Kirill Romanov v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: 17-71340
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 30 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KIRILL ALEXANDROVICH ROMANOV, No. 17-71340

Petitioner, Agency No. A206-531-404

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 5, 2026 Submission Vacated February 6, 2026 Resubmitted March 26, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: LEE, KOH, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Kirill Alexandrovich Romanov, a native of Poland and citizen of

Russia, seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing

Petitioner’s appeal of the immigration judge’s (IJ) order denying his application for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). asylum. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

Where the BIA conducts de novo review and issues its own decision, rather

than adopting the IJ’s decision as its own, we review the BIA’s decision.

Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). To the extent the BIA

adopts the IJ’s decision as its own, we review both the decisions of the BIA and the

IJ. Kalubi v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1137 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004). With respect to an

agency’s persecution determination, we “review the entirety of the agency’s

conclusions—both the underlying factual findings and the application of the

[Immigration and Nationality Act] to those findings—for substantial evidence.”

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, No. 24-777, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2026).

To be eligible for asylum, Petitioner must prove that “(1) [his] treatment

rises to the level of persecution or that [he] has a well-founded fear of future

persecution; (2) the persecution was or would be on account of one or more

protected grounds; and (3) the persecution was or would be committed by the

government, or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control.”

Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 750–51 (9th Cir. 2021).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that the beating Petitioner’s

brother experienced and threats third parties received, which were intended for

Petitioner, do not rise to the level of past persecution. See Gu v. Gonzales, 454

2 F.3d 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 2006). The agency also observed that when Petitioner

returned to Russia between September 2013 and December 2013, he was not

harmed or personally threatened. Because Petitioner failed to establish past

persecution, the BIA properly determined that Petitioner was not entitled to a

presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See C.F.R. §

208.13(b)(1); Vallecillo-Castillo v. INS, 121 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 1996).

In analyzing whether Petitioner separately established a well-founded fear of

future persecution, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Petitioner could

relocate within Russia. See 8 U.S.C. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). Petitioner did not

address the agency’s relocation decision either before the BIA or on appeal to this

court. Petitioner therefore forfeited any challenge to the agency’s relocation

determination in two ways: (1) by failing to raise the issue on appeal to this court,

see Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne, 520 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir.

2008), and (2) by failing to administratively exhaust the issue. See Suate-Orellana

v. Garland, 101 F.4th 624, 629 (9th Cir. 2024).1

1 Petitioner argues that the BIA abused its discretion by affirming the IJ’s determination that Petitioner did not belong to a particular social group. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the BIA did not reach the question of whether any persecution was or would be on account of a protected ground, and we decline to address the issue in the first instance. See Sec. & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).

3 PETITION DENIED.2

2 Petitioner’s motions to stay removal (Dkt. Nos. 1, 6) are DENIED effective upon the issuance of the mandate from this court.