Kirkpatrick v. State Board of Assessors

29 A. 442, 57 N.J.L. 53, 28 Vroom 53, 1894 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 59
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedJune 15, 1894
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 29 A. 442 (Kirkpatrick v. State Board of Assessors) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kirkpatrick v. State Board of Assessors, 29 A. 442, 57 N.J.L. 53, 28 Vroom 53, 1894 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 59 (N.J. 1894).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Depue, J.

This certiorari brings lip a franchise tax assessed upon the Domestic Sewing Machine Company by the state board of assessors for the year 1893.

The return of the company on which the assessment was-computed was made May 3d, 1893. The assessment made-by the board was filed with the comptroller June 5th, 1893.. Between the date of the return made by the company and the-filing of the assessment in the comptroller’s office, to wit,. June 2d, 1893, proceedings in insolvency were commenced' against the company, and Andrew Kirkpatrick -was appointed* receiver. The insolvency proceedings are still pending, and the corporation has not been dissolved. This writ is sued out by the receiver.

Putting a corporation in charge of a receiver does not work, its dissolution. The corporation continues to exist until its dissolution is effected either by surrender or judicial decision.. Meanwhile the corporation exists with all its franchises, exercisable by the receiver in the management of its affairs, subject to all the duties, obligations and liabilities that rested upon the corporation itself, among which is liability to taxation, the same as the corporation itself would have been subject to in case the management and control of its affairs had not been committed to a receiver. New Jersey Southern Railroad Co. v. Railroad Commissioners, 12 Vroom 235. This conclusion disposes of all the reasons relied on for setting-aside this assessment, except the first.

The reason for reversal to be considered is in these words ‘‘ Because the Domestic Sewing Machine Company is a manufacturing corporation, organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey, and carrying on business in this state, fifty per cent, of whose capital stock, issued and outstanding, -was-at the time of the imposition of said tax invested in manufacturing carried on within this state.”

[55]*55The act in virtue of which this assessment was made contains a proviso that the act shall not apply to manufacturing or mining corporations, at least fifty per cent, of whose capital stock, issued and outstanding, shall be invested in mining or manufacturing carried on within this state; if any manufacturing or mining company carrying on business in this state shall have less than fifty per cent, of its capital stock, issued and outstanding, invested in business carried on within this state, such company shall pay the annual license fee or franchise tax therein provided, but shall be entitled in the computation of such tax to a deduction from the amount of its capital stock of the assessed value of its real and personal estate so used in manufacturing or mining. Pamph. L. 1892,. p. 139, § 4. ■

The amount of the tax laid is $1,431.10. It was computed) upon the following basis:

Capital stock issued......................................$1,641,100 Less amount of real and personal estate invested in

manufacturing in New Jersey..................... 210,000

$1,431,100

On this sum of $1,431,100 the tax was laid of one-tenth of one per cent;, amounting to $1,431.10.

This computation was made upon the statements contained! in the return made by the officers of the company before the-receiver was appointed, and is, in all respects, in conformity with such return.

The receiver, in this suit, contends that the company is-not liable to the tax in question, for the reason that it had at least fifty per cent, of its capital invested in business carried1 on within this state, and was, therefore, exempt from this, taxation by force of the proviso above referred to.

The facts upon which this contention rests are quite complicated. A corporation called the Domestic Machine Company was organized in 1870, under the general manufacturing laws of the State of Ohio. The Ohio company acquired [56]*56a large manufacturing plant in the city of Newark, which was operated for the manufacture of sewing machines. A corporation called the Domestic Manufacturing Company was incorporated under the laws of this state by a certificate filed May 3d, 1881, with a capital of $200,000. This company was organized by parties interested in the Ohio company, by the authority of the board of directors of that company, as a matter of convenience for the transaction of its business. Shortly after the organization of the Domestic Manufacturing Company in this state, the Ohio company transferred to it its entire manufacturing plant, then located at Newark, consisting of its tools, machinery and fixtures and materials, manufactured, unmanufactured and in the process of manufacture, but not including its real estate in Newark, which was purchased by the Ohio company, and title taken in the name of Eli J. Blake, as trustee for the Ohio company. The consideration of this transfer was one thousand nine hundred and eighty shares of the capital stock of the manufacturing company, which were issued to the Ohio company, being all the capital stock of this company except twenty shares held by individuals.

The Domestic Sewing Machine Company, with respect to which this assessment was made, was incorporated under the Jaws of this state by a certificate filed April 3d, 1891, with a capital of $2,000,000, for which capital, stock has been issued and is outstanding to the amount of $1,641,100. The certificate of incorporation states the objects for which this company was organized to be the manufacture and sale of sewing machines * * * and the establishing of agencies in all parts of the United States and Europe for the sale and disposition of the manufactured product of the company. The name by which this company was incorporated was “The United Domestic Sewing Machine Company.” The corporate name was afterwards changed to “The Domestic Sewing Machine Company.” Soon after the latter company was incorporated the Ohio company transferred to the new company, by a bill of sale dated April 22d, 1891, all the real [57]*57■estate, leaseholds, patents, licenses, shop-rights, trade-mark^ copyrights, merchandise and good will, accounts, furniture, fixtures, &c., together with all the assets owned by it or to which it was in any way entitled, valued at $564,901.61, together with one thousand nine hundred and eighty shares of the stock of the Domestic Manufacturing Company, valued on the books of the Domestic Sewing Machine Company at $930,571.39, for the net sum of $1,500,000, payable in the stock of the new company at par. After this transfer the business was carried on by the new company at Newark.

The situation after the transfer to the Domestic Sewing Machine Company by the Ohio company appears to be this : Two corporations organized under the laws of this state, the Domestic Manufacturing Company and the Domestic Sewing Machine Company, the former being the owner of the plant, machinery and fixtures conveyed to it by the Ohio company, the latter being the owner of the assets of the Ohio company which that company owned in April, 1891, and also of one thousand' nine hundred and eighty of the shares of the Domestic Manufacturing Company held by the Ohio company, and the title to the lands, which stood in Blake’s name.

The facts appearing in the statement agreed on with respect to the course of business between the two companies are these: The Domestic Manufacturing Company manufactured all the Domestic sewing machines that were made and did no other business.

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Bluebook (online)
29 A. 442, 57 N.J.L. 53, 28 Vroom 53, 1894 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 59, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kirkpatrick-v-state-board-of-assessors-nj-1894.