Kirsch v. Smith

853 F. Supp. 301, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7150, 1994 WL 227022
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMay 19, 1994
Docket94-C-474
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 853 F. Supp. 301 (Kirsch v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kirsch v. Smith, 853 F. Supp. 301, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7150, 1994 WL 227022 (E.D. Wis. 1994).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

MYRON L. GORDON, District Judge.

Pro se plaintiffs, Kevin Kirsch and James Griffin, currently incarcerated at the Waupun Correctional Institution [“W.C.I.”], have filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the above-captioned defendants. Their complaint is accompanied by “Plaintiff Kirsch’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,” “Plaintiff Griffin’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,” and a motion for a “Temporary Restraining Order or in the Alternative a Preliminary Injunction” [“TRO motion”]. The plaintiffs’ motions requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted, and the defendants will be directed to serve and file a response to the plaintiffs’ TRO motion.

In order to authorize a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must make two determinations: first, whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action; and second, whether the action is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a) and (d). The court is obliged to give Mr. Kirsch’s and Mr. Griffin’s pro se allegations a liberal construction. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Vanshike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 807 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1303, 122 L.Ed.2d 692 (1993).

*303 Mr. Kirsch’s affidavit of indigence reveals that he is in prison and has no substantial assets. Mr. Griffin’s affidavit of indigence reveals that he is also financially destitute. Accordingly, I conclude that Mr. Kirsch and Mr. Griffin have satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and are unable to pay the costs of commencing this action.

Mr. Kirsch and Mr. Griffin must next demonstrate that their action has merit as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). An action is frivolous, for purposes of § 1915(d), if there is no arguable basis for relief either in law or fact. See Denton v. Hernandez, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992); Casteel v. Pieschek, 3 F.3d 1050, 1056 (7th Cir.1993); Castillo v. Cook County Mail Room, Dep’t, 990 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir.1993).

In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that they are currently confined in “W.C.I.’s punitive segregation unit formally known as the Adjustment Center but commonly referred to as the ‘Overlook Hotel’ due to the deleterious effect that it has on the minds of staff and prisoners.” The plaintiffs aver that Major J.C. Smith, with the authorization of Warden McCaughtry, has established the following practice and policy at W.C.I.:

No pens or pencils are allowed to be used by any prisoner confined in the Overlook Hotel. Prisoners in the Overlook may only use a[n] ink tube for all their legal and personal writings ... Any modification of or alteration to the ink tube will result in the offending prisoner being allowed only a crayola crayon to write with and other disciplinary sanctions.

The plaintiffs have submitted as exhibit “A” to their complaint a sample “ink tube” which consists only of the plastic inner insert of a ballpoint pen that contains the ink of such a pen.

The plaintiffs allege that they are both involved in ongoing litigation. Specifically, they allege that Mr. Kirsch has an appellate brief due “40 days from April 12, 1994” in Kirsch v. Endicott, No. 94-359 (Wis.Ct.App.1994), and that he is jailhouse counsel to the plaintiff in Santiago v. Ware, et al., No. 92-CV-3906 (Dane county circuit court). They further allege that Mr. Griffin is currently litigating Griffin v. McCaughtry, et al., No. 94-C-247-C (W.D.Wis.1994) and that “both are attempting to prepare litigations challenging various conditions of their confinements.”

As a result of the ink tube policy at W.C.I., the plaintiffs contend that they are:

[UJnable to pursue their litigations and administrative proceedings ... using the ink tube because: plaintiffs are unable to grip the ink tube and write legibly; the ink tube bends and wobbles with the slightest pressure prohibiting the making of carbon copies; trying to write with the ink tube causes the plaintiffs hands to quickly ache and throb due to previous hand injuries; the resulting pain forces plaintiffs to stop their attempts at writing with the ink tube and discourages plaintiffs from pursuing their legal and administrative avenues.

The plaintiffs further allege that in order to “write this civil complaint they had to violate the prohibition against alteration or modification of the ink tube by adding a cardboard and paper cylinder to enclose the ink tube in to make it thick enough to grip and strong enough to write with without bending or wobbling.” They also aver that the “ink tube policy is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”

As relief, the plaintiffs request a temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendants from punishing the plaintiffs for modifying their ink tubes or in the alternative an order directing the defendants to provide the plaintiffs with proper ink pens. The plaintiffs also request a temporary restraining order preventing the defendants from transferring them from W.C.I. In addition, among other relief, the plaintiffs request damages and preliminary and permanent in-junctive relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the ink tube policy.

The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint is that the ink tube policy instituted by the defendants violates the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts. It is clear law “that indigent, inmates *304 must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents” to assure meaningful access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1496, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). However, what constitutes a “pen” is not so clear. For example, “a typewriter or full-sized pen is merely a convenience” that need not be provided to inmates unless it is asserted that a medical condition prevents them from using modified pens or pencils. See Canell v. Bradshaw, 840 F.Supp. 1382, 1391 (D.Or.1993). In such circumstances, “a full-sized writing instrument or typewriter might become an indispensable tool for communicating with the court.” Id.

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Related

West v. McCaughtry
962 F. Supp. 1184 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1997)
Kirsch v. Smith
894 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
853 F. Supp. 301, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7150, 1994 WL 227022, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kirsch-v-smith-wied-1994.