Kirker v. Saul

District Court, S.D. California·Decided September 16, 2020·No. 3:20-cv-00673·Unknown

Opinion

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9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA □ 10 11 || OSCARK., Case No.: 3:20-cv-00673-LAB-RBM 2 _ ‘Plamtit | ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS 13 || Vv. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 14 || ANDREW M. SAUL, COMMISSIONER | eee eee costs 16 Defendant. 17 (Doe. 9] 18 20 . On September 12, 2020, Plaintiff Oscar K. (“Plaintiff”) filed an amended complaint 21 under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of 97 Social Security Administration’s (“Defendant” or “Commissioner’) denial of disability 73 ||insurance benefits and'supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social 24 Security Act (“the Act”). (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff did not pay the required filing fee and instead 95 || filed an amended motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”).' (Doc. 9.) 26 || ———________ | Plaintiff previously filed a complaint and motion to proceed in forma pauperis on April 7, 2020 (“Apri 27 ||7, 2020 IFP Motion”). (Docs. 1, 3.) On September 11, 2020, the undersigned issued a Report and 28 Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that the initial complaint be dismissed with leave to amend and the April 7, 2020 IFP Motion be denied without prejudice. (Doc. 7.) On September 12, 2020, Plaintif ]

1 On April 8, 2020, Chief Judge Larry A. Burns issued an order staying civil cases 2 || arising under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) that were filed on or after March 1, 2020, due to the 3 ongoing COVID-19 public health emergency. See Or. of Chief Judge No. 21, sec. 6 (stating 4 part “all civil cases filed on or after March 1, 2020 brought against the Commissioner . 5 ||. . are hereby stayed, unless otherwise ordered by the [Court].”). Initially, the Court held

_ 6 |lits ruling on the IFP Motion in abeyance pursuant to the Chief Judge Order. But, the 7 || COVID-19 pandemic has been ongoing for months and will continue for the foreseeable 8 future. At this time, the Court lifts the stay of this case for the limited of purpose of ruling 9 |lon the IFP Motion which will allow Plaintiff to proceed with effectuating service of the 10 ||summons and complaint to Defendant. Once service is complete, the undersigned will stay 11 the case again until such time as the Commissioner begins normal operations at the Office 12 Appellate Hearings Operations and resumes preparation of Certified Administrative 13 ||Records. See Or. of Chief Judge No. 21 at sec.6. □ 14 Having reviewed the complaint and IFP Motion, the Court finds that □□□□□□□□□□□ 15 ||complaint is sufficient to survive a sua sponte screening and further GRANTS □□□□□□□□□□□ 16 ||IFP Motion. 17 □ IL DISCUSSION 18 _ A. Sua Sponte Screening 19 _ Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP is 20 || also subject to a mandatory sua sponte screening. The Court must review and dismiss any 21 |}complaint which is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief 22 || from a defendant who is immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 23 || F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Alamar v. Soc. Sec., 19-cv-0291-GPC-LL, 2019 24 || WL1258846, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2019). . 25 26 27 || filed the instant amended complaint and amended IFP Motion. These September 12, 2020 filings rendered ng ||the pending R&R and April 7, 2020 IFP Motion moot. Therefore, the undersigned withdrew the September 11, 2020 R&R and accepted the instant IFP Motion in place of the April 7, 2020 IFP Motion.

To survive, complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 2 ||showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading 3 standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands 4 ||more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. 5 || Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 6 ||(2007)). And “[t]hreadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 7 ||conclusory statements do not suffice.” Jd. Instead, plaintiff must state a claim plausible 8 |lon its face, meaning “plaintiff pleads factual content that. allows the court to draw the 9 |jreasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Igbal, 556 10 at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “When there are well-pleaded factual 11 |/allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they 12 || plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. 13 Social security appeals are not exempt from the general screening requirements for 14 ||IFP cases. Montoya v. Colvin, 16-cv-00454-RFB-NJK, 2016 WL 890922, at *2 (D. Nev. 15 || Mar. 8, 2016) (citing Hoagland v. Astrue, 12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *] 16 ||(E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012)). 17 || - In social security appeals, courts within the Ninth Circuit have established four 18 ||requirements necessary for a complaint to survive a’sua sponte screening: 19 | First, the plaintiff must establish that she had exhausted her administrative remedies 20 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and that the civil action was commenced within sixty days after notice of a final decision. Second, the complaint must indicate the judicial 21 district in which the plaintiff resides. Third, the complaint must state the nature of 2 the plaintiff s disability and when the plaintiff claims she became disabled. Fourth, the complaint must contain a plain, short, and concise statement identifying the — 23 nature of the plaintiffs disagreement with the determination made by the Social Security Administration and show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. 25 Skylar v. Saul, 19-cv-1581-NLS, 2019 WL 4039650, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2019) 26 (quoting Montoya, 2016 WL 890922, at *2). As to the fourth requirement, a complaint is 27 || insufficient if it merely alleges the Commissioner was wrong in denying plaintiff benefits. 28 ||See Skylar, 2019 WL 4039650, at *1; see also Hoagland, 2012 WL 2521753, at *3

1 ||Instead, a complaint “must set forth a brief statement of facts setting forth the reasons why 2 ||the Commissioner’s decision was wrong.” Skylar, 2019 WL 4039650, at *2. As to the first requirement, the complaint contains sufficient allegations that Plaintiff 4 |lexhausted his administrative remedies. Plaintiff filed an application for disability 5 ||insurance benefits which was subsequently denied. (See Doc. 8 at { 2.) This became the 6 ||Commissioner’s final administrative decision. (/d.) Plaintiff timely filed the complaint 7 || within sixty days of the Commissioner’s final decision. (/d.) As to the second requirement, 8 ||the complaint states Plaintiff “resides in San Diego, CA, within the jurisdiction of this 9 ||Court.” (Ud. at 94.) As to the third requirement, Plaintiff alleges he “is disabled due to a 10 ||combination of severe physical and mental impairments . . .” including ataxia, spasmodic 11 ||torticollis, depression, and pain. (/d. at {§ 6-7.) Plaintiff alleges his onset date of disability 12 October 1, 2010. (Ud. at ¥ 6.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges the Commissioner’s decision is 13 ||not supported by substantial evidence and contrary to law and regulation.

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