges. They were obtained with a public records act request by Dan Dale.”). 1 Competence. See Becker Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. 10.4 2 To prepare for the hearing before the Commission, Kissner had the right to conduct 3 discovery, subpoena witnesses, depose witnesses, request documents, and be represented 4 by counsel throughout. MSJ (dkt. 97) Ex. N at 71. In front of the three-member 5 administrative panel, Kissner had the right to call witnesses and present evidence, and the 6 right to be represented by counsel. Id. at 71–72. The hearing before the Commission took 7 place on October 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 25, and 28, 2021, and the matter was 8 submitted for decision on November 10, 2021. RJN Ex. E (dkt. 97-6) (Termination 9 Decision) at 1–2. Kissner’s termination became effective when the Commission made its 10 decision. MSJ Ex. N at 68–69. The Commission issued a lengthy written decision on 11 December 7, 2021, detailing the alleged grounds for dismissal, making a series of legal 12 conclusions, and ultimately directing the District to terminate Kissner’s employment due to 13 his evident unfitness for service. RJN Ex. E. The Commission concluded, however, that 14 Kissner had not engaged in “immoral conduct.” Id. at 31. And it made no findings about 15 grooming. Id. 16 Kissner declares that in the time since his termination, it has been difficult to find 17 suitable employment opportunities. Kissner Decl. ¶ 5. He attests that he was hired in 18 September of 2022 by a company called Elevate to teach online math in the Liberty 19 Elementary School District, but that he was asked about “newspaper or internet articles 20 about Loma Prieta District’s allegations against [him],” and was then terminated. Id. ¶¶ 4– 21 6. He further asserts that he has “applied for work with numerous online and in-person 22 education employers, both with private companies and public school districts, and [has] 23 had limited success, even in a climate of extreme teacher shortage.” Id. ¶ 8. Kissner 24
25 4 Defendants object to this assertion in Kissner’s counsel’s declaration, and to this exhibit, 26 see Reply at 2, but the Court already included this fact in its previous summary judgment order, see Order on MSJ at 11. Moreover, Defendants themselves discuss the fact that “the 27 District moved to strike the charges that referenced ‘potential grooming behavior’ prior to the administrative hearing,” and the fact that “plaintiff actively sought to exclude from the 1 conceded in his deposition, however, that this federal lawsuit had already been filed at the 2 time of the Elevate incident. Kissner Ex. 6 (dkt. 117-20) at 30. He stated that he did not 3 know what information the students in Liberty knew about his termination from Loma 4 Prieta, and that he could not say “whether they saw a copy of [his] complaint from this 5 lawsuit or . . . various online comments from individuals unaffiliated with the [D]istrict or . 6 . . actual communications from Loma Prieta.” Id. at 31. Kissner testified that an “Elevate 7 HR person” said that they would not be able to place him, and mentioned the grooming 8 allegation. Id. at 34. But Kissner acknowledged that the complaint in this case—filed in 9 February of 2022—also mentioned the grooming allegation. Id.5 10 B. Relevant Procedural History 11 In September of 2023, this Court granted summary judgment to Defendants as to 12 Claim 1 in the Second Amended Complaint, for First Amendment retaliation, and all 13 claims in connection with Kissner’s layoff. See Order on MSJ. The Court denied 14 summary judgment to Defendants as to Claim 3, for “stigma-plus” defamation. Id. As to 15 that claim, the Court noted that the parties had argued past each other quite a bit: Kissner 16 argued that he had received a lack of process when Defendants released the Statement of 17 Charges to the public in response to the two PRA requests, and Defendants argued that 18 Kissner had received all of the process he was due in connection with his termination. See 19 id. at 22–23. The Court observed: “Defendants are correct that Kissner received a lot of 20 process in connection with his layoff and termination. . . . But . . . Kissner seems to have 21 gotten no process in connection with the PRA disclosures by Fraser and Grier.” Id. at 23. 22 The Court observed that Defendants had not persuaded the Court that they should prevail 23 on the “stigma-plus” defamation claim, though noted that “the Court has not determined 24 that Kissner should prevail on that claim either.” Id. at 24, n.25. 25 Following the denial of summary judgment on the “stigma-plus” defamation claim, 26 the Court permitted “Defendants to file a second motion for summary judgment on the 27 1 limited question of whether they are entitled to qualified immunity” on that claim. See 2 Order Granting Ex Parte Application for Leave to File a Second Motion for Summary 3 Judgment (dkt. 113) at 1–2. The Court asked the parties to “focus on qualified immunity 4 as it pertains to Kissner’s claim that he was entitled to due process in connection with, and 5 at the time of, the PRA disclosures.” Id. at 2. The Court specified that it wished “to hear 6 from the parties whether the PRA disclosures, which took place in April and July of 2021, 7 in advance of the December 2021 termination, could themselves have worked ‘the denial 8 of some more tangible interest,’ see [Chaudhry] v. Aragon, 68 F.4th 1161, 1170 (9th Cir. 9 2023), and if so, whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for causing any 10 such harm.” Id. 11 The parties’ briefing is complete, see MSJ; Opp’n (dkt. 118); Reply, and the Court 12 held a motion hearing on Friday, January 26, 2024, see Motion Hearing (dkt. 121). 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show 15 that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [moving] party is entitled 16 to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may 17 affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 18 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a 19 reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. 