Kirk Wayne McBride v. New Braunfels Herald-Zeitung

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 11, 1992
• Docket: 03-91-00083-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

McBride v. New Braunfels Herald-Zeitung IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS,

AT AUSTIN



NO. 3-91-083-CV

KIRK WAYNE MCBRIDE,

APPELLANT

vs.

NEW BRAUNFELS HERALD-ZEITUNG,

APPELLEE

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY, 274TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

NO. C-90-217C, HONORABLE ROBERT T. PFEUFFER, JUDGE

PER CURIAM

This is a pro se appeal from the grant of a summary judgment in a libel case. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 73.001-.006 (1986). Appellant Kirk Wayne McBride sued appellee, the New Braunfels Herald-Zeitung, for publishing an allegedly libelous story, and the district court granted the newspaper's motion for summary judgment. McBride brings four points of error, alleging the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because the publication was not privileged (points 1 through 3) and erred in overruling his motion for rehearing or motion to reconsider (point 4). We will reverse.

McBride was arrested and charged with aggravated robbery on May 2, 1989. On May 3, 1989, the newspaper printed an article concerning the arrest. ⁽¹⁾ The district attorney dropped the charge against McBride and he was released from the Comal County jail on May 26, 1989. McBride filed suit in April 1990, and the newspaper moved for summary judgment based on statutory privileges alleging the article was a fair, true, and impartial account of an official proceeding to administer the law or in the alternative, a reasonable and fair comment on a matter of public concern published for general information. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.002(b) (1986). The district court granted the motion and rendered a general summary judgment in September 1990.

The standards for reviewing a motion for summary judgment are well established: (1) The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in its favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). The newspaper, therefore, must prove the existence of a privilege as a matter of law. Poe v. San Antonio Express-News Corp., 590 S.W.2d 537, 541 (Tex. App. 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

In point of error one, McBride contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the newspaper's claim of privilege. We disagree. The newspaper does not dispute the content of the article, but rather argues that the publication was privileged. The existence of a privilege is a matter of law for the court to decide when the circumstances surrounding the published defamation are undisputed. Christy v. Stauffer Publications, Inc., 437 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. 1969); Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Publishing Co., 228 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex. 1950). Point of error one is overruled.

In points of error two and three, McBride contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because the article was neither privileged as a fair, true, and impartial account of an official proceeding to administer the law, nor privileged as a reasonable and fair comment on or criticism of a matter of public concern published for general information. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.002(b) (1986). We agree.

At the outset, we note that the newspaper has not argued in the district court or this Court that it is entitled to protection under either the federal or state constitutions, or under common-law defenses. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Tex. Const. art. I, § 8; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.006 (1986). Our analysis, therefore, is based solely on the newspaper's statutory privileges and not on a publisher's constitutional or common-law privileges against liability for defamation of a private citizen. See, e.g., Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 789 (1974). See generally Randy R. Koenders, Annotation, Defamation: Privilege Attaching to News Report of Criminal Activities Based on Information Supplied by Public Safety Officers--Modern Status, 47 A.L.R.4th 718 (1986).

The newspaper's allegedly libelous action was the publication of Lt. Rubio's statement, "He got away with approximately $1,700 in cash and cigarettes . . . . We believe that there was someone else with him." Because this cause comes to us on summary judgment, we must make every reasonable inference in favor of McBride and resolve any doubts in his favor. See Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49. We must, therefore, assume that Lt. Rubio's use of the word "he" referred to McBride instead of "the robber." Viewed in this light, Lt. Rubio's statement accuses McBride of the commission of a crime for which punishment by imprisonment in jail or the penitentiary may be imposed, which constitutes libel per se. See Christy, 437 S.W.2d at 815; Democrat Publishing Co. v. Jones, 18 S.W. 652, 654 (Tex. 1892); Poe, 590 S.W.2d at 541. The district attorney dropped the charge against McBride and the newspaper has not established as a matter of law that he "got away with approximately $1,700 in cash and cigarettes." ⁽²⁾ In addition, we must assume that McBride was innocent and Lt. Rubio's statement was, in fact, not true. The publication, therefore, cannot be privileged as a "fair, true, and impartial account of . . . an official proceeding . . . to administer the law" for the purposes of our summary-judgment review. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.002(b)(1) (1986). The publication also fails as a "reasonable and fair comment on or criticism of a . . . matter of public concern published for general information." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.002(b)(2) (1986). A false statement of fact, even if made in a discussion of matters of public concern, is not privileged as fair comment. Bell Publishing Co. v. Garrett Eng'g Co., 170 S.W.2d 197, 204 (Tex. 1943); see A.H. Belo & Co. v. Looney, 246 S.W. 777, 784 (Tex. 1922); Fitzjarrald, 228 S.W.2d at 505; Hornby v. Hunter, 385 S.W.2d 473, 476-77 (Tex. App. 1964, no writ); Davila v. Caller Times Publishing Co., 311 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. App. 1958, no writ). "However much the reading public may be interested in news concerning law enforcement, or whatever may be the duty of a newspaper to disseminate news thereof, these considerations can never be suffered to outweigh the duty which one person owes to another not to injure his good name by the publication of untrue statements concerning him." Times Publishing Co. v. Ray, 1 S.W.2d 471, 474-75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), aff'd, 12 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, judgm't adopted).

In its reply point, the newspaper claims that if the article is substantially true, then the publication is privileged. See Crites v. Mullins, 697 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. App. 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). "The test used in deciding whether the broadcast is substantially true involves consideration of whether the alleged defamatory statement was more damaging . . . , in the mind of the average listener, than a truthful statement would have been." McIlvain v. Jacobs, 794 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1990). Lt. Rubio's statement was that the unnamed "he," whom we must presume on summary-judgment review to be McBride, stole approximately $1,700. The truthful statement was simply that McBride was arrested and charged with aggravated robbery. The average reader can certainly appreciate that saying a person is a robber is not substantially the same as saying that same person was arrested and charged with robbery. The summary-judgment evidence does not establish privilege as a matter of law. McBride's points of error two and three are sustained.

In point of error four, McBride contends that the district court erred in overruling his motion for rehearing, or in the alternate, his motion to reconsider the order granting the motion for summary judgment. It is unnecessary to reach this point in light of our disposition of points two and three.

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a trial on the merits.

[Before Justices Powers, Jones and Kidd]

Reversed and Remanded

Filed: March 11, 1992

[Do Not Publish]

1. The article is as follows:

Man jailed for April 17 store holdup

A New Braunfels man remains in the Comal County jail today in lieu of a $50,000 bond and is charged with robbing the Lone Star Ice House at the intersection of FM 2252 and FM 3009.

Curt Wayne McBride, 28, 1532 Lorelei Lane, was arrested after authorities received a Crime Stoppers tip regarding the robbery and linked him to the crime. He is charged with aggravated robbery.

Garden Ridge Police Department officers and Comal County sheriff's office detectives performed the investigation.

"He got away with approximately $1,700 in cash and cigarettes," said Lt. Rubio, Comal County sheriff's office. "We believe that there was someone else with him."

The suspect was arrested at his place of employment in New Braunfels Tuesday at 11:35 a.m. He was magistrated by Precinct 2 Justice of the Peace R.G. Blanchard.

"The attendant was checking how much gas she had out in the pumps" when she was robbed at knifepoint, Rubio said. The robbery occurred around 5:40 the morning of April 17.

2. The facts and outcome of Christy v. Stauffer Publications, Inc. and Stewart v. Enterprise Co. are analogous to the instant cause. Christy, 431 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), rev'd, 437 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1969); Stewart, 393 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App. 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).