Kirsch v. Green
This text of 166 So. 774 (Kirsch v. Green) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
It may be conceded that the guardian had the right to dispose of the note and mortgage. Echols v. Speake, 185 Ala. 149, 64 So. 306, Ann.Cas.1916C, 332. But we think the assignment of the note and mortgage in question, that is, assigning it by the guardian to her husband to be used and applied as a credit on the mortgage from the husband to the complainant, Kirsch, was a flagrant devastavit.
Whether the note, which on its face is payable to Mrs. Sparks as “guardian” and wáh assigned by her as “guardian,” was notice to the purchaser, Kirsch, of a probable limited or restricted authority to negotiate the same, 8 C.J. 515; Wolffe v. State, 79 Ala. 201, 58 Am.Rep. 590, is unnecessary for us to decide, as the evidence was ore tenus and the trial court was warranted in finding that Kirsch, who held a mortgage on Sparks, the husband, knew his financial condition and that he could not and did not make a bona fide purchase of the note and mortgage from his wife, the guardian of her minor son.
The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
166 So. 774, 232 Ala. 65, 1936 Ala. LEXIS 120, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kirsch-v-green-ala-1936.