20 The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying 21 those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a 22 genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where 23 the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively 24 demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Id. 25 But on an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the 26 moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the 27 nonmoving party’s case.” Id. 1 beyond the pleadings to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact by 2 “citing to specific parts of material in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do 3 not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A 4 triable dispute of fact exists only if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving 5 party to allow a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. If the 6 nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 7 matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 8 It is not a court’s task “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable 9 fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1996) (internal citation omitted). 10 Rather, a court is entitled to rely on the nonmoving party to “identify with reasonable 11 particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” See id. When deciding a 12 summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 13 the nonmoving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 14 255; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that they are entitled to qualified 17 immunity on the “stigma-plus” defamation claim because it was not clearly established 18 that disclosing the charges against Kissner constituted a deprivation of some 19 constitutionally protected interest separate from his interest in his job at the District, and 20 that even if Kissner had a constitutionally protected interest, it was not clearly established 21 that the process Kissner received in connection with that interest was inadequate. See 22 MSJ. This order therefore discusses (A) qualified immunity law; (B) whether it was 23 clearly established that disclosure would deprive Kissner of a constitutionally protected 24 interest; and (C) whether it was clearly established that the process Kissner received was 25 inadequate. 26 A. Qualified Immunity 27 Defendants’ motion turns on whether qualified immunity applies to the April 2021 1 law follows. 2 “A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim for damages 3 unless the plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact showing (1) ‘a violation of a constitutional 4 right,’ and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established at the time of [the] defendant’s alleged 5 misconduct.’” Evans v. Skolnik, 997 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pearson v. 6 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). Courts may address the two prongs of qualified 7 immunity analysis in either order. Id. (citing Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 8 756 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2014)). 9 “In considering what constitutes ‘clearly established’ law for purposes of qualified 10 immunity, the Supreme Court has taken a narrow approach.” Id. at 1066. Accordingly, “A 11 government official ‘violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged 12 conduct, [t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official 13 would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft 14 v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). “Although the Supreme Court ‘does not require a 15 case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have 16 placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Id. (quoting Kisela v. 17 Hughes, – U.S. –, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)). “‘This demanding standard protects all 18 but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting District 19 of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56 (2018)). If public employees “of reasonable 20 competence could disagree . . . , immunity should be recognized.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 21 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 22 As to the sources of clearly established law, the Ninth Circuit has explained that 23 [The] analysis is straightforward if “the right is clearly 24 established by decisional authority of the Supreme Court or this Circuit.” Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th 25 Cir. 2004). Where such binding precedent exists, “our inquiry should come to an end.” Id. If such binding precedent is 26 lacking, we have considered other sources “including decisions of state courts, other circuits, and district courts.” Id. (cleaned 27 up). The Supreme Court has not clarified when state and district court decisions could place a “statutory or 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074. Rather, as the Supreme Court has pointed 1 out, “district court decisions—unlike those from the courts of appeals—do not necessarily settle constitutional standards,” 2 because “[a] decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same 3 judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7, 131 S.Ct. 4 2020, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011); see also Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616, 119 S.Ct. 1692 (finding no clearly established law where 5 the only cases cited were a state intermediate court decision and two unpublished district court decisions). 6 Evans, 997 F.3d at 1066–67. “The lack of ‘any cases of controlling authority’ or a 7 ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ on the constitutional question compels the 8 conclusion that the law was not clearly established at the time of the incident.” Jessop v. 9 City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 10 617 (1999)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in 11 particular []—not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” al-Kidd, 12 563 U.S. at 742. 13 B. “Other” Constitutionally Protected Right 14 Defendants argue that it was not clearly established that disclosing the Statement of 15 Charges against Kissner in response to the PRA requests would violate his rights. MSJ at 16 13–16. The Court agrees. 17 1. Defining the “Plus” at Issue 18 As the Court explained in its last summary judgment order, 19 Garden variety defamation “is a tort actionable under the laws 20 of most States, but not a constitutional deprivation.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991). However, if a government 21 official’s act of defamation results in a plaintiff being deprived of a previously held constitutionally protected right, a plaintiff 22 can bring a claim of defamation under Section 1983, arguing that he has been deprived of a constitutionally protected right 23 without the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708–09 (1976). 24 “Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice 25 and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” Id. at 708 (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish “stigma-plus” 26 defamation, “a plaintiff must show: (1) the public disclosure of a stigmatizing statement by the government; (2) the accuracy 27 of which is contested; (3) plus the denial of some more tangible interest such as employment. Chaudhry v. Aragon, 68 F.4th 1 Order on MSJ at 21. There is no dispute here that the grooming allegation, which was part 2 of the Statement of Charges disclosed by Fraser and Grier, was stigmatizing and 3 contested.6 The issue is the “plus” element—specifically, whether it was clearly 4 established that disclosure of the Statement of Charges denied Kissner a “more tangible 5 interest such as employment.” See Chaudhry, 68 F.4th at 1170; see also Endy v. County of 6 L.A., 975 F.3d 757, 766 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Even if we assume that the County’s [action] is 7 stigmatizing, Endy must also show that it altered or extinguished one of his known rights 8 under the ‘stigma-plus’ test.”). 9 To be clear: while termination of employment could satisfy the “plus” element of a 10 “stigma-plus” defamation claim, see Chaudhry, 68 F.4th at 1170, Kissner’s termination 11 from the District does not satisfy that element here. For one thing, no one argues that the 12 PRA disclosures, which took place in April and July of 2021, effectuated the termination 13 of Kissner’s employment. See, e.g., Kissner Depo. (dkt. 97-16) at 68–69 (Kissner 14 testifying that his termination “did not become effective” until the Commission on 15 Professional Competence made its decision in December of 2021).7 For another, there is 16 no dispute that Kissner received “a lot of process in connection with his layoff and 17 termination.” See Order on MSJ at 23. 18 The question, both parties agree, is therefore whether the disclosures altered or 19 extinguished some other constitutionally cognizable interest held by Kissner. See MSJ at 20 148; Opp’n at 1–2; see also Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2002) 21 22 6 This is not to gloss over the real harm that being wrongly viewed as a groomer poses to anyone, and particularly to anyone who works with children. The Court simply recognizes 23 that, as they reiterated at the motion hearing, Defendants do not contest this point. Kissner’s counsel’s assertion at the motion hearing that “I wouldn’t want to be called a 24 groomer,” is therefore at once totally understandable and legally insufficient—at least for a “stigma-plus” defamation claim. As Defendants suggest in their motion, “state defamation 25 law” might be a different story. See MSJ at 7. 7 Moreover, while the Ninth Circuit has held that there need not be “a strict temporal link 26 between the defamation and the nonrenewal or discharge,” such that a defamatory statement one week after an employee resigned might still imply a stigmatizing reason for 27 the resignation, see Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 983 (9th Cir. 2002), here, the time between the stigmatizing disclosures and the termination was five or more 1 (requiring, for “stigma-plus” defamation claim, the public disclosure of a stigmatizing, 2 contested charge “made in connection with the termination of employment or the alteration 3 of some right or status recognized by . . . law”) (emphasis added) (citing Llamas v. Butte 4 Community College Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001)). Kissner argues that the 5 relevant interest is his liberty interest in future employment opportunities. See Opp’n at 7 6 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 705). 7 2. Case Analysis 8 The problem for Kissner is that damage to one’s reputation is insufficient to alter or 9 extinguish a constitutionally cognizable interest. 10 In Paul, which Kissner cites in his brief9 and cited repeatedly in the motion hearing, 11 the respondent’s name and photo appeared on a flyer about active shoplifters that two 12 police chiefs in Louisville, Kentucky distributed to hundreds of merchants “so that [the 13 merchants could] inform [their] security personnel to watch for these subjects.” 424 U.S. 14 at 694–95. The respondent had been charged with shoplifting but not yet convicted. Id. at 15 695–96. The flyer “soon came to the attention of” the respondent’s supervisor, who 16 warned but did not fire him. Id. at 696. The respondent brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 17 1983. Id. The Supreme Court reviewed its earlier “stigma-plus” defamation cases,10 and 18 19 solely to the scope of Kissner’s property interest in his employment with the Loma Prieta Joint Union School District.” Opp’n at 1. While Defendants discuss Kissner’s 20 termination, they do so only to say, accurately, that “it is undisputed that [Kissner] received constitutionally adequate process in relation to the termination.” See MSJ at 13. 21 They then move onto other possible liberty/property interests. See id. at 14–16. 9 See Opp’n at iii. 22 10 One of these cases, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) is particularly notable. In Constantineau, the police, without notice or an opportunity to be heard, posted 23 a notice to all retail liquor stores in a city “that sales or gifts of liquors to appellee were forbidden for one year.” 400 U.S. at 435. The Court recognized that such a posting would 24 subject the appellee to “public embarrassment and ridicule.” Id. at 436. And it held the Wisconsin Act unconstitutional because the “requirements of procedural due process must 25 be met.” Id. As the Court explained later in Paul, the posting of the notice in Constantineau “significantly altered [the appellee’s] status as a matter of state law, and it 26 was that alteration of legal status which, combined with the injury resulting from the defamation, justified the invocation of procedural safeguards.” 424 U.S. at 708–09 27 (emphasis added); see also id. at 709 (“The ‘stigma’ resulting from the defamatory character of the posting was doubtless an important factor in evaluating the extent of harm 1 concluded that “[i]n each of these cases, as a result of the state action complained of, a 2 right or status previously recognized by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished.” 3 Id. at 711 (emphasis added). The Court observed that “Kentucky law does not extend to 4 respondent any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation which has been altered 5 as a result of petitioners’ actions.” Id. at 711–12. The respondent had not asserted the 6 “denial of any right vouchsafed by the State and thereby protected under the Fourteenth 7 Amendment.” Id. at 712. Accordingly, while the flyer might have seriously “harmed 8 respondent’s reputation,” it “did not deprive him of any ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests 9 protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. 10 Here, the disclosures of the grooming allegation against Kissner were harmful to his 11 reputation, but they did not alter or extinguish Kissner’s right to future employment. A 12 pair of child abuse cases is instructive. 13 In Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172, 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004), a noncustodial 14 grandfather argued, among other things, that his placement on the California Child Abuse 15 Central Index (CACI) was “stigma-plus” defamation. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, 16 explaining that while being falsely named a child abuser could be defamatory, “the Millers 17 must show that the stigma was accompanied by some additional deprivation of liberty or 18 property.” Id. at 1178. The court discussed Paul and Constantineau, and concluded that 19 “[t]he Millers have suffered no . . . change of legal status.” Id. at 1178–79. It explained: 20 “Whereas once listed, Constantineau legally could not do something that she could 21 otherwise do—buy alcoholic beverages—the Millers are not legally disabled by the listing 22 alone from doing anything they otherwise could do.” Id. at 1179 (emphasis added). 23 Five years later, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs in Humphries v. County of 24 L.A., 554 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Jan. 30, 2009), rev’d and remanded sub 25 nom. on other grounds by Los Angeles Cnty., Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2010), had 26 made out a “stigma-plus” defamation claim. There, parents whom two California courts 27 1 had found “factually innocent” of abuse nonetheless “were identified as ‘substantiated’ 2 child abusers and placed on [the CACI].” Id. at 1175. The CACI “offer[ed] no procedure 3 to remove their listing on the database as suspected child abusers, and thus no opportunity 4 to clear their names.” Id. California also made the CACI “available to a broad array of 5 government agencies, employers, and law enforcement entities and even require[d] some 6 public and private groups to consult the database before making hiring, licensing, and 7 custody decisions.” Id. at 1175–76. The court discussed Paul and Constantineau, noting 8 that “[i]n contrast to the mandatory nature of the statute in Constantineau, the flyer [in 9 Paul] merely ‘came to the attention’ of Davis’ supervisor”—“no law had required the 10 Chief of Police [in Paul] to distribute this flyer, nor did any law require employers to check 11 the list.” Id. at 1186–87. The court then discussed Miller, noting that that case had 12 “declined to address whether the mere presence of Miller’s name on the CACI denied him 13 due process.” Id. at 1187. 14 In contrast to Miller, “[t]he Humphries allege[d] more than mere reputational harm” 15 but that “being listed on the CACI alter[ed] their rights in two general ways.” Id. First, 16 the challenged Act required licensing agencies to search the CACI and do an additional 17 investigation of individuals on it before “granting a number of rights and benefits.” Id. at 18 1187–88. And second, California made the CACI available to other agencies, including 19 state licensing agencies that oversaw employment positions with children, and some of 20 those agencies’ own regulations or practices required them to consult the CACI. Id. at 21 1188. The court held that these requirements “place[d] a tangible burden on a legal right 22 that satisfies the ‘plus’ test.” Id. It explained that the decision was “limited to those 23 ‘stigma-plus’ situations where both the defamatory statement and the tangible burden on a 24 legal right are statutorily created.” Id. at 1189; see also id. at 1189–90 (“the burdens on the 25 Humphries’ abilities to obtain various licenses and other legal rights from the state of 26 California are the result of state statutes creating the CACI, instructing state officers to put 27 certain information on the CACI, and effectively mandating that various entities consult 1 information that happens to reach the ears of an employer” as in Paul. Id. at 1190. The 2 court also distinguished an Eleventh Circuit case denying a “stigma-plus” defamation 3 claim as to an Alabama child abuse registry, explaining that “Alabama did not mandate 4 that potential employers consult the Registry.” Id. at 1191 (discussing Smith v. Siegelman, 5 322 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2003)). The court reiterated: “the CACI is more than a registry 6 that an employer ‘may’ consult. By law, licensing agencies must consult the CACI, 7 investigate, and use the CACI information in making their licensing decisions.” Id. 8 Here, Defendants did not put Kissner’s name on a registry that future employers 9 were required to consult. Defendants disclosed the stigmatizing grooming allegation to 10 two different individuals in the course of responding to those individuals’ PRA requests. 11 See Fraser Depo. Ex. 30; Becker Decl. Ex. 9. When Defendants did so, no statutes or 12 regulations were triggered that altered Kissner’s rights in any way. While news of the 13 grooming allegation had the potential to reach Kissner’s prospective employers—and 14 did11—it was the same “haphazard, second-hand information that happens to reach the ears 15 of an employer” as in Paul, rather than the required reporting at issue in Humphries. See 16 554 F.3d at 1190; cf. Ooley v. Citrus Heights Police Dept., 603 Fed. Appx. 628, 629 (9th 17 Cir. 2015) (“defamation [must] be accompanied by an injury directly caused by the 18 Government, rather than an injury caused by the act of some third party.”) (internal 19 quotation marks omitted); Chaudhry v. Angell, No. 1:16-cv-01243-SAB, 2021 WL 20 4461667, at *34 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021) (“The Ninth Circuit has held in unpublished 21 cases that the stigma-plus test requires that the defamation be accompanied by an injury 22 directly caused by the state, rather than an injury caused by the act of some third party in 23 reaction to the state’s defamatory statements.”) (collecting cases). 24 It is not lost on the Court that the Paul opinion is from 1976 (pre-internet), and 25 involved the distribution of flyers. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 695. Once Defendants disclosed 26
27 11 Again, it is not clear whether news of the grooming allegation reached Elevate, the 1 the Statement of Charges against Kissner in response to the two PRA requests, individuals 2 (not Defendants) promptly posted it online, see Kissner Decl. ¶ 3; Becker Decl. Ex. 6; 3 Kissner Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. 2, which presumably means that a larger audience could access it 4 than could see the flyers in Paul. But Kissner has not addressed this point and cites to no 5 authority clearly establishing that this distinction makes a difference. 6 Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that it was clearly established that 7 disclosing the Statement of Charges in response to the PRA requests would violate 8 Kissner’s right to future employment. 9 3. Kissner’s Authority 10 Kissner argues, though, that other cases recognize a clearly established right to 11 procedural due process in connection with the impairment of his future employment 12 opportunities. See Opp’n at 7 (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 13 564, 575 (1972)). But Roth, 408 U.S. at 575, which predates Paul, held that there was no 14 right to due process where the respondent was “simply . . . not rehired in one job but 15 remains as free as before to seek another.” The Court explained that if the state had 16 declined to rehire the respondent based on a stigmatizing charge, then he might have been 17 entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 573. Roth is not helpful to Kissner 18 because Kissner did receive notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection with his 19 termination. See Order on MSJ at 23. 20 Kissner also relies a great deal on Justice Marshall’s dissent12 in Siegert, 500 U.S. at 21 236–47 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Opp’n at 7–8. In it, Justice Marshall wrote, citing 22 Paul, that an individual has a liberty interest where the state imposes a stigma that 23 forecloses a plaintiff’s freedom to pursue future employment. 500 U.S. at 241–42 24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He went on to write that the respondent in that case—the 25 petitioner’s supervisor, who wrote a disparaging letter to the petitioner’s new employer, 26 causing the petitioner to lose his job and “render[ing] him unable to obtain other 27 1 appropriate employment in the field,” see id. at 228–29—“should have known that his 2 alleged conduct deprived [the petitioner] of a liberty interest,” id. at 242 (Marshall, J., 3 dissenting). This dissent would help Kissner, because it would hold that a stigmatizing 4 disclosure to one individual could violate the right to pursue future employment. But it is 5 merely a dissent, and therefore not controlling authority. 6 Moreover, the majority opinion in Siegert held, relying on Paul, that “[the 7 petitioner] failed not only to allege the violation of a constitutional right that was clearly 8 established at the time of [the respondent’s] actions, but also to establish the violation of 9 any constitutional right at all.” Id. at 233. The Court explained that “[t]he alleged 10 defamation was not uttered incident to the termination of [the petitioner’s] employment by 11 the hospital,” but “several weeks later.” Id. at 234. The Court noted that while the 12 statements in the letter were damaging to the petitioner’s reputation and would 13 undoubtedly “impair his future employment prospects,” the plaintiff in Paul had alleged 14 the impairment of his future employment opportunities too. Id. The Court concluded that 15 the respondent’s conduct might support a state defamation claim, but reiterated that there is 16 no “constitutional protection for the interest in reputation.” Id. The Siegert majority 17 opinion therefore undercuts Kissner’s efforts to identify a clearly established right to 18 procedural due process for conduct analogous to the respondent’s letter. 19 Finally, Kissner relies on Taylor v. Resolution Trust Corp., 56 F.3d 1497, 1506 20 (D.C. Cir. 1995), Silva v. City of Los Gatos, No. 21-cv-2639-EJD, 2021 WL 5847885, at 21 *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2021), aff’d, No. 22-15017, 2023 WL 1989771 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 22 2023), and Collier v. Windsor Fire. Prot. Dist. Bd. of Directors, No. C 08-2582 PJH, 2011 23 WL 4635036, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2011). Opp’n at 8–9. But Taylor, an out-of-circuit 24 case, held, citing Siegert, that “[t]o prove constitutional injury, the plaintiff must show not 25 only that the government has imposed some stigma upon him, but also that it has worked 26 some change in his status under law.” 56 F.3d at 1506 (emphasis added). Silva, which is 27 only persuasive authority, was not a “stigma-plus” defamation case, but involved a 1 The claim failed because plaintiff “[did] not allege that Defendants took any stigmatizing 2 action, much less action akin to ‘blacklisting’ him from working as a police officer.” Id. 3 Collier, which is also only persuasive authority, involved a claim for deprivation of liberty 4 without due process by a terminated fire captain, and is also no help to Kissner. See 2011 5 WL 4635036, at *1. Judge Hamilton assumed in that case “that the accusations of 6 workplace violence and sexual battery could impose a stigma on plaintiff’s reputation so as 7 to implicate a liberty interest,” and noted that the allegations had been published in a local 8 paper. Id. at *10. But the defendants were still entitled to summary judgment because the 9 fire captain had been given notice and an opportunity to clear his name in a series of 10 hearings connected to his termination. Id. Collier did not hold that separate process is due 11 in connection with the mere publication of stigmatizing charges. It therefore does not 12 clearly establish a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard in connection with 13 disclosures that are not a part of (or that are only at the very beginning of the process of) 14 termination. 15 Accordingly, while many cases recognize a liberty interest in connection with future 16 employment, they do not clearly establish that the disclosures here—which did not alter or 17 extinguish Kissner’s status under the law—would violate Kissner’s liberty interest in 18 future employment such that he was entitled to due process. Instead, the disclosures 19 damaged Kissner’s reputation, which is not enough for a “stigma plus” defamation claim. 20 See Paul, 424 U.S. at 712.13 21 22 13 At the motion hearing, Kissner argued that Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and the cases cited in the District’s cover letters disclosing the Statement of Charges 23 clearly established his right to due process in connection with the PRA disclosures. But to seize upon Mathews, which involved the termination of social security benefits, would be 24 to “define clearly established law at” an excessively “high level of generality.” See al- Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742. The state law cases cited in the District’s cover letters— 25 Bakersfield City School District v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1041 (2004); BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 4th 742 (2006); and Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu 26 Unified School District, 202 Cal. App. 4th 1250 (2012), see Becker Decl. Ex. 6 (dkt. 99- 7)—do illustrate a balancing of public and private interests, and a concern with not 27 harming a public employee by disclosing unfounded allegations in his personnel records. Nevertheless, those cases all involve state appellate courts interpreting the PRA, not C. Adequacy of Process 1 Kissner maintains that it was clearly established that the District was obligated to 2 provide some form of due process prior to and after the disclosures, but he did not receive 3 any. Opp’n at 9. Conversely, Defendants argue that even if Kissner had established a 4 right to due process, it is not clearly established that the termination procedures provided 5 under the Education Code were inadequate. MSJ at 16–18. The Court again agrees with 6 Defendants. 7 “Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process 8 is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). As discussed above, Kissner has 9 not established that due process applies. Kissner asserts, though, that Defendants could 10 have removed or redacted the grooming allegation, or could have given him the 11 opportunity to file a reverse-PRA lawsuit. See Opp’n at 10–12.14 He even says at one 12 point: “Whether compelled or not is beside the point. It was a process available to them to 13 provide.” Id. at 12. The question is not what process was available—the Court has 14 already agreed that various processes were available. See Order on MSJ at 23. The 15 question is “what process is due,” see Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481; see also Cafeteria & 16 Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (“The 17 very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures applicable to every 18 imaginable situation.”), and—because of Defendants’ claim to qualified immunity—is 19 really better framed as: “what process was it clearly established was due.” 20 1. Name Clearing 21 Kissner does cite to California authority holding that an “at-will public employee’s 22 liberty interests are deprived when his discharge is accompanied by charges ‘that might 23 seriously damage his standing and associations in his community’ or ‘impose [] on him a 24
25 see Jessop, 936 F.3d at 942, particularly giving the relevant controlling authority, such as 26 Paul, pointing the other way. 14 At the motion hearing, Kissner added that the “perfect time to redact” the grooming 27 allegation was not before his three-person Commission hearing but earlier. The Court is sympathetic to that position, having stated in the last summary judgment order that “[o]nce 1 stigma or other disability that foreclose[s] his freedom to take advantage of other 2 employment opportunities,’” and when that happens, he “has a right to a ‘name-clearing 3 hearing.’” Opp’n at 12–13 (emphasis in original; cleaned up; quoting Kreutzer v. City & 4 Cnty. of S.F., 166 Cal. App. 4th 306, 320 (2008)). Plenty of federal cases hold the same 5 thing. See, e.g., Mustafa v. Clark Cnty. School Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 1998) 6 (“The termination of a public employee which includes publication of stigmatizing charges 7 triggers due process protections.”) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 573); Bollow v. Federal 8 Reserve Bank of S.F., 650 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1981) (“when the government dismisses an 9 individual for reasons that might seriously damage his standing in the community, he is 10 entitled to notice and a hearing to clear his name.”) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 & n.12). 11 For an employee to be entitled to a name-clearing hearing, though, the defamation 12 must have occurred in the course of his termination. See, e.g., Stiesberg v. State of Cal., 13 80 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Nearly all reported decisions dealing with section 1983 14 in the context of disciplinary proceedings against public employees arise out of discharges 15 from public employment, and not mere disciplinary actions.”) (emphasis in original); 16 Moody v. County of Santa Clara, No. 15-cv-4378-EJD, 2018 WL 646686, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 17 2018) (“Additionally, to be actionable, an allegedly stigmatizing statement must be 18 substantially false and must occur in conjunction with the termination of employment.”) 19 (internal quotation marks omitted); Lopez v. City & Cnty. of S.F., No. 12-cv-6523-MEJ, 20 2014 WL 2943417, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2014) (“It is unclear whether discipline short 21 of termination may be sufficient to constitute a deprivation of property interest.”) (citing 22 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929 (1997)); Turner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., No. C-11- 23 1427 EMC, 2012 WL 6631490, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2012), aff’d sub nom. Turner v. 24 City & Cty. of S.F., 788 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2015) (“If the tangible interest deprived is 25 public employment, the stigmatizing statement must occur in connection with the 26 termination of employment.”) (citing Siegert, 500 U.S. at 234). 27 Here, again, the disclosures were in April and July of 2021, eight and five months 1 Decl. Ex. 9. The Ninth Circuit in Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1483 (9th Cir. 2 1996), explained that “[c]ommon sense and the reasoning of Paul dictate that there must be 3 some temporal nexus between the employer’s statements and the termination” and so “a 4 seven- to nine-day interval between the termination and the publication of the defendant’s 5 statements did not attenuate the temporal connection.”). That case differs from ours in 6 that, in Campanelli, the termination came first and the defamatory statement came second. 7 See id. at 1477–78. Even so, the time between disclosure and termination in our case is 8 too far attenuated to treat the disclosures as the termination. See also Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 9 983 (defamatory statement one week after an employee resigned might still imply a 10 stigmatizing reason for the resignation). 11 2. Adequacy of Name Clearing 12 Even if the Court concluded that, because the Statement of Charges were a part of 13 the Education Code’s lengthy termination process, their disclosure triggers the right to the 14 same “name-clearing” process as if Defendants defamed Kissner at the moment of 15 termination, Defendants would still prevail. That is because even Kissner’s demand for a 16 name-clearing hearing stated that “[a]t minimum, notice and an opportunity to be heard 17 prior to the termination must be provided.” See Becker Decl. Ex. 8 at 3 (emphasis added). 18 And, as the Court has already held, “Kissner received a lot of process in connection with 19 his . . . termination.” Order on MSJ at 23. Kissner had the right to conduct discovery, 20 subpoena witnesses, depose witnesses, request documents, and be represented by counsel 21 as he prepared for a hearing before the Commission. MSJ Ex. N at 71. He had the right to 22 call witnesses, present evidence, and be represented by counsel at the hearing before the 23 Commission. Id. at 71–72. The hearing took place over eleven days. See RJN Ex. E at 1. 24 And the Commission issued a lengthy written decision with its conclusions. Id. 25 The process Kissner received appears to have been more extensive than that 26 received by the plaintiff in Mustafa, 157 F.3d 1169. Mustafa was a math and science 27 teacher accused of sexual misconduct. Id. at 1172. He had a January 19, 1994 meeting 1 with a notice of intended disciplinary action and informed him that there would be a 2 hearing. Id. “Mustafa denied the charges.” Id. On January 24, 1994, there was a pre- 3 termination hearing where “Mustafa gave his version of events.” Id. The district’s legal 4 counsel “held a brief closed-door meeting,” and then announced “that the issue would go 5 to arbitration” and that the district recommended dismissal. Id. at 1172–73. There was 6 then a one-day arbitration hearing at which the arbitrator ruled that the allegations “could 7 not be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence and ordered that Mustafa be 8 reinstated.” Id. at 1173. The district transferred Mustafa to another location, and Mustafa 9 sued. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that “harm to reputation alone is insufficient” under 10 Paul, and held that “Mustafa by virtue of his arbitration hearing if not the January 19th and 11 24th hearings, was afforded the opportunity to clear his name.” Id. at 1179 (citing 12 Komlosi v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 64 F.3d 13 810, 817–18 (2d Cir. 1995)). It so held even though it is unclear if Mustafa had the right to 14 representation by counsel, the right to conduct discovery, or the right to call witnesses, and 15 his arbitration hearing was a single day. See id. at 1172–73. As Defendants state, Kissner 16 received “formal, written notice of the charges against him, the right to representation by 17 counsel, a formal hearing before the school board, and the right to conduct discovery” 18 before the PRA disclosures, and a “formal, multi-day, evidentiary hearing before a three- 19 member administrative panel” after the PRA disclosures. See MSJ at 17. 20 The process Kissner received also compares favorably to that received by the 21 plaintiff in Moody, 2018 WL 646686. Moody was the Public Guardian for Santa Clara 22 County for six years. Id. at *1–*2. He participated in a meeting, at which he was placed 23 on administrative leave; he received a termination letter that provided the reason for 24 recommending his termination and outlined the available procedures to respond. Id. at *2. 25 He was entitled to a Skelly hearing which was “not a formal hearing with the examination 26 of witnesses,” and without “a right to a court reporter,” and if he was not satisfied with the 27 outcome of the Skelly hearing, “he could appeal the decision and have a public hearing 1 of a “name-clearing hearing,” noting that “[d]ue process imposes no hard and fast 2 requirements on this ‘name-clearing’ hearing, including, for example, whether it must be 3 public, evidentiary in nature, or held prior to deprivation of the liberty or property 4 interest.” Id. at *7 (citing Shinault v. Hawks, 782 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015)). He 5 concluded that Moody had not plausibly alleged insufficient process because “[t]here is no 6 indication that the Termination Letter and Moody’s Skelly hearing were not sufficient 7 opportunities for Moody to clear his name.” Id. at *8. He further rejected Moody’s 8 argument that an appeal to the Personnel Board would be inadequate because it would 9 occur 18 months after the stigmatizing action. See id. (18 months not “so unreasonably 10 long so as to effectively deny Moody the opportunity to clear his name”). The process 11 Kissner received both before and after the PRA disclosures was more extensive and 12 included more protections. See MSJ at 17. Moreover, Kissner’s hearing before the 13 Commission in October/November of 2021 was eight and five months (not 18) after the 14 stigmatizing actions in April and July of 2021. 15 Accordingly, the process Kissner received appears adequate. See Mathews, 424 16 U.S. at 334–35. 17 The only wrinkle is that Kissner did not actually get to litigate the grooming 18 allegation in his hearing before the Commission because the District was no longer 19 pursuing the grooming allegation as a basis for Kissner’s dismissal by that time. The 20 District had voluntarily dropped the allegation of grooming and it did not appear in the 21 Statement of Charges presented to the Commission. See Becker Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. 10. 22 Kissner argues, then, that Defendants “denied [him] a hearing by redacting the 23 stigmatizing allegations, leaving the issue of immoral conduct a moot issue before the 24 Commission yet failing to affirmatively clear Kissner’s name.” Opp’n at 13. 25 Defendants respond to that argument in a number of ways, some of which lack 26 record cites, so the Court cannot evaluate them. See, e.g., Reply at 9 (asserting that 27 Kissner “failed to oppose” the striking of the grooming allegation at the administrative 1 || evidence that even referenced the stricken charges”). Defendants also argue that because 2 || the grooming allegation was removed from the Statement of Charges, Kissner was 3 || essentially cleared of that charge—or at a minimum, that no one could believe that 4 || grooming was “a basis for his termination.” Id. at 10. Certainly, because grooming was 5 || not a basis for the Commission’s Termination Decision, then grooming was not a basis for 6 || Kissner’s termination. See RJN Ex. E. But Kissner may not feel as though his name has 7 || been satisfactorily “cleared” in the same way that it would have been had the Commission 8 || considered the District’s evidence of grooming and judged it false.!° Defendants’ more 9 || persuasive argument is that, given the striking of the grooming allegation, and Kissner’s 10 failure to point to any authority holding that the District was required to go through the 11 |] motions of a name-clearing hearing as to a charge that it had voluntarily withdrawn, it was 12 || not clearly established that the process Kissner received was inadequate. See Reply at 10.
= «+13 || IV. CONCLUSION
Y 14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that (1) it was not clearly established that
3 15 |} Kissner was entitled to due process in connection with the PRA disclosures; and (2) even if & 16 || Kissner was entitled to due process in connection with the PRA disclosures, it was not
3 17 |} clearly established that the process the District provided was inadequate. The Court
S 18 || therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion based on qualified immunity. 19 IT ISSO ORDERED. 20 Dated: January 39 , 2024 LO K yw CHARLES R. BREYER 21 United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 20 Was Defendants are correct that the Commission concluded that Kissner did not engage in 27 “ammoral conduct.” See Reply at 10; RJN Ex. E at 31. But that conclusion was premised on the Commission’s finding at the charged conduct did “not constitute immoral conduct 28 within the meaning of the Education Code,” see RJN Ex. E at 31, not an adjudication of the stricken grooming allegation